83857 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Chandan Babu R
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0a229c935a |
xfs: fix cpu hotplug mess [v2]
Ritesh and Eric separately reported crashes in XFS's hook function for CPU hot remove if the remove event races with a filesystem being mounted. I also noticed via generic/650 that once in a while the log will shut down over an apparent overrun of a transaction reservation; this turned out to be due to CIL percpu list aggregation failing to pick up the percpu list items from a dying CPU. Either way, the solution here is to eliminate the need for a CPU dying hook by using a private cpumask to track which CPUs have added to their percpu lists directly, and iterating with that mask. This fixes the log problems and (I think) solves a theoretical UAF bug in the inodegc code too. v2: fix a few put_cpu uses, add necessary memory barriers, and use atomic cpumask operations This has been lightly tested with fstests. Enjoy! Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQQ2qTKExjcn+O1o2YRKO3ySh0YRpgUCZQChOQAKCRBKO3ySh0YR plauAQCV0RymbwD/ONbvpor3yK4R3YO1pa923KtoiQ9IAV5uswD/YBWvyI76BhNs B8hwbEDm3X2ZjQaikxI+Xx2cMaAhkgY= =EJ0b -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fix-percpu-lists-6.6_2023-09-12' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux into xfs-6.6-fixesA xfs: fix cpu hotplug mess Ritesh and Eric separately reported crashes in XFS's hook function for CPU hot remove if the remove event races with a filesystem being mounted. I also noticed via generic/650 that once in a while the log will shut down over an apparent overrun of a transaction reservation; this turned out to be due to CIL percpu list aggregation failing to pick up the percpu list items from a dying CPU. Either way, the solution here is to eliminate the need for a CPU dying hook by using a private cpumask to track which CPUs have added to their percpu lists directly, and iterating with that mask. This fixes the log problems and (I think) solves a theoretical UAF bug in the inodegc code too. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> * tag 'fix-percpu-lists-6.6_2023-09-12' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux: xfs: remove CPU hotplug infrastructure xfs: remove the all-mounts list xfs: use per-mount cpumask to track nonempty percpu inodegc lists xfs: fix per-cpu CIL structure aggregation racing with dying cpus |
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Chandan Babu R
|
da6f8410e7 |
xfs: fix fsmap cursor handling [v2]
This patchset addresses an integer overflow bug that Dave Chinner found in how fsmap handles figuring out where in the record set we left off when userspace calls back after the first call filled up all the designated record space. v2: add RVB tags This has been lightly tested with fstests. Enjoy! Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQQ2qTKExjcn+O1o2YRKO3ySh0YRpgUCZQChMwAKCRBKO3ySh0YR prqBAP9Zp2WxwQuNQLqCfXBRLZiJRiW8JFcTNJOjdqIicsOPYgEAxs1GHJU4ozrO bKyolvNJIjSow7LWYP1GmfCRa9FqwQ4= =3uSx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fix-fsmap-6.6_2023-09-12' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux into xfs-6.6-fixesA xfs: fix fsmap cursor handling This patchset addresses an integer overflow bug that Dave Chinner found in how fsmap handles figuring out where in the record set we left off when userspace calls back after the first call filled up all the designated record space. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> * tag 'fix-fsmap-6.6_2023-09-12' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djwong/xfs-linux: xfs: fix an agbno overflow in __xfs_getfsmap_datadev |
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Steve French
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05d0f8f55a |
smb3: move server check earlier when setting channel sequence number
Smatch warning pointed out by Dan Carpenter: fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c:105 smb2_hdr_assemble() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'server' (see line 95) Fixes: 09ee7a3bf866 ("[SMB3] send channel sequence number in SMB3 requests after reconnects") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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3669558bdf |
for-6.6-rc1-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmT/hwAACgkQxWXV+ddt WDsn7hAAngwEMKEAH9Jvu/BtHgRYcAdsGh5Mxw34aQf1+DAaH03GGsZjN6hfHYo4 FMsnnvoZD5VPfuaFaQVd+mS9mRzikm503W7KfZFAPAQTOjz50RZbohLnZWa3eFbI 46OcpoHusxwoYosEmIAt+dcw/gDlT9fpj+W11dKYtwOEjCqGA/OeKoVenfk38hVJ r+XhLwZFf4dPIqE3Ht26UtJk87Xs2X0/LQxOX3vM1MZ+l38N4dyo7TQnwfTHlQNw AK9sK6vp3rpRR96rvTV1dWr9lnmE7wky+Vh36DN/jxpzbW7Wx8IVoobBpcsO4Tyk Vw/rdjB7g7LfBmjLFhWvvQ73jv0WjIUUzXH17RuxOeyAQJ9tXFztVMh+QoVVC/Ka NxwA5uqyJKR7DIA+kLL06abUnASUVgP6Krdv9Fk7rYCKWluWk1k9ls9XaFFhytvg eeno/UB0px1rwps5P5zfaSXLIXEl53Luy5rFhTMCCNQfXyo+Qe6PJyTafR3E0uP8 aXJV1lPG+o7qi9Vwg+20yy//1sE5gR0dLrcTaup3/20RK6eljZ/bNSkl3GJR9mlS YF+J/Ccia06y8Qo0xaeCofxkoI3J/PK6KPOTt8yZDgYoetYgHhrfBRO0I7ZU4Edq 10512hAeskzPt6+5348+/jOEENASffXKP3FJSdDEzWd33vtlaHE= =mHTa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: - several fixes for handling directory item (inserting, removing, iteration, error handling) - fix transaction commit stalls when auto relocation is running and blocks other tasks that want to commit - fix a build error when DEBUG is enabled - fix lockdep warning in inode number lookup ioctl - fix race when finishing block group creation - remove link to obsolete wiki in several files * tag 'for-6.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: MAINTAINERS: remove links to obsolete btrfs.wiki.kernel.org btrfs: assert delayed node locked when removing delayed item btrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item btrfs: improve error message after failure to add delayed dir index item btrfs: fix a compilation error if DEBUG is defined in btree_dirty_folio btrfs: check for BTRFS_FS_ERROR in pending ordered assert btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running delayed items btrfs: do not block starts waiting on previous transaction commit btrfs: release path before inode lookup during the ino lookup ioctl btrfs: fix race between finishing block group creation and its item update |
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Darrick J. Wong
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e031928200 |
xfs: only call xchk_stats_merge after validating scrub inputs
Harshit Mogalapalli slogged through several reports from our internal syzbot instance and observed that they all had a common stack trace: BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1294 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in queued_spin_lock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in do_raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:187 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:134 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in _raw_spin_lock+0x76/0xe0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 Write of size 4 at addr 0000001dd87ee280 by task syz-executor365/1543 CPU: 2 PID: 1543 Comm: syz-executor365 Not tainted 6.5.0-syzk #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module+el8.3.0+7860+a7792d29 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xb0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_report+0x3f8/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:478 kasan_report+0xb0/0xe0 mm/kasan/report.c:588 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:181 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x139/0x1e0 mm/kasan/generic.c:187 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline] atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1294 [inline] queued_spin_lock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:111 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:187 [inline] __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:134 