[MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and state
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Venkat Yekkirala
David S. Miller
parent
b6340fcd76
commit
e0d1caa7b0
@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
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#include <linux/msg.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/xfrm.h>
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struct ctl_table;
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@ -825,9 +826,8 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
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* used by the XFRM system.
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* @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
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* the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
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* Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field.
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* The security field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is
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* allocated.
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* Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
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* field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
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* Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
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* @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
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* @old contains an existing xfrm_policy in the SPD.
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@ -846,9 +846,14 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
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* Database by the XFRM system.
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* @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
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* the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
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* Allocate a security structure to the x->security field. The
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* security field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is
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* allocated.
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* @polsec contains the security context information associated with a xfrm
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* policy rule from which to take the base context. polsec must be NULL
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* when sec_ctx is specified.
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* @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the context.
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* Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
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* field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
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* context to correspond to either sec_ctx or polsec, with the mls portion
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* taken from secid in the latter case.
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* Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context).
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* @xfrm_state_free_security:
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* @x contains the xfrm_state.
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@ -859,13 +864,26 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
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* @xfrm_policy_lookup:
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* @xp contains the xfrm_policy for which the access control is being
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* checked.
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* @sk_sid contains the sock security label that is used to authorize
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* @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
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* access to the policy xp.
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* @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
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* Check permission when a sock selects a xfrm_policy for processing
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* Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
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* XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a
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* per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
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* Return 0 if permission is granted.
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* @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
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* @x contains the state to match.
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* @xp contains the policy to check for a match.
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* @fl contains the flow to check for a match.
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* Return 1 if there is a match.
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* @xfrm_flow_state_match:
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* @fl contains the flow key to match.
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* @xfrm points to the xfrm_state to match.
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* Return 1 if there is a match.
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* @xfrm_decode_session:
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* @skb points to skb to decode.
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* @fl points to the flow key to set.
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* Return 0 if successful decoding.
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*
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* Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
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*
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@ -1343,10 +1361,16 @@ struct security_operations {
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int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
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void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security) (struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int (*xfrm_state_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
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int (*xfrm_state_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
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u32 secid);
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void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
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int (*xfrm_state_delete_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
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int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
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int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
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int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
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int (*xfrm_flow_state_match)(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm);
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int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
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/* key management security hooks */
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@ -3050,9 +3074,18 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
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return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(xp);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
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{
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return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx);
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return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, NULL, 0);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
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{
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if (!polsec)
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return 0;
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return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, polsec, secid);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
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@ -3065,9 +3098,25 @@ static inline void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
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security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
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static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
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{
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return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, sk_sid, dir);
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return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, fl_secid, dir);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
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{
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return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
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{
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return security_ops->xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, xfrm);
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
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{
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return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, fl);
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}
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#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
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static inline int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
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@ -3089,7 +3138,14 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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@ -3103,10 +3159,28 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
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static inline int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl,
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struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
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@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ struct flowi {
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#define FLOW_DIR_FWD 2
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struct sock;
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typedef void (*flow_resolve_t)(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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typedef void (*flow_resolve_t)(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
