net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1

commit 676bcfece19f83621e905aa55b5ed2d45cc4f2d3 upstream.

t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'

Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
adapter->msix_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Gustavo A. R. Silva 2018-07-16 20:59:58 -05:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent be86990b14
commit f69272773d

View File

@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "common.h"
@ -2256,6 +2257,7 @@ static int cxgb_extension_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
if (t.qset_idx >= nqsets)
return -EINVAL;
t.qset_idx = array_index_nospec(t.qset_idx, nqsets);
q = &adapter->params.sge.qset[q1 + t.qset_idx];
t.rspq_size = q->rspq_size;