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x76/0xe0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] xchk_stats_merge_one.isra.1+0x39/0x650 fs/xfs/scrub/stats.c:191 xchk_stats_merge+0x5f/0xe0 fs/xfs/scrub/stats.c:225 xfs_scrub_metadata+0x252/0x14e0 fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.c:599 xfs_ioc_scrub_metadata+0xc8/0x160 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c:1646 xfs_file_ioctl+0x3fd/0x1870 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c:1955 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x199/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:857 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7ff155af753d Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b 79 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc006e2568 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff155af753d RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 00000000c040583c RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 00000000004010c0 R09: 00000000004010c0 R10: 00000000004010c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400cb0 R13: 00007ffc006e2670 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The root cause here is that xchk_stats_merge_one walks off the end of the xchk_scrub_stats.cs_stats array because it has been fed a garbage value in sm->sm_type. That occurs because I put the xchk_stats_merge in the wrong place -- it should have been after the last xchk_teardown call on our way out of xfs_scrub_metadata because we only call the teardown function if we called the setup function, and we don't call the setup functions if the inputs are obviously garbage. Thanks to Harshit for triaging the bug reports and bringing this to my attention. Fixes: d7a74cad8f45 ("xfs: track usage statistics of online fsck") Reported-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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34389616a9 |
xfs: require a relatively recent V5 filesystem for LARP mode
While reviewing the FIEXCHANGE code in XFS, I realized that the function that enables logged xattrs doesn't actually check that the superblock has a LOG_INCOMPAT feature bit field. Add a check to refuse the operation if we don't have a V5 filesystem... ...but on second though, let's require either reflink or rmap so that we only have to deal with LARP mode on relatively /modern/ kernel. 4.14 is about as far back as I feel like going. Seeing as LARP is a debugging-only option anyway, this isn't likely to affect any real users. Fixes: d9c61ccb3b09 ("xfs: move xfs_attr_use_log_assist out of xfs_log.c") Really-Fixes: f3f36c893f26 ("xfs: Add xfs_attr_set_deferred and xfs_attr_remove_deferred") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell <bodonnel@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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49813a21ed |
xfs: make inode unlinked bucket recovery work with quotacheck
Teach quotacheck to reload the unlinked inode lists when walking the inode table. This requires extra state handling, since it's possible that a reloaded inode will get inactivated before quotacheck tries to scan it; in this case, we need to ensure that the reloaded inode does not have dquots attached when it is freed. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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68b957f64f |
xfs: load uncached unlinked inodes into memory on demand
shrikanth hegde reports that filesystems fail shortly after mount with the following failure: WARNING: CPU: 56 PID: 12450 at fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1839 xfs_iunlink_lookup+0x58/0x80 [xfs] This of course is the WARN_ON_ONCE in xfs_iunlink_lookup: ip = radix_tree_lookup(&pag->pag_ici_root, agino); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ip || !ip->i_ino)) { ... } From diagnostic data collected by the bug reporters, it would appear that we cleanly mounted a filesystem that contained unlinked inodes. Unlinked inodes are only processed as a final step of log recovery, which means that clean mounts do not process the unlinked list at all. Prior to the introduction of the incore unlinked lists, this wasn't a problem because the unlink code would (very expensively) traverse the entire ondisk metadata iunlink chain to keep things up to date. However, the incore unlinked list code complains when it realizes that it is out of sync with the ondisk metadata and shuts down the fs, which is bad. Ritesh proposed to solve this problem by unconditionally parsing the unlinked lists at mount time, but this imposes a mount time cost for every filesystem to catch something that should be very infrequent. Instead, let's target the places where we can encounter a next_unlinked pointer that refers to an inode that is not in cache, and load it into cache. Note: This patch does not address the problem of iget loading an inode from the middle of the iunlink list and needing to set i_prev_unlinked correctly. Reported-by: shrikanth hegde <sshegde@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Triaged-by: Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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3c919b0910 |
xfs: reserve less log space when recovering log intent items
Wengang Wang reports that a customer's system was running a number of truncate operations on a filesystem with a very small log. Contention on the reserve heads lead to other threads stalling on smaller updates (e.g. mtime updates) long enough to result in the node being rebooted on account of the lack of responsivenes. The node failed to recover because log recovery of an EFI became stuck waiting for a grant of reserve space. From Wengang's report: "For the file deletion, log bytes are reserved basing on xfs_mount->tr_itruncate which is: tr_logres = 175488, tr_logcount = 2, tr_logflags = XFS_TRANS_PERM_LOG_RES, "You see it's a permanent log reservation with two log operations (two transactions in rolling mode). After calculation (xlog_calc_unit_res() adds space for various log headers), the final log space needed per transaction changes from 175488 to 180208 bytes. So the total log space needed is 360416 bytes (180208 * 2). [That quantity] of log space (360416 bytes) needs to be reserved for both run time inode removing (xfs_inactive_truncate()) and EFI recover (xfs_efi_item_recover())." In other words, runtime pre-reserves 360K of space in anticipation of running a chain of two transactions in which each transaction gets a 180K reservation. Now that we've allocated the transaction, we delete the bmap mapping, log an EFI to free the space, and roll the transaction as part of finishing the deferops chain. Rolling creates a new xfs_trans which shares its ticket with the old transaction. Next, xfs_trans_roll calls __xfs_trans_commit with regrant == true, which calls xlog_cil_commit with the same regrant parameter. xlog_cil_commit calls xfs_log_ticket_regrant, which decrements t_cnt and subtracts t_curr_res from the reservation and write heads. If the filesystem is fresh and the first transaction only used (say) 20K, then t_curr_res will be 160K, and we give that much reservation back to the reservation head. Or if the file is really fragmented and the first transaction actually uses 170K, then t_curr_res will be 10K, and that's what we give back to the reservation. Having done that, we're now headed into the second transaction with an EFI and 180K of reservation. Other threads apparently consumed all the reservation for smaller transactions, such as timestamp updates. Now let's say the first transaction gets written to disk and we crash without ever completing the second transaction. Now we remount the fs, log recovery finds the unfinished EFI, and calls xfs_efi_recover to finish the EFI. However, xfs_efi_recover starts a new tr_itruncate tranasction, which asks for 360K log reservation. This is a lot more than the 180K