IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"Lots of bug fixes here:
1) Out of bounds access in __bpf_skc_lookup, from Lorenz Bauer.
2) Fix rate reporting in cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he(), from John
Crispin.
3) Use after free in psock backlog workqueue, from John Fastabend.
4) Fix source port matching in fdb peer flow rule of mlx5, from Raed
Salem.
5) Use atomic_inc_not_zero() in fl6_sock_lookup(), from Eric Dumazet.
6) Network header needs to be set for packet redirect in nfp, from
John Hurley.
7) Fix udp zerocopy refcnt, from Willem de Bruijn.
8) Don't assume linear buffers in vxlan and geneve error handlers,
from Stefano Brivio.
9) Fix TOS matching in mlxsw, from Jiri Pirko.
10) More SCTP cookie memory leak fixes, from Neil Horman.
11) Fix VLAN filtering in rtl8366, from Linus Walluij.
12) Various TCP SACK payload size and fragmentation memory limit fixes
from Eric Dumazet.
13) Use after free in pneigh_get_next(), also from Eric Dumazet.
14) LAPB control block leak fix from Jeremy Sowden"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (145 commits)
lapb: fixed leak of control-blocks.
tipc: purge deferredq list for each grp member in tipc_group_delete
ax25: fix inconsistent lock state in ax25_destroy_timer
neigh: fix use-after-free read in pneigh_get_next
tcp: fix compile error if !CONFIG_SYSCTL
hv_sock: Suppress bogus "may be used uninitialized" warnings
be2net: Fix number of Rx queues used for flow hashing
net: handle 802.1P vlan 0 packets properly
tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()
tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl
tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Revert "net: phylink: set the autoneg state in phylink_phy_change"
bpf: fix nested bpf tracepoints with per-cpu data
bpf: Fix out of bounds memory access in bpf_sk_storage
vsock/virtio: set SOCK_DONE on peer shutdown
net: dsa: rtl8366: Fix up VLAN filtering
net: phylink: set the autoneg state in phylink_phy_change
net: add high_order_alloc_disable sysctl/static key
tcp: add tcp_tx_skb_cache sysctl
...
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-06-15
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
The main changes are:
1) fix stack layout of JITed x64 bpf code, from Alexei.
2) fix out of bounds memory access in bpf_sk_storage, from Arthur.
3) fix lpm trie walk, from Jonathan.
4) fix nested bpf_perf_event_output, from Matt.
5) and several other fixes.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Convert proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_stats() into a more generic
helper, since we are going to use jump labels more often.
Note that sysctl_bpf_stats_enabled is removed, since
it is no longer needed/used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
.ndo_xdp_xmit() assumes it is called under RCU. For example virtio_net
uses RCU to detect it has setup the resources for tx. The assumption
accidentally broke when introducing bulk queue in devmap.
Fixes: 5d053f9da4 ("bpf: devmap prepare xdp frames for bulking")
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
dev_map_free() waits for flush_needed bitmap to be empty in order to
ensure all flush operations have completed before freeing its entries.
However the corresponding clear_bit() was called before using the
entries, so the entries could be used after free.
All access to the entries needs to be done before clearing the bit.
It seems commit a5e2da6e97 ("bpf: netdev is never null in
__dev_map_flush") accidentally changed the clear_bit() and memory access
order.
Note that the problem happens only in __dev_map_flush(), not in
dev_map_flush_old(). dev_map_flush_old() is called only after nulling
out the corresponding netdev_map entry, so dev_map_free() never frees
the entry thus no such race happens there.
Fixes: a5e2da6e97 ("bpf: netdev is never null in __dev_map_flush")
Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Compiling kernel/bpf/core.c with W=1 causes a flood of warnings:
kernel/bpf/core.c:1198:65: warning: initialized field overwritten [-Woverride-init]
1198 | #define BPF_INSN_3_TBL(x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = true
| ^~~~
kernel/bpf/core.c:1087:2: note: in expansion of macro 'BPF_INSN_3_TBL'
1087 | INSN_3(ALU, ADD, X), \
| ^~~~~~
kernel/bpf/core.c:1202:3: note: in expansion of macro 'BPF_INSN_MAP'
1202 | BPF_INSN_MAP(BPF_INSN_2_TBL, BPF_INSN_3_TBL),
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/bpf/core.c:1198:65: note: (near initialization for 'public_insntable[12]')
1198 | #define BPF_INSN_3_TBL(x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = true
| ^~~~
kernel/bpf/core.c:1087:2: note: in expansion of macro 'BPF_INSN_3_TBL'
1087 | INSN_3(ALU, ADD, X), \
| ^~~~~~
kernel/bpf/core.c:1202:3: note: in expansion of macro 'BPF_INSN_MAP'
1202 | BPF_INSN_MAP(BPF_INSN_2_TBL, BPF_INSN_3_TBL),
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
98 copies of the above.
The attached patch silences the warnings, because we *know* we're overwriting
the default initializer. That leaves bpf/core.c with only 6 other warnings,
which become more visible in comparison.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
If the leftmost parent node of the tree has does not have a child
on the left side, then trie_get_next_key (and bpftool map dump) will
not look at the child on the right. This leads to the traversal
missing elements.
Lookup is not affected.
Update selftest to handle this case.
Reproducer:
bpftool map create /sys/fs/bpf/lpm type lpm_trie key 6 \
value 1 entries 256 name test_lpm flags 1
bpftool map update pinned /sys/fs/bpf/lpm key 8 0 0 0 0 0 value 1
bpftool map update pinned /sys/fs/bpf/lpm key 16 0 0 0 0 128 value 2
bpftool map dump pinned /sys/fs/bpf/lpm
Returns only 1 element. (2 expected)
Fixes: b471f2f1de ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command for LPM_TRIE")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Currently, the AF_XDP code uses a separate map in order to
determine if an xsk is bound to a queue. Instead of doing this,
have bpf_map_lookup_elem() return a xdp_sock.
Rearrange some xdp_sock members to eliminate structure holes.
Remove selftest - will be added back in later patch.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-06-07
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Fix several bugs in riscv64 JIT code emission which forgot to clear high
32-bits for alu32 ops, from Björn and Luke with selftests covering all
relevant BPF alu ops from Björn and Jiong.
2) Two fixes for UDP BPF reuseport that avoid calling the program in case of
__udp6_lib_err and UDP GRO which broke reuseport_select_sock() assumption
that skb->data is pointing to transport header, from Martin.
3) Two fixes for BPF sockmap: a use-after-free from sleep in psock's backlog
workqueue, and a missing restore of sk_write_space when psock gets dropped,
from Jakub and John.
4) Fix unconnected UDP sendmsg hook API which is insufficient as-is since it
breaks standard applications like DNS if reverse NAT is not performed upon
receive, from Daniel.
5) Fix an out-of-bounds read in __bpf_skc_lookup which in case of AF_INET6
fails to verify that the length of the tuple is long enough, from Lorenz.
6) Fix libbpf's libbpf__probe_raw_btf to return an fd instead of 0/1 (for
{un,}successful probe) as that is expected to be propagated as an fd to
load_sk_storage_btf() and thus closing the wrong descriptor otherwise,
from Michal.
7) Fix bpftool's JSON output for the case when a lookup fails, from Krzesimir.
8) Minor misc fixes in docs, samples and selftests, from various others.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some ISDN files that got removed in net-next had some changes
done in mainline, take the removals.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Intention of cgroup bind/connect/sendmsg BPF hooks is to act transparently
to applications as also stated in original motivation in 7828f20e37 ("Merge
branch 'bpf-cgroup-bind-connect'"). When recently integrating the latter
two hooks into Cilium to enable host based load-balancing with Kubernetes,
I ran into the issue that pods couldn't start up as DNS got broken. Kubernetes
typically sets up DNS as a service and is thus subject to load-balancing.
Upon further debugging, it turns out that the cgroupv2 sendmsg BPF hooks API
is currently insufficient and thus not usable as-is for standard applications
shipped with most distros. To break down the issue we ran into with a simple
example:
# cat /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 147.75.207.207
nameserver 147.75.207.208
For the purpose of a simple test, we set up above IPs as service IPs and
transparently redirect traffic to a different DNS backend server for that
node:
# cilium service list
ID Frontend Backend
1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
The attached BPF program is basically selecting one of the backends if the
service IP/port matches on the cgroup hook. DNS breaks here, because the
hooks are not transparent enough to applications which have built-in msg_name
address checks:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
[...]
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
# dig 1.1.1.1
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
[...]
; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1
;; global options: +cmd
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
For comparison, if none of the service IPs is used, and we tell nslookup
to use 8.8.8.8 directly it works just fine, of course:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8
1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one.
In order to fix this and thus act more transparent to the application,
this needs reverse translation on recvmsg() side. A minimal fix for this
API is to add similar recvmsg() hooks behind the BPF cgroups static key
such that the program can track state and replace the current sockaddr_in{,6}
with the original service IP. From BPF side, this basically tracks the
service tuple plus socket cookie in an LRU map where the reverse NAT can
then be retrieved via map value as one example. Side-note: the BPF cgroups
static key should be converted to a per-hook static key in future.
Same example after this fix:
# cilium service list
ID Frontend Backend
1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
Lookups work fine now:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one.
Authoritative answers can be found from:
# dig 1.1.1.1
; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 51550
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;1.1.1.1. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
. 23426 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2019052001 1800 900 604800 86400
;; Query time: 17 msec
;; SERVER: 147.75.207.207#53(147.75.207.207)
;; WHEN: Tue May 21 12:59:38 UTC 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 111
And from an actual packet level it shows that we're using the back end
server when talking via 147.75.207.20{7,8} front end:
# tcpdump -i any udp
[...]
12:59:52.698732 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
12:59:52.698735 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
[...]
In order to be flexible and to have same semantics as in sendmsg BPF
programs, we only allow return codes in [1,1] range. In the sendmsg case
the program is called if msg->msg_name is present which can be the case
in both, connected and unconnected UDP.
The former only relies on the sockaddr_in{,6} passed via connect(2) if
passed msg->msg_name was NULL. Therefore, on recvmsg side, we act in similar
way to call into the BPF program whenever a non-NULL msg->msg_name was
passed independent of sk->sk_state being TCP_ESTABLISHED or not. Note
that for TCP case, the msg->msg_name is ignored in the regular recvmsg
path and therefore not relevant.
For the case of ip{,v6}_recv_error() paths, picked up via MSG_ERRQUEUE,
the hook is not called. This is intentional as it aligns with the same
semantics as in case of TCP cgroup BPF hooks right now. This might be
better addressed in future through a different bpf_attach_type such
that this case can be distinguished from the regular recvmsg paths,
for example.
Fixes: 1cedee13d2 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
released under terms in gpl version 2 see copying
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 5 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081035.689962394@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The variable err is assigned with the value -EINVAL that is never
read and it is re-assigned a new value later on. The assignment is
redundant and can be removed.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Most bpf map types doing similar checks and bytes to pages
conversion during memory allocation and charging.
Let's unify these checks by moving them into bpf_map_charge_init().
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In order to unify the existing memlock charging code with the
memcg-based memory accounting, which will be added later, let's
rework the current scheme.
Currently the following design is used:
1) .alloc() callback optionally checks if the allocation will likely
succeed using bpf_map_precharge_memlock()
2) .alloc() performs actual allocations
3) .alloc() callback calculates map cost and sets map.memory.pages
4) map_create() calls bpf_map_init_memlock() which sets map.memory.user
and performs actual charging; in case of failure the map is
destroyed
<map is in use>
1) bpf_map_free_deferred() calls bpf_map_release_memlock(), which
performs uncharge and releases the user
2) .map_free() callback releases the memory
The scheme can be simplified and made more robust:
1) .alloc() calculates map cost and calls bpf_map_charge_init()
2) bpf_map_charge_init() sets map.memory.user and performs actual
charge
3) .alloc() performs actual allocations
<map is in use>
1) .map_free() callback releases the memory
2) bpf_map_charge_finish() performs uncharge and releases the user
The new scheme also allows to reuse bpf_map_charge_init()/finish()
functions for memcg-based accounting. Because charges are performed
before actual allocations and uncharges after freeing the memory,
no bogus memory pressure can be created.
In cases when the map structure is not available (e.g. it's not
created yet, or is already destroyed), on-stack bpf_map_memory
structure is used. The charge can be transferred with the
bpf_map_charge_move() function.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Group "user" and "pages" fields of bpf_map into the bpf_map_memory
structure. Later it can be extended with "memcg" and other related
information.
The main reason for a such change (beside cosmetics) is to pass
bpf_map_memory structure to charging functions before the actual
allocation of bpf_map.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cgroup local storage maps lack the memlock precharge check,
which is performed before the memory allocation for
most other bpf map types.
Let's add it in order to unify all map types.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
For egress packets, __cgroup_bpf_fun_filter_skb() will now call
BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY() instead of PROG_CGROUP_RUN_ARRAY()
in order to propagate congestion notifications (cn) requests to TCP
callers.
For egress packets, this function can return:
NET_XMIT_SUCCESS (0) - continue with packet output
NET_XMIT_DROP (1) - drop packet and notify TCP to call cwr
NET_XMIT_CN (2) - continue with packet output and notify TCP
to call cwr
-EPERM - drop packet
For ingress packets, this function will return -EPERM if any attached
program was found and if it returned != 1 during execution. Otherwise 0
is returned.
Signed-off-by: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allows cgroup inet skb programs to return values in the range [0, 3].
The second bit is used to deterine if congestion occurred and higher
level protocol should decrease rate. E.g. TCP would call tcp_enter_cwr()
The bpf_prog must set expected_attach_type to BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS
at load time if it uses the new return values (i.e. 2 or 3).
The expected_attach_type is currently not enforced for
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. e.g Meaning the current bpf_prog with
expected_attach_type setting to BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS can attach to
BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS. Blindly enforcing expected_attach_type will
break backward compatibility.
This patch adds a enforce_expected_attach_type bit to only
enforce the expected_attach_type when it uses the new
return value.
Signed-off-by: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 107 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528171438.615055994@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that we don't have __rcu markers on the bpf_prog_array helpers,
let's use proper rcu_dereference_protected to obtain array pointer
under mutex.
We also don't need __rcu annotations on cgroup_bpf.inactive since
it's not read/updated concurrently.
v4:
* drop cgroup_rcu_xyz wrappers and use rcu APIs directly; presumably
should be more clear to understand which mutex/refcount protects
each particular place
v3:
* amend cgroup_rcu_dereference to include percpu_ref_is_dying;
cgroup_bpf is now reference counted and we don't hold cgroup_mutex
anymore in cgroup_bpf_release
v2:
* replace xchg with rcu_swap_protected
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array
helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers
call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex.
This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen.
In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing
rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper
way to use these helpers is:
struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...;
struct bpf_prog_array *p;
mutex_lock(&mtx);
p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx));
bpf_prog_array_length(p);
bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...);
bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...);
bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...);
bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...);
bpf_prog_array_free(p);
mutex_unlock(&mtx);
No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held
should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex
(I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex
everywhere).
Motivation is to fix sparse warnings:
kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head
kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> *
kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces)
kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item
kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> *
kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing
kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> *
kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing
kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> *
v2:
* remove comment about potential race; that can't happen
because all callers are in rcu-update section
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Currently the lifetime of bpf programs attached to a cgroup is bound
to the lifetime of the cgroup itself. It means that if a user
forgets (or intentionally avoids) to detach a bpf program before
removing the cgroup, it will stay attached up to the release of the
cgroup. Since the cgroup can stay in the dying state (the state
between being rmdir()'ed and being released) for a very long time, it
leads to a waste of memory. Also, it blocks a possibility to implement
the memcg-based memory accounting for bpf objects, because a circular
reference dependency will occur. Charged memory pages are pinning the
corresponding memory cgroup, and if the memory cgroup is pinning
the attached bpf program, nothing will be ever released.
A dying cgroup can not contain any processes, so the only chance for
an attached bpf program to be executed is a live socket associated
with the cgroup. So in order to release all bpf data early, let's
count associated sockets using a new percpu refcounter. On cgroup
removal the counter is transitioned to the atomic mode, and as soon
as it reaches 0, all bpf programs are detached.
Because cgroup_bpf_release() can block, it can't be called from
the percpu ref counter callback directly, so instead an asynchronous
work is scheduled.
The reference counter is not socket specific, and can be used for any
other types of programs, which can be executed from a cgroup-bpf hook
outside of the process context, had such a need arise in the future.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch randomizes high 32-bit of a definition when BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32
is set.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
x86_64 and AArch64 perhaps are two arches that running bpf testsuite
frequently, however the zero extension insertion pass is not enabled for
them because of their hardware support.
It is critical to guarantee the pass correction as it is supposed to be
enabled at default for a couple of other arches, for example PowerPC,
SPARC, arm, NFP etc. Therefore, it would be very useful if there is a way
to test this pass on for example x86_64.
The test methodology employed by this set is "poisoning" useless bits. High
32-bit of a definition is randomized if it is identified as not used by any
later insn. Such randomization is only enabled under testing mode which is
gated by the new bpf prog load flags "BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32".
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
After previous patches, verifier will mark a insn if it really needs zero
extension on dst_reg.
It is then for back-ends to decide how to use such information to eliminate
unnecessary zero extension code-gen during JIT compilation.
One approach is verifier insert explicit zero extension for those insns
that need zero extension in a generic way, JIT back-ends then do not
generate zero extension for sub-register write at default.
