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Kernel developers working on confidential computing for virtualized
environments in x86 operate under a set of assumptions regarding the Linux
kernel threat model that differs from the traditional view. Historically,
the Linux threat model acknowledges attackers residing in userspace, as
well as a limited set of external attackers that are able to interact with
the kernel through networking or limited HW-specific exposed interfaces
(e.g. USB, thunderbolt). The goal of this document is to explain additional
attack vectors that arise in the virtualized confidential computing space.
Reviewed-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Message-ID: <98804f27-c2e7-74d6-d671-1eda927e19fe@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Fix one kernel-doc warning, but invesigating that led to other
kernel-doc movement (lsm_hooks.h to security.c) that needs to be
fixed also.
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h:1: warning: no structured comments found
Fixes: e261301c85 ("lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 1cd2aca64a ("lsm: move the io_uring hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 452b670c72 ("lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 55e853201a ("lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: b14faf9c94 ("lsm: move the audit hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 1427ddbe5c ("lsm: move the binder hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 43fad28218 ("lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: ecc419a445 ("lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 742b99456e ("lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: ac318aed54 ("lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 4a49f592e9 ("lsm: move the SCTP hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 6b6bbe8c02 ("lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 2c2442fd46 ("lsm: move the AF_UNIX hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 2bcf51bf2f ("lsm: move the netlink hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 130c53bfee ("lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: a0fd6480de ("lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 9348944b77 ("lsm: move the kernfs hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 916e32584d ("lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 08526a902c ("lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 36819f1855 ("lsm: move the fs_context hook comments to security/security.c")
Fixes: 1661372c91 ("lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Starting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, it is worth explaining why we
choose to restrict access checks at open time. This new "File
descriptor access rights" section is complementary to the existing
"Inode access rights" section. Add a new guiding principle related to
this section.
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Include the latest Günther's suggestion, and fix spelling]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Commit cd3bc044af ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with
user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user
provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was
just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl
pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted
data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be
done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u
However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were
specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only
need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input
range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could
have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and
doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.
The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
fixed (see link below).
Fixes: cd3bc044af ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
It seems that all code should use double backquotes, which is also used
to convert "%" defines. Let's use an homogeneous style and remove all
use of simple backquotes (which should only be used for emphasis).
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220923154207.3311629-4-mic@digikod.net
Now that we have more than one ABI version, make limitation explanation
more consistent by replacing "ABI 1" with "ABI < 2". This also
indicates which ABIs support such past limitation.
Improve documentation consistency by not using contractions.
Fix spelling in fs.c .
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220923154207.3311629-3-mic@digikod.net
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
digest based signatures, both based on policy.
In addition, are two bug fixes:
- avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
Macs with T2 chips.
- remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
command line ordering issue.
The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
evm: Clean up some variables
evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
fsverity: update the documentation
ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
- Strictened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.
- Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.
- Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module
(CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there is total
three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and CAAM.
- A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.
- Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.
- Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
CAAM.
- A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
Important changes:
* improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE;
* fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case;
* set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers;
* add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle
file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support);
* add new tests and documentation;
* format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and
contribute.
Related patch series:
* [PATCH v1 0/7] Landlock: Clean up coding style with clang-format
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v2 00/10] Minor Landlock fixes and new tests
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v3 00/12] Landlock: file linking and renaming support
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v2] landlock: Explain how to support Landlock
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513112743.156414-1-mic@digikod.net
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Merge tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
- improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE;
- fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case;
- set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers;
- add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle
file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support);
- add new tests and documentation;
- format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and
contribute.
* tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (30 commits)
landlock: Explain how to support Landlock
landlock: Add design choices documentation for filesystem access rights
landlock: Document good practices about filesystem policies
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and ABI versioning
samples/landlock: Add support for file reparenting
selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to file reparenting
landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one
landlock: Fix same-layer rule unions
landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers()
landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16
landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask size
selftests/landlock: Test landlock_create_ruleset(2) argument check ordering
landlock: Change landlock_restrict_self(2) check ordering
landlock: Change landlock_add_rule(2) argument check ordering
selftests/landlock: Add tests for O_PATH
selftests/landlock: Fully test file rename with "remove" access
selftests/landlock: Extend access right tests to directories
selftests/landlock: Add tests for unknown access rights
...
- Allow runtime services to be re-enabled at boot on RT kernels.
- Provide access to secrets injected into the boot image by CoCo
hypervisors (COnfidential COmputing)
- Use DXE services on x86 to make the boot image executable after
relocation, if needed.
- Prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations.
- Only randomize the placement of the kernel image on arm64 if the
loader has not already done so.
- Add support for obtaining the boot hartid from EFI on RISC-V.
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Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Allow runtime services to be re-enabled at boot on RT kernels.
- Provide access to secrets injected into the boot image by CoCo
hypervisors (COnfidential COmputing)
- Use DXE services on x86 to make the boot image executable after
relocation, if needed.
- Prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations.
- Only randomize the placement of the kernel image on arm64 if the
loader has not already done so.
- Add support for obtaining the boot hartid from EFI on RISC-V.
* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
efi: x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
efi: libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
efi: libstub: declare DXE services table
efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Summarize the rationale of filesystem access rights according to the
file type.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-13-mic@digikod.net
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the
'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When
the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file
hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a
header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data
- hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity
signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating
the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature.
In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be
disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new
signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id
structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest.
The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.
appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default),
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA
default, by first specifying the digest type:
digest_type:= [verity]
The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be
constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label.
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to
be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.
To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's
file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2
template.
The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies
the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The
policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM
label.
measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In preparation to differentiate between unsigned regular IMA file
hashes and fs-verity's file digests in the IMA measurement list,
define a new template field named 'd-ngv2'.
Also define two new templates named 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2', which
include the new 'd-ngv2' field.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Initially the 'd-ng' template field did not prefix the digest with either
"md5" or "sha1" hash algorithms. Prior to being upstreamed this changed,
but the comments and documentation were not updated. Fix the comments
and documentation.
Fixes: 4d7aeee73f ("ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix the documentation for the hsiphash functions to avoid conflating the
HalfSipHash algorithm with the hsiphash functions, since these functions
actually implement either HalfSipHash or SipHash, and random.c now uses
HalfSipHash (in a very special way) without the hsiphash functions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Render usage example of HalfSipHash function as code block by using
literal block syntax.
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Render danger paragraph into warning block for emphasization.
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are:
- Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes
all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs.
We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns
zero on success.
- In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we
simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process.
The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new
mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux
options.
- Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the
security_sctp_assoc_established() hook.
This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should
complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the
associations.
- Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu"
markings of some core kernel structures.
- Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the
stacking-safe accessors.
- Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and
FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is
specified.
- Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements,
additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal.
- Documentation fixes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits)
selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names
docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst
selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
selinux: use correct type for context length
selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions
security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
selinux: parse contexts for mount options early
selinux: various sparse fixes
selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid()
selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()
LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param
selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security()
selinux: drop unused macro
selinux: simplify cred_init_security
selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast
selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node
selinux: drop cast to same type
selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis
selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const
...
Fix following 'make htmldocs' warnings:
./Documentation/security/SCTP.rst:123: WARNING: Title underline too short.
security_sctp_assoc_established()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./Documentation/security/SCTP.rst:123: WARNING: Title underline too short.
security_sctp_assoc_established()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./Documentation/security/SCTP.rst:273: WARNING: Title underline too short.
security_sctp_assoc_established()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./Documentation/security/SCTP.rst:273: WARNING: Title underline too short.
security_sctp_assoc_established()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fixes: 5e50f5d4ff ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook")
Signed-off-by: Wan Jiabing <wanjiabing@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For availability and performance reasons master keys often need to be
released outside of a Key Management Service (KMS) to clients. It
would be beneficial to provide a mechanism where the
wrapping/unwrapping of data encryption keys (DEKs) is not dependent
on a remote call at runtime yet security is not (or only minimally)
compromised. Master keys could be securely stored in the Kernel and
be used to wrap/unwrap keys from Userspace.
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to inject and encrypt user-provided
decrypted data. The decrypted data must be hex-ascii encoded.
Signed-off-by: Yael Tzur <yaelt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c9402
("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and
7c2ef0240e ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which
create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a
SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged
without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from
Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that
were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections
from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches.
Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the
reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review,
but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready
for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping
objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially
a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
v1->v2:
- fix the return value of security_sctp_assoc_established() in
security.h, found by kernel test robot and Ondrej.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The asoc created when receives the INIT chunk is a temporary one, it
will be deleted after INIT_ACK chunk is replied. So for the real asoc
created in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() when the COOKIE_ECHO chunk is received,
security_sctp_assoc_request() should also be called.
v1->v2:
- fix some typo and grammar errors, noticed by Ondrej.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.
Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
v1->v2:
- fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
- fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Some kernel-doc cleanups. That script is still regex onslaught from
hell, but it has gotten a little better.
- Improvements to the checkpatch docs, which are also used by the tool
itself.
- A major update to the pathname lookup documentation.
- Elimination of :doc: markup, since our automarkup magic can create
references from filenames without all the extra noise.
- The flurry of Chinese translation activity continues.
Plus, of course, the usual collection of updates, typo fixes, and warning
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.14' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"This was a reasonably active cycle for documentation; this includes:
- Some kernel-doc cleanups. That script is still regex onslaught from
hell, but it has gotten a little better.
- Improvements to the checkpatch docs, which are also used by the
tool itself.
- A major update to the pathname lookup documentation.