that we had reserved at the time of the crash. If the first EFI to be recovered is also pinning the tail of the log, we will be unable to free any space in the log, and recovery livelocks. Wengang confirmed this: "Now we have the second transaction which has 180208 log bytes reserved too. The second transaction is supposed to process intents including extent freeing. With my hacking patch, I blocked the extent freeing 5 hours. So in that 5 hours, 180208 (NOT 360416) log bytes are reserved. "With my test case, other transactions (update timestamps) then happen. As my hacking patch pins the journal tail, those timestamp-updating transactions finally use up (almost) all the left available log space (in memory in on disk). And finally the on disk (and in memory) available log space goes down near to 180208 bytes. Those 180208 bytes are reserved by [the] second (extent-free) transaction [in the chain]." Wengang and I noticed that EFI recovery starts a transaction, completes one step of the chain, and commits the transaction without completing any other steps of the chain. Those subsequent steps are completed by xlog_finish_defer_ops, which allocates yet another transaction to finish the rest of the chain. That transaction gets the same tr_logres as the head transaction, but with tr_logcount = 1 to force regranting with every roll to avoid livelocks. In other words, we already figured this out in commit 929b92f64048d ("xfs: xfs_defer_capture should absorb remaining transaction reservation"), but should have applied that logic to each intent item's recovery function. For Wengang's case, the xfs_trans_alloc call in the EFI recovery function should only be asking for a single transaction's worth of log reservation -- 180K, not 360K. Quoting Wengang again: "With log recovery, during EFI recovery, we use tr_itruncate again to reserve two transactions that needs 360416 log bytes. Reserving 360416 bytes fails [stalls] because we now only have about 180208 available. "Actually during the EFI recover, we only need one transaction to free the extents just like the 2nd transaction at RUNTIME. So it only needs to reserve 180208 rather than 360416 bytes. We have (a bit) more than 180208 available log bytes on disk, so [if we decrease the reservation to 180K] the reservation goes and the recovery [finishes]. That is to say: we can fix the log recover part to fix the issue. We can introduce a new xfs_trans_res xfs_mount->tr_ext_free { tr_logres = 175488, tr_logcount = 0, tr_logflags = 0, } "and use tr_ext_free instead of tr_itruncate in EFI recover." However, I don't think it quite makes sense to create an entirely new transaction reservation type to handle single-stepping during log recovery. Instead, we should copy the transaction reservation information in the xfs_mount, change tr_logcount to 1, and pass that into xfs_trans_alloc. We know this won't risk changing the min log size computation since we always ask for a fraction of the reservation for all known transaction types. This looks like it's been lurking in the codebase since commit 3d3c8b5222b92, which changed the xfs_trans_reserve call in xlog_recover_process_efi to use the tr_logcount in tr_itruncate. That changed the EFI recovery transaction from making a non-XFS_TRANS_PERM_LOG_RES request for one transaction's worth of log space to a XFS_TRANS_PERM_LOG_RES request for two transactions worth. Fixes: 3d3c8b5222b92 ("xfs: refactor xfs_trans_reserve() interface") Complements: 929b92f64048d ("xfs: xfs_defer_capture should absorb remaining transaction reservation") Suggested-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Cc: Srikanth C S <srikanth.c.s@oracle.com> [djwong: apply the same transformation to all log intent recovery] Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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74ad4693b6 |
xfs: fix log recovery when unknown rocompat bits are set
Log recovery has always run on read only mounts, even where the primary superblock advertises unknown rocompat bits. Due to a misunderstanding between Eric and Darrick back in 2018, we accidentally changed the superblock write verifier to shutdown the fs over that exact scenario. As a result, the log cleaning that occurs at the end of the mounting process fails if there are unknown rocompat bits set. As we now allow writing of the superblock if there are unknown rocompat bits set on a RO mount, we no longer want to turn off RO state to allow log recovery to succeed on a RO mount. Hence we also remove all the (now unnecessary) RO state toggling from the log recovery path. Fixes: 9e037cb7972f ("xfs: check for unknown v5 feature bits in superblock write verifier" Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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83771c50e4 |
xfs: reload entire unlinked bucket lists
The previous patch to reload unrecovered unlinked inodes when adding a newly created inode to the unlinked list is missing a key piece of functionality. It doesn't handle the case that someone calls xfs_iget on an inode that is not the last item in the incore list. For example, if at mount time the ondisk iunlink bucket looks like this: AGI -> 7 -> 22 -> 3 -> NULL None of these three inodes are cached in memory. Now let's say that someone tries to open inode 3 by handle. We need to walk the list to make sure that inodes 7 and 22 get loaded cold, and that the i_prev_unlinked of inode 3 gets set to 22. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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76e589013f |
xfs: allow inode inactivation during a ro mount log recovery
In the next patch, we're going to prohibit log recovery if the primary superblock contains an unrecognized rocompat feature bit even on readonly mounts. This requires removing all the code in the log mounting process that temporarily disables the readonly state. Unfortunately, inode inactivation disables itself on readonly mounts. Clearing the iunlinked lists after log recovery needs inactivation to run to free the unreferenced inodes, which (AFAICT) is the only reason why log mounting plays games with the readonly state in the first place. Therefore, change the inactivation predicates to allow inactivation during log recovery of a readonly mount. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
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f12b96683d |
xfs: use i_prev_unlinked to distinguish inodes that are not on the unlinked list
Alter the definition of i_prev_unlinked slightly to make it more obvious when an inode with 0 link count is not part of the iunlink bucket lists rooted in the AGI. This distinction is necessary because it is not sufficient to check inode.i_nlink to decide if an inode is on the unlinked list. Updates to i_nlink can happen while holding only ILOCK_EXCL, but updates to an inode's position in the AGI unlinked list (which happen after the nlink update) requires both ILOCK_EXCL and the AGI buffer lock. The next few patches will make it possible to reload an entire unlinked bucket list when we're walking the inode table or performing handle operations and need more than the ability to iget the last inode in the chain. The upcoming directory repair code also needs to be able to make this distinction to decide if a zero link count directory should be moved to the orphanage or allowed to inactivate. An upcoming enhancement to the online AGI fsck code will need this distinction to check and rebuild the AGI unlinked buckets. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> |
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Christoph Hellwig
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4aa8cdd5e5 |
iomap: handle error conditions more gracefully in iomap_to_bh
iomap_to_bh currently BUG()s when the passed in block number is not in the iomap. For file systems that have proper synchronization this should never happen and so far hasn't in mainline, but for block devices size changes aren't fully synchronized against ongoing I/O. Instead of BUG()ing in this case, return -EIO to the caller, which already has proper error handling. While we're at it, also return -EIO for an unknown iomap state instead of returning garbage. Fixes: 487c607df790 ("block: use iomap for writes to block devices") Reported-by: syzbot+4a08ffdf3667b36650a1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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afe03f088f |
overlayfs fixes for 6.6-rc2
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE9zuTYTs0RXF+Ke33EVvVyTe/1WoFAmT+s8AACgkQEVvVyTe/ 1Wr3GA/+IiTHYJSqHOjKvAWs8pVX3rcmJxoodPidOFAncPKzw5GlD7Lo0C8Qgmie CEzg8kSfMPg0n7VpywOCiA1n37gBJbmHdQ0108OxJA65IRna4K6qcyBQvfOGXq9u Qx360cTCJFGBITkkRmg8RZQKF+Dj3nd0vHn3feGkPftL113fhZTZ1uWFxyXIGsuu eki8wW3WgZFvS71Pp9nZEVFd/HPJukd03LKHQlSnQQBnCJJjZhvM6O2Y4o4lFznj aWTIHQdowz00Mj1kFEM46cGFDg3SwFtdOizpRrWxL0oOVnElIo8mRAxtf3gz4081 fvvhvYG5QEgSUrq7VfuGxaxlh2tyHgc8gh7lNXC0JCGSjc2lHGosvniFcRo6ecgU 7UwT+rX0odWzbSDH6TrMHPZsBSS/siKWreii63HUlMOo0mSorTzA20EK7f9qoXTA dgvMD7cbFiEOjwlS9SbIjMMuvYM5VykCyWuniBqicA5UzUj2/K5DG6apkMK/MGbn DU/r0HYROqdggk920i/Yyv4GoS6uERfELpkoJr9q7Lx1+wAkRGbNUpUe408Wp411 I66Ynie48oBmlDfU3LiyW9b3OPbFMPKE3WTPIngJurWRoHFXunxdkArfQi+rAUpx cmC5CovFAaVSL3HyhWAXh5lMbe1KjUasQM8ywTyhki2wZzrAI7U= =F/OX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ovl-fixes-6.6-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/overlayfs/vfs Pull overlayfs fixes from Amir Goldstein: "Two fixes for pretty old regressions" * tag 'ovl-fixes-6.6-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/overlayfs/vfs: ovl: fix incorrect fdput() on aio completion ovl: fix failed copyup of fileattr on a symlink |
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NeilBrown
|
88956eabfd |
NFSD: fix possible oops when nfsd/pool_stats is closed.
If /proc/fs/nfsd/pool_stats is open when the last nfsd thread exits, then when the file is closed a NULL pointer is dereferenced. This is because nfsd_pool_stats_release() assumes that the pointer to the svc_serv cannot become NULL while a reference is held. This used to be the case but a recent patch split nfsd_last_thread() out from nfsd_put(), and clearing the pointer is done in nfsd_last_thread(). This is easily reproduced by running rpc.nfsd 8 ; ( rpc.nfsd 0;true) < /proc/fs/nfsd/pool_stats Fortunately nfsd_pool_stats_release() has easy access to the svc_serv pointer, and so can call svc_put() on it directly. Fixes: 9f28a971ee9f ("nfsd: separate nfsd_last_thread() from nfsd_put()") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> |
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Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
9243e54309 |
tracefs/eventfs: Use list_for_each_srcu() in dcache_dir_open_wrapper()
The eventfs files list is protected by SRCU. In earlier iterations it was protected with just RCU, but because it needed to also call sleepable code, it had to be switch to SRCU. The dcache_dir_open_wrapper() list_for_each_rcu() was missed and did not get converted over to list_for_each_srcu(). That needs to be fixed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230911120053.ca82f545e7f46ea753deda18@kernel.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230911200654.71ce927c@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Reported-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> |
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Darrick J. Wong
|
ef7d959339 |
xfs: remove CPU hotplug infrastructure
There are no users of the cpu hotplug hooks in xfs now, so remove it. This reverts f1653c2e2831e ("xfs: introduce CPU hotplug infrastructure"). Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
|
f5bfa695f0 |
xfs: remove the all-mounts list
Revert commit 0ed17f01c8540 ("xfs: introduce all-mounts list for cpu hotplug notifications") because the cpu hotplug hooks are now pointless, so we don't need this list anymore. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
|
62334fab47 |
xfs: use per-mount cpumask to track nonempty percpu inodegc lists
Directly track which CPUs have contributed to the inodegc percpu lists instead of trusting the cpu online mask. This eliminates a theoretical problem where the inodegc flush functions might fail to flush a CPU's inodes if that CPU happened to be dying at exactly the same time. Most likely nobody's noticed this because the CPU dead hook moves the percpu inodegc list to another CPU and schedules that worker immediately. But it's quite possible that this is a subtle race leading to UAF if the inodegc flush were part of an unmount. Further benefits: This reduces the overhead of the inodegc flush code slightly by allowing us to ignore CPUs that have empty lists. Better yet, it reduces our dependence on the cpu online masks, which have been the cause of confusion and drama lately. Fixes: ab23a7768739 ("xfs: per-cpu deferred inode inactivation queues") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
|
cfa2df68b7 |
xfs: fix an agbno overflow in __xfs_getfsmap_datadev
Dave Chinner reported that xfs/273 fails if the AG size happens to be an exact power of two. I traced this to an agbno integer overflow when the current GETFSMAP call is a continuation of a previous GETFSMAP call, and the last record returned was non-shareable space at the end of an AG. __xfs_getfsmap_datadev sets up a data device query by converting the incoming fmr_physical into an xfs_fsblock_t and cracking it into an agno and agbno pair. In the (failing) case of where fmr_blockcount of the low key is nonzero and the record was for a non-shareable extent, it will add fmr_blockcount to start_fsb and info->low.rm_startblock. If the low key was actually the last record for that AG, then this addition causes info->low.rm_startblock to point beyond EOAG. When the rmapbt range query starts, it'll return an empty set, and fsmap moves on to the next AG. Or so I thought. Remember how we added to start_fsb? If agsize < 1<<agblklog, start_fsb points to the same AG as the original fmr_physical from the low key. We run the rmapbt query, which returns nothing, so getfsmap zeroes info->low and moves on to the next AG. If agsize == 1<<agblklog, start_fsb now points to the next AG. We run the rmapbt query on the next AG with the excessively large rm_startblock. If this next AG is actually the last AG, we'll set info->high to EOFS (which is now has a lower rm_startblock than info->low), and the ranged btree query code will return -EINVAL. If it's not the last AG, we ignore all records for the intermediate AGs. Oops. Fix this by decoding start_fsb into agno and agbno only after making adjustments to start_fsb. This means that info->low.rm_startblock will always be set to a valid agbno, and we always start the rmapbt iteration in the correct AG. While we're at it, fix the predicate for determining if an fsmap record represents non-shareable space to include file data on pre-reflink filesystems. Reported-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Fixes: 63ef7a35912dd ("xfs: fix interval filtering in multi-step fsmap queries") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Darrick J. Wong
|
ecd49f7a36 |
xfs: fix per-cpu CIL structure aggregation racing with dying cpus
