From c1034eb069201f3f3c40f34f3d937ecb8049d0cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Budankov Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 10:15:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] perf tool: Make perf tool aware of SELinux access control Implement selinux sysfs check to see the system is in enforcing mode and print warning message with pointer to check audit logs. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/819338ce-d160-4a2f-f1aa-d756a2e7c6fc@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c index 6b3988a7aba8..fa8248aadb59 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) return 1; } - WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY, + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void) if (fd >= 0) close(fd); - if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY, + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) return -1; diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c index 55f2c6cf21b6..95b525149949 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c @@ -2478,31 +2478,40 @@ int evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target, int err, char *msg, size_t size) { char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; - int printed = 0; + int printed = 0, enforced = 0; switch (err) { case EPERM: case EACCES: + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, + "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n"); + + if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) { + if (enforced) { + printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, + "Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance\n" + "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for\n" + "more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n"); + } + } + if (err == EPERM) - printed = scnprintf(msg, size, + printed += scnprintf(msg, size, "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", evsel__name(evsel)); return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed, - "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" - "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" - "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" - "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" - "The current value is %d:\n\n" + "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n" + "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n" + "without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.\n" + "perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" - ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - " Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" - ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" - "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" - " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , - target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "", - perf_event_paranoid()); + ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n" + ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n" + ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n" + "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n" + "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = )", + perf_event_paranoid()); case ENOENT: return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", evsel__name(evsel)); case EMFILE: