From d00d8da5869a2608e97cfede094dfc5e11462a46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xie Yongji Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 20:56:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] virtio_console: Assure used length from device is limited The buf->len might come from an untrusted device. This ensures the value would not exceed the size of the buffer to avoid data corruption or loss. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji Acked-by: Jason Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525125622.1203-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin --- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c index 59dfd9c421a1..7eaf303a7a86 100644 --- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c +++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static struct port_buffer *get_inbuf(struct port *port) buf = virtqueue_get_buf(port->in_vq, &len); if (buf) { - buf->len = len; + buf->len = min_t(size_t, len, buf->size); buf->offset = 0; port->stats.bytes_received += len; } @@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ static void control_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) while ((buf = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len))) { spin_unlock(&portdev->c_ivq_lock); - buf->len = len; + buf->len = min_t(size_t, len, buf->size); buf->offset = 0; handle_control_message(vq->vdev, portdev, buf);