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nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set

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A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@
ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those
entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a
default ACL.

nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code
just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a
default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny
entries.

For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something
like this:

	# NFSv4 translation by server
	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy

	# POSIX ACL of underlying file
	user::rwx
	group::r-x
	other::r-x

...if I then add new v4 ACE:

	nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test

...I end up with a result like this today:

	user::rwx
	user:1000:rwx
	group::r-x
	mask::rwx
	other::r-x
	default:user::---
	default:user:1000:rwx
	default:group::---
	default😷:rwx
	default:other::---

	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
	D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
	A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
	A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy

...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE
should not result in everyone else losing access.

The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other
entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:

    "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the  Default  ACL  contains  no
     owner,  owning group,  or  others  entry,  a  copy of the ACL owner,
     owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.

Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs
in the resulting set):

	user::rwx
	user:1000:rwx
	group::r-x
	mask::rwx
	other::r-x
	default:user::rwx
	default:user:1000:rwx
	default:group::r-x
	default😷:rwx
	default:other::r-x

	A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A::1000:rwaDxtcy
	A::GROUP@:rxtcy
	A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
	A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
	A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
	A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
	A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy

Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452
Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jeff Layton 2023-07-24 08:13:05 -04:00 committed by Chuck Lever
parent f80774787a
commit d424797032
1 changed files with 29 additions and 5 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

34
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c
View File

@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {
* calculated so far: */
struct posix_acl_state {
int empty;
unsigned char valid;
struct posix_ace_state owner;
struct posix_ace_state group;
struct posix_ace_state other;
@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
int alloc;
memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
state->empty = 1;
/*
* In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
* named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
* calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
*/
if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
return NULL;
/*
@ -622,11 +621,12 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
struct nfs4_ace *ace)
{
u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
short type = ace2type(ace);
int i;
state->empty = 0;
state->valid |= type;
switch (ace2type(ace)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
}
/*
* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
*
* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
*
* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL
* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
*
* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
* explicitly set.
*/
if (default_acl_state.valid) {
if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
}
*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);