fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy()
Commitdf04abfd18
("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed. A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore. Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in question. With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before executing the memcpy() also doesn't work. Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore(). At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce warnings that were removed withdf04abfd18
("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions. While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be completely removed...(?) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes:df04abfd18
("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") Fixes:f5509cc18d
("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
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return -EFAULT;
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return -EFAULT;
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} else {
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} else {
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if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
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if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
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unsigned long n;
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/*
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/*
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* Using bounce buffer to bypass the
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* Using bounce buffer to bypass the
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* hardened user copy kernel text checks.
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* hardened user copy kernel text checks.
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*/
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*/
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memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz);
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if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) {
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n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz);
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if (clear_user(buffer, tsz))
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/*
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return -EFAULT;
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* We cannot distinguish between fault on source
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} else {
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* and fault on destination. When this happens
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if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
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* we clear too and hope it will trigger the
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* EFAULT again.
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*/
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if (n) {
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if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n,
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n))
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return -EFAULT;
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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}
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} else {
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} else {
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