- Start checking for -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix clang support too now that LLVM
16 will support it - Fix a NULL ptr deref when suspending with Xen PV - Have a SEV-SNP guest check explicitly for features enabled by the hypervisor and fail gracefully if some are unsupported by the guest instead of failing in a non-obvious and hard-to-debug way - Fix a MSI descriptor leakage under Xen - Mark Xen's MSI domain as supporting MSI-X - Prevent legacy PIC interrupts from being resent in software by marking them level triggered, as they should be, which lead to a NULL ptr deref -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmPWdaAACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrHUBAAvRh7cDVKvr2wPNJ+9RFjPFubcLq/+4yTe4Bu14wnYn8+gb2S7P2bPJWl TxbZhJGV2IeYyB+aJybjGwX96AzE5lWD6epQLRLI/BOVmqLA8Eyw9te0NEQDd9Wq hgY1/hhUmLdpXubq09YjIht5nlxVZ+JFfppouTR7LVtZl7MFvQbAOU8rWzpcbm7l UlA4GLakFeOYpbI5g+zzsZ1a1M0cSz8wQ43plD5aAtNy2wKbWiA4QDXJo9J7+ZQg 1FmOHZ3ChPjEhf9k/N2uAZ6RUHVEDIJ7hDfsM3j/qsKGzCV4cho2Ify+0PFWo4pt FO2bRh1yDFqdz4m6ulhnmuMnoRnEuswwrTzrG+HYu1ntpUt72dULmmRBpJ0s6C7W BHpCThNWIlcfHbLNY+VAOJ2hiOqfU/8ld+8R0sn7xmomjgCRYHh9kDGOeuvh1hJl jfITDuL2gjcj3Ph6+xh6KvOga41ff3EcxkfvqolZ/emRllPiDWsKYXVgUIl22FHt 23xH7gutPCp27MdoXM1EaWs5s/PQfctvm4LrW6XS8IjWURLo4RrkU6y7YD5VKVy8 KCKcpF+JMdE1Ao1WpMFfjDG4ObyMYyqnD790nQVM1e5kIhOpeWaa7WzkGFRyIo6Q 5BU3GGDyMT8SHy7NFhQL62YJe0P2ZctNIDjiTQlYDnWWhjmvk8I= =4QMN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.2_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Start checking for -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix clang support too now that LLVM 16 will support it - Fix a NULL ptr deref when suspending with Xen PV - Have a SEV-SNP guest check explicitly for features enabled by the hypervisor and fail gracefully if some are unsupported by the guest instead of failing in a non-obvious and hard-to-debug way - Fix a MSI descriptor leakage under Xen - Mark Xen's MSI domain as supporting MSI-X - Prevent legacy PIC interrupts from being resent in software by marking them level triggered, as they should be, which lead to a NULL ptr deref * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.2_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/build: Move '-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix' out of GCC-only block acpi: Fix suspend with Xen PV x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support x86/pci/xen: Fixup fallout from the PCI/MSI overhaul x86/pci/xen: Set MSI_FLAG_PCI_MSIX support in Xen MSI domain x86/i8259: Mark legacy PIC interrupts with IRQ_LEVEL
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
commit
bc6bc34b10
@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
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not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
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if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
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is specified.
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Secure Nested Paging (SNP)
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==========================
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SEV-SNP introduces new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) which can be enabled
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by the hypervisor for security enhancements. Some of these features need
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guest side implementation to function correctly. The below table lists the
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expected guest behavior with various possible scenarios of guest/hypervisor
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SNP feature support.
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| Feature Enabled | Guest needs | Guest has | Guest boot |
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| by the HV | implementation| implementation| behaviour |
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+=================+===============+===============+==================+
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| No | No | No | Boot |
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| | | | |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| No | Yes | No | Boot |
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| | | | |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| No | Yes | Yes | Boot |
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| | | | |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| Yes | No | No | Boot with |
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| | | | feature enabled |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| Yes | Yes | No | Graceful boot |
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| | | | failure |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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| Yes | Yes | Yes | Boot with |
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| | | | feature enabled |
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+-----------------+---------------+---------------+------------------+
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More details in AMD64 APM[1] Vol 2: 15.34.10 SEV_STATUS MSR
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[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/40332.pdf
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@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ endif
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ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
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RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
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RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
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RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register)
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endif
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ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
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RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk
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RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline
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endif
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RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
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ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
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RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
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@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode)
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/* Load the new page-table. */
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write_cr3(top_level_pgt);
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/*
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* Now that the required page table mappings are established and a
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* GHCB can be used, check for SNP guest/HV feature compatibility.