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void **objp, atomic_t **obj_refp);
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extern void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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extern void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
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flow_resolve_t resolver);
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extern void flow_cache_flush(void);
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extern atomic_t flow_cache_genid;
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@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ struct flow_cache_entry {
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u8 dir;
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struct flowi key;
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u32 genid;
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u32 sk_sid;
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void *object;
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atomic_t *object_ref;
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};
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@ -165,7 +164,7 @@ static int flow_key_compare(struct flowi *key1, struct flowi *key2)
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return 0;
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}
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void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u16 family, u8 dir,
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flow_resolve_t resolver)
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{
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struct flow_cache_entry *fle, **head;
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@ -189,7 +188,6 @@ void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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for (fle = *head; fle; fle = fle->next) {
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if (fle->family == family &&
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fle->dir == dir &&
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fle->sk_sid == sk_sid &&
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flow_key_compare(key, &fle->key) == 0) {
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if (fle->genid == atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid)) {
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void *ret = fle->object;
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@ -214,7 +212,6 @@ void *flow_cache_lookup(struct flowi *key, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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*head = fle;
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fle->family = family;
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fle->dir = dir;
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fle->sk_sid = sk_sid;
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memcpy(&fle->key, key, sizeof(*key));
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fle->object = NULL;
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flow_count(cpu)++;
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@ -226,7 +223,7 @@ nocache:
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void *obj;
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atomic_t *obj_ref;
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resolver(key, sk_sid, family, dir, &obj, &obj_ref);
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resolver(key, family, dir, &obj, &obj_ref);
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if (fle) {
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fle->genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
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@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk);
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/* Find policy to apply to this flow. */
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static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u16 family, u8 dir,
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void **objp, atomic_t **obj_refp)
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{
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struct xfrm_policy *pol;
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@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
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match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
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if (match) {
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if (!security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid, dir)) {
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if (!security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, fl->secid, dir)) {
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xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
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break;
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}
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@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static inline int policy_to_flow_dir(int dir)
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};
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}
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static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid)
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static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct flowi *fl)
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{
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struct xfrm_policy *pol;
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@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir, struc
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int err = 0;
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if (match)
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err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid, policy_to_flow_dir(dir));
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err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, fl->secid, policy_to_flow_dir(dir));
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if (match && !err)
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xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
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@ -862,19 +862,20 @@ int xfrm_lookup(struct dst_entry **dst_p, struct flowi *fl,
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u32 genid;
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u16 family;
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u8 dir = policy_to_flow_dir(XFRM_POLICY_OUT);
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u32 sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, fl, dir);
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fl->secid = security_sk_sid(sk, fl, dir);
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restart:
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genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
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policy = NULL;
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if (sk && sk->sk_policy[1])
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policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl, sk_sid);
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policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl);
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if (!policy) {
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/* To accelerate a bit... */
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if ((dst_orig->flags & DST_NOXFRM) || !xfrm_policy_list[XFRM_POLICY_OUT])
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return 0;
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policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, sk_sid, dst_orig->ops->family,
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policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, dst_orig->ops->family,
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dir, xfrm_policy_lookup);
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}
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@ -1032,13 +1033,15 @@ int
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xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, unsigned short family)
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{
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struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
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int err;
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if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
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return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
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afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl);
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err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, fl);
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xfrm_policy_put_afinfo(afinfo);
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return 0;
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return err;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_decode_session);
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@ -1058,14 +1061,11 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct xfrm_policy *pol;
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struct flowi fl;
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u8 fl_dir = policy_to_flow_dir(dir);
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u32 sk_sid;
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if (xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0)
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return 0;
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nf_nat_decode_session(skb, &fl, family);
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sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, &fl, fl_dir);
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/* First, check used SA against their selectors. */
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if (skb->sp) {
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int i;
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@ -1079,10 +1079,10 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
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pol = NULL;
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if (sk && sk->sk_policy[dir])
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pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl, sk_sid);
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pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl);
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if (!pol)
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pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, sk_sid, family, fl_dir,
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pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, family, fl_dir,
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xfrm_policy_lookup);
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if (!pol)
