lib: harden strncpy_from_user
The strncpy_from_user() accessor is effectively a copy_from_user() specialised to copy strings, terminating early at a NUL byte if possible. In other respects it is identical, and can be used to copy an arbitrarily large buffer from userspace into the kernel. Conceptually, it exposes a similar attack surface. As with copy_from_user(), we check the destination range when the kernel is built with KASAN, but unlike copy_from_user() we do not check the destination buffer when using HARDENED_USERCOPY. As strncpy_from_user() calls get_user() in a loop, we must call check_object_size() explicitly. This patch adds this instrumentation to strncpy_from_user(), per the same rationale as with the regular copy_from_user(). In the absence of hardened usercopy this will have no impact as the instrumentation expands to an empty static inline function. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472221903-31181-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
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#include <linux/thread_info.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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long retval;
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kasan_check_write(dst, count);
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check_object_size(dst, count, false);
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user_access_begin();
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retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
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user_access_end();
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