In commit 7c8ade2121200 ("xfs: implement percpu cil space used calculation"), the XFS committed (log) item list code was converted to use per-cpu lists and space tracking to reduce cpu contention when multiple threads are modifying different parts of the filesystem and hence end up contending on the log structures during transaction commit. Each CPU tracks its own commit items and space usage, and these do not have to be merged into the main CIL until either someone wants to push the CIL items, or we run over a soft threshold and switch to slower (but more accurate) accounting with atomics. Unfortunately, the for_each_cpu iteration suffers from the same race with cpu dying problem that was identified in commit 8b57b11cca88f ("pcpcntrs: fix dying cpu summation race") -- CPUs are removed from cpu_online_mask before the CPUHP_XFS_DEAD callback gets called. As a result, both CIL percpu structure aggregation functions fail to collect the items and accounted space usage at the correct point in time. If we're lucky, the items that are collected from the online cpus exceed the space given to those cpus, and the log immediately shuts down in xlog_cil_insert_items due to the (apparent) log reservation overrun. This happens periodically with generic/650, which exercises cpu hotplug vs. the filesystem code: smpboot: CPU 3 is now offline XFS (sda3): ctx ticket reservation ran out. Need to up reservation XFS (sda3): ticket reservation summary: XFS (sda3): unit res = 9268 bytes XFS (sda3): current res = -40 bytes XFS (sda3): original count = 1 XFS (sda3): remaining count = 1 XFS (sda3): Filesystem has been shut down due to log error (0x2). Applying the same sort of fix from 8b57b11cca88f to the CIL code seems to make the generic/650 problem go away, but I've been told that tglx was not happy when he saw: "...the only thing we actually need to care about is that percpu_counter_sum() iterates dying CPUs. That's trivial to do, and when there are no CPUs dying, it has no addition overhead except for a cpumask_or() operation." The CPU hotplug code is rather complex and difficult to understand and I don't want to try to understand the cpu hotplug locking well enough to use cpu_dying mask. Furthermore, there's a performance improvement that could be had here. Attach a private cpu mask to the CIL structure so that we can track exactly which cpus have accessed the percpu data at all. It doesn't matter if the cpu has since gone offline; log item aggregation will still find the items. Better yet, we skip cpus that have not recently logged anything. Worse yet, Ritesh Harjani and Eric Sandeen both reported today that CPU hot remove racing with an xfs mount can crash if the cpu_dead notifier tries to access the log but the mount hasn't yet set up the log. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/ZOLzgBOuyWHapOyZ@dread.disaster.area/T/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/877cuj1mt1.ffs@tglx/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230414162755.281993820@linutronix.de/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/ZOVkjxWZq0YmjrJu@dread.disaster.area/T/ Cc: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: peterz@infradead.org Reported-by: ritesh.list@gmail.com Reported-by: sandeen@sandeen.net Fixes: af1c2146a50b ("xfs: introduce per-cpu CIL tracking structure") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> |
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Trond Myklebust
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954998b60c |
NFS: Fix error handling for O_DIRECT write scheduling
If we fail to schedule a request for transmission, there are 2 possibilities: 1) Either we hit a fatal error, and we just want to drop the remaining requests on the floor. 2) We were asked to try again, in which case we should allow the outstanding RPC calls to complete, so that we can recoalesce requests and try again. Fixes: d600ad1f2bdb ("NFS41: pop some layoutget errors to application") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> |
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Shigeru Yoshida
|
2251588143 |
reiserfs: Replace 1-element array with C99 style flex-array
UBSAN found the following issue: ================================================================================ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/reiserfs/journal.c:4166:22 index 1 is out of range for type '__le32 [1]' This is because struct reiserfs_journal_desc uses 1-element array for dynamically sized array member, j_realblock. This patch fixes this issue by replacing the 1-element array member with C99 style flex-array. This patch also fixes the same issue in struct reiserfs_journal_commit as the same manner. Fixes: f466c6fdb3b1 ("move private bits of reiserfs_fs.h to fs/reiserfs/reiserfs.h") Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20230821043312.1444068-1-syoshida@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
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Lukas Bulwahn
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57c0f4a8ea |
xfs: fix select in config XFS_ONLINE_SCRUB_STATS
Commit d7a74cad8f45 ("xfs: track usage statistics of online fsck") introduces config XFS_ONLINE_SCRUB_STATS, which selects the non-existing config FS_DEBUG. It is probably intended to select the existing config XFS_DEBUG. Fix the select in config XFS_ONLINE_SCRUB_STATS. Fixes: d7a74cad8f45 ("xfs: track usage statistics of online fsck") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> |
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Heinrich Schuchardt
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79b83606ab |
efivarfs: fix statfs() on efivarfs
Some firmware (notably U-Boot) provides GetVariable() and GetNextVariableName() but not QueryVariableInfo(). With commit d86ff3333cb1 ("efivarfs: expose used and total size") the statfs syscall was broken for such firmware. If QueryVariableInfo() does not exist or returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED, just report the file system size as 0 as statfs_simple() previously did. Fixes: d86ff3333cb1 ("efivarfs: expose used and total size") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230910045445.41632-1-heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com/ Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com> [ardb: log warning on QueryVariableInfo() failure] Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
|
fd3a5940e6 |
six smb3 client fixes, one fix for nls Kconfig, one minor spnego registry update
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGzBAABCgAdFiEE6fsu8pdIjtWE/DpLiiy9cAdyT1EFAmT8qQwACgkQiiy9cAdy T1Hjzgv/dCmqowHN9fI1gP/SpkbyZt0/GrlhpRMELQ2THAYuJmWQ9i/vR7VFMMv7 C7vfx3nYTQfQAcsshA+bfOkABr02A9HD5HuBEhWldEFQD/qIPrPMyU53DJ6m4QOb 81/8ox6XJMDNHWJUPJVfhAyHoKBxYyNcqqkITnBcSpqENbm7IZ8UhUJe1l75nkBi IYR28e4Aci5uGPuMB7NAuKmJM0IKi1ipMy4MCXkSD/vQZStz76mhzx200Wm6ObuX jqPzIb32simsVY7q/Hbkxt2MPDUbsn6kBhOSe8oJVxEgrMy56pZCOByPjc0ZFzE6 SziZ0JanrfjlGdBg5qjmcUamEMV44Oi1QQ6PpkHRA2zDyXMpv8ulwy/3Z40O7zbb WBBar0HsJE5osCL0jiwLbNorctEnmtSKWcyXOI924Bli4eesE/ojq2u4H4KrlXzA gDqPwAhhw/PrbuEmgRy9maYE8KwutZh2HCRvxgFB1NgbcNLvKgkQrly4QP29hKQy +HViqKAe =6QhY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag '6.6-rc-smb3-client-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6 Pull smb client fixes from Steve French: - six smb3 client fixes including ones to allow controlling smb3 directory caching timeout and limits, and one debugging improvement - one fix for nls Kconfig (don't need to expose NLS_UCS2_UTILS option) - one minor spnego registry update * tag '6.6-rc-smb3-client-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: spnego: add missing OID to oid registry smb3: fix minor typo in SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_LARGE_MTU cifs: update internal module version number for cifs.ko smb3: allow controlling maximum number of cached directories smb3: add trace point for queryfs (statfs) nls: Hide new NLS_UCS2_UTILS smb3: allow controlling length of time directory entries are cached with dir leases smb: propagate error code of extract_sharename() |
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Jeff Layton
|
fdd2630a73 |
nfsd: fix change_info in NFSv4 RENAME replies
nfsd sends the transposed directory change info in the RENAME reply. The source directory is in save_fh and the target is in current_fh. Reported-by: Zhi Li <yieli@redhat.com> Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2218844 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
|
6099776f9f |
one patch to remove unneded warning
