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Merge branch 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

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Pull integrity subsystem fixes from Mimi Zohar:
 "Four bug fixes, none 5.2-specific, all marked for stable.

  The first two are related to the architecture specific IMA policy
  support. The other two patches, one is related to EVM signatures,
  based on additional hash algorithms, and the other is related to
  displaying the IMA policy"

* 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly
  evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
  ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising
  x86/ima: Check EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES before using
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2019-05-31 11:08:44 -07:00
commit d266b3f5ca
3 changed files with 24 additions and 12 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
View File

@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
size = sizeof(secboot);
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) {
pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
/* Get variable contents into buffer */
status = efi.get_variable(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
NULL, &size, &secboot);

3
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
View File

@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
tfm = &hmac_tfm;
algo = evm_hmac;
} else {
if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
}

28
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -498,10 +498,11 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
}
if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE)
if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) {
temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
}
}
}
@ -1146,10 +1147,10 @@ enum {
};
static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
"MAY_EXEC",
"MAY_WRITE",
"MAY_READ",
"MAY_APPEND"
"^MAY_EXEC",
"^MAY_WRITE",
"^MAY_READ",
"^MAY_APPEND"
};
#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
@ -1209,6 +1210,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
int i;
char tbuf[64] = {0,};
int offset = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
@ -1232,15 +1234,17 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) {
if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK)
offset = 1;
if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}