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*/
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snp_check_features();
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}
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static pte_t *split_large_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
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@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
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void snp_check_features(void);
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void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
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extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
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void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
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@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
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if (bp)
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bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
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}
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static inline void snp_check_features(void) { }
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static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
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static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
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{
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@ -208,6 +208,23 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
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error("Can't unmap GHCB page");
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}
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static void __noreturn sev_es_ghcb_terminate(struct ghcb *ghcb, unsigned int set,
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unsigned int reason, u64 exit_info_2)
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{
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u64 exit_info_1 = SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(set, reason);
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vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
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ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST);
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ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
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ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
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sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
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VMGEXIT();
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while (true)
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asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
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}
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bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
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{
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/* Check whether the fault was on the GHCB page */
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@ -270,6 +287,59 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
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sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
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}
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/*
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* SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
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* guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
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* of these features are enabled in the hypervisor but are lacking guest
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* side implementation, the behavior of the guest will be undefined. The
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* guest could fail in non-obvious way making it difficult to debug.
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*
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* As the behavior of reserved feature bits is unknown to be on the
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* safe side add them to the required features mask.
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*/
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#define SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ (MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
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MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
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/*
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* SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
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* by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
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* guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
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*/
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#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
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void snp_check_features(void)
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{
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u64 unsupported;
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if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
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return;
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/*
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* Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature lacking
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* guest side implementation. Pass on the unsupported features mask through
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* EXIT_INFO_2 of the GHCB protocol so that those features can be reported
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* as part of the guest boot failure.
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*/
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unsupported = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
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if (unsupported) {
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if (ghcb_version < 2 || (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb()))
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sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
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sev_es_ghcb_terminate(boot_ghcb, SEV_TERM_SET_GEN,
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GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED, unsupported);
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}
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}
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void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
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{
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unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
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#include <asm/mmu.h>
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#include <asm/mpspec.h>
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#include <asm/x86_init.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI
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# include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
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@ -63,6 +64,13 @@ extern int (*acpi_suspend_lowlevel)(void);
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/* Physical address to resume after wakeup */
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unsigned long acpi_get_wakeup_address(void);
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static inline bool acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address(void)
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{
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return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
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}
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#define acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address
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/*
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* Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper
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*/
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@ -566,6 +566,26 @@
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#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
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/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_REFLECT_VC BIT_ULL(4)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ BIT_ULL(5)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_ALT_INJ BIT_ULL(6)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(7)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_PREVENT_HOST_IBS BIT_ULL(8)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_BTB_ISOLATION BIT_ULL(9)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS BIT_ULL(10)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(11)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM BIT_ULL(12)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT BIT_ULL(14)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(16)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROTECTION BIT_ULL(17)
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/* SNP feature bits reserved for future use. */
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 BIT_ULL(13)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 BIT_ULL(15)
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#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 18)
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#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
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/* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
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@ -116,6 +116,12 @@
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
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/* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */ \
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(((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) | \
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/* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */ \
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((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
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#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
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/* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
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@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void make_8259A_irq(unsigned int irq)
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disable_irq_nosync(irq);
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io_apic_irqs &= ~(1<<irq);
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irq_set_chip_and_handler(irq, &i8259A_chip, handle_level_irq);
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irq_set_status_flags(irq, IRQ_LEVEL);
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enable_irq(irq);
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lapic_assign_legacy_vector(irq, true);
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}
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@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ void __init init_ISA_irqs(void)
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legacy_pic->init(0);
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for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++)
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for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++) {
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irq_set_chip_and_handler(i, chip, handle_level_irq);
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irq_set_status_flags(i, IRQ_LEVEL);
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}
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}
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void __init init_IRQ(void)
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@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ static void xen_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)
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msi_for_each_desc(msidesc, &dev->dev, MSI_DESC_ASSOCIATED) {
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for (i = 0; i < msidesc->nvec_used; i++)
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xen_destroy_irq(msidesc->irq + i);
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msidesc->irq = 0;
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}
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}
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@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ static struct msi_domain_ops xen_pci_msi_domain_ops = {
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};
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static struct msi_domain_info xen_pci_msi_domain_info = {
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.flags = MSI_FLAG_PCI_MSIX | MSI_FLAG_FREE_MSI_DESCS | MSI_FLAG_DEV_SYSFS,
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.ops = &xen_pci_msi_domain_ops,
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};
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@ -60,13 +60,17 @@ static struct notifier_block tts_notifier = {
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.priority = 0,
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};
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#ifndef acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address
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#define acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address() false
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#endif
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static int acpi_sleep_prepare(u32 acpi_state)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP
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unsigned long acpi_wakeup_address;
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/* do we have a wakeup address for S2 and S3? */
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if (acpi_state == ACPI_STATE_S3) {
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if (acpi_state == ACPI_STATE_S3 && !acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address()) {
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acpi_wakeup_address = acpi_get_wakeup_address();
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if (!acpi_wakeup_address)
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return -EFAULT;
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Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user