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGzBAABCgAdFiEE6fsu8pdIjtWE/DpLiiy9cAdyT1EFAmT7eEwACgkQiiy9cAdy T1EY1Qv+OIgraDJ23wl4FX17dEQLKqcVH5wCWhU9IEq9oIhKSMngDE4kAKu/unEJ GOKy9QfY2eshPWHCoZjh9lI1Xg776nC3GeAtekOFHXX9FXRZfWP0+Sp6HRNk1TxD iTrRUDGnGA20QF7tgxNo5EJb2yvxBmEmhiSTwlFUuV+oOjvbQw0eB2EheEEzhPJF 7qrlvC0GvvgUOrVVg6YEMCNFb9bvrns06Rwrl3Hq86gaauXIg4pBIF/AHiwh7jCo +upXo1vgfWp29XMwX79LqCOx9u96q0i5AZonXTN2W/AxsgsWA6RQnGyZmL+Q/2/4 w4jN76NaLspoVE8grbzcSJq8b3Rlx2HUlzBaZgqAbuB8zx/59RXf559Aewt+Y9Pt anGsTTpp6a9nc9YYlAGSmaA97y5fnHO47sHpKHVhR9vKbQgvnqGzvmqgNUeRbDzb wgUjOma6SPfZL6JNqNb+SrktI410MjS11/+mP4NlTrVVomYyKZXslcvpnMuoiHMH U4RpYB84 =9Rd7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag '6.6-rc-ksmbd' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd Pull smb server update from Steve French: "After two years, many fixes and much testing, ksmbd is no longer experimental" * tag '6.6-rc-ksmbd' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd: ksmbd: remove experimental warning |
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Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
d508ee2dd5 |
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal
When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> |
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Steve French
|
702c390bc8 |
smb3: fix minor typo in SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_LARGE_MTU
There was a minor typo in the define for SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_LARGE_MTU 0X00000004 instead of 0x00000004 make it consistent Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
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Bhaskar Chowdhury
|
5facccc940 |
MAINTAINERS: remove links to obsolete btrfs.wiki.kernel.org
The wiki has been archived and is not updated anymore. Remove or replace the links in files that contain it (MAINTAINERS, Kconfig, docs). Signed-off-by: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
a57c2d4e46 |
btrfs: assert delayed node locked when removing delayed item
When removing a delayed item, or releasing which will remove it as well, we will modify one of the delayed node's rbtrees and item counter if the delayed item is in one of the rbtrees. This require having the delayed node's mutex locked, otherwise we will race with other tasks modifying the rbtrees and the counter. This is motivated by a previous version of another patch actually calling btrfs_release_delayed_item() after unlocking the delayed node's mutex and against a delayed item that is in a rbtree. So assert at __btrfs_remove_delayed_item() that the delayed node's mutex is locked. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
2c58c3931e |
btrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item
Instead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item into the delayed node's tree, we can just release all the resources we have allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is fine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before calling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending snapshots in the transaction commit path). So remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling. This relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because it only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow we attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000036e1290603e097e0@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
91bfe3104b |
btrfs: improve error message after failure to add delayed dir index item
If we fail to add a delayed dir index item because there's already another item with the same index number, we print an error message (and then BUG). However that message isn't very helpful to debug anything because we don't know what's the index number and what are the values of index counters in the inode and its delayed inode (index_cnt fields of struct btrfs_inode and struct btrfs_delayed_node). So update the error message to include the index number and counters. We actually had a recent case where this issue was hit by a syzbot report (see the link below). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000036e1290603e097e0@google.com/ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Qu Wenruo
|
5e0e879926 |
btrfs: fix a compilation error if DEBUG is defined in btree_dirty_folio
[BUG] After commit 72a69cd03082 ("btrfs: subpage: pack all subpage bitmaps into a larger bitmap"), the DEBUG section of btree_dirty_folio() would no longer compile. [CAUSE] If DEBUG is defined, we would do extra checks for btree_dirty_folio(), mostly to make sure the range we marked dirty has an extent buffer and that extent buffer is dirty. For subpage, we need to iterate through all the extent buffers covered by that page range, and make sure they all matches the criteria. However commit 72a69cd03082 ("btrfs: subpage: pack all subpage bitmaps into a larger bitmap") changes how we store the bitmap, we pack all the 16 bits bitmaps into a larger bitmap, which would save some space. This means we no longer have btrfs_subpage::dirty_bitmap, instead the dirty bitmap is starting at btrfs_subpage_info::dirty_offset, and has a length of btrfs_subpage_info::bitmap_nr_bits. [FIX] Although I'm not sure if it still makes sense to maintain such code, at least let it compile. This patch would let us test the bits one by one through the bitmaps. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
4ca8e03cf2 |
btrfs: check for BTRFS_FS_ERROR in pending ordered assert
If we do fast tree logging we increment a counter on the current transaction for every ordered extent we need to wait for. This means we expect the transaction to still be there when we clear pending on the ordered extent. However if we happen to abort the transaction and clean it up, there could be no running transaction, and thus we'll trip the "ASSERT(trans)" check. This is obviously incorrect, and the code properly deals with the case that the transaction doesn't exist. Fix this ASSERT() to only fire if there's no trans and we don't have BTRFS_FS_ERROR() set on the file system. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
e110f8911d |
btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running delayed items
When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline] lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781 up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376 btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline] btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078 process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600 worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751 kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257: #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8 </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(). Reported-by: syzbot+a379155f07c134ea9879@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000abba27060403b5bd@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Josef Bacik
|
77d20c685b |
btrfs: do not block starts waiting on previous transaction commit
