From cf1c01a5e4c3e269b9211ae2ef0a57f8c9474bfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:33:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data. Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 6108e5a294ea..3c3e4a466136 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -586,11 +586,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) return; /* - * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting - * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that + * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected + * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;