netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries
[ Upstream commit e799299aafed417cc1f32adccb2a0e5268b3f6d5 ] We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
eadec8da44
commit
f716a68234
@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
|
||||
nr->t2 =
|
||||
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay);
|
||||
nr->n2 =
|
||||
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries);
|
||||
msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries));
|
||||
nr->t4 =
|
||||
msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay);
|
||||
nr->idle =
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user