Internally I got a report of very long stalls on normal operations like creating a new file when auto relocation was running. The reporter used the 'bpf offcputime' tracer to show that we would get stuck in start_transaction for 5 to 30 seconds, and were always being woken up by the transaction commit. Using my timing-everything script, which times how long a function takes and what percentage of that total time is taken up by its children, I saw several traces like this 1083 took 32812902424 ns 29929002926 ns 91.2110% wait_for_commit_duration 25568 ns 7.7920e-05% commit_fs_roots_duration 1007751 ns 0.00307% commit_cowonly_roots_duration 446855602 ns 1.36182% btrfs_run_delayed_refs_duration 271980 ns 0.00082% btrfs_run_delayed_items_duration 2008 ns 6.1195e-06% btrfs_apply_pending_changes_duration 9656 ns 2.9427e-05% switch_commit_roots_duration 1598 ns 4.8700e-06% btrfs_commit_device_sizes_duration 4314 ns 1.3147e-05% btrfs_free_log_root_tree_duration Here I was only tracing functions that happen where we are between START_COMMIT and UNBLOCKED in order to see what would be keeping us blocked for so long. The wait_for_commit() we do is where we wait for a previous transaction that hasn't completed it's commit. This can include all of the unpin work and other cleanups, which tends to be the longest part of our transaction commit. There is no reason we should be blocking new things from entering the transaction at this point, it just adds to random latency spikes for no reason. Fix this by adding a PREP stage. This allows us to properly deal with multiple committers coming in at the same time, we retain the behavior that the winner waits on the previous transaction and the losers all wait for this transaction commit to occur. Nothing else is blocked during the PREP stage, and then once the wait is complete we switch to COMMIT_START and all of the same behavior as before is maintained. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
ee34a82e89 |
btrfs: release path before inode lookup during the ino lookup ioctl
During the ino lookup ioctl we can end up calling btrfs_iget() to get an inode reference while we are holding on a root's btree. If btrfs_iget() needs to lookup the inode from the root's btree, because it's not currently loaded in memory, then it will need to lock another or the same path in the same root btree. This may result in a deadlock and trigger the following lockdep splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor277/5012 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88802df41710 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_search_slot+0x13a4/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2302 btrfs_init_root_free_objectid+0x148/0x320 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4955 btrfs_init_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1128 [inline] btrfs_get_root_ref+0x5ae/0xae0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1338 btrfs_get_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1390 [inline] open_ctree+0x29c8/0x3030 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3494 btrfs_fill_super+0x1c7/0x2f0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1154 btrfs_mount_root+0x7e0/0x910 fs/btrfs/super.c:1519 legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611 vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1112 [inline] vfs_kern_mount+0xbc/0x150 fs/namespace.c:1142 btrfs_mount+0x39f/0xb50 fs/btrfs/super.c:1579 legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611 vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519 do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281 btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412 btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline] btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716 btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105 btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(btrfs-tree-01); lock(btrfs-tree-00); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor277/5012: #0: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor277 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281 btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412 btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline] btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716 btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105 btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f0bec94ea39 Fix this simply by releasing the path before calling btrfs_iget() as at point we don't need the path anymore. Reported-by: syzbot+bf66ad948981797d2f1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000045fa140603c4a969@google.com/ Fixes: 23d0b79dfaed ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Filipe Manana
|
2d6cd791e6 |
btrfs: fix race between finishing block group creation and its item update
Commit 675dfe1223a6 ("btrfs: fix block group item corruption after inserting new block group") fixed one race that resulted in not persisting a block group's item when its "used" bytes field decreases to zero. However there's another race that can happen in a much shorter time window that results in the same problem. The following sequence of steps explains how it can happen: 1) Task A creates a metadata block group X, its "used" and "commit_used" fields are initialized to 0; 2) Two extents are allocated from block group X, so its "used" field is updated to 32K, and its "commit_used" field remains as 0; 3) Transaction commit starts, by some task B, and it enters btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(). There it tries to update the block group item for block group X, which currently has its "used" field with a value of 32K and its "commit_used" field with a value of 0. However that fails since the block group item was not yet inserted, so at update_block_group_item(), the btrfs_search_slot() call returns 1, and then we set 'ret' to -ENOENT. Before jumping to the label 'fail'... 4) The block group item is inserted by task A, when for example btrfs_create_pending_block_groups() is called when releasing its transaction handle. This results in insert_block_group_item() inserting the block group item in the extent tree (or block group tree), with a "used" field having a value of 32K and setting "commit_used", in struct btrfs_block_group, to the same value (32K); 5) Task B jumps to the 'fail' label and then resets the "commit_used" field to 0. At btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(), because -ENOENT was returned from update_block_group_item(), we add the block group again to the list of dirty block groups, so that we will try again in the critical section of the transaction commit when calling btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(); 6) Later the two extents from block group X are freed, so its "used" field becomes 0; 7) If no more extents are allocated from block group X before we get into btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(), then when we call update_block_group_item() again for block group X, we will not update the block group item to reflect that it has 0 bytes used, because the "used" and "commit_used" fields in struct btrfs_block_group have the same value, a value of 0. As a result after committing the transaction we have an empty block group with its block group item having a 32K value for its "used" field. This will trigger errors from fsck ("btrfs check" command) and after mounting again the fs, the cleaner kthread will not automatically delete the empty block group, since its "used" field is not 0. Possibly there are other issues due to this inconsistency. When this issue happens, the error reported by fsck is like this: [1/7] checking root items [2/7] checking extents block group [1104150528 1073741824] used 39796736 but extent items used 0 ERROR: errors found in extent allocation tree or chunk allocation (...) So fix this by not resetting the "commit_used" field of a block group when we don't find the block group item at update_block_group_item(). Fixes: 7248e0cebbef ("btrfs: skip update of block group item if used bytes are the same") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.2+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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Steven Rostedt (Google)
|
9879e5e1c5 |
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory
Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> |
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Ritesh Harjani (IBM)
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147d4a092e |
jbd2: Remove page size assumptions