However, only those back-ends which do not have hardware zero extension
want this optimization. Back-ends like x86_64 and AArch64 have hardware
zero extension support that the insertion should be disabled.
This patch introduces new target hook "bpf_jit_needs_zext" which returns
false at default, meaning verifier zero extension insertion is disabled at
default. A back-end could override this hook to return true if it doesn't
have hardware support and want verifier insert zero extension explicitly.
Offload targets do not use this native target hook, instead, they could
get the optimization results using bpf_prog_offload_ops.finalize.
NOTE: arches could have diversified features, it is possible for one arch
to have hardware zero extension support for some sub-register write insns
but not for all. For example, PowerPC, SPARC have zero extended loads, but
not for alu32. So when verifier zero extension insertion enabled, these JIT
back-ends need to peephole insns to remove those zero extension inserted
for insn that actually has hardware zero extension support. The peephole
could be as simple as looking the next insn, if it is a special zero
extension insn then it is safe to eliminate it if the current insn has
hardware zero extension support.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Patched insns do not go through generic verification, therefore doesn't has
zero extension information collected during insn walking.
We don't bother analyze them at the moment, for any sub-register def comes
from them, just conservatively mark it as needing zero extension.
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
eBPF ISA specification requires high 32-bit cleared when low 32-bit
sub-register is written. This applies to destination register of ALU32 etc.
JIT back-ends must guarantee this semantic when doing code-gen. x86_64 and
AArch64 ISA has the same semantics, so the corresponding JIT back-end
doesn't need to do extra work.
However, 32-bit arches (arm, x86, nfp etc.) and some other 64-bit arches
(PowerPC, SPARC etc) need to do explicit zero extension to meet this
requirement, otherwise code like the following will fail.
u64_value = (u64) u32_value
... other uses of u64_value
This is because compiler could exploit the semantic described above and
save those zero extensions for extending u32_value to u64_value, these JIT
back-ends are expected to guarantee this through inserting extra zero
extensions which however could be a significant increase on the code size.
Some benchmarks show there could be ~40% sub-register writes out of total
insns, meaning at least ~40% extra code-gen.
One observation is these extra zero extensions are not always necessary.
Take above code snippet for example, it is possible u32_value will never be
casted into a u64, the value of high 32-bit of u32_value then could be
ignored and extra zero extension could be eliminated.
This patch implements this idea, insns defining sub-registers will be
marked when the high 32-bit of the defined sub-register matters. For
those unmarked insns, it is safe to eliminate high 32-bit clearnace for
them.
Algo:
- Split read flags into READ32 and READ64.
- Record index of insn that does sub-register write. Keep the index inside
reg state and update it during verifier insn walking.
- A full register read on a sub-register marks its definition insn as
needing zero extension on dst register.
A new sub-register write overrides the old one.
- When propagating read64 during path pruning, also mark any insn defining
a sub-register that is read in the pruned path as full-register.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
All prune points inside a callee bpf function most likely will have
different callsites. For example, if function foo() is called from
two callsites the half of explored states in all prune points in foo()
will be useless for subsequent walking of one of those callsites.
Fortunately explored_states pruning heuristics keeps the number of states
per prune point small, but walking these states is still a waste of cpu
time when the callsite of the current state is different from the callsite
of the explored state.
To improve pruning logic convert explored_states into hash table and
use simple insn_idx ^ callsite hash to select hash bucket.
This optimization has no effect on programs without bpf2bpf calls
and drastically improves programs with calls.
In the later case it reduces total memory consumption in 1M scale tests
by almost 3 times (peak_states drops from 5752 to 2016).
Care should be taken when comparing the states for equivalency.
Since the same hash bucket can now contain states with different indices
the insn_idx has to be part of verifier_state and compared.
Different hash table sizes and different hash functions were explored,
but the results were not significantly better vs this patch.
They can be improved in the future.
Hit/miss heuristic is not counting index miscompare as a miss.
Otherwise verifier stats become unstable when experimenting
with different hash functions.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
split explored_states into prune_point boolean mark
and link list of explored states.
This removes STATE_LIST_MARK hack and allows marks to be separate from states.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
clean up explored_states to prep for introduction of hashtable
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The limit of 1024 subsequent jumps was causing otherwise valid
programs to be rejected. Bump it to 8192 and make the error more verbose.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Here are series of patches that add SPDX tags to different kernel files,
based on two different things:
- SPDX entries are added to a bunch of files that we missed a year ago
that do not have any license information at all.
These were either missed because the tool saw the MODULE_LICENSE()
tag, or some EXPORT_SYMBOL tags, and got confused and thought the
file had a real license, or the files have been added since the last
big sweep, or they were Makefile/Kconfig files, which we didn't
touch last time.
- Add GPL-2.0-only or GPL-2.0-or-later tags to files where our scan
tools can determine the license text in the file itself. Where this
happens, the license text is removed, in order to cut down on the
700+ different ways we have in the kernel today, in a quest to get
rid of all of these.
These patches have been out for review on the linux-spdx@vger mailing
list, and while they were created by automatic tools, they were
hand-verified by a bunch of different people, all whom names are on the
patches are reviewers.
The reason for these "large" patches is if we were to continue to
progress at the current rate of change in the kernel, adding license
tags to individual files in different subsystems, we would be finished
in about 10 years at the earliest.
There will be more series of these types of patches coming over the next
few weeks as the tools and reviewers crunch through the more "odd"
variants of how to say "GPLv2" that developers have come up with over
the years, combined with other fun oddities (GPL + a BSD disclaimer?)
that are being unearthed, with the goal for the whole kernel to be
cleaned up.
These diffstats are not small, 3840 files are touched, over 10k lines
removed in just 24 patches.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCXOP8uw8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+ynmGQCgy3evqzleuOITDpuWaxewFdHqiJYAnA7KRw4H
1KwtfRnMtG6dk/XaS7H7
=O9lH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'spdx-5.2-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull SPDX update from Greg KH:
"Here is a series of patches that add SPDX tags to different kernel
files, based on two different things:
- SPDX entries are added to a bunch of files that we missed a year
ago that do not have any license information at all.
These were either missed because the tool saw the MODULE_LICENSE()
tag, or some EXPORT_SYMBOL tags, and got confused and thought the
file had a real license, or the files have been added since the
last big sweep, or they were Makefile/Kconfig files, which we
didn't touch last time.
- Add GPL-2.0-only or GPL-2.0-or-later tags to files where our scan
tools can determine the license text in the file itself. Where this
happens, the license text is removed, in order to cut down on the
700+ different ways we have in the kernel today, in a quest to get
rid of all of these.
These patches have been out for review on the linux-spdx@vger mailing
list, and while they were created by automatic tools, they were
hand-verified by a bunch of different people, all whom names are on
the patches are reviewers.
The reason for these "large" patches is if we were to continue to
progress at the current rate of change in the kernel, adding license
tags to individual files in different subsystems, we would be finished
in about 10 years at the earliest.
There will be more series of these types of patches coming over the
next few weeks as the tools and reviewers crunch through the more
"odd" variants of how to say "GPLv2" that developers have come up with
over the years, combined with other fun oddities (GPL + a BSD
disclaimer?) that are being unearthed, with the goal for the whole
kernel to be cleaned up.
These diffstats are not small, 3840 files are touched, over 10k lines
removed in just 24 patches"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (24 commits)
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 25
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 24
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 23
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 22
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 21
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 20
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 19
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 18
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 17
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 15
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 14
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 13
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 12
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 11
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 10
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 9
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 7
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 5
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 4
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 3
...
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
For iptable module to load a bpf program from a pinned location, it
only retrieve a loaded program and cannot change the program content so
requiring a write permission for it might not be necessary.
Also when adding or removing an unrelated iptable rule, it might need to
flush and reload the xt_bpf related rules as well and triggers the inode
permission check. It might be better to remove the write premission
check for the inode so we won't need to grant write access to all the
processes that flush and restore iptables rules.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
One of the biggest issues we face right now with picking LRU map over
regular hash table is that a map walk out of user space, for example,
to just dump the existing entries or to remove certain ones, will
completely mess up LRU eviction heuristics and wrong entries such
as just created ones will get evicted instead. The reason for this
is that we mark an entry as "in use" via bpf_lru_node_set_ref() from
system call lookup side as well. Thus upon walk, all entries are
being marked, so information of actual least recently used ones
are "lost".
In case of Cilium where it can be used (besides others) as a BPF
based connection tracker, this current behavior causes disruption
upon control plane changes that need to walk the map from user space
to evict certain entries. Discussion result from bpfconf [0] was that
we should simply just remove marking from system call side as no
good use case could be found where it's actually needed there.
Therefore this patch removes marking for regular LRU and per-CPU
flavor. If there ever should be a need in future, the behavior could
be selected via map creation flag, but due to mentioned reason we
avoid this here.
[0] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf.html
Fixes: 29ba732acb ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH")
Fixes: 8f8449384e ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a callback map_lookup_elem_sys_only() that map implementations
could use over map_lookup_elem() from system call side in case the
map implementation needs to handle the latter differently than from
the BPF data path. If map_lookup_elem_sys_only() is set, this will
be preferred pick for map lookups out of user space. This hook is
used in a follow-up fix for LRU map, but once development window
opens, we can convert other map types from map_lookup_elem() (here,
the one called upon BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM cmd is meant) over to use
the callback to simplify and clean up the latter.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Commit 31fd85816d ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program
context fields") made the verifier add AND instructions to clear the
unwanted bits with a mask when doing a narrow load. The mask is
computed with
(1 << size * 8) - 1
where "size" is the size of the narrow load. When doing a 4 byte load
of a an 8 byte field the verifier shifts the literal 1 by 32 places to
the left. This results in an overflow of a signed integer, which is an
undefined behavior. Typically, the computed mask was zero, so the
result of the narrow load ended up being zero too.
Cast the literal to long long to avoid overflows. Note that narrow
load of the 4 byte fields does not have the undefined behavior,
because the load size can only be either 1 or 2 bytes, so shifting 1
by 8 or 16 places will not overflow it. And reading 4 bytes would not
be a narrow load of a 4 bytes field.
Fixes: 31fd85816d ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Reviewed-by: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Reviewed-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Krzesimir Nowak <krzesimir@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support AES128-CCM ciphers in kTLS, from Vakul Garg.
2) Add fib_sync_mem to control the amount of dirty memory we allow to
queue up between synchronize RCU calls, from David Ahern.
3) Make flow classifier more lockless, from Vlad Buslov.
4) Add PHY downshift support to aquantia driver, from Heiner
Kallweit.
5) Add SKB cache for TCP rx and tx, from Eric Dumazet. This reduces
contention on SLAB spinlocks in heavy RPC workloads.
6) Partial GSO offload support in XFRM, from Boris Pismenny.
7) Add fast link down support to ethtool, from Heiner Kallweit.
8) Use siphash for IP ID generator, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Pull nexthops even further out from ipv4/ipv6 routes and FIB
entries, from David Ahern.
10) Move skb->xmit_more into a per-cpu variable, from Florian
Westphal.
11) Improve eBPF verifier speed and increase maximum program size,
from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Eliminate per-bucket spinlocks in rhashtable, and instead use bit
spinlocks. From Neil Brown.
13) Allow tunneling with GUE encap in ipvs, from Jacky Hu.
14) Improve link partner cap detection in generic PHY code, from
Heiner Kallweit.
15) Add layer 2 encap support to bpf_skb_adjust_room(), from Alan
Maguire.
16) Remove SKB list implementation assumptions in SCTP, your's truly.
17) Various cleanups, optimizations, and simplifications in r8169
driver. From Heiner Kallweit.
18) Add memory accounting on TX and RX path of SCTP, from Xin Long.
19) Switch PHY drivers over to use dynamic featue detection, from
Heiner Kallweit.
20) Support flow steering without masking in dpaa2-eth, from Ioana
Ciocoi.
21) Implement ndo_get_devlink_port in netdevsim driver, from Jiri
Pirko.
22) Increase the strict parsing of current and future netlink
attributes, also export such policies to userspace. From Johannes
Berg.
23) Allow DSA tag drivers to be modular, from Andrew Lunn.
24) Remove legacy DSA probing support, also from Andrew Lunn.
25) Allow ll_temac driver to be used on non-x86 platforms, from Esben
Haabendal.
26) Add a generic tracepoint for TX queue timeouts to ease debugging,
from Cong Wang.
27) More indirect call optimizations, from Paolo Abeni"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1763 commits)
cxgb4: Fix error path in cxgb4_init_module
net: phy: improve pause mode reporting in phy_print_status
dt-bindings: net: Fix a typo in the phy-mode list for ethernet bindings
net: macb: Change interrupt and napi enable order in open
net: ll_temac: Improve error message on error IRQ
net/sched: remove block pointer from common offload structure
net: ethernet: support of_get_mac_address new ERR_PTR error
net: usb: smsc: fix warning reported by kbuild test robot
staging: octeon-ethernet: Fix of_get_mac_address ERR_PTR check
net: dsa: support of_get_mac_address new ERR_PTR error
net: dsa: sja1105: Fix status initialization in sja1105_get_ethtool_stats
vrf: sit mtu should not be updated when vrf netdev is the link
net: dsa: Fix error cleanup path in dsa_init_module
l2tp: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
taprio: add null check on sched_nest to avoid potential null pointer dereference
net: mvpp2: cls: fix less than zero check on a u32 variable
net_sched: sch_fq: handle non connected flows
net_sched: sch_fq: do not assume EDT packets are ordered
net: hns3: use devm_kcalloc when allocating desc_cb
net: hns3: some cleanup for struct hns3_enet_ring
...
Pull vfs inode freeing updates from Al Viro:
"Introduction of separate method for RCU-delayed part of
->destroy_inode() (if any).
Pretty much as posted, except that destroy_inode() stashes
->free_inode into the victim (anon-unioned with ->i_fops) before
scheduling i_callback() and the last two patches (sockfs conversion
and folding struct socket_wq into struct socket) are excluded - that
pair should go through netdev once davem reopens his tree"
* 'work.icache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (58 commits)
orangefs: make use of ->free_inode()
shmem: make use of ->free_inode()
hugetlb: make use of ->free_inode()
overlayfs: make use of ->free_inode()
jfs: switch to ->free_inode()
fuse: switch to ->free_inode()
ext4: make use of ->free_inode()
ecryptfs: make use of ->free_inode()
ceph: use ->free_inode()
btrfs: use ->free_inode()
afs: switch to use of ->free_inode()
dax: make use of ->free_inode()
ntfs: switch to ->free_inode()
securityfs: switch to ->free_inode()
apparmor: switch to ->free_inode()
rpcpipe: switch to ->free_inode()
bpf: switch to ->free_inode()
mqueue: switch to ->free_inode()
ufs: switch to ->free_inode()
coda: switch to ->free_inode()
...
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The changes in here are:
- text_poke() fixes and an extensive set of executability lockdowns,
to (hopefully) eliminate the last residual circumstances under
which we are using W|X mappings even temporarily on x86 kernels.
This required a broad range of surgery in text patching facilities,
module loading, trampoline handling and other bits.
- tweak page fault messages to be more informative and more
structured.
- remove DISCONTIGMEM support on x86-32 and make SPARSEMEM the
default.
- reduce KASLR granularity on 5-level paging kernels from 512 GB to
1 GB.
- misc other changes and updates"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
x86/mm: Initialize PGD cache during mm initialization
x86/alternatives: Add comment about module removal races
x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag
x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag
bpf: Use vmalloc special flag
modules: Use vmalloc special flag
mm/vmalloc: Add flag for freeing of special permsissions
mm/hibernation: Make hibernation handle unmapped pages
x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_*() functions
x86/alternatives: Remove the return value of text_poke_*()
x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom text poker
x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules
x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable
x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable
x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code
x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking
x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching
fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm
uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier
x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm
...
Use new flag VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS for handling freeing of special
permissioned memory in vmalloc and remove places where memory was set RW
before freeing which is no longer needed. Don't track if the memory is RO
anymore because it is now tracked in vmalloc.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>
Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com>
Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-19-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
After allowing a bpf prog to
- directly read the skb->sk ptr
- get the fullsock bpf_sock by "bpf_sk_fullsock()"
- get the bpf_tcp_sock by "bpf_tcp_sock()"
- get the listener sock by "bpf_get_listener_sock()"
- avoid duplicating the fields of "(bpf_)sock" and "(bpf_)tcp_sock"
into different bpf running context.
this patch is another effort to make bpf's network programming
more intuitive to do (together with memory and performance benefit).
When bpf prog needs to store data for a sk, the current practice is to
define a map with the usual 4-tuples (src/dst ip/port) as the key.
If multiple bpf progs require to store different sk data, multiple maps
have to be defined. Hence, wasting memory to store the duplicated
keys (i.e. 4 tuples here) in each of the bpf map.
[ The smallest key could be the sk pointer itself which requires
some enhancement in the verifier and it is a separate topic. ]
Also, the bpf prog needs to clean up the elem when sk is freed.
Otherwise, the bpf map will become full and un-usable quickly.
The sk-free tracking currently could be done during sk state
transition (e.g. BPF_SOCK_OPS_STATE_CB).
The size of the map needs to be predefined which then usually ended-up
with an over-provisioned map in production. Even the map was re-sizable,
while the sk naturally come and go away already, this potential re-size
operation is arguably redundant if the data can be directly connected
to the sk itself instead of proxy-ing through a bpf map.
