seccomp: ignore secure_computing return values
This change is inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/16/14 which fixes the build warnings for arches that don't support CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In particular, there is no requirement for the return value of secure_computing() to be checked unless the architecture supports seccomp filter. Instead of silencing the warnings with (void) a new static inline is added to encode the expected behavior in a compiler and human friendly way. v2: - cleans things up with a static inline - removes sfr's signed-off-by since it is a different approach v1: - matches sfr's original change Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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long ret = 0;
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secure_computing(regs->r12);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->r12);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static inline int audit_arch(void)
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asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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/* do the secure computing check first */
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secure_computing(regs->regs[2]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[2]);
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if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
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goto out;
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@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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long ret = 0;
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secure_computing(regs->gpr[0]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->gpr[0]);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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long ret = 0;
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/* Do the secure computing check first. */
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secure_computing(regs->gprs[2]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->gprs[2]);
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/*
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* The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
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@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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long ret = 0;
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secure_computing(regs->regs[0]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[0]);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ asmlinkage long long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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long long ret = 0;
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secure_computing(regs->regs[9]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[9]);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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int ret = 0;
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/* do the secure computing check first */
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secure_computing(regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]);
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secure_computing_strict(regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]);
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
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ret = tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs);
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@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
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return 0;
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}
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/* A wrapper for architectures supporting only SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. */
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static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
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{
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BUG_ON(secure_computing(this_syscall) != 0);
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}
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extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
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extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
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@ -91,6 +97,7 @@ struct seccomp { };
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struct seccomp_filter { };
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static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { return 0; }
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static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
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static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
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{
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