jbd2_alloc() allocates a buffer from slab when the block size is smaller than PAGE_SIZE, and slab may be using a compound page. Before commit 8147c4c4546f, we set b_page to the precise page containing the buffer and this code worked well. Now we set b_page to the head page of the allocation, so we can no longer use offset_in_page(). While we could do a 1:1 replacement with offset_in_folio(), use the more idiomatic bh_offset() and the folio APIs to map the buffer. This isn't enough to support a b_size larger than PAGE_SIZE on HIGHMEM machines, but this is good enough to fix the actual bug we're seeing. Fixes: 8147c4c4546f ("jbd2: use a folio in jbd2_journal_write_metadata_buffer()") Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> [converted to be more folio] Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> |
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Christian Brauner
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78a06688a4 |
ntfs3: drop inode references in ntfs_put_super()
Recently we moved most cleanup from ntfs_put_super() into ntfs3_kill_sb() as part of a bigger cleanup. This accidently also moved dropping inode references stashed in ntfs3's sb->s_fs_info from @sb->put_super() to @sb->kill_sb(). But generic_shutdown_super() verifies that there are no busy inodes past sb->put_super(). Fix this and disentangle dropping inode references from freeing @sb->s_fs_info. Fixes: a4f64a300a29 ("ntfs3: free the sbi in ->kill_sb") # mainline only Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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9013c51c63 |
vfs: mostly undo glibc turning 'fstat()' into 'fstatat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)'
Mateusz reports that glibc turns 'fstat()' calls into 'fstatat()', and that seems to have been going on for quite a long time due to glibc having tried to simplify its stat logic into just one point. This turns out to cause completely unnecessary overhead, where we then go off and allocate the kernel side pathname, and actually look up the empty path. Sure, our path lookup is quite optimized, but it still causes a fair bit of allocation overhead and a couple of completely unnecessary rounds of lockref accesses etc. This is all hopefully getting fixed in user space, and there is a patch floating around for just having glibc use the native fstat() system call. But even with the current situation we can at least improve on things by catching the situation and short-circuiting it. Note that this is still measurably slower than just a plain 'fstat()', since just checking that the filename is actually empty is somewhat expensive due to inevitable user space access overhead from the kernel (ie verifying pointers, and SMAP on x86). But it's still quite a bit faster than actually looking up the path for real. To quote numers from Mateusz: "Sapphire Rapids, will-it-scale, ops/s stock fstat 5088199 patched fstat 7625244 (+49%) real fstat 8540383 (+67% / +12%)" where that 'stock fstat' is the glibc translation of fstat into fstatat() with an empty path, the 'patched fstat' is with this short circuiting of the path lookup, and the 'real fstat' is the actual native fstat() system call with none of this overhead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230903204858.lv7i3kqvw6eamhgz@f/ Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Steve French
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30bded94dc |
cifs: update internal module version number for cifs.ko
From 2.44 to 2.45 Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
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Steve French
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6a50d71d0f |
smb3: allow controlling maximum number of cached directories
Allow adjusting the maximum number of cached directories per share (defaults to 16) via mount parm "max_cached_dirs" Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
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Steve French
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feeec636b6 |
smb3: add trace point for queryfs (statfs)
In debugging a recent performance problem with statfs, it would have been helpful to be able to trace the smb3 query fs info request more narrowly. Add a trace point "smb3_qfs_done" Which displays: stat-68950 [008] ..... 1472.360598: smb3_qfs_done: xid=14 sid=0xaa9765e4 tid=0x95a76f54 unc_name=\\localhost\test rc=0 Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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7ba2090ca6 |
Mixed with some fixes and cleanups, this brings in reasonably complete
fscrypt support to CephFS! The list of things which don't work with encryption should be fairly short, mostly around the edges: fallocate (not supported well in CephFS to begin with), copy_file_range (requires re-encryption), non-default striping patterns. This was a multi-year effort principally by Jeff Layton with assistance from Xiubo Li, Luís Henriques and others, including several dependant changes in the MDS, netfs helper library and fscrypt framework itself. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFHBAABCAAxFiEEydHwtzie9C7TfviiSn/eOAIR84sFAmT4pl4THGlkcnlvbW92 QGdtYWlsLmNvbQAKCRBKf944AhHzi5kzB/4sMgzZyUa3T1vA/G2pPvEkyy1qDxsW y+o4dDMWA9twcrBVpNuGd54wbXpmO/LAekHEdorjayH+f0zf10MsnP1ePz9WB3NG jr7RRujb+Gpd2OFYJXGSEbd3faTg8M2kpGCCrVe7SFNoyu8z9NwFItwWMog5aBjX ODGQrq+kA4ARA6xIqwzF5gP0zr+baT9rWhQdm7Xo9itWdosnbyDLJx1dpEfLuqBX te3SmifDzedn3Gw73hdNo/+ybw0kHARoK+RmXCTsoDDQw+JsoO9KxZF5Q8QcDELq 2woPNp0Hl+Dm4MkzGnPxv56Qj8ZDViS59syXC0CfGRmu4nzF1Rw+0qn5 =/WlE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.6-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov: "Mixed with some fixes and cleanups, this brings in reasonably complete fscrypt support to CephFS! The list of things which don't work with encryption should be fairly short, mostly around the edges: fallocate (not supported well in CephFS to begin with), copy_file_range (requires re-encryption), non-default striping patterns. This was a multi-year effort principally by Jeff Layton with assistance from Xiubo Li, Luís Henriques and others, including several dependant changes in the MDS, netfs helper library and fscrypt framework itself" * tag 'ceph-for-6.6-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (53 commits) ceph: make num_fwd and num_retry to __u32 ceph: make members in struct ceph_mds_request_args_ext a union rbd: use list_for_each_entry() helper libceph: do not include crypto/algapi.h ceph: switch ceph_lookup/atomic_open() to use new fscrypt helper ceph: fix updating i_truncate_pagecache_size for fscrypt ceph: wait for OSD requests' callbacks to finish when unmounting ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations ceph: prevent snapshot creation in encrypted locked directories ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names ceph: invalidate pages when doing direct/sync writes ceph: plumb in decryption during reads ceph: add encryption support to writepage and writepages ceph: add read/modify/write to ceph_sync_write ceph: align data in pages in ceph_sync_write ceph: don't use special DIO path for encrypted inodes ceph: add truncate size handling support for fscrypt ceph: add object version support for sync read libceph: allow ceph_osdc_new_request to accept a multi-op read ... |
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Steven Rostedt (Google)
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e24709454c |
tracefs/eventfs: Add missing lockdown checks
All the eventfs external functions do not check if TRACEFS_LOCKDOWN was set or not. This can caused some functions to return success while others fail, which can trigger unexpected errors. Add the missing lockdown checks. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230905182711.899724045@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202309050916.58201dc6-oliver.sang@intel.com/ Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Ching-lin Yu <chinglinyu@google.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> |