This patch introduces sk->sk_bpf_storage to provide local storage space
at sk for bpf prog to use. The space will be allocated when the first bpf
prog has created data for this particular sk.
The design optimizes the bpf prog's lookup (and then optionally followed by
an inline update). bpf_spin_lock should be used if the inline update needs
to be protected.
BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
-----------------------
To define a bpf "sk-local-storage", a BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE map (new in
this patch) needs to be created. Multiple BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE maps can
be created to fit different bpf progs' needs. The map enforces
BTF to allow printing the sk-local-storage during a system-wise
sk dump (e.g. "ss -ta") in the future.
The purpose of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE map is not for lookup/update/delete
a "sk-local-storage" data from a particular sk.
Think of the map as a meta-data (or "type") of a "sk-local-storage". This
particular "type" of "sk-local-storage" data can then be stored in any sk.
The main purposes of this map are mostly:
1. Define the size of a "sk-local-storage" type.
2. Provide a similar syscall userspace API as the map (e.g. lookup/update,
map-id, map-btf...etc.)
3. Keep track of all sk's storages of this "type" and clean them up
when the map is freed.
sk->sk_bpf_storage:
------------------
The main lookup/update/delete is done on sk->sk_bpf_storage (which
is a "struct bpf_sk_storage"). When doing a lookup,
the "map" pointer is now used as the "key" to search on the
sk_storage->list. The "map" pointer is actually serving
as the "type" of the "sk-local-storage" that is being
requested.
To allow very fast lookup, it should be as fast as looking up an
array at a stable-offset. At the same time, it is not ideal to
set a hard limit on the number of sk-local-storage "type" that the
system can have. Hence, this patch takes a cache approach.
The last search result from sk_storage->list is cached in
sk_storage->cache[] which is a stable sized array. Each
"sk-local-storage" type has a stable offset to the cache[] array.
In the future, a map's flag could be introduced to do cache
opt-out/enforcement if it became necessary.
The cache size is 16 (i.e. 16 types of "sk-local-storage").
Programs can share map. On the program side, having a few bpf_progs
running in the networking hotpath is already a lot. The bpf_prog
should have already consolidated the existing sock-key-ed map usage
to minimize the map lookup penalty. 16 has enough runway to grow.
All sk-local-storage data will be removed from sk->sk_bpf_storage
during sk destruction.
bpf_sk_storage_get() and bpf_sk_storage_delete():
------------------------------------------------
Instead of using bpf_map_(lookup|update|delete)_elem(),
the bpf prog needs to use the new helper bpf_sk_storage_get() and
bpf_sk_storage_delete(). The verifier can then enforce the
ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET argument. The bpf_sk_storage_get() also allows to
"create" new elem if one does not exist in the sk. It is done by
the new BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE flag. An optional value can also be
provided as the initial value during BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE.
The BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE also supports bpf_spin_lock. Together,
it has eliminated the potential use cases for an equivalent
bpf_map_update_elem() API (for bpf_prog) in this patch.
Misc notes:
----------
1. map_get_next_key is not supported. From the userspace syscall
perspective, the map has the socket fd as the key while the map
can be shared by pinned-file or map-id.
Since btf is enforced, the existing "ss" could be enhanced to pretty
print the local-storage.
Supporting a kernel defined btf with 4 tuples as the return key could
be explored later also.
2. The sk->sk_lock cannot be acquired. Atomic operations is used instead.
e.g. cmpxchg is done on the sk->sk_bpf_storage ptr.
Please refer to the source code comments for the details in
synchronization cases and considerations.
3. The mem is charged to the sk->sk_omem_alloc as the sk filter does.
Benchmark:
---------
Here is the benchmark data collected by turning on
the "kernel.bpf_stats_enabled" sysctl.
Two bpf progs are tested:
One bpf prog with the usual bpf hashmap (max_entries = 8192) with the
sk ptr as the key. (verifier is modified to support sk ptr as the key
That should have shortened the key lookup time.)
Another bpf prog is with the new BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE.
Both are storing a "u32 cnt", do a lookup on "egress_skb/cgroup" for
each egress skb and then bump the cnt. netperf is used to drive
data with 4096 connected UDP sockets.
BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH with a modifier verifier (152ns per bpf run)
27: cgroup_skb name egress_sk_map tag 74f56e832918070b run_time_ns 58280107540 run_cnt 381347633
loaded_at 2019-04-15T13:46:39-0700 uid 0
xlated 344B jited 258B memlock 4096B map_ids 16
btf_id 5
BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE in this patch (66ns per bpf run)
30: cgroup_skb name egress_sk_stora tag d4aa70984cc7bbf6 run_time_ns 25617093319 run_cnt 390989739
loaded_at 2019-04-15T13:47:54-0700 uid 0
xlated 168B jited 156B memlock 4096B map_ids 17
btf_id 6
Here is a high-level picture on how are the objects organized:
sk
┌──────┐
│ │
│ │
│ │
│*sk_bpf_storage─────▶ bpf_sk_storage
└──────┘ ┌───────┐
┌───────────┤ list │
│ │ │
│ │ │
│ │ │
│ └───────┘
│
│ elem
│ ┌────────┐
├─▶│ snode │
│ ├────────┤
│ │ data │ bpf_map
│ ├────────┤ ┌─────────┐
│ │map_node│◀─┬─────┤ list │
│ └────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ elem │ │ │
│ ┌────────┐ │ └─────────┘
└─▶│ snode │ │
├────────┤ │
bpf_map │ data │ │
┌─────────┐ ├────────┤ │
│ list ├───────▶│map_node│ │
│ │ └────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ │ elem │
└─────────┘ ┌────────┐ │
┌─▶│ snode │ │
│ ├────────┤ │
│ │ data │ │
│ ├────────┤ │
│ │map_node│◀─┘
│ └────────┘
│
│
│ ┌───────┐
sk └──────────│ list │
┌──────┐ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ └───────┘
│*sk_bpf_storage───────▶bpf_sk_storage
└──────┘
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This is an opt-in interface that allows a tracepoint to provide a safe
buffer that can be written from a BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT program.
The size of the buffer must be a compile-time constant, and is checked
before allowing a BPF program to attach to a tracepoint that uses this
feature.
The pointer to this buffer will be the first argument of tracepoints
that opt in; the pointer is valid and can be bpf_probe_read() by both
BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT and BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE
programs that attach to such a tracepoint, but the buffer to which it
points may only be written by the latter.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In case of a null check on a pointer inside a subprog, we should mark all
registers with this pointer as either safe or unknown, in both the current
and previous frames. Currently, only spilled registers and registers in
the current frame are marked. Packet bound checks in subprogs have the
same issue. This patch fixes it to mark registers in previous frames as
well.
A good reproducer for null checks looks as follow:
1: ptr = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &key);
2: ret = subprog(ptr) {
3: return ptr != NULL;
4: }
5: if (ret)
6: value = *ptr;
With the above, the verifier will complain on line 6 because it sees ptr
as map_value_or_null despite the null check in subprog 1.
Note that this patch fixes another resulting bug when using
bpf_sk_release():
1: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(...);
2: subprog(sk) {
3: if (sk)
4: bpf_sk_release(sk);
5: }
6: if (!sk)
7: return 0;
8: return 1;
In the above, mark_ptr_or_null_regs will warn on line 6 because it will
try to free the reference state, even though it was already freed on
line 3.
Fixes: f4d7e40a5b ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@orange.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
target_fd is target namespace. If there is a flow dissector BPF program
attached to that namespace, its (single) id is returned.
v5:
* drop net ref right after rcu unlock (Daniel Borkmann)
v4:
* add missing put_net (Jann Horn)
v3:
* add missing inline to skb_flow_dissector_prog_query static def
(kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
v2:
* don't sleep in rcu critical section (Jakub Kicinski)
* check input prog_cnt (exit early)
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Drop bpf_verifier_lock for root to avoid being DoS-ed by unprivileged.
The BPF verifier is now fully parallel.
All unpriv users are still serialized by bpf_verifier_lock to avoid
exhausting kernel memory by running N parallel verifications.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Move three global variables protected by bpf_verifier_lock into
'struct bpf_verifier_env' to allow parallel verification.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
A lot of the performance gain comes from this patch.
While analysing performance overhead it was found that the largest CPU
stalls were caused when touching the struct page area. It is first read with
a READ_ONCE from build_skb_around via page_is_pfmemalloc(), and when freed
written by page_frag_free() call.
Measurements show that the prefetchw (W) variant operation is needed to
achieve the performance gain. We believe this optimization it two fold,
first the W-variant saves one step in the cache-coherency protocol, and
second it helps us to avoid the non-temporal prefetch HW optimizations and
bring this into all cache-levels. It might be worth investigating if
prefetch into L2 will have the same benefit.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
As cpumap now batch consume xdp_frame's from the ptr_ring, it knows how many
SKBs it need to allocate. Thus, lets bulk allocate these SKBs via
kmem_cache_alloc_bulk() API, and use the previously introduced function
build_skb_around().
Notice that the flag __GFP_ZERO asks the slab/slub allocator to clear the
memory for us. This does clear a larger area than needed, but my micro
benchmarks on Intel CPUs show that this is slightly faster due to being a
cacheline aligned area is cleared for the SKBs. (For SLUB allocator, there
is a future optimization potential, because SKBs will with high probability
originate from same page. If we can find/identify continuous memory areas
then the Intel CPU memset rep stos will have a real performance gain.)
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move ptr_ring dequeue outside loop, that allocate SKBs and calls network
stack, as these operations that can take some time. The ptr_ring is a
communication channel between CPUs, where we want to reduce/limit any
cacheline bouncing.
Do a concentrated bulk dequeue via ptr_ring_consume_batched, to shorten the
period and times the remote cacheline in ptr_ring is read
Batch size 8 is both to (1) limit BH-disable period, and (2) consume one
cacheline on 64-bit archs. After reducing the BH-disable section further
then we can consider changing this, while still thinking about L1 cacheline
size being active.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
verifier.c uses BPF_CAST_CALL for casting bpf call except at one
place in jit_subprogs(). Let's use the macro for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
commit f1a2e44a3a ("bpf: add queue and stack maps") introduced new BPF
helper functions:
- BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem
- BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem
- BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem
but they were made available only for network BPF programs. This patch
makes them available for tracepoint, cgroup and lirc programs.
Signed-off-by: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Mauricio Vasquez B <mauricio.vasquez@polito.it>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
There are a few "regs[regno]" here are there across "check_reg_arg", this
patch factor it out into a simple "reg" pointer. The intention is to
simplify code indentation and make the later patches in this set look
cleaner.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
After code refactor in previous patches, the propagation logic inside the
for loop in "propagate_liveness" becomes clear that they are good enough to
be factored out into a common function "propagate_liveness_reg".
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Access to reg states were not factored out, the consequence is long code
for dereferencing them which made the indentation not good for reading.
This patch factor out these code so the core code in the loop could be
easier to follow.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Propagation for register and stack slot are finished in separate for loop,
while they are perfect to be put into a single loop.
This could also let them share some common variables in later patches.
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Fix a new warning reported by kbuild for make ARCH=i386:
In file included from kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:11:0:
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c: In function '__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl':
include/linux/kernel.h:827:29: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast
(!!(sizeof((typeof(x) *)1 == (typeof(y) *)1)))
^
include/linux/kernel.h:841:4: note: in expansion of macro '__typecheck'
(__typecheck(x, y) && __no_side_effects(x, y))
^~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/kernel.h:851:24: note: in expansion of macro '__safe_cmp'
__builtin_choose_expr(__safe_cmp(x, y), \
^~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/kernel.h:860:19: note: in expansion of macro '__careful_cmp'
#define min(x, y) __careful_cmp(x, y, <)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:837:17: note: in expansion of macro 'min'
ctx.new_len = min(PAGE_SIZE, *pcount);
^~~
Fixes: 4e63acdff8 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value helpers")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add bpf_strtol and bpf_strtoul to convert a string to long and unsigned
long correspondingly. It's similar to user space strtol(3) and
strtoul(3) with a few changes to the API:
* instead of NUL-terminated C string the helpers expect buffer and
buffer length;
* resulting long or unsigned long is returned in a separate
result-argument;
* return value is used to indicate success or failure, on success number
of consumed bytes is returned that can be used to identify position to
read next if the buffer is expected to contain multiple integers;
* instead of *base* argument, *flags* is used that provides base in 5
LSB, other bits are reserved for future use;
* number of supported bases is limited.
Documentation for the new helpers is provided in bpf.h UAPI.
The helpers are made available to BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL programs to
be able to convert string input to e.g. "ulongvec" output.
E.g. "net/ipv4/tcp_mem" consists of three ulong integers. They can be
parsed by calling to bpf_strtoul three times.
Implementation notes:
Implementation includes "../../lib/kstrtox.h" to reuse integer parsing
functions. It's done exactly same way as fs/proc/base.c already does.
Unfortunately existing kstrtoX function can't be used directly since
they fail if any invalid character is present right after integer in the
string. Existing simple_strtoX functions can't be used either since
they're obsolete and don't handle overflow properly.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently the way to pass result from BPF helper to BPF program is to
provide memory area defined by pointer and size: func(void *, size_t).
It works great for generic use-case, but for simple types, such as int,
it's overkill and consumes two arguments when it could use just one.
Introduce new argument types ARG_PTR_TO_INT and ARG_PTR_TO_LONG to be
able to pass result from helper to program via pointer to int and long
correspondingly: func(int *) or func(long *).
New argument types are similar to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM with the following
differences:
* they don't require corresponding ARG_CONST_SIZE argument, predefined
access sizes are used instead (32bit for int, 64bit for long);
* it's possible to use more than one such an argument in a helper;
* provided pointers have to be aligned.
It's easy to introduce similar ARG_PTR_TO_CHAR and ARG_PTR_TO_SHORT
argument types. It's not done due to lack of use-case though.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add file_pos field to bpf_sysctl context to read and write sysctl file
position at which sysctl is being accessed (read or written).
The field can be used to e.g. override whole sysctl value on write to
sysctl even when sys_write is called by user space with file_pos > 0. Or
BPF program may reject such accesses.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add helpers to work with new value being written to sysctl by user
space.
bpf_sysctl_get_new_value() copies value being written to sysctl into
provided buffer.
bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() overrides new value being written by user
space with a one from provided buffer. Buffer should contain string
representation of the value, similar to what can be seen in /proc/sys/.
Both helpers can be used only on sysctl write.
File position matters and can be managed by an interface that will be
introduced separately. E.g. if user space calls sys_write to a file in
/proc/sys/ at file position = X, where X > 0, then the value set by
bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() will be written starting from X. If program
wants to override whole value with specified buffer, file position has
to be set to zero.
Documentation for the new helpers is provided in bpf.h UAPI.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add bpf_sysctl_get_current_value() helper to copy current sysctl value
into provided by BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL program buffer.
It provides same string as user space can see by reading corresponding
file in /proc/sys/, including new line, etc.
Documentation for the new helper is provided in bpf.h UAPI.
Since current value is kept in ctl_table->data in a parsed form,
ctl_table->proc_handler() with write=0 is called to read that data and
convert it to a string. Such a string can later be parsed by a program
using helpers that will be introduced separately.
Unfortunately it's not trivial to provide API to access parsed data due to
variety of data representations (string, intvec, uintvec, ulongvec,
custom structures, even NULL, etc). Instead it's assumed that user know
how to handle specific sysctl they're interested in and appropriate
helpers can be used.
Since ctl_table->proc_handler() expects __user buffer, conversion to
__user happens for kernel allocated one where the value is stored.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add bpf_sysctl_get_name() helper to copy sysctl name (/proc/sys/ entry)
into provided by BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL program buffer.
By default full name (w/o /proc/sys/) is copied, e.g. "net/ipv4/tcp_mem".
If BPF_F_SYSCTL_BASE_NAME flag is set, only base name will be copied,
e.g. "tcp_mem".
Documentation for the new helper is provided in bpf.h UAPI.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Containerized applications may run as root and it may create problems
for whole host. Specifically such applications may change a sysctl and
affect applications in other containers.
Furthermore in existing infrastructure it may not be possible to just
completely disable writing to sysctl, instead such a process should be
gradual with ability to log what sysctl are being changed by a
container, investigate, limit the set of writable sysctl to currently
used ones (so that new ones can not be changed) and eventually reduce
this set to zero.
The patch introduces new program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL and
attach type BPF_CGROUP_SYSCTL to solve these problems on cgroup basis.
New program type has access to following minimal context:
struct bpf_sysctl {
__u32 write;
};
Where @write indicates whether sysctl is being read (= 0) or written (=
1).
Helpers to access sysctl name and value will be introduced separately.
BPF_CGROUP_SYSCTL attach point is added to sysctl code right before
passing control to ctl_table->proc_handler so that BPF program can
either allow or deny access to sysctl.
Suggested-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently kernel/bpf/cgroup.c contains only one program type and one
proto function cgroup_dev_func_proto(). It'd be useful to have base
proto function that can be reused for new cgroup-bpf program types
coming soon.
Introduce cgroup_base_func_proto().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-04-12
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Improve BPF verifier scalability for large programs through two
optimizations: i) remove verifier states that are not useful in pruning,
ii) stop walking parentage chain once first LIVE_READ is seen. Combined
gives approx 20x speedup. Increase limits for accepting large programs
under root, and add various stress tests, from Alexei.