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@ -1298,6 +1298,8 @@ int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *first, struct flowi *fl, int family)
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if (fl && !xfrm_selector_match(&dst->xfrm->sel, fl, family))
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return 0;
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if (fl && !security_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, dst->xfrm))
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return 0;
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if (dst->xfrm->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
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return 0;
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@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr,
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*/
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if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
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if (!xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, fl, family) ||
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!xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, x->security))
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!security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, pol, fl))
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continue;
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if (!best ||
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best->km.dying > x->km.dying ||
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@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr,
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} else if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ERROR ||
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x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_EXPIRED) {
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if (xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, fl, family) &&
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xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, x->security))
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security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, pol, fl))
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error = -ESRCH;
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}
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}
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@ -403,6 +403,14 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr,
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* to current session. */
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xfrm_init_tempsel(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family);
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error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->secid);
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if (error) {
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x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
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xfrm_state_put(x);
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x = NULL;
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goto out;
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}
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if (km_query(x, tmpl, pol) == 0) {
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x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ACQ;
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list_add_tail(&x->bydst, xfrm_state_bydst+h);
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|
||||
@ -835,7 +835,8 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
|
||||
static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
||||
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -853,6 +854,23 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
||||
struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
||||
static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -1076,6 +1094,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match);
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
||||
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, &ad);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3720,7 +3720,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, &ad);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -4633,6 +4633,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
|
||||
.xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
|
||||
.xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
|
||||
.xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
|
||||
.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
|
||||
.xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
|
||||
.xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
|
||||
* Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
|
||||
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
|
||||
@ -10,10 +11,16 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
|
||||
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
||||
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid);
|
||||
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
||||
struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
|
||||
@ -39,17 +46,21 @@ static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad);
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad);
|
||||
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
|
||||
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -6,7 +6,12 @@
|
||||
* Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
|
||||
* Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
|
||||
@ -67,10 +72,10 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used
|
||||
* with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction.
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
|
||||
* a xfrm policy rule.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
|
||||
@ -84,27 +89,129 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
|
||||
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM :
|
||||
((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO :
|
||||
(ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))),
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
|
||||
NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
|
||||
* the given policy, flow combo.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
|
||||
struct flowi *fl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u32 state_sid;
|
||||
u32 pol_sid;
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (x->security)
|
||||
state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
|
||||
else
|
||||
state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
|
||||
|
||||
if (xp->security)
|
||||
pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
|
||||
else
|
||||
pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
|
||||
|
||||
err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
|
||||
NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
|
||||
* can use a given security association.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
|
||||
if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
|
||||
if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
|
||||
NULL)? 0:1;
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_path *sp;
|
||||
|
||||
fl->secid = SECSID_NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (skb == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sp = skb->sp;
|
||||
if (sp) {
|
||||
int i, sid_set = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
||||
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
|
||||
if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!sid_set) {
|
||||
fl->secid = ctx->ctx_sid;
|
||||
sid_set = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (fl->secid != ctx->ctx_sid)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
|
||||
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
|
||||
static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
|
||||
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
char *ctx_str = NULL;
|
||||
u32 str_len;
|
||||
u32 ctx_sid;
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pol)
|
||||
goto from_policy;
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(!uctx);
|
||||
BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX);
|
||||
|
||||
if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
@ -141,9 +248,41 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_us
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
from_policy:
|
||||
BUG_ON(!pol);
|
||||
rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
*ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
|
||||
str_len,
|
||||
GFP_ATOMIC);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ctx) {
|
||||
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
|
||||
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
|
||||
ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
|
||||
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
|
||||
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
|
||||
ctx_str,
|
||||
str_len);
|
||||
|
||||
goto out2;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
*ctxp = NULL;
|
||||
kfree(ctx);
|
||||
out2:
|
||||
kfree(ctx_str);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -157,7 +296,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(!xp);
|
||||
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, 0);
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -217,13 +356,14 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
|
||||
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
|
||||
* xfrm_state.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(!x);
|
||||
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx);
|
||||
err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -329,38 +469,30 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
||||
* we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
|
||||
* gone thru the IPSec process.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, rc = 0;
|
||||
struct sec_path *sp;
|
||||
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
|
||||
|
||||
sp = skb->sp;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sp) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok
|
||||
* says that spi's match for policy and the socket.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
|
||||
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
|
||||
|
||||
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
|
||||
goto accept;
|
||||
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
|
||||
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
|
||||
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
goto drop;
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
|
||||
|
||||
accept:
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
drop:
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -371,7 +503,8 @@ drop:
|
||||
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
|
||||
* checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
||||
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct dst_entry *dst;
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
@ -391,7 +524,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
|
||||
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user