random: unify early init crng load accounting
crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() have different semantics: - crng_fast_load() xors and accounts with crng_init_cnt. - crng_slow_load() hashes and doesn't account. However add_hwgenerator_randomness() can afford to hash (it's called from a kthread), and it should account. Additionally, ones that can afford to hash don't need to take a trylock but can take a normal lock. So, we combine these into one function, crng_pre_init_inject(), which allows us to control these in a uniform way. This will make it simpler later to simplify this all down when the time comes for that. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
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* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
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* then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
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* ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
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* this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init.
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* this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
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*/
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if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) {
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bool ready;
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@ -437,72 +437,75 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
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}
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/*
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* This function is for crng_init == 0 only.
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* This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly
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* into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is,
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* generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early
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* boot time when it's better to have something there rather than
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* nothing.
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*
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* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
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* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
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* bytes processed from cp.
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* There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one
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* hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply
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* xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context.
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*
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* If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented.
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* This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
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* where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
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* unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
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*
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* Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded
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* by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true.
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*/
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static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
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static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len,
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bool fast, bool account)
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{
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static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
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unsigned long flags;
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const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;
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size_t ret = 0;
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if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
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return 0;
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if (fast) {
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if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
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return 0;
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} else {
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spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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}
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if (crng_init != 0) {
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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return 0;
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}
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while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
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base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src;
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src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
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if (account)
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len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
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if (fast) {
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const u8 *src = input;
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
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base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) %
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sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= src[i];
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} else {
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struct blake2s_state hash;
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blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
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blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
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}
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if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
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++base_crng.generation;
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crng_init = 1;
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if (account) {
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crng_init_cnt += len;
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if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
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++base_crng.generation;
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crng_init = 1;
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}
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}
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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if (crng_init == 1)
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pr_notice("fast init done\n");
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* This function is for crng_init == 0 only.
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*
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* crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
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* attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
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* guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
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* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
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* crng_fast_load().
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*
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* So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally,
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* we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be
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* something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very
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* well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
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*/
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static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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struct blake2s_state hash;
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blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
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return;
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if (crng_init != 0) {
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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return;
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}
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blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len);
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blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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return len;
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}
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static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
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@ -1018,7 +1021,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
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unsigned long flags;
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if (!crng_ready() && size)
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crng_slow_load(buf, size);
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crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false, false);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
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_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
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@ -1135,7 +1138,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
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size_t entropy)
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{
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if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
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size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
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size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, false, true);
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mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret);
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count -= ret;
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buffer += ret;
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@ -1298,7 +1301,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
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if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
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if (new_count >= 64 &&
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crng_fast_load(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32)) > 0) {
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crng_pre_init_inject(fast_pool->pool32, sizeof(fast_pool->pool32),
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true, true) > 0) {
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atomic_set(&fast_pool->count, 0);
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fast_pool->last = now;
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if (spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) {
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