2) Implement global data support in BPF. This enables static global variables
for .data, .rodata and .bss sections to be properly handled which allows
for more natural program development. This also opens up the possibility
to optimize program workflow by compiling ELFs only once and later only
rewriting section data before reload, from Daniel and with test cases and
libbpf refactoring from Joe.
3) Add config option to generate BTF type info for vmlinux as part of the
kernel build process. DWARF debug info is converted via pahole to BTF.
Latter relies on libbpf and makes use of BTF deduplication algorithm which
results in 100x savings compared to DWARF data. Resulting .BTF section is
typically about 2MB in size, from Andrii.
4) Add BPF verifier support for stack access with variable offset from
helpers and add various test cases along with it, from Andrey.
5) Extend bpf_skb_adjust_room() growth BPF helper to mark inner MAC header
so that L2 encapsulation can be used for tc tunnels, from Alan.
6) Add support for input __sk_buff context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN so that
users can define a subset of allowed __sk_buff fields that get fed into
the test program, from Stanislav.
7) Add bpf fs multi-dimensional array tests for BTF test suite and fix up
various UBSAN warnings in bpftool, from Yonghong.
8) Generate a pkg-config file for libbpf, from Luca.
9) Dump program's BTF id in bpftool, from Prashant.
10) libbpf fix to use smaller BPF log buffer size for AF_XDP's XDP
program, from Magnus.
11) kallsyms related fixes for the case when symbols are not present in
BPF selftests and samples, from Daniel
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add new set of arguments to bpf_attr for BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN:
* ctx_in/ctx_size_in - input context
* ctx_out/ctx_size_out - output context
The intended use case is to pass some meta data to the test runs that
operate on skb (this has being brought up on recent LPC).
For programs that use bpf_prog_test_run_skb, support __sk_buff input and
output. Initially, from input __sk_buff, copy _only_ cb and priority into
skb, all other non-zero fields are prohibited (with EINVAL).
If the user has set ctx_out/ctx_size_out, copy the potentially modified
__sk_buff back to the userspace.
We require all fields of input __sk_buff except the ones we explicitly
support to be set to zero. The expectation is that in the future we might
add support for more fields and we want to fail explicitly if the user
runs the program on the kernel where we don't yet support them.
The API is intentionally vague (i.e. we don't explicitly add __sk_buff
to bpf_attr, but ctx_in) to potentially let other test_run types use
this interface in the future (this can be xdp_md for xdp types for
example).
v4:
* don't copy more than allowed in bpf_ctx_init [Martin]
v3:
* handle case where ctx_in is NULL, but ctx_out is not [Martin]
* convert size==0 checks to ptr==NULL checks and add some extra ptr
checks [Martin]
v2:
* Addressed comments from Martin Lau
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Given we'll be reusing BPF array maps for global data/bss/rodata
sections, we need a way to associate BTF DataSec type as its map
value type. In usual cases we have this ugly BPF_ANNOTATE_KV_PAIR()
macro hack e.g. via 38d5d3b3d5 ("bpf: Introduce BPF_ANNOTATE_KV_PAIR")
to get initial map to type association going. While more use cases
for it are discouraged, this also won't work for global data since
the use of array map is a BPF loader detail and therefore unknown
at compilation time. For array maps with just a single entry we make
an exception in terms of BTF in that key type is declared optional
if value type is of DataSec type. The latter LLVM is guaranteed to
emit and it also aligns with how we regard global data maps as just
a plain buffer area reusing existing map facilities for allowing
things like introspection with existing tools.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This work adds kernel-side verification, logging and seq_show dumping
of BTF Var and DataSec kinds which are emitted with latest LLVM. The
following constraints apply:
BTF Var must have:
- Its kind_flag is 0
- Its vlen is 0
- Must point to a valid type
- Type must not resolve to a forward type
- Size of underlying type must be > 0
- Must have a valid name
- Can only be a source type, not sink or intermediate one
- Name may include dots (e.g. in case of static variables
inside functions)
- Cannot be a member of a struct/union
- Linkage so far can either only be static or global/allocated
BTF DataSec must have:
- Its kind_flag is 0
- Its vlen cannot be 0
- Its size cannot be 0
- Must have a valid name
- Can only be a source type, not sink or intermediate one
- Name may include dots (e.g. to represent .bss, .data, .rodata etc)
- Cannot be a member of a struct/union
- Inner btf_var_secinfo array with {type,offset,size} triple
must be sorted by offset in ascending order
- Type must always point to BTF Var
- BTF resolved size of Var must be <= size provided by triple
- DataSec size must be >= sum of triple sizes (thus holes
are allowed)
btf_var_resolve(), btf_ptr_resolve() and btf_modifier_resolve()
are on a high level quite similar but each come with slight,
subtle differences. They could potentially be a bit refactored
in future which hasn't been done here to ease review.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Trivial addition to allow '.' aside from '_' as "special" characters
in the object name. Used to allow for substrings in maps from loader
side such as ".bss", ".data", ".rodata", but could also be useful for
other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch adds a new BPF_MAP_FREEZE command which allows to
"freeze" the map globally as read-only / immutable from syscall
side.
Map permission handling has been refactored into map_get_sys_perms()
and drops FMODE_CAN_WRITE in case of locked map. Main use case is
to allow for setting up .rodata sections from the BPF ELF which
are loaded into the kernel, meaning BPF loader first allocates
map, sets up map value by copying .rodata section into it and once
complete, it calls BPF_MAP_FREEZE on the map fd to prevent further
modifications.
Right now BPF_MAP_FREEZE only takes map fd as argument while remaining
bpf_attr members are required to be zero. I didn't add write-only
locking here as counterpart since I don't have a concrete use-case
for it on my side, and I think it makes probably more sense to wait
once there is actually one. In that case bpf_attr can be extended
as usual with a flag field and/or others where flag 0 means that
we lock the map read-only hence this doesn't prevent to add further
extensions to BPF_MAP_FREEZE upon need.
A map creation flag like BPF_F_WRONCE was not considered for couple
of reasons: i) in case of a generic implementation, a map can consist
of more than just one element, thus there could be multiple map
updates needed to set the map into a state where it can then be
made immutable, ii) WRONCE indicates exact one-time write before
it is then set immutable. A generic implementation would set a bit
atomically on map update entry (if unset), indicating that every
subsequent update from then onwards will need to bail out there.
However, map updates can fail, so upon failure that flag would need
to be unset again and the update attempt would need to be repeated
for it to be eventually made immutable. While this can be made
race-free, this approach feels less clean and in combination with
reason i), it's not generic enough. A dedicated BPF_MAP_FREEZE
command directly sets the flag and caller has the guarantee that
map is immutable from syscall side upon successful return for any
future syscall invocations that would alter the map state, which
is also more intuitive from an API point of view. A command name
such as BPF_MAP_LOCK has been avoided as it's too close with BPF
map spin locks (which already has BPF_F_LOCK flag). BPF_MAP_FREEZE
is so far only enabled for privileged users.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This work adds two new map creation flags BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG
and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG in order to allow for read-only or
write-only BPF maps from a BPF program side.
Today we have BPF_F_RDONLY and BPF_F_WRONLY, but this only
applies to system call side, meaning the BPF program has full
read/write access to the map as usual while bpf(2) calls with
map fd can either only read or write into the map depending
on the flags. BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG allows
for the exact opposite such that verifier is going to reject
program loads if write into a read-only map or a read into a
write-only map is detected. For read-only map case also some
helpers are forbidden for programs that would alter the map
state such as map deletion, update, etc. As opposed to the two
BPF_F_RDONLY / BPF_F_WRONLY flags, BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG as well
as BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG really do correspond to the map lifetime.
We've enabled this generic map extension to various non-special
maps holding normal user data: array, hash, lru, lpm, local
storage, queue and stack. Further generic map types could be
followed up in future depending on use-case. Main use case
here is to forbid writes into .rodata map values from verifier
side.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Both BPF_F_WRONLY / BPF_F_RDONLY flags are tied to the map file
descriptor, but not to the map object itself! Meaning, at map
creation time BPF_F_RDONLY can be set to make the map read-only
from syscall side, but this holds only for the returned fd, so
any other fd either retrieved via bpf file system or via map id
for the very same underlying map object can have read-write access
instead.
Given that, keeping the two flags around in the map_flags attribute
and exposing them to user space upon map dump is misleading and
may lead to false conclusions. Since these two flags are not
tied to the map object lets also not store them as map property.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This generic extension to BPF maps allows for directly loading
an address residing inside a BPF map value as a single BPF
ldimm64 instruction!
The idea is similar to what BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD does today, which
is a special src_reg flag for ldimm64 instruction that indicates
that inside the first part of the double insns's imm field is a
file descriptor which the verifier then replaces as a full 64bit
address of the map into both imm parts. For the newly added
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE src_reg flag, the idea is the following:
the first part of the double insns's imm field is again a file
descriptor corresponding to the map, and the second part of the
imm field is an offset into the value. The verifier will then
replace both imm parts with an address that points into the BPF
map value at the given value offset for maps that support this
operation. Currently supported is array map with single entry.
It is possible to support more than just single map element by
reusing both 16bit off fields of the insns as a map index, so
full array map lookup could be expressed that way. It hasn't
been implemented here due to lack of concrete use case, but
could easily be done so in future in a compatible way, since
both off fields right now have to be 0 and would correctly
denote a map index 0.
The BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE is a distinct flag as otherwise with
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD we could not differ offset 0 between load of
map pointer versus load of map's value at offset 0, and changing
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD's encoding into off by one to differ between
regular map pointer and map value pointer would add unnecessary
complexity and increases barrier for debugability thus less
suitable. Using the second part of the imm field as an offset
into the value does /not/ come with limitations since maximum
possible value size is in u32 universe anyway.
This optimization allows for efficiently retrieving an address
to a map value memory area without having to issue a helper call
which needs to prepare registers according to calling convention,
etc, without needing the extra NULL test, and without having to
add the offset in an additional instruction to the value base
pointer. The verifier then treats the destination register as
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE with constant reg->off from the user passed
offset from the second imm field, and guarantees that this is
within bounds of the map value. Any subsequent operations are
normally treated as typical map value handling without anything
extra needed from verification side.
The two map operations for direct value access have been added to
array map for now. In future other types could be supported as
well depending on the use case. The main use case for this commit
is to allow for BPF loader support for global variables that
reside in .data/.rodata/.bss sections such that we can directly
load the address of them with minimal additional infrastructure
required. Loader support has been added in subsequent commits for
libbpf library.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Minor comment merge conflict in mlx5.
Staging driver has a fixup due to the skb->xmit_more changes
in 'net-next', but was removed in 'net'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
check_stack_access() that prints verbose log is used in
adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() that prints its own verbose log and now they
stick together, e.g.:
variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4) off=-16
size=1R2 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for
!root
Add missing newline so that log is more readable:
variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4) off=-16 size=1
R2 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for !root
Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
As discussed in [1] max value of variable offset has to be checked for
overflow on stack access otherwise verifier would accept code like this:
0: (b7) r2 = 6
1: (b7) r3 = 28
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0
3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r1 +168)
5: (c5) if r4 s< 0x0 goto pc+4
R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv6 R3=inv28
R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0;
0x7fffffffffffffff)) R10=fp0,call_-1 fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16=mmmmmmmm
6: (17) r4 -= 16
7: (0f) r4 += r10
8: (b7) r5 = 8
9: (85) call bpf_getsockopt#57
10: (b7) r0 = 0
11: (95) exit
, where R4 obviosly has unbounded max value.
Fix it by checking that reg->smax_value is inside (-BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF;
BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) range.
reg->smax_value is used instead of reg->umax_value because stack
pointers are calculated using negative offset from fp. This is opposite
to e.g. map access where offset must be non-negative and where
umax_value is used.
Also dedicated verbose logs are added for both min and max bound check
failures to have diagnostics consistent with variable offset handling in
check_map_access().
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=155433357510597&w=2
Fixes: 2011fccfb6 ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Proper support of indirect stack access with variable offset in
unprivileged mode (!root) requires corresponding support in Spectre
masking for stack ALU in retrieve_ptr_limit().
There are no use-case for variable offset in unprivileged mode though so
make verifier reject such accesses for simplicity.
Pointer arithmetics is one (and only?) way to cause variable offset and
it's already rejected in unpriv mode so that verifier won't even get to
helper function whose argument contains variable offset, e.g.:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0
1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
3: (57) r2 &= 4
4: (17) r2 -= 16
5: (0f) r2 += r10
variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4) off=-16 size=1R2
stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for !root
Still it looks like a good idea to reject variable offset indirect stack
access for unprivileged mode in check_stack_boundary() explicitly.
Fixes: 2011fccfb6 ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
It's hard to guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
helper return if uninitialized stack is accessed with variable offset
since specific bounds are unknown to verifier. This may cause
uninitialized stack leaking.
Reject such an access in check_stack_boundary to prevent possible
leaking.
There are no known use-cases for indirect uninitialized stack access
with variable offset so it shouldn't break anything.
Fixes: 2011fccfb6 ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The existing 16Mbyte verifier log limit is not enough for log_level=2
even for small programs. Increase it to 1Gbyte.
Note it's not a kernel memory limit.
It's an amount of memory user space provides to store
the verifier log. The kernel populates it 1k at a time.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Large verifier speed improvements allow to increase
verifier complexity limit.
Now regardless of the program composition and its size it takes
little time for the verifier to hit insn_processed limit.
On typical x86 machine non-debug kernel processes 1M instructions
in 1/10 of a second.
(before these speed improvements specially crafted programs
could be hitting multi-second verification times)
Full kasan kernel with debug takes ~1 second for the same 1M insns.
Hence bump the BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit to 1M.
Also increase the number of instructions per program
from 4k to internal BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit.
4k limit was confusing to users, since small programs with hundreds
of insns could be hitting BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit.
Sometimes adding more insns and bpf_trace_printk debug statements
would make the verifier accept the program while removing
code would make the verifier reject it.
Some user space application started to add #define MAX_FOO to
their programs and do:
MAX_FOO=100;
again:
compile with MAX_FOO;
try to load;
if (fails_to_load) { reduce MAX_FOO; goto again; }
to be able to fit maximum amount of processing into single program.
Other users artificially split their single program into a set of programs
and use all 32 iterations of tail_calls to increase compute limits.
And the most advanced folks used unlimited tc-bpf filter list
to execute many bpf programs.
Essentially the users managed to workaround 4k insn limit.
This patch removes the limit for root programs from uapi.
BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS is the kernel internal limit
and success to load the program no longer depends on program size,
but on 'smartness' of the verifier only.
The verifier will continue to get smarter with every kernel release.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Larger programs may trigger 16-bit jump offset overflow check
during instruction patching. Make this error verbose otherwise
users cannot decipher error code without printks in the verifier.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Temporary arrays used during program verification need to be vmalloc-ed
to support large bpf programs.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
With large verifier speed improvement brought by the previous patch
mark_reg_read() becomes the hottest function during verification.
On a typical program it consumes 40% of cpu.
mark_reg_read() walks parentage chain of registers to mark parents as LIVE_READ.
Once the register is marked there is no need to remark it again in the future.
Hence stop walking the chain once first LIVE_READ is seen.
This optimization drops mark_reg_read() time from 40% of cpu to <1%
and overall 2x improvement of verification speed.
For some programs the longest_mark_read_walk counter improves from ~500 to ~5
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Branch instructions, branch targets and calls in a bpf program are
the places where the verifier remembers states that led to successful
verification of the program.
These states are used to prune brute force program analysis.
For unprivileged programs there is a limit of 64 states per such
'branching' instructions (maximum length is tracked by max_states_per_insn
counter introduced in the previous patch).
Simply reducing this threshold to 32 or lower increases insn_processed
metric to the point that small valid programs get rejected.
For root programs there is no limit and cilium programs can have
max_states_per_insn to be 100 or higher.
Walking 100+ states multiplied by number of 'branching' insns during
verification consumes significant amount of cpu time.
Turned out simple LRU-like mechanism can be used to remove states
that unlikely will be helpful in future search pruning.
This patch introduces hit_cnt and miss_cnt counters:
hit_cnt - this many times this state successfully pruned the search
miss_cnt - this many times this state was not equivalent to other states
(and that other states were added to state list)
The heuristic introduced in this patch is:
if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3)
/* drop this state from future considerations */
Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn (allow more states to be
considered for pruning) and slow verification speed, but do not meaningfully
reduce insn_processed metric.
Lower numbers drop too many states and insn_processed increases too much.
Many different formulas were considered.
This one is simple and works well enough in practice.
(the analysis was done on selftests/progs/* and on cilium programs)
The end result is this heuristic improves verification speed by 10 times.
Large synthetic programs that used to take a second more now take
1/10 of a second.
In cases where max_states_per_insn used to be 100 or more, now it's ~10.
There is a slight increase in insn_processed for cilium progs:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1831 1838
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3029 3218
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26309 26935
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 33517 34439
bpf_netdev.o 9713 9721
bpf_overlay.o 6184 6184
bpf_lcx_jit.o 37335 39389
And 2-3 times improvement in the verification speed.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
In order to understand the verifier bottlenecks add various stats
and extend log_level:
log_level 1 and 2 are kept as-is:
bit 0 - level=1 - print every insn and verifier state at branch points
bit 1 - level=2 - print every insn and verifier state at every insn
bit 2 - level=4 - print verifier error and stats at the end of verification
When verifier rejects the program the libbpf is trying to load the program twice.
