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orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access

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[ Upstream commit 53e4efa470 ]

Arnd Bergmann sent a patch to fsdevel, he says:

"orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into
the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification
helpers"

Jan Kara suggested an alternate way to do the patch to make it more readable.

I ran both ideas through xfstests and both seem fine. This patch
is based on Jan Kara's suggestion.

Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Mike Marshall
2024-05-01 16:20:36 -04:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 76e03eedaf
commit de8a5f7b71
1 changed files with 2 additions and 1 deletions
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3
fs/orangefs/super.c
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@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ static int orangefs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
(long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail); (long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail);
buf->f_type = sb->s_magic; buf->f_type = sb->s_magic;
memcpy(&buf->f_fsid, &ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id, sizeof(buf->f_fsid)); buf->f_fsid.val[0] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id;
buf->f_fsid.val[1] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->id;
buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size; buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size;
buf->f_namelen = ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX; buf->f_namelen = ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX;