x86/speculation: Make all RETbleed mitigations 64-bit only
The mitigations for RETBleed are currently ineffective on x86_32 since entry_32.S does not use the required macros. However, for an x86_32 target, the kconfig symbols for them are still enabled by default and /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed will wrongly report that mitigations are in place. Make all of these symbols depend on X86_64, and only enable RETHUNK by default on X86_64. Fixes: f43b9876e857 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YtwSR3NNsWp1ohfV@decadent.org.uk
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@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ config RETHUNK
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bool "Enable return-thunks"
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depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
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select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
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default y
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default y if X86_64
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help
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Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
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against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
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@ -2482,21 +2482,21 @@ config RETHUNK
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config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
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bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
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depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
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depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
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default y
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help
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Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
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config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
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bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
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depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
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depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
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default y
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help
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Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
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config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
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bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
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depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
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depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
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default y
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help
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Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.
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