Once with log_level=0 (no messages, only error code is reported to user space)
and second time with log_level=1 to tell the user why the verifier rejected it.
With introduction of bit 2 - level=4 the libbpf can choose to always use that
level and load programs once, since the verification speed is not affected and
in case of error the verbose message will be available.
Note that the verifier stats are not part of uapi just like all other
verbose messages. They're expected to change in the future.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
We want to avoid leaking pointer info from xdp_frame (that is placed in
top of frame) like commit 6dfb970d3d ("xdp: avoid leaking info stored in
frame data on page reuse"), and followup commit 97e19cce05 ("bpf:
reserve xdp_frame size in xdp headroom") that reserve this headroom.
These changes also affected how cpumap constructed SKBs, as xdpf->headroom
size changed, the skb data starting point were in-effect shifted with 32
bytes (sizeof xdp_frame). This was still okay, as the cpumap frame_size
calculation also included xdpf->headroom which were reduced by same amount.
A bug was introduced in commit 77ea5f4cbe ("bpf/cpumap: make sure
frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't"), where the
xdpf->headroom became part of the SKB_DATA_ALIGN rounding up. This
round-up to find the frame_size is in principle still correct as it does
not exceed the 2048 bytes frame_size (which is max for ixgbe and i40e),
but the 32 bytes offset of pkt_data_start puts this over the 2048 bytes
limit. This cause skb_shared_info to spill into next frame. It is a little
hard to trigger, as the SKB need to use above 15 skb_shinfo->frags[] as
far as I calculate. This does happen in practise for TCP streams when
skb_try_coalesce() kicks in.
KASAN can be used to detect these wrong memory accesses, I've seen:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_try_coalesce+0x3cb/0x760
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in skb_release_data+0xe2/0x250
Driver veth also construct a SKB from xdp_frame in this way, but is not
affected, as it doesn't reserve/deduct the room (used by xdp_frame) from
the SKB headroom. Instead is clears the pointers via xdp_scrub_frame(),
and allows SKB to use this area.
The fix in this patch is to do like veth and instead allow SKB to (re)use
the area occupied by xdp_frame, by clearing via xdp_scrub_frame(). (This
does kill the idea of the SKB being able to access (mem) info from this
area, but I guess it was a bad idea anyhow, and it was already killed by
the veth changes.)
Fixes: 77ea5f4cbe ("bpf/cpumap: make sure frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently there is a difference in how verifier checks memory access for
helper arguments for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_STACK with regard to
variable part of offset.
check_map_access, that is used for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, can handle variable
offsets just fine, so that BPF program can call a helper like this:
some_helper(map_value_ptr + off, size);
, where offset is unknown at load time, but is checked by program to be
in a safe rage (off >= 0 && off + size < map_value_size).
But it's not the case for check_stack_boundary, that is used for
PTR_TO_STACK, and same code with pointer to stack is rejected by
verifier:
some_helper(stack_value_ptr + off, size);
For example:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0
1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
3: (57) r2 &= 4
4: (17) r2 -= 16
5: (0f) r2 += r10
6: (18) r1 = 0xffff888111343a80
8: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
invalid variable stack read R2 var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4)
Add support for variable offset access to check_stack_boundary so that
if offset is checked by program to be in a safe range it's accepted by
verifier.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The BPF verifier checks the maximum number of call stack frames twice,
first in the main CFG traversal (do_check) and then in a subsequent
traversal (check_max_stack_depth). If the second check fails, it logs a
'verifier bug' warning and errors out, as the number of call stack frames
should have been verified already.
However, the second check may fail without indicating a verifier bug: if
the excessive function calls reside in dead code, the main CFG traversal
may not visit them; the subsequent traversal visits all instructions,
including dead code.
This case raises the question of how invalid dead code should be treated.
This patch implements the conservative option and rejects such code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@orange.com>
Tested-by: Xiao Han <xiao.han@orange.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
syzkaller was able to generate the following UAF in bpf:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in lookup_last fs/namei.c:2269 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in path_lookupat.isra.43+0x9f8/0xc00 fs/namei.c:2318
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c4865c47 by task syz-executor2/9423
CPU: 0 PID: 9423 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-next-20181109+
#110
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.7+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.8+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
lookup_last fs/namei.c:2269 [inline]
path_lookupat.isra.43+0x9f8/0xc00 fs/namei.c:2318
filename_lookup+0x26a/0x520 fs/namei.c:2348
user_path_at_empty+0x40/0x50 fs/namei.c:2608
user_path include/linux/namei.h:62 [inline]
do_mount+0x180/0x1ff0 fs/namespace.c:2980
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3258
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3272 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3269 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3269
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457569
Code: fd b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 cb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fde6ed96c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000457569
RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 000000000072bf00 R08: 0000000020000340 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fde6ed976d4
R13: 00000000004c2c24 R14: 00000000004d4990 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 9424:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3722 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x157/0x760 mm/slab.c:3737
kstrdup+0x39/0x70 mm/util.c:49
bpf_symlink+0x26/0x140 kernel/bpf/inode.c:356
vfs_symlink+0x37a/0x5d0 fs/namei.c:4127
do_symlinkat+0x242/0x2d0 fs/namei.c:4154
__do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4173 [inline]
__se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4171 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlink+0x59/0x80 fs/namei.c:4171
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 9425:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3817
bpf_evict_inode+0x11f/0x150 kernel/bpf/inode.c:565
evict+0x4b9/0x980 fs/inode.c:558
iput_final fs/inode.c:1550 [inline]
iput+0x674/0xa90 fs/inode.c:1576
do_unlinkat+0x733/0xa30 fs/namei.c:4069
__do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4110 [inline]
__se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4108 [inline]
__x64_sys_unlink+0x42/0x50 fs/namei.c:4108
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
In this scenario path lookup under RCU is racing with the final
unlink in case of symlinks. As Linus puts it in his analysis:
[...] We actually RCU-delay the inode freeing itself, but
when we do the final iput(), the "evict()" function is called
synchronously. Now, the simple fix would seem to just RCU-delay
the kfree() of the symlink data in bpf_evict_inode(). Maybe
that's the right thing to do. [...]
Al suggested to piggy-back on the ->destroy_inode() callback in
order to implement RCU deferral there which can then kfree() the
inode->i_link eventually right before putting inode back into
inode cache. By reusing free_inode_nonrcu() from there we can
avoid the need for our own inode cache and just reuse generic
one as we currently do.
And in-fact on top of all this we should just get rid of the
bpf_evict_inode() entirely. This means truncate_inode_pages_final()
and clear_inode() will then simply be called by the fs core via
evict(). Dropping the reference should really only be done when
inode is unhashed and nothing reachable anymore, so it's better
also moved into the final ->destroy_inode() callback.
Fixes: 0f98621bef ("bpf, inode: add support for symlinks and fix mtime/ctime")
Reported-by: syzbot+fb731ca573367b7f6564@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a13e5ead792d6df37818@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+7a8ba368b47fdefca61e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Analyzed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000006946d2057bbd0eef@google.com/T/
Commit 7640ead939 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune
with caller differences") connected up parentage chains of all
frames of the stack. It didn't, however, ensure propagate_liveness()
propagates all liveness information along those chains.
This means pruning happening in the callee may generate explored
states with incomplete liveness for the chains in lower frames
of the stack.
The included selftest is similar to the prior one from commit
7640ead939 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with
caller differences"), where callee would prune regardless of the
difference in r8 state.
Now we also initialize r9 to 0 or 1 based on a result from get_random().
r9 is never read so the walk with r9 = 0 gets pruned (correctly) after
the walk with r9 = 1 completes.
The selftest is so arranged that the pruning will happen in the
callee. Since callee does not propagate read marks of r8, the
explored state at the pruning point prior to the callee will
now ignore r8.
Propagate liveness on all frames of the stack when pruning.
Fixes: f4d7e40a5b ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow looking up a sock_common. This gives eBPF programs
access to timewait and request sockets.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
It's currently not possible to access timewait or request sockets
from eBPF, since there is no way to return a PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON
from a helper. Introduce RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON to enable this
behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
So far, the verifier only acquires reference tracking state for
RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL. Instead of extending this for every
new return type which desires these semantics, acquire reference
tracking state iff the called helper is an acquire function.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Syzkaller hit 'KASAN: use-after-free Write in sanitize_ptr_alu' bug.
Call trace:
dump_stack+0xbf/0x12e
print_address_description+0x6a/0x280
kasan_report+0x237/0x360
sanitize_ptr_alu+0x85a/0x8d0
adjust_ptr_min_max_vals+0x8f2/0x1ca0
adjust_reg_min_max_vals+0x8ed/0x22e0
do_check+0x1ca6/0x5d00
bpf_check+0x9ca/0x2570
bpf_prog_load+0xc91/0x1030
__se_sys_bpf+0x61e/0x1f00
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x550
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fault injection trace:
kfree+0xea/0x290
free_func_state+0x4a/0x60
free_verifier_state+0x61/0xe0
push_stack+0x216/0x2f0 <- inject failslab
sanitize_ptr_alu+0x2b1/0x8d0
adjust_ptr_min_max_vals+0x8f2/0x1ca0
adjust_reg_min_max_vals+0x8ed/0x22e0
do_check+0x1ca6/0x5d00
bpf_check+0x9ca/0x2570
bpf_prog_load+0xc91/0x1030
__se_sys_bpf+0x61e/0x1f00
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x550
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
When kzalloc() fails in push_stack(), free_verifier_state() will free
current verifier state. As push_stack() returns, dst_reg was restored
if ptr_is_dst_reg is false. However, as member of the cur_state,
dst_reg is also freed, and error occurs when dereferencing dst_reg.
Simply fix it by testing ret of push_stack() before restoring dst_reg.
Fixes: 979d63d50c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Naresh reported that test_align fails because of the mismatch at the
verbose printout of the register states. The reason is due to the newly
added ref_obj_id.
ref_obj_id is only useful for refcounted reg. Thus, this patch fixes it
by only printing ref_obj_id for refcounted reg. While at it, it also uses
comma instead of space to separate between "id" and "ref_obj_id".
Fixes: 1b98658968 ("bpf: Fix bpf_tcp_sock and bpf_sk_fullsock issue related to bpf_sk_release")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
It has been observed that sometimes a higher order memory allocation
for BPF maps fails when there is no obvious memory pressure in a system.
E.g. the map (BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH, key=38, value=56, max_elems=524288)
could not be created due to vmalloc unable to allocate 75497472B,
when the system's memory consumption (in MB) was the following:
Total: 3942 Used: 837 (21.24%) Free: 138 Buffers: 239 Cached: 2727
Later analysis [1] by Michal Hocko showed that the vmalloc was not trying
to reclaim memory from the page cache and was failing prematurely due to
__GFP_NORETRY.
Considering dcda9b0471 ("mm, tree wide: replace __GFP_REPEAT by
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL with more useful semantic") and [1], we can replace
__GFP_NORETRY with __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL, as it won't invoke OOM killer
and will try harder to fulfil allocation requests.
Unfortunately, replacing the body of the BPF map memory allocation
function with the kvmalloc_node helper function is not an option at
this point in time, given 1) kmalloc is non-optional for higher order
allocations, and 2) passing __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL to the kmalloc would
stress the slab allocator too much for large requests.
The change has been tested with the workloads mentioned above and by
observing oom_kill value from /proc/vmstat.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190310071318.GW5232@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190318153940.GL8924@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-03-16
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Fix a umem memory leak on cleanup in AF_XDP, from Björn.
2) Fix BTF to properly resolve forward-declared enums into their corresponding
full enum definition types during deduplication, from Andrii.
3) Fix libbpf to reject invalid flags in xsk_socket__create(), from Magnus.
4) Fix accessing invalid pointer returned from bpf_tcp_sock() and
bpf_sk_fullsock() after bpf_sk_release() was called, from Martin.
5) Fix generation of load/store DW instructions in PPC JIT, from Naveen.
6) Various fixes in BPF helper function documentation in bpf.h UAPI header
used to bpf-helpers(7) man page, from Quentin.
7) Fix segfault in BPF test_progs when prog loading failed, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Lorenz Bauer [thanks!] reported that a ptr returned by bpf_tcp_sock(sk)
can still be accessed after bpf_sk_release(sk).
Both bpf_tcp_sock() and bpf_sk_fullsock() have the same issue.
This patch addresses them together.
A simple reproducer looks like this:
sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
/* if (!sk) ... */
tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk);
/* if (!tp) ... */
bpf_sk_release(sk);
snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; /* oops! The verifier does not complain. */
The problem is the verifier did not scrub the register's states of
the tcp_sock ptr (tp) after bpf_sk_release(sk).
[ Note that when calling bpf_tcp_sock(sk), the sk is not always
refcount-acquired. e.g. bpf_tcp_sock(skb->sk). The verifier works
fine for this case. ]
Currently, the verifier does not track if a helper's return ptr (in REG_0)
is "carry"-ing one of its argument's refcount status. To carry this info,
the reg1->id needs to be stored in reg0.
One approach was tried, like "reg0->id = reg1->id", when calling
"bpf_tcp_sock()". The main idea was to avoid adding another "ref_obj_id"
for the same reg. However, overlapping the NULL marking and ref
tracking purpose in one "id" does not work well:
ref_sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(ref_sk);
tp = bpf_tcp_sock(ref_sk);
if (!fullsock) {
bpf_sk_release(ref_sk);
return 0;
}
/* fullsock_reg->id is marked for NOT-NULL.
* Same for tp_reg->id because they have the same id.
*/
/* oops. verifier did not complain about the missing !tp check */
snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
Hence, a new "ref_obj_id" is needed in "struct bpf_reg_state".
With a new ref_obj_id, when bpf_sk_release(sk) is called, the verifier can
scrub all reg states which has a ref_obj_id match. It is done with the
changes in release_reg_references() in this patch.
While fixing it, sk_to_full_sk() is removed from bpf_tcp_sock() and
bpf_sk_fullsock() to avoid these helpers from returning
another ptr. It will make bpf_sk_release(tp) possible:
sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
/* if (!sk) ... */
tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk);
/* if (!tp) ... */
bpf_sk_release(tp);
A separate helper "bpf_get_listener_sock()" will be added in a later
patch to do sk_to_full_sk().
Misc change notes:
- To allow bpf_sk_release(tp), the arg of bpf_sk_release() is changed
from ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET to ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON. ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET
is removed from bpf.h since no helper is using it.
- arg_type_is_refcounted() is renamed to arg_type_may_be_refcounted()
because ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON is the only one and skb->sk is not
refcounted. All bpf_sk_release(), bpf_sk_fullsock() and bpf_tcp_sock()
take ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON.
- check_refcount_ok() ensures is_acquire_function() cannot take
arg_type_may_be_refcounted() as its argument.
- The check_func_arg() can only allow one refcount-ed arg. It is
guaranteed by check_refcount_ok() which ensures at most one arg can be
refcounted. Hence, it is a verifier internal error if >1 refcount arg
found in check_func_arg().
- In release_reference(), release_reference_state() is called
first to ensure a match on "reg->ref_obj_id" can be found before
scrubbing the reg states with release_reg_references().
- reg_is_refcounted() is no longer needed.
1. In mark_ptr_or_null_regs(), its usage is replaced by
"ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id" because,
when is_null == true, release_reference_state() should only be
called on the ref_obj_id obtained by a acquire helper (i.e.
is_acquire_function() == true). Otherwise, the following
would happen:
sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
/* if (!sk) { ... } */
fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);
if (!fullsock) {
/*
* release_reference_state(fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id)
* where fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id == sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
*
* Hence, the following bpf_sk_release(sk) will fail
* because the ref state has already been released in the
* earlier release_reference_state(fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id).
*/
bpf_sk_release(sk);
}
2. In release_reg_references(), the current reg_is_refcounted() call
is unnecessary because the id check is enough.
- The type_is_refcounted() and type_is_refcounted_or_null()
are no longer needed also because reg_is_refcounted() is removed.
Fixes: 655a51e536 ("bpf: Add struct bpf_tcp_sock and BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock")
Reported-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"First batch of fixes in the new merge window:
1) Double dst_cache free in act_tunnel_key, from Wenxu.
2) Avoid NULL deref in IN_DEV_MFORWARD() by failing early in the
ip_route_input_rcu() path, from Paolo Abeni.
3) Fix appletalk compile regression, from Arnd Bergmann.
4) If SLAB objects reach the TCP sendpage method we are in serious
trouble, so put a debugging check there. From Vasily Averin.
5) Memory leak in hsr layer, from Mao Wenan.
6) Only test GSO type on GSO packets, from Willem de Bruijn.
7) Fix crash in xsk_diag_put_umem(), from Eric Dumazet.
8) Fix VNIC mailbox length in nfp, from Dirk van der Merwe.
9) Fix race in ipv4 route exception handling, from Xin Long.
10) Missing DMA memory barrier in hns3 driver, from Jian Shen.
11) Use after free in __tcf_chain_put(), from Vlad Buslov.
12) Handle inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() failures, from Guillaume Nault.
13) Return value correction when ip_mc_may_pull() fails, from Eric
Dumazet.