- Elimination of :doc: markup, since our automarkup magic can create
references from filenames without all the extra noise.
- The flurry of Chinese translation activity continues.
Plus, of course, the usual collection of updates, typo fixes, and
warning fixes"
* tag 'docs-5.14' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (115 commits)
docs: path-lookup: use bare function() rather than literals
docs: path-lookup: update symlink description
docs: path-lookup: update get_link() ->follow_link description
docs: path-lookup: update WALK_GET, WALK_PUT desc
docs: path-lookup: no get_link()
docs: path-lookup: update i_op->put_link and cookie description
docs: path-lookup: i_op->follow_link replaced with i_op->get_link
docs: path-lookup: Add macro name to symlink limit description
docs: path-lookup: remove filename_mountpoint
docs: path-lookup: update do_last() part
docs: path-lookup: update path_mountpoint() part
docs: path-lookup: update path_to_nameidata() part
docs: path-lookup: update follow_managed() part
docs: Makefile: Use CONFIG_SHELL not SHELL
docs: Take a little noise out of the build process
docs: x86: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: virt: kvm: s390-pv-boot.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: userspace-api: landlock.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: trace: ftrace.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: trace: coresight: coresight.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
...
With the recent introduction of the evmsig template field, remote verifiers
can obtain the EVM portable signature instead of the IMA signature, to
verify file metadata.
After introducing the new fields to include file metadata in the
measurement list, this patch finally defines the evm-sig template, whose
format is:
d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode
xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues are populated only from defined
EVM protected xattrs, i.e. the ones that EVM considers to verify the
portable signature. xattrnames and xattrlengths are populated only if the
xattr is present.
xattrnames and xattrlengths are not necessary for verifying the EVM
portable signature, but they are included for completeness of information,
if a remote verifier wants to infer more from file metadata.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and
xattrvalues, which contain respectively a list of xattr names (strings,
separated by |), lengths (u32, hex) and values (hex). If an xattr is not
present, the name and length are not displayed in the measurement list.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Missing prototype def)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template field imode, which includes the
inode mode. It can be used by a remote verifier to verify the EVM portable
signature, if it was included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template fields iuid and igid, which include
respectively the inode UID and GID. For idmapped mounts, still the original
UID and GID are provided.
These fields can be used to verify the EVM portable signature, if it was
included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the
appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can
be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature.
However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type
was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list.
This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig'
to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing
field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A few of the Documentation .rst files begin with a Unicode
byte order mark (BOM). The BOM may signify endianess for
16-bit or 32-bit encodings or indicate that the text stream
is indeed Unicode. We don't need it for either of those uses.
It may also interfere with (confuse) some software.
Since we don't need it and its use is optional, just delete
the uses of it in Documentation/.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byte_order_mark
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506231907.14359-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
Add a first document describing userspace API: how to define and enforce
a Landlock security policy. This is explained with a simple example.
The Landlock system calls are described with their expected behavior and
current limitations.
Another document is dedicated to kernel developers, describing guiding
principles and some important kernel structures.
This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-13-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Update documentation for Trusted and Encrypted Keys with TEE as a new
trust source. Following is brief description of updates:
- Add a section to demonstrate a list of supported devices along with
their security properties/guarantees.
- Add a key generation section.
- Updates for usage section including differences specific to a trust
source.
Co-developed-by: Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
don't have to keep passing it in each time.
This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
keys with passwords but no policy.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on
pipes, so let the documentation reflect that.
Fixes: f7e47677e3 ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Replace the lkml.org links with lore to better use a single source
that's more likely to stay available long-term.
Done by bash script:
cvt_lkml_to_lore ()
{
tmpfile=$(mktemp ./.cvt_links.XXXXXXX)
header=$(echo $1 | sed 's@/lkml/@/lkml/headers/@')
wget -qO - $header > $tmpfile
if [[ $? == 0 ]] ; then
link=$(grep -i '^Message-Id:' $tmpfile | head -1 | \
sed -r -e 's/^\s*Message-Id:\s*<\s*//' -e 's/\s*>\s*$//' -e 's@^@https://lore.kernel.org/r/@')
# echo "testlink: $link"
if [ -n "$link" ] ; then
wget -qO - $link > /dev/null
if [[ $? == 0 ]] ; then
echo $link
fi
fi
fi
rm -f $tmpfile
}
git grep -P -o "\bhttps?://(?:www.)?lkml.org/lkml[\/\w]+" $@ |
while read line ; do
echo $line
file=$(echo $line | cut -f1 -d':')
link=$(echo $line | cut -f2- -d':')
newlink=$(cvt_lkml_to_lore $link)
if [[ -n "$newlink" ]] ; then
sed -i -e "s#\b$link\b#$newlink#" $file
fi
done
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1265849/#1462688
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/77cdb7f32cfb087955bfc3600b86c40bed5d4104.camel@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
