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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
"Just one patch to address a NULL ptr dereferencing when there is a
mismatch between the user enabled LSMs and IMA/EVM"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches:
- Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
reasons.
- Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
when loading the SELinux policy.
All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
testing with no failures"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().
Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).
I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.
The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.
This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.
https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071
As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
"There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
to even generate the problem case"
* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
Pull RCU-safe common_lsm_audit() from Al Viro:
"Make common_lsm_audit() non-blocking and usable from RCU pathwalk
context.
We don't really need to grab/drop dentry in there - rcu_read_lock() is
enough. There's a couple of followups using that to simplify the
logics in selinux, but those hadn't soaked in -next yet, so they'll
have to go in next window"
* 'work.audit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make dump_common_audit_data() safe to be called from RCU pathwalk
new helper: d_find_alias_rcu()
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- Cr50 I2C TPM driver
- sysfs exports of PCR registers in TPM 2.0 chips
Bug fixes:
- bug fixes for tpm_tis driver, which had a racy wait for hardware
state change to be ready to send a command to the TPM chip. The bug
has existed already since 2006, but has only made itself known in
recent past. This is the same as the "last time" :-)
- Otherwise there's bunch of fixes for not as alarming regressions. I
think the list is about the same as last time, except I added fixes
for some disjoint bugs in trusted keys that I found some time ago"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
tpm/ppi: Constify static struct attribute_group
ABI: add sysfs description for tpm exports of PCR registers
tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers
keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain
tpm: Remove tpm_dev_wq_lock
char: tpm: add i2c driver for cr50
tpm: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
tpm_tis: Clean up locality release
tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for measuring kernel critical data, as per usual
based on policy. The first example measures the in memory SELinux
policy. The second example measures the kernel version.
In addition are four bug fixes to address memory leaks and a missing
'static' function declaration"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Make function integrity_add_key() static
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error
IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
evm: Fix memleak in init_desc
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a good handful of patches for SELinux this time around; with
everything passing the selinux-testsuite and applying cleanly to your
tree as of a few minutes ago. The highlights are:
- Add support for labeling anonymous inodes, and extend this new
support to userfaultfd.
- Fallback to SELinux genfs file labeling if the filesystem does not
have xattr support. This is useful for virtiofs which can vary in
its xattr support depending on the backing filesystem.
- Classify and handle MPTCP the same as TCP in SELinux.
- Ensure consistent behavior between inode_getxattr and
inode_listsecurity when the SELinux policy is not loaded. This
fixes a known problem with overlayfs.
- A couple of patches to prune some unused variables from the SELinux
code, mark private variables as static, and mark other variables as
__ro_after_init or __read_mostly"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
fs: anon_inodes: rephrase to appropriate kernel-doc
userfaultfd: use secure anon inodes for userfaultfd
selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
fs: add LSM-supporting anon-inode interface
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support
selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostly
selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_init
selinux: make selinuxfs_mount static
selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variable
selinux: remove unused global variables
selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurity
selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the
return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would
only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read
counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
Fixes: 41ab999c80 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The sparse tool complains as follows:
security/integrity/digsig.c:146:12: warning:
symbol 'integrity_add_key' was not declared. Should it be static?
This function is not used outside of digsig.c, so this
commit marks it static.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 60740accf7 ("integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.
Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.
Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Commit db68ce10c4 ("new helper: uaccess_kernel()") replaced
segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) with uaccess_kernel(). But the correct
method for tomoyo to check whether current is a kernel thread in order
to assume that kernel threads are privileged for socket operations was
(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD). Now that uaccess_kernel() became 0 on x86,
tomoyo has to fix this problem. Do like commit 942cb357ae ("Smack:
Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges") does.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
syzbot is reporting that tomoyo's quota check is racy [1]. But this check
is tolerant of some degree of inaccuracy. Thus, teach KCSAN to ignore
this data race.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=999533deec7ba6337f8aa25d8bd1a4d5f7e50476
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0789a72b46fd91431bd8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.
If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The i_uid and i_gid are mostly used when logging for AppArmor. This is
broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported instead
of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-26-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f878 ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewing use of memset in keyctl_pkey.c
keyctl_pkey_params_get prologue code to set params up
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
params->encoding = "raw";
keyctl_pkey_query has the same prologue
and calls keyctl_pkey_params_get.
So remove the prologue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Drop repeated words in comments.
{to, will, the}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Use kvfree_sensitive() instead of open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on
pipes, so let the documentation reflect that.
Fixes: f7e47677e3 ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
When the semantics of the ->read() handlers were changed such that "buffer"
is a kernel pointer, some __user annotations survived.
Since they're wrong now, get rid of them.
Fixes: d3ec10aa95 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data
at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided
by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem
provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate
the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy
can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of
the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading
the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe
system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get
the expected hash.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy
is loaded.
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document
the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Integrity critical data may belong to a single subsystem or it may
arise from cross subsystem interaction. Currently there is no mechanism
to group or limit the data based on certain label. Limiting and
grouping critical data based on a label would make it flexible and
configurable to measure.
Define "label:=", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow grouping and limiting measurement of integrity
critical data.
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"label:=". If "label:=" is not provided with
the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure all the input integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for
measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer
would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The
policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.)
for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add policy rule support for measuring integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