14) Use after free in x25_device_event(), also from Eric"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (72 commits)
gro_cells: make sure device is up in gro_cells_receive()
vxlan: test dev->flags & IFF_UP before calling gro_cells_receive()
net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_device_event()
isdn: mISDNinfineon: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
net: hns3: fix to stop multiple HNS reset due to the AER changes
ip: fix ip_mc_may_pull() return value
net: keep refcount warning in reqsk_free()
net: stmmac: Avoid one more sometimes uninitialized Clang warning
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Set correct interface mode for CPU/DSA ports
rxrpc: Fix client call queueing, waiting for channel
tcp: handle inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() failures
net: ethernet: sun: Zero initialize class in default case in niu_add_ethtool_tcam_entry
8139too : Add support for U.S. Robotics USR997901A 10/100 Cardbus NIC
fou, fou6: avoid uninit-value in gue_err() and gue6_err()
net: sched: fix potential use-after-free in __tcf_chain_put()
vhost: silence an unused-variable warning
vsock/virtio: fix kernel panic from virtio_transport_reset_no_sock
connector: fix unsafe usage of ->real_parent
vxlan: do not need BH again in vxlan_cleanup()
net: hns3: add dma_rmb() for rx description
...
Non-zero imm value in the second part of the ldimm64 instruction for
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD is invalid, and thus must be rejected. The map fd
only ever sits in the first instructions' imm field. None of the BPF
loaders known to us are using it, so risk of regression is minimal.
For clarity and consistency, the few insn->{src_reg,imm} occurrences
are rewritten into insn[0].{src_reg,imm}. Add a test case to the BPF
selftest suite as well.
Fixes: 0246e64d9a ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Lots of tooling updates - too many to list, here's a few highlights:
- Various subcommand updates to 'perf trace', 'perf report', 'perf
record', 'perf annotate', 'perf script', 'perf test', etc.
- CPU and NUMA topology and affinity handling improvements,
- HW tracing and HW support updates:
- Intel PT updates
- ARM CoreSight updates
- vendor HW event updates
- BPF updates
- Tons of infrastructure updates, both on the build system and the
library support side
- Documentation updates.
- ... and lots of other changes, see the changelog for details.
Kernel side updates:
- Tighten up kprobes blacklist handling, reduce the number of places
where developers can install a kprobe and hang/crash the system.
- Fix/enhance vma address filter handling.
- Various PMU driver updates, small fixes and additions.
- refcount_t conversions
- BPF updates
- error code propagation enhancements
- misc other changes"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (238 commits)
perf script python: Add Python3 support to syscall-counts-by-pid.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to syscall-counts.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to stat-cpi.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to stackcollapse.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to sctop.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to powerpc-hcalls.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to net_dropmonitor.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to mem-phys-addr.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to failed-syscalls-by-pid.py
perf script python: Add Python3 support to netdev-times.py
perf tools: Add perf_exe() helper to find perf binary
perf script: Handle missing fields with -F +..
perf data: Add perf_data__open_dir_data function
perf data: Add perf_data__(create_dir|close_dir) functions
perf data: Fail check_backup in case of error
perf data: Make check_backup work over directories
perf tools: Add rm_rf_perf_data function
perf tools: Add pattern name checking to rm_rf
perf tools: Add depth checking to rm_rf
perf data: Add global path holder
...
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-03-04
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Add AF_XDP support to libbpf. Rationale is to facilitate writing
AF_XDP applications by offering higher-level APIs that hide many
of the details of the AF_XDP uapi. Sample programs are converted
over to this new interface as well, from Magnus.
2) Introduce a new cant_sleep() macro for annotation of functions
that cannot sleep and use it in BPF_PROG_RUN() to assert that
BPF programs run under preemption disabled context, from Peter.
3) Introduce per BPF prog stats in order to monitor the usage
of BPF; this is controlled by kernel.bpf_stats_enabled sysctl
knob where monitoring tools can make use of this to efficiently
determine the average cost of programs, from Alexei.
4) Split up BPF selftest's test_progs similarly as we already
did with test_verifier. This allows to further reduce merge
conflicts in future and to get more structure into our
quickly growing BPF selftest suite, from Stanislav.
5) Fix a bug in BTF's dedup algorithm which can cause an infinite
loop in some circumstances; also various BPF doc fixes and
improvements, from Andrii.
6) Various BPF sample cleanups and migration to libbpf in order
to further isolate the old sample loader code (so we can get
rid of it at some point), from Jakub.
7) Add a new BPF helper for BPF cgroup skb progs that allows
to set ECN CE code point and a Host Bandwidth Manager (HBM)
sample program for limiting the bandwidth used by v2 cgroups,
from Lawrence.
8) Enable write access to skb->queue_mapping from tc BPF egress
programs in order to let BPF pick TX queue, from Jesper.
9) Fix a bug in BPF spinlock handling for map-in-map which did
not propagate spin_lock_off to the meta map, from Yonghong.
10) Fix a bug in the new per-CPU BPF prog counters to properly
initialize stats for each CPU, from Eric.
11) Add various BPF helper prototypes to selftest's bpf_helpers.h,
from Willem.
12) Fix various BPF samples bugs in XDP and tracing progs,
from Toke, Daniel and Yonghong.
13) Silence preemption splat in test_bpf after BPF_PROG_RUN()
enforces it now everywhere, from Anders.
14) Fix a signedness bug in libbpf's btf_dedup_ref_type() to
get error handling working, from Dan.
15) Fix bpftool documentation and auto-completion with regards
to stream_{verdict,parser} attach types, from Alban.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Marek reported that he saw an issue with the below snippet in that
timing measurements where off when loaded as unpriv while results
were reasonable when loaded as privileged:
[...]
uint64_t a = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
uint64_t b = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
uint64_t delta = b - a;
if ((int64_t)delta > 0) {
[...]
Turns out there is a bug where a corner case is missing in the fix
d3bd7413e0 ("bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar
type from different paths"), namely fixup_bpf_calls() only checks
whether aux has a non-zero alu_state, but it also needs to test for
the case of BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER since in both occasions we need to
skip the masking rewrite (as there is nothing to mask).
Fixes: d3bd7413e0 ("bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths")
Reported-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Reported-by: Arthur Fabre <afabre@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJPywTJqP34cK20iLM5YmUMz9KXQOdu1-+BZrGMAGgLuBWz7fg@mail.gmail.com/T/
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
We need to iterate through all possible cpus.
Fixes: 492ecee892 ("bpf: enable program stats")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
In bpf/syscall.c, map_create() first set map->usercnt to 1, a file
descriptor is supposed to return to userspace. When bpf_map_new_fd()
fails, drop the refcount.
Fixes: bd5f5f4ecb ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID")
Signed-off-by: Peng Sun <sironhide0null@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Commit d83525ca62 ("bpf: introduce bpf_spin_lock")
introduced bpf_spin_lock and the field spin_lock_off
in kernel internal structure bpf_map has the following
meaning:
>=0 valid offset, <0 error
For every map created, the kernel will ensure
spin_lock_off has correct value.
Currently, bpf_map->spin_lock_off is not copied
from the inner map to the map_in_map inner_map_meta
during a map_in_map type map creation, so
inner_map_meta->spin_lock_off = 0.
This will give verifier wrong information that
inner_map has bpf_spin_lock and the bpf_spin_lock
is defined at offset 0. An access to offset 0
of a value pointer will trigger the following error:
bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store
This patch fixed the issue by copy inner map's spin_lock_off
value to inner_map_meta->spin_lock_off.
Fixes: d83525ca62 ("bpf: introduce bpf_spin_lock")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Return bpf program run_time_ns and run_cnt via bpf_prog_info
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
JITed BPF programs are indistinguishable from kernel functions, but unlike
kernel code BPF code can be changed often.
Typical approach of "perf record" + "perf report" profiling and tuning of
kernel code works just as well for BPF programs, but kernel code doesn't
need to be monitored whereas BPF programs do.
Users load and run large amount of BPF programs.
These BPF stats allow tools monitor the usage of BPF on the server.
The monitoring tools will turn sysctl kernel.bpf_stats_enabled
on and off for few seconds to sample average cost of the programs.
Aggregated data over hours and days will provide an insight into cost of BPF
and alarms can trigger in case given program suddenly gets more expensive.
The cost of two sched_clock() per program invocation adds ~20 nsec.
Fast BPF progs (like selftests/bpf/progs/test_pkt_access.c) will slow down
from ~10 nsec to ~30 nsec.
static_key minimizes the cost of the stats collection.
There is no measurable difference before/after this patch
with kernel.bpf_stats_enabled=0
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
In bpf/syscall.c, bpf_map_get_fd_by_id() use bpf_map_inc_not_zero()
to increase the refcount, both map->refcnt and map->usercnt. Then, if
bpf_map_new_fd() fails, should handle map->usercnt too.
Fixes: bd5f5f4ecb ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID")
Signed-off-by: Peng Sun <sironhide0null@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Three conflicts, one of which, for marvell10g.c is non-trivial and
requires some follow-up from Heiner or someone else.
The issue is that Heiner converted the marvell10g driver over to
use the generic c45 code as much as possible.
However, in 'net' a bug fix appeared which makes sure that a new
local mask (MDIO_AN_10GBT_CTRL_ADV_NBT_MASK) with value 0x01e0
is cleared.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
trie_delete_elem() was deleting an entry even though it was not matching
if the prefixlen was correct. This patch adds a check on matchlen.
Reproducer:
$ sudo bpftool map create /sys/fs/bpf/mylpm type lpm_trie key 8 value 1 entries 128 name mylpm flags 1
$ sudo bpftool map update pinned /sys/fs/bpf/mylpm key hex 10 00 00 00 aa bb cc dd value hex 01
$ sudo bpftool map dump pinned /sys/fs/bpf/mylpm
key: 10 00 00 00 aa bb cc dd value: 01
Found 1 element
$ sudo bpftool map delete pinned /sys/fs/bpf/mylpm key hex 10 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff
$ echo $?
0
$ sudo bpftool map dump pinned /sys/fs/bpf/mylpm
Found 0 elements
A similar reproducer is added in the selftests.
Without the patch:
$ sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_lpm_map
test_lpm_map: test_lpm_map.c:485: test_lpm_delete: Assertion `bpf_map_delete_elem(map_fd, key) == -1 && errno == ENOENT' failed.
Aborted
With the patch: test_lpm_map runs without errors.
Fixes: e454cf5958 ("bpf: Implement map_delete_elem for BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE")
Cc: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-02-16
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) numerous libbpf API improvements, from Andrii, Andrey, Yonghong.
2) test all bpf progs in alu32 mode, from Jiong.
3) skb->sk access and bpf_sk_fullsock(), bpf_tcp_sock() helpers, from Martin.
4) support for IP encap in lwt bpf progs, from Peter.
5) remove XDP_QUERY_XSK_UMEM dead code, from Jan.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently bpf_offload_dev does not have any priv pointer, forcing
the drivers to work backwards from the netdev in program metadata.
This is not great given programs are conceptually associated with
the offload device, and it means one or two unnecessary deferences.
Add a priv pointer to bpf_offload_dev.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This patch adds a helper function BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock and it
is currently available for cg_skb and sched_(cls|act):
struct bpf_tcp_sock *bpf_tcp_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk);
int cg_skb_foo(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
struct bpf_tcp_sock *tp;
struct bpf_sock *sk;
__u32 snd_cwnd;
sk = skb->sk;
if (!sk)
return 1;
tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk);
if (!tp)
return 1;
snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
/* ... */
return 1;
}
A 'struct bpf_tcp_sock' is also added to the uapi bpf.h to provide
read-only access. bpf_tcp_sock has all the existing tcp_sock's fields
that has already been exposed by the bpf_sock_ops.
i.e. no new tcp_sock's fields are exposed in bpf.h.
This helper returns a pointer to the tcp_sock. If it is not a tcp_sock
or it cannot be traced back to a tcp_sock by sk_to_full_sk(), it
returns NULL. Hence, the caller needs to check for NULL before
accessing it.
The current use case is to expose members from tcp_sock
to allow a cg_skb_bpf_prog to provide per cgroup traffic
policing/shaping.
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In kernel, it is common to check "skb->sk && sk_fullsock(skb->sk)"
before accessing the fields in sock. For example, in __netdev_pick_tx:
static u16 __netdev_pick_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *sb_dev)
{
/* ... */
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
if (queue_index != new_index && sk &&
sk_fullsock(sk) &&
rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_dst_cache))
sk_tx_queue_set(sk, new_index);
/* ... */
return queue_index;
}
This patch adds a "struct bpf_sock *sk" pointer to the "struct __sk_buff"
where a few of the convert_ctx_access() in filter.c has already been
accessing the skb->sk sock_common's fields,
e.g. sock_ops_convert_ctx_access().
"__sk_buff->sk" is a PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL in the verifier.
Some of the fileds in "bpf_sock" will not be directly
accessible through the "__sk_buff->sk" pointer. It is limited
by the new "bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access()".
e.g. The existing "type", "protocol", "mark" and "priority" in bpf_sock
are not allowed.
The newly added "struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_fullsock(struct bpf_sock *sk)"
can be used to get a sk with all accessible fields in "bpf_sock".
This helper is added to both cg_skb and sched_(cls|act).
int cg_skb_foo(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
struct bpf_sock *sk;
sk = skb->sk;
if (!sk)
return 1;
sk = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);
if (!sk)
return 1;
if (sk->family != AF_INET6 || sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
return 1;
/* some_traffic_shaping(); */
return 1;
}
(1) The sk is read only
(2) There is no new "struct bpf_sock_common" introduced.
(3) Future kernel sock's members could be added to bpf_sock only
instead of repeatedly adding at multiple places like currently
in bpf_sock_ops_md, bpf_sock_addr_md, sk_reuseport_md...etc.
(4) After "sk = skb->sk", the reg holding sk is in type
PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL.
(5) After bpf_sk_fullsock(), the return type will be in type
PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL which is the same as the return type of
bpf_sk_lookup_xxx().
However, bpf_sk_fullsock() does not take refcnt. The
acquire_reference_state() is only depending on the return type now.
To avoid it, a new is_acquire_function() is checked before calling
acquire_reference_state().
(6) The WARN_ON in "release_reference_state()" is no longer an
internal verifier bug.
When reg->id is not found in state->refs[], it means the
bpf_prog does something wrong like
"bpf_sk_release(bpf_sk_fullsock(skb->sk))" where reference has
never been acquired by calling "bpf_sk_fullsock(skb->sk)".
A -EINVAL and a verbose are done instead of WARN_ON. A test is
added to the test_verifier in a later patch.
Since the WARN_ON in "release_reference_state()" is no longer
needed, "__release_reference_state()" is folded into
"release_reference_state()" also.
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
An ipvlan bug fix in 'net' conflicted with the abstraction away
of the IPV6 specific support in 'net-next'.
Similarly, a bug fix for mlx5 in 'net' conflicted with the flow
action conversion in 'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce BPF_F_LOCK flag for map_lookup and map_update syscall commands
and for map_update() helper function.
In all these cases take a lock of existing element (which was provided
in BTF description) before copying (in or out) the rest of map value.
Implementation details that are part of uapi:
Array:
The array map takes the element lock for lookup/update.
Hash:
hash map also takes the lock for lookup/update and tries to avoid the bucket lock.
If old element exists it takes the element lock and updates the element in place.
If element doesn't exist it allocates new one and inserts into hash table
while holding the bucket lock.
In rare case the hashmap has to take both the bucket lock and the element lock
to update old value in place.
Cgroup local storage:
It is similar to array. update in place and lookup are done with lock taken.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Introduce 'struct bpf_spin_lock' and bpf_spin_lock/unlock() helpers to let
bpf program serialize access to other variables.
Example:
struct hash_elem {
int cnt;
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
};
struct hash_elem * val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&hash_map, &key);
if (val) {
bpf_spin_lock(&val->lock);
val->cnt++;
bpf_spin_unlock(&val->lock);
}
Restrictions and safety checks:
- bpf_spin_lock is only allowed inside HASH and ARRAY maps.
- BTF description of the map is mandatory for safety analysis.
- bpf program can take one bpf_spin_lock at a time, since two or more can
cause dead locks.
- only one 'struct bpf_spin_lock' is allowed per map element.
It drastically simplifies implementation yet allows bpf program to use
any number of bpf_spin_locks.
- when bpf_spin_lock is taken the calls (either bpf2bpf or helpers) are not allowed.
- bpf program must bpf_spin_unlock() before return.
- bpf program can access 'struct bpf_spin_lock' only via
bpf_spin_lock()/bpf_spin_unlock() helpers.
- load/store into 'struct bpf_spin_lock lock;' field is not allowed.
- to use bpf_spin_lock() helper the BTF description of map value must be
a struct and have 'struct bpf_spin_lock anyname;' field at the top level.
Nested lock inside another struct is not allowed.
- syscall map_lookup doesn't copy bpf_spin_lock field to user space.
- syscall map_update and program map_update do not update bpf_spin_lock field.
- bpf_spin_lock cannot be on the stack or inside networking packet.
bpf_spin_lock can only be inside HASH or ARRAY map value.
- bpf_spin_lock is available to root only and to all program types.
- bpf_spin_lock is not allowed in inner maps of map-in-map.
- ld_abs is not allowed inside spin_lock-ed region.
- tracing progs and socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock due to
insufficient preemption checks
Implementation details:
- cgroup-bpf class of programs can nest with xdp/tc programs.
Hence bpf_spin_lock is equivalent to spin_lock_irqsave.
Other solutions to avoid nested bpf_spin_lock are possible.
Like making sure that all networking progs run with softirq disabled.
spin_lock_irqsave is the simplest and doesn't add overhead to the
programs that don't use it.
