bpf: net: Consider has_current_bpf_ctx() when testing capable() in sk_setsockopt()
When bpf program calling bpf_setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET),
it could be run in softirq and doesn't make sense to do the capable
check. There was a similar situation in bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION).
In commit 8d650cdeda
("tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook"),
tcp_set_congestion_control(..., cap_net_admin) was added to skip
the cap check for bpf prog.
This patch adds sockopt_ns_capable() and sockopt_capable() for
the sk_setsockopt() to use. They will consider the
has_current_bpf_ctx() before doing the ns_capable() and capable() test.
They are in EXPORT_SYMBOL for the ipv6 module to use in a latter patch.
Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817061723.4175820-1-kafai@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
24426654ed
commit
e42c7beee7
@ -1751,6 +1751,8 @@ static inline void unlock_sock_fast(struct sock *sk, bool slow)
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void sockopt_lock_sock(struct sock *sk);
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void sockopt_release_sock(struct sock *sk);
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bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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bool sockopt_capable(int cap);
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/* Used by processes to "lock" a socket state, so that
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* interrupts and bottom half handlers won't change it
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@ -1060,6 +1060,18 @@ void sockopt_release_sock(struct sock *sk)
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_release_sock);
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bool sockopt_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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return has_current_bpf_ctx() || ns_capable(ns, cap);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_ns_capable);
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bool sockopt_capable(int cap)
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{
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return has_current_bpf_ctx() || capable(cap);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(sockopt_capable);
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/*
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* This is meant for all protocols to use and covers goings on
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* at the socket level. Everything here is generic.
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@ -1095,7 +1107,7 @@ static int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
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switch (optname) {
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case SO_DEBUG:
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if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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if (val && !sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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ret = -EACCES;
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else
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sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool);
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@ -1139,7 +1151,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
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break;
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case SO_SNDBUFFORCE:
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if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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if (!sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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@ -1161,7 +1173,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
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break;
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case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
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if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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if (!sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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@ -1188,8 +1200,8 @@ set_sndbuf:
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case SO_PRIORITY:
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if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) ||
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ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) ||
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ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) ||
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sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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sk->sk_priority = val;
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else
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ret = -EPERM;
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@ -1334,8 +1346,8 @@ set_sndbuf:
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clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
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break;
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case SO_MARK:
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if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
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!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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if (!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
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!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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@ -1343,8 +1355,8 @@ set_sndbuf:
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__sock_set_mark(sk, val);
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break;
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case SO_RCVMARK:
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if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
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!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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if (!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) &&
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!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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@ -1378,7 +1390,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
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#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
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case SO_BUSY_POLL:
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/* allow unprivileged users to decrease the value */
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if ((val > sk->sk_ll_usec) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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if ((val > sk->sk_ll_usec) && !sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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ret = -EPERM;
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else {
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if (val < 0)
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@ -1388,13 +1400,13 @@ set_sndbuf:
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}
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break;
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case SO_PREFER_BUSY_POLL:
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if (valbool && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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if (valbool && !sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
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ret = -EPERM;
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else
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WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_prefer_busy_poll, valbool);
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break;
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case SO_BUSY_POLL_BUDGET:
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if (val > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_busy_poll_budget) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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if (val > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_busy_poll_budget) && !sockopt_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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} else {
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if (val < 0 || val > U16_MAX)
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@ -1465,7 +1477,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
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* scheduler has enough safe guards.
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*/
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if (sk_txtime.clockid != CLOCK_MONOTONIC &&
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!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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