- arch_spinlock_t is used when its implemented as queued_spin_lock
- archs can force their own arch_spinlock_t
- on architectures where queued_spin_lock is not available and
sizeof(arch_spinlock_t) != sizeof(__u32) trivial lock is used.
- presence of bpf_spin_lock inside map value could have been indicated via
extra flag during map_create, but specifying it via BTF is cleaner.
It provides introspection for map key/value and reduces user mistakes.
Next steps:
- allow bpf_spin_lock in other map types (like cgroup local storage)
- introduce BPF_F_LOCK flag for bpf_map_update() syscall and helper
to request kernel to grab bpf_spin_lock before rewriting the value.
That will serialize access to map elements.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The map_lookup_elem used to not acquiring spinlock
in order to optimize the reader.
It was true until commit 557c0c6e7d ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
The syscall's map_lookup_elem(stackmap) calls bpf_stackmap_copy().
bpf_stackmap_copy() may find the elem no longer needed after the copy is done.
If that is the case, pcpu_freelist_push() saves this elem for reuse later.
This push requires a spinlock.
If a tracing bpf_prog got run in the middle of the syscall's
map_lookup_elem(stackmap) and this tracing bpf_prog is calling
bpf_get_stackid(stackmap) which also requires the same pcpu_freelist's
spinlock, it may end up with a dead lock situation as reported by
Eric Dumazet in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1030266/
The situation is the same as the syscall's map_update_elem() which
needs to acquire the pcpu_freelist's spinlock and could race
with tracing bpf_prog. Hence, this patch fixes it by protecting
bpf_stackmap_copy() with this_cpu_inc(bpf_prog_active)
to prevent tracing bpf_prog from running.
A later syscall's map_lookup_elem commit f1a2e44a3a ("bpf: add queue and stack maps")
also acquires a spinlock and races with tracing bpf_prog similarly.
Hence, this patch is forward looking and protects the majority
of the map lookups. bpf_map_offload_lookup_elem() is the exception
since it is for network bpf_prog only (i.e. never called by tracing
bpf_prog).
Fixes: 557c0c6e7d ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Disabled preemption is necessary for proper access to per-cpu maps
from BPF programs.
But the sender side of socket filters didn't have preemption disabled:
unix_dgram_sendmsg->sk_filter->sk_filter_trim_cap->bpf_prog_run_save_cb->BPF_PROG_RUN
and a combination of af_packet with tun device didn't disable either:
tpacket_snd->packet_direct_xmit->packet_pick_tx_queue->ndo_select_queue->
tun_select_queue->tun_ebpf_select_queue->bpf_prog_run_clear_cb->BPF_PROG_RUN
Disable preemption before executing BPF programs (both classic and extended).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Building with W=1 reveals some bitrot:
CC kernel/bpf/cgroup.o
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:238: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in '__cgroup_bpf_attach'
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:367: warning: Function parameter or member 'unused_flags' not described in '__cgroup_bpf_detach'
Add a kerneldoc line for 'flags'.
Fixing the warning for 'unused_flags' is best approached by
removing the unused parameter on the function call.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Over the years, the function signature has changed, but the
kerneldoc block hasn't.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Current implementation does not allow typedef func_proto.
But it is actually allowed.
-bash-4.4$ cat t.c
typedef int (f) (int);
f *g;
-bash-4.4$ clang -O2 -g -c -target bpf t.c -Xclang -target-feature -Xclang +dwarfris
-bash-4.4$ pahole -JV t.o
File t.o:
[1] PTR (anon) type_id=2
[2] TYPEDEF f type_id=3
[3] FUNC_PROTO (anon) return=4 args=(4 (anon))
[4] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED
-bash-4.4$
This patch related btf verifier to allow such (typedef func_proto)
patterns.
Fixes: 2667a2626f ("bpf: btf: Add BTF_KIND_FUNC and BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-01-29
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Teach verifier dead code removal, this also allows for optimizing /
removing conditional branches around dead code and to shrink the
resulting image. Code store constrained architectures like nfp would
have hard time doing this at JIT level, from Jakub.
2) Add JMP32 instructions to BPF ISA in order to allow for optimizing
code generation for 32-bit sub-registers. Evaluation shows that this
can result in code reduction of ~5-20% compared to 64 bit-only code
generation. Also add implementation for most JITs, from Jiong.
3) Add support for __int128 types in BTF which is also needed for
vmlinux's BTF conversion to work, from Yonghong.
4) Add a new command to bpftool in order to dump a list of BPF-related
parameters from the system or for a specific network device e.g. in
terms of available prog/map types or helper functions, from Quentin.
5) Add AF_XDP sock_diag interface for querying sockets from user
space which provides information about the RX/TX/fill/completion
rings, umem, memory usage etc, from Björn.
6) Add skb context access for skb_shared_info->gso_segs field, from Eric.
7) Add support for testing flow dissector BPF programs by extending
existing BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN infrastructure, from Stanislav.
8) Split BPF kselftest's test_verifier into various subgroups of tests
in order better deal with merge conflicts in this area, from Jakub.
9) Add support for queue/stack manipulations in bpftool, from Stanislav.
10) Document BTF, from Yonghong.
11) Dump supported ELF section names in libbpf on program load
failure, from Taeung.
12) Silence a false positive compiler warning in verifier's BTF
handling, from Peter.
13) Fix help string in bpftool's feature probing, from Prashant.
14) Remove duplicate includes in BPF kselftests, from Yue.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds JIT blinds support for JMP32.
Like BPF_JMP_REG/IMM, JMP32 version are needed for building raw bpf insn.
They are added to both include/linux/filter.h and
tools/include/linux/filter.h.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch implements interpreting new JMP32 instructions.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch teaches disassembler about JMP32. There are two places to
update:
- Class 0x6 now used by BPF_JMP32, not "unused".
- BPF_JMP32 need to show comparison operands properly.
The disassemble format is to add an extra "(32)" before the operands if
it is a sub-register. A better disassemble format for both JMP32 and
ALU32 just show the register prefix as "w" instead of "r", this is the
format using by LLVM assembler.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch teach verifier about the new BPF_JMP32 instruction class.
Verifier need to treat it similar as the existing BPF_JMP class.
A BPF_JMP32 insn needs to go through all checks that have been done on
BPF_JMP.
Also, verifier is doing runtime optimizations based on the extra info
conditional jump instruction could offer, especially when the comparison is
between constant and register that the value range of the register could be
improved based on the comparison results. These code are updated
accordingly.
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The current min/max code does both signed and unsigned comparisons against
the input argument "val" which is "u64" and there is explicit type casting
when the comparison is signed.
As we will need slightly more complexer type casting when JMP32 introduced,
it is better to host the signed type casting. This makes the code more
clean with ignorable runtime overhead.
Also, code for J*GE/GT/LT/LE and JEQ/JNE are very similar, this patch
combine them.
The main purpose for this refactor is to make sure the min/max code will
still be readable and with minimum code duplication after JMP32 introduced.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Let offload JITs know when instructions are replaced and optimized
out, so they can update their state appropriately. The optimizations
are best effort, if JIT returns an error from any callback verifier
will stop notifying it as state may now be out of sync, but the
verifier continues making progress.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The communication between the verifier and advanced JITs is based
on instruction indexes. We have to keep them stable throughout
the optimizations otherwise referring to a particular instruction
gets messy quickly.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Unconditional branches by 0 instructions are basically noops
but they can result from earlier optimizations, e.g. a conditional
jumps which would never be taken or a conditional jump around
dead code.
Remove those branches.
v0.2:
- s/opt_remove_dead_branches/opt_remove_nops/ (Jiong).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Instead of overwriting dead code with jmp -1 instructions
remove it completely for root. Adjust verifier state and
line info appropriately.
v2:
- adjust func_info (Alexei);
- make sure first instruction retains line info (Alexei).
v4: (Yonghong)
- remove unnecessary if (!insn to remove) checks;
- always keep last line info if first live instruction lacks one.
v5: (Martin Lau)
- improve and clarify comments.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Loading programs with dead code becomes more and more
common, as people begin to patch constants at load time.
Turn conditional jumps to unconditional ones, to avoid
potential branch misprediction penalty.
This optimization is enabled for privileged users only.
For branches which just fall through we could just mark
them as not seen and have dead code removal take care of
them, but that seems less clean.
v0.2:
- don't call capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) twice (Jiong).
v3:
- fix GCC warning;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In preparation for code removal change parameters to branch
and call adjustment functions to be more universal. The
current parameters assume we are patching a single instruction
with a longer set.
A diagram may help reading the change, this is for the patch
single case, patching instruction 1 with a replacement of 4:
____
0 |____|
1 |____| <-- pos ^
2 | | <-- end old ^ |
3 | | | delta | len
4 |____| | | (patch region)
5 | | <-- end new v v
6 |____|
end_old = pos + 1
end_new = pos + delta + 1
If we are before the patch region - curr variable and the target
are fully in old coordinates (hence comparing against end_old).
If we are after the region curr is in new coordinates (hence
the comparison to end_new) but target is in mixed coordinates,
so we just check if it falls before end_new, and if so it needs
the adjustment.
Note that we will not fix up branches which land in removed region
in case of removal, which should be okay, as we are only going to
remove dead code.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
For better performance analysis of BPF programs, this patch introduces
PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT, a new perf_event_type that exposes BPF program
load/unload information to user space.
Each BPF program may contain up to BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS (256) sub programs.
The following example shows kernel symbols for a BPF program with 7 sub
programs:
ffffffffa0257cf9 t bpf_prog_b07ccb89267cf242_F
ffffffffa02592e1 t bpf_prog_2dcecc18072623fc_F
ffffffffa025b0e9 t bpf_prog_bb7a405ebaec5d5c_F
ffffffffa025dd2c t bpf_prog_a7540d4a39ec1fc7_F
ffffffffa025fcca t bpf_prog_05762d4ade0e3737_F
ffffffffa026108f t bpf_prog_db4bd11e35df90d4_F
ffffffffa0263f00 t bpf_prog_89d64e4abf0f0126_F
ffffffffa0257cf9 t bpf_prog_ae31629322c4b018__dummy_tracepoi
When a bpf program is loaded, PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL is generated for each
of these sub programs. Therefore, PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT is not needed
for simple profiling.
For annotation, user space need to listen to PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT and
gather more information about these (sub) programs via sys_bpf.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradeaed.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190117161521.1341602-4-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough
and this place in the code produced a warnings (W=1).
This commit removes the following warning:
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:719:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Initially in commit 69b693f0ae ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format
(BTF)") the function 'btf_name_offset_valid' was introduced as static
function it was later on changed to a non-static one, and then finally
in commit 23127b33ec ("bpf: Create a new btf_name_by_offset() for
non type name use case") the function prototype was removed.
Revert back to original implementation and make the function static.
Remove warning triggered with W=1:
kernel/bpf/btf.c:470:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'btf_name_offset_valid' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Fixes: 23127b33ec ("bpf: Create a new btf_name_by_offset() for non type name use case")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
When returning BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP from stack_map_get_build_id_offset,
make sure that build_id field is empty. Since we are using percpu
free list, there is a possibility that we might reuse some previous
bpf_stack_build_id with non-zero build_id.
Fixes: 615755a77b ("bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address")
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Build-id length is not fixed to 20, it can be (`man ld` /--build-id):
* 128-bit (uuid)
* 160-bit (sha1)
* any length specified in ld --build-id=0xhexstring
To fix the issue of missing BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID for shorter build-ids,
assume that build-id is somewhere in the range of 1 .. 20.
Set the remaining bytes to zero.
v2:
* don't introduce new "len = min(BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE, nhdr->n_descsz)",
we already know that nhdr->n_descsz <= BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE if we enter
this 'if' condition
Fixes: 615755a77b ("bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address")
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
An older GCC compiler complains:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function 'bpf_check':
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4***:13: error: 'prev_offset' may be used uninitialized
in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
} else if (krecord[i].insn_offset <= prev_offset) {
^
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4***:38: note: 'prev_offset' was declared here
u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size, prev_offset;
Although the compiler is wrong here, the patch makes sure
that prev_offset is always initialized, just to silence the warning.
v2: fix a spelling error in the commit message.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Currently, btf only supports up to 64-bit integer.
On the other hand, 128bit support for gcc and clang
has existed for a long time. For example, both gcc 4.8
and llvm 3.7 supports types "__int128" and
"unsigned __int128" for virtually all 64bit architectures
including bpf.
The requirement for __int128 support comes from two areas:
. bpf program may use __int128. For example, some bcc tools
(https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/tree/master/tools),
mostly tcp v6 related, tcpstates.py, tcpaccept.py, etc.,
are using __int128 to represent the ipv6 addresses.
. linux itself is using __int128 types. Hence supporting
__int128 type in BTF is required for vmlinux BTF,
which will be used by "compile once and run everywhere"
and other projects.
For 128bit integer, instead of base-10, hex numbers are pretty
printed out as large decimal number is hard to decipher, e.g.,
for ipv6 addresses.
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Commit 9d5f9f701b ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types
with kind_flag") introduced kind_flag and used bitfield_size
in the btf_member to directly pretty print member values.
The commit contained a bug where the incorrect parameters could be
passed to function btf_bitfield_seq_show(). The bits_offset
parameter in the function expects a value less than 8.
Instead, the member offset in the structure is passed.
The below is btf_bitfield_seq_show() func signature:
void btf_bitfield_seq_show(void *data, u8 bits_offset,
u8 nr_bits, struct seq_file *m)
both bits_offset and nr_bits are u8 type. If the bitfield
member offset is greater than 256, incorrect value will
be printed.
This patch fixed the issue by calculating correct proper
data offset and bits_offset similar to non kind_flag case.
Fixes: 9d5f9f701b ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types with kind_flag")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
As Naresh reported, test_stacktrace_build_id() causes panic on i386 and
arm32 systems. This is caused by page_address() returns NULL in certain
cases.
This patch fixes this error by using kmap_atomic/kunmap_atomic instead
of page_address.
Fixes: 615755a77b (" bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
While 979d63d50c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In check_map_access() we probe actual bounds through __check_map_access()
with offset of reg->smin_value + off for lower bound and offset of
reg->umax_value + off for the upper bound. However, even though the
reg->smin_value could have a negative value, the final result of the
sum with off could be positive when pointer arithmetic with known and
unknown scalars is combined. In this case we reject the program with
an error such as "R<x> min value is negative, either use unsigned index
or do a if (index >=0) check." even though the access itself would be
fine. Therefore extend the check to probe whether the actual resulting
reg->smin_value + off is less than zero.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is
negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic
with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every
map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is
unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or
positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should
be very small.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with
a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is
rejected for unprivileged program loads. This is analog to map
value pointer arithmetic and needed for masking later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a
map value pointer as a destination it will simulate a check_map_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected
for unprivileged program loads. We use this later on for masking any
pointer arithmetic with the remainder of the map value space. The
likelihood of breaking any existing real-world unprivileged eBPF
program is very small for this corner case.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as
well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able
to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in
bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding
will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination
register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the
verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note,
ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run()
into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs
for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF
interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use
it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later
on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into
the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various
helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put
this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only
to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later
on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-12-21
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
There is a merge conflict in test_verifier.c. Result looks as follows:
[...]
},
{
"calls: cross frame pruning",
.insns = {
[...]
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.errstr_unpriv = "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr = "!read_ok",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"jset: functional",
.insns = {
[...]
{
"jset: unknown const compare not taken",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_0, 1, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.errstr_unpriv = "!read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr = "!read_ok",
.result = REJECT,
},
[...]
{
"jset: range",
.insns = {
[...]
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
The main changes are:
1) Various BTF related improvements in order to get line info
working. Meaning, verifier will now annotate the corresponding
BPF C code to the error log, from Martin and Yonghong.
2) Implement support for raw BPF tracepoints in modules, from Matt.
3) Add several improvements to verifier state logic, namely speeding
up stacksafe check, optimizations for stack state equivalence
test and safety checks for liveness analysis, from Alexei.
4) Teach verifier to make use of BPF_JSET instruction, add several
test cases to kselftests and remove nfp specific JSET optimization
now that verifier has awareness, from Jakub.
5) Improve BPF verifier's slot_type marking logic in order to
allow more stack slot sharing, from Jiong.
6) Add sk_msg->size member for context access and add set of fixes
and improvements to make sock_map with kTLS usable with openssl
based applications, from John.
7) Several cleanups and documentation updates in bpftool as well as
auto-mount of tracefs for "bpftool prog tracelog" command,
from Quentin.
8) Include sub-program tags from now on in bpf_prog_info in order to
have a reliable way for user space to get all tags of the program
e.g. needed for kallsyms correlation, from Song.
9) Add BTF annotations for cgroup_local_storage BPF maps and
implement bpf fs pretty print support, from Roman.
10) Fix bpftool in order to allow for cross-compilation, from Ivan.
11) Update of bpftool license to GPLv2-only + BSD-2-Clause in order
to be compatible with libbfd and allow for Debian packaging,
from Jakub.
12) Remove an obsolete prog->aux sanitation in dump and get rid of
version check for prog load, from Daniel.
13) Fix a memory leak in libbpf's line info handling, from Prashant.
14) Fix cpumap's frame alignment for build_skb() so that skb_shared_info
does not get unaligned, from Jesper.
15) Fix test_progs kselftest to work with older compilers which are less
smart in optimizing (and thus throwing build error), from Stanislav.
16) Cleanup and simplify AF_XDP socket teardown, from Björn.
17) Fix sk lookup in BPF kselftest's test_sock_addr with regards
to netns_id argument, from Andrey.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The frame_size passed to build_skb must be aligned, else it is
possible that the embedded struct skb_shared_info gets unaligned.
For correctness make sure that xdpf->headroom in included in the
alignment. No upstream drivers can hit this, as all XDP drivers provide
an aligned headroom. This was discovered when playing with implementing
XDP support for mvneta, which have a 2 bytes DSA header, and this
Marvell ARM64 platform didn't like doing atomic operations on an
unaligned skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref addresses.
Fixes: 1c601d829a ("bpf: cpumap xdp_buff to skb conversion and allocation")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Lots of conflicts, by happily all cases of overlapping
changes, parallel adds, things of that nature.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell, Saeed Mahameed, and others
for their guidance in these resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reorder the calls to check_max_stack_depth() and sanitize_dead_code()
to separate functions which can rewrite instructions from pure checks.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Some JITs (nfp) try to optimize code on their own. It could make
sense in case of BPF_JSET instruction which is currently not interpreted
by the verifier, meaning for instance that dead could would not be
detected if it was under BPF_JSET branch.
Teach the verifier basics of BPF_JSET, JIT optimizations will be
removed shortly.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This patch rejects a line_info if the bpf insn code referred by
line_info.insn_off is 0. F.e. a broken userspace tool might generate
a line_info.insn_off that points to the second 8 bytes of a BPF_LD_IMM64.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Current btf internal verbose logger logs fwd type as
[2] FWD A type_id=0
where A is the type name.
Commit 9d5f9f701b ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types
with kind_flag") introduced kind_flag which can be used
to distinguish whether a forward type is a struct or
union.
Also, "type_id=0" does not carry any meaningful
information for fwd type as btf_type.type = 0 is simply
enforced during btf verification and is not used
anywhere else.
This commit changed the log to
[2] FWD A struct
if kind_flag = 0, or
[2] FWD A union
if kind_flag = 1.
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Verifier is supposed to support sharing stack slot allocated to ptr with
SCALAR_VALUE for privileged program. However this doesn't happen for some
cases.
The reason is verifier is not clearing slot_type STACK_SPILL for all bytes,
it only clears part of them, while verifier is using:
slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL
as a convention to check one slot is ptr type.
So, the consequence of partial clearing slot_type is verifier could treat a
partially overridden ptr slot, which should now be a SCALAR_VALUE slot,
still as ptr slot, and rejects some valid programs.
Before this patch, test_xdp_noinline.o under bpf selftests, bpf_lxc.o and
bpf_netdev.o under Cilium bpf repo, when built with -mattr=+alu32 are
rejected due to this issue. After this patch, they all accepted.
There is no processed insn number change before and after this patch on
Cilium bpf programs.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Distributions build drivers as modules, including network and filesystem
drivers which export numerous tracepoints. This enables
bpf(BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN) to attach to those tracepoints.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Commit 970289fc0a83 ("bpf: add bpffs pretty print for cgroup
local storage maps") added bpffs pretty print for cgroup
local storage maps. The commit worked for struct without kind_flag
set.
This patch refactored and made pretty print also work
with kind_flag set for the struct.
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This patch fixed two issues with BTF. One is related to
struct/union bitfield encoding and the other is related to
forward type.
Issue #1 and solution:
======================
Current btf encoding of bitfield follows what pahole generates.
For each bitfield, pahole will duplicate the type chain and
put the bitfield size at the final int or enum type.
Since the BTF enum type cannot encode bit size,
pahole workarounds the issue by generating
an int type whenever the enum bit size is not 32.
For example,
-bash-4.4$ cat t.c
typedef int ___int;
enum A { A1, A2, A3 };
struct t {
int a[5];
___int b:4;
volatile enum A c:4;
} g;
-bash-4.4$ gcc -c -O2 -g t.c
The current kernel supports the following BTF encoding:
$ pahole -JV t.o
[1] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=2
[2] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED
[3] ENUM A size=4 vlen=3
A1 val=0
A2 val=1
A3 val=2
[4] STRUCT t size=24 vlen=3
a type_id=5 bits_offset=0
b type_id=9 bits_offset=160
c type_id=11 bits_offset=164
[5] ARRAY (anon) type_id=2 index_type_id=2 nr_elems=5
[6] INT sizetype size=8 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=64 encoding=(none)
[7] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=3
[8] INT int size=1 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=4 encoding=(none)
[9] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=8
[10] INT (anon) size=1 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=4 encoding=SIGNED
[11] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=10
Two issues are in the above:
. by changing enum type to int, we lost the original
type information and this will not be ideal later
when we try to convert BTF to a header file.
. the type duplication for bitfields will cause
BTF bloat. Duplicated types cannot be deduplicated
later if the bitfield size is different.
To fix this issue, this patch implemented a compatible
change for BTF struct type encoding:
. the bit 31 of struct_type->info, previously reserved,
now is used to indicate whether bitfield_size is
encoded in btf_member or not.
. if bit 31 of struct_type->info is set,
btf_member->offset will encode like:
bit 0 - 23: bit offset
bit 24 - 31: bitfield size
if bit 31 is not set, the old behavior is preserved:
bit 0 - 31: bit offset
So if the struct contains a bit field, the maximum bit offset
will be reduced to (2^24 - 1) instead of MAX_UINT. The maximum
bitfield size will be 256 which is enough for today as maximum
bitfield in compiler can be 128 where int128 type is supported.
This kernel patch intends to support the new BTF encoding:
$ pahole -JV t.o
[1] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=2
[2] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED
[3] ENUM A size=4 vlen=3
A1 val=0
A2 val=1
A3 val=2
[4] STRUCT t kind_flag=1 size=24 vlen=3
a type_id=5 bitfield_size=0 bits_offset=0
b type_id=1 bitfield_size=4 bits_offset=160
c type_id=7 bitfield_size=4 bits_offset=164
[5] ARRAY (anon) type_id=2 index_type_id=2 nr_elems=5
[6] INT sizetype size=8 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=64 encoding=(none)
[7] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=3
Issue #2 and solution:
======================
Current forward type in BTF does not specify whether the original
type is struct or union. This will not work for type pretty print
and BTF-to-header-file conversion as struct/union must be specified.
$ cat tt.c
struct t;
union u;
int foo(struct t *t, union u *u) { return 0; }
$ gcc -c -g -O2 tt.c
$ pahole -JV tt.o
[1] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED
[2] FWD t type_id=0
[3] PTR (anon) type_id=2
[4] FWD u type_id=0
[5] PTR (anon) type_id=4
To fix this issue, similar to issue #1, type->info bit 31
is used. If the bit is set, it is union type. Otherwise, it is
a struct type.
$ pahole -JV tt.o
[1] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED
[2] FWD t kind_flag=0 type_id=0
[3] PTR (anon) kind_flag=0 type_id=2
[4] FWD u kind_flag=1 type_id=0
[5] PTR (anon) kind_flag=0 type_id=4
Pahole/LLVM change:
===================
The new kind_flag functionality has been implemented in pahole
and llvm:
https://github.com/yonghong-song/pahole/tree/bitfieldhttps://github.com/yonghong-song/llvm/tree/bitfield
Note that pahole hasn't implemented func/func_proto kind
and .BTF.ext. So to print function signature with bpftool,
the llvm compiler should be used.
Fixes: 69b693f0ae ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Refactor function btf_int_bits_seq_show() by creating
function btf_bitfield_seq_show() which has no dependence
on btf and btf_type. The function btf_bitfield_seq_show()
will be in later patch to directly dump bitfield member values.
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Existing libraries and tracing frameworks work around this kernel
version check by automatically deriving the kernel version from
uname(3) or similar such that the user does not need to do it
manually; these workarounds also make the version check useless
at the same time.
Moreover, most other BPF tracing types enabling bpf_probe_read()-like
functionality have /not/ adapted this check, and in general these
days it is well understood anyway that all the tracing programs are
not stable with regards to future kernels as kernel internal data
structures are subject to change from release to release.
Back at last netconf we discussed [0] and agreed to remove this
check from bpf_prog_load() and instead document it here in the uapi
header that there is no such guarantee for stable API for these
programs.
[0] http://vger.kernel.org/netconf2018_files/DanielBorkmann_netconf2018.pdf
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce REG_LIVE_DONE to check the liveness propagation
and prepare the states for merging.
See algorithm description in clean_live_states().
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
"if (old->allocated_stack > cur->allocated_stack)" check is too conservative.
In some cases explored stack could have allocated more space,
but that stack space was not live.
The test case improves from 19 to 15 processed insns
and improvement on real programs is significant as well:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1831
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3029
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1064
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 26309
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 33517
bpf_netdev.o 10864 9713
bpf_overlay.o 6643 6184
bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 37335
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Don't check the same stack liveness condition 8 times.
once is enough.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This patch adds bpf_line_info during the verifier's verbose.
It can give error context for debug purpose.
~~~~~~~~~~
Here is the verbose log for backedge:
while (a) {
a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
bpf_trace_printk(fmt, sizeof(fmt), a);
}
~> bpftool prog load ./test_loop.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_loop type tracepoint
13: while (a) {
3: a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
back-edge from insn 13 to 3
~~~~~~~~~~
Here is the verbose log for invalid pkt access:
Modification to test_xdp_noinline.c:
data = (void *)(long)xdp->data;
data_end = (void *)(long)xdp->data_end;
/*
if (data + 4 > data_end)
return XDP_DROP;
*/
*(u32 *)data = dst->dst;
~> bpftool prog load ./test_xdp_noinline.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_xdp_noinline type xdp
; data = (void *)(long)xdp->data;
224: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -112)
225: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
; *(u32 *)data = dst->dst;
226: (63) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = r1
invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R2(id=0,off=0,r=0)
R2 offset is outside of the packet
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The current btf_name_by_offset() is returning "(anon)" type name for
the offset == 0 case and "(invalid-name-offset)" for the out-of-bound
offset case.
It fits well for the internal BTF verbose log purpose which
is focusing on type. For example,
offset == 0 => "(anon)" => anonymous type/name.
Returning non-NULL for the bad offset case is needed
during the BTF verification process because the BTF verifier may
complain about another field first before discovering the name_off
is invalid.
However, it may not be ideal for the newer use case which does not
necessary mean type name. For example, when logging line_info
in the BPF verifier in the next patch, it is better to log an
empty src line instead of logging "(anon)".
The existing bpf_name_by_offset() is renamed to __bpf_name_by_offset()
and static to btf.c.
A new bpf_name_by_offset() is added for generic context usage. It
returns "\0" for name_off == 0 (note that btf->strings[0] is "\0")
and NULL for invalid offset. It allows the caller to decide
what is the best output in its context.
The new btf_name_by_offset() is overlapped with btf_name_offset_valid().
Hence, btf_name_offset_valid() is removed from btf.h to keep the btf.h API
minimal. The existing btf_name_offset_valid() usage in btf.c could also be
replaced later.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This logic is not needed anymore since we got rid of the verifier
rewrite that was using prog->aux address in f6069b9aa9 ("bpf:
fix redirect to map under tail calls").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently for liveness and state pruning the register parentage
chains don't include states of the callee. This makes some sense
as the callee can't access those registers. However, this means
that READs done after the callee returns will not propagate into
the states of the callee. Callee will then perform pruning
disregarding differences in caller state.
Example:
0: (85) call bpf_user_rnd_u32
1: (b7) r8 = 0
2: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1
3: (b7) r8 = 1
4: (bf) r1 = r8
5: (85) call pc+4
6: (15) if r8 == 0x1 goto pc+1
7: (05) *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r3
8: (b7) r0 = 0
9: (95) exit
10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+0
11: (95) exit
Here we acquire unknown state with call to get_random() [1]. Then
we store this random state in r8 (either 0 or 1) [1 - 3], and make
a call on line 5. Callee does nothing but a trivial conditional
jump (to create a pruning point). Upon return caller checks the
state of r8 and either performs an unsafe read or not.
Verifier will first explore the path with r8 == 1, creating a pruning
point at [11]. The parentage chain for r8 will include only callers
states so once verifier reaches [6] it will mark liveness only on states
in the caller, and not [11]. Now when verifier walks the paths with
r8 == 0 it will reach [11] and since REG_LIVE_READ on r8 was not
propagated there it will prune the walk entirely (stop walking
the entire program, not just the callee). Since [6] was never walked
with r8 == 0, [7] will be considered dead and replaced with "goto -1"
causing hang at runtime.
This patch weaves the callee's explored states onto the callers
parentage chain. Rough parentage for r8 would have looked like this
before:
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [10] [11] [6] [7]
| | ,---|----. | | |
sl0: sl0: / sl0: \ sl0: sl0: sl0:
fr0: r8 <-- fr0: r8<+--fr0: r8 `fr0: r8 ,fr0: r8<-fr0: r8
\ fr1: r8 <- fr1: r8 /
\__________________/
after:
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [10] [11] [6] [7]
| | | | | |
sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0:
fr0: r8 <-- fr0: r8 <- fr0: r8 <- fr0: r8 <-fr0: r8<-fr0: r8
fr1: r8 <- fr1: r8
Now the mark from instruction 6 will travel through callees states.
Note that we don't have to connect r0 because its overwritten by
callees state on return and r1 - r5 because those are not alive
any more once a call is made.
v2:
- don't connect the callees registers twice (Alexei: suggestion & code)
- add more details to the comment (Ed & Alexei)
v1: don't unnecessarily link caller saved regs (Jiong)
Fixes: f4d7e40a5b ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Reported-by: David Beckett <david.beckett@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Changes v2 -> v3:
1. remove check for bpf_dump_raw_ok().
Changes v1 -> v2:
1. Fix error path as Martin suggested.
This patch adds nr_prog_tags and prog_tags to bpf_prog_info. This is a
reliable way for user space to get tags of all sub programs. Before this
patch, user space need to find sub program tags via kallsyms.
This feature will be used in BPF introspection, where user space queries
information about BPF programs via sys_bpf.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The func_info and line_info have the bpf insn offset but
they do not contain kernel address. They will still be useful
for the userspace tool to annotate the xlated insn.
This patch removes the bpf_dump_raw_ok() guard for the
func_info and line_info during bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd().
The guard stays for jited_line_info which contains the kernel
address.
Although this bpf_dump_raw_ok() guard behavior has started since
the earlier func_info patch series, I marked the Fixes tag to the
latest line_info patch series which contains both func_info and
line_info and this patch is fixing for both of them.
Fixes: c454a46b5e ("bpf: Add bpf_line_info support")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Implement bpffs pretty printing for cgroup local storage maps
(both shared and per-cpu).
Output example (captured for tools/testing/selftests/bpf/netcnt_prog.c):
Shared:
$ cat /sys/fs/bpf/map_2
# WARNING!! The output is for debug purpose only
# WARNING!! The output format will change
{4294968594,1}: {9999,1039896}
Per-cpu:
$ cat /sys/fs/bpf/map_1
# WARNING!! The output is for debug purpose only
# WARNING!! The output format will change
{4294968594,1}: {
cpu0: {0,0,0,0,0}
cpu1: {0,0,0,0,0}
cpu2: {1,104,0,0,0}
cpu3: {0,0,0,0,0}
}
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
If key_type or value_type are of non-trivial data types
(e.g. structure or typedef), it's not possible to check them without
the additional information, which can't be obtained without a pointer
to the btf structure.
So, let's pass btf pointer to the map_check_btf() callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Michael and Sandipan report:
Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.
For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
value:
root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
-1673527296
and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:
setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)
and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
with no noticeable errors in the logs.
Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().
Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.
Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.
Fixes: ede95a63b5 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-12-11
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
It has three minor merge conflicts, resolutions:
1) tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
Take first chunk with alignment_prevented_execution.
2) net/core/filter.c
[...]
case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct __sk_buff, flow_keys):
case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, wire_len):
return false;
[...]
3) include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
Take the second chunk for the two cases each.
The main changes are:
1) Add support for BPF line info via BTF and extend libbpf as well
as bpftool's program dump to annotate output with BPF C code to
facilitate debugging and introspection, from Martin.
2) Add support for BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X} in interpreter
and all JIT backends, from Jiong.
3) Improve BPF test coverage on archs with no efficient unaligned
access by adding an "any alignment" flag to the BPF program load
to forcefully disable verifier alignment checks, from David.
4) Add a new bpf_prog_test_run_xattr() API to libbpf which allows for
proper use of BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN with data_out, from Lorenz.
5) Extend tc BPF programs to use a new __sk_buff field called wire_len
for more accurate accounting of packets going to wire, from Petar.
6) Improve bpftool to allow dumping the trace pipe from it and add
several improvements in bash completion and map/prog dump,
from Quentin.
7) Optimize arm64 BPF JIT to always emit movn/movk/movk sequence for
kernel addresses and add a dedicated BPF JIT backend allocator,
from Ard.
8) Add a BPF helper function for IR remotes to report mouse movements,
from Sean.
9) Various cleanups in BPF prog dump e.g. to make UAPI bpf_prog_info
member naming consistent with existing conventions, from Yonghong
and Song.
10) Misc cleanups and improvements in allowing to pass interface name
via cmdline for xdp1 BPF example, from Matteo.
11) Fix a potential segfault in BPF sample loader's kprobes handling,
from Daniel T.
12) Fix SPDX license in libbpf's README.rst, from Andrey.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
