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Scott reports an occasional scatterlist BUG that is triggered by the
RFC 8009 Kunit test, then says:
> Looking through the git history of the auth_gss code, there are various
> places where static buffers were replaced by dynamically allocated ones
> because they're being used with scatterlists.
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Fixes: 561141dd49 ("SUNRPC: Use a static buffer for the checksum initialization vector")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Allocating and zeroing a buffer during every call to
krb5_etm_checksum() is inefficient. Instead, set aside a static
buffer that is the maximum crypto block size, and use a portion
(or all) of that.
Reported-by: Markus Elfring <Markus.Elfring@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The creds and oa->data need to be freed in the error-handling paths after
their allocation. So this patch add these deallocations in the
corresponding paths.
Fixes: 1d658336b0 ("SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The ctx->mech_used.data allocated by kmemdup is not freed in neither
gss_import_v2_context nor it only caller gss_krb5_import_sec_context,
which frees ctx on error.
Thus, this patch reform the last call of gss_import_v2_context to the
gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2, preventing the memleak while keepping the return
formation.
Fixes: 47d8480776 ("gss_krb5: handle new context format from gssd")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to Sun RPC modules.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108181610.2697017-6-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
NFSD will use this new API to determine whether nfsd_splice_read is
safe to use. This avoids the need to add a dependency to NFSD for
CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only. Use the
header file crypto/utils.h instead.
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In addition to the benefits of using an enum rather than a set of
macros, we now have a named type that can improve static type
checking of function return values.
As part of this change, I removed a stale comment from svcauth.h;
the return values from current implementations of the
auth_ops::release method are all zero/negative errno, not the SVC_OK
enum values as the old comment suggested.
Suggested-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
All supported encryption types now use the same context import
function.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
This code is now always on, so the ifdef can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Scott reports SUNRPC self-test failures regarding the output IV on arm64
when using the SIMD accelerated implementation of AES in CBC mode with
ciphertext stealing ("cts(cbc(aes))" in crypto API speak).
These failures are the result of the fact that, while RFC 3962 does
specify what the output IV should be and includes test vectors for it,
the general concept of an output IV is poorly defined, and generally,
not specified by the various algorithms implemented by the crypto API.
Only algorithms that support transparent chaining (e.g., CBC mode on a
block boundary) have requirements on the output IV, but ciphertext
stealing (CTS) is fundamentally about how to encapsulate CBC in a way
where the length of the entire message may not be an integral multiple
of the cipher block size, and the concept of an output IV does not exist
here because it has no defined purpose past the end of the message.
The generic CTS template takes advantage of this chaining capability of
the CBC implementations, and as a result, happens to return an output
IV, simply because it passes its IV buffer directly to the encapsulated
CBC implementation, which operates on full blocks only, and always
returns an IV. This output IV happens to match how RFC 3962 defines it,
even though the CTS template itself does not contain any output IV logic
whatsoever, and, for this reason, lacks any test vectors that exercise
this accidental output IV generation.
The arm64 SIMD implementation of cts(cbc(aes)) does not use the generic
CTS template at all, but instead, implements the CBC mode and ciphertext
stealing directly, and therefore does not encapsule a CBC implementation
that returns an output IV in the same way. The arm64 SIMD implementation
complies with the specification and passes all internal tests, but when
invoked by the SUNRPC code, fails to produce the expected output IV and
causes its selftests to fail.
Given that the output IV is defined as the penultimate block (where the
final block may smaller than the block size), we can quite easily derive
it in the caller by copying the appropriate slice of ciphertext after
encryption.
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The get_expiry() function currently returns a timestamp, and uses the
special return value of 0 to indicate an error.
Unfortunately this causes a problem when 0 is the correct return value.
On a system with no RTC it is possible that the boot time will be seen
to be "3". When exportfs probes to see if a particular filesystem
supports NFS export it tries to cache information with an expiry time of
"3". The intention is for this to be "long in the past". Even with no
RTC it will not be far in the future (at most a second or two) so this
is harmless.
But if the boot time happens to have been calculated to be "3", then
get_expiry will fail incorrectly as it converts the number to "seconds
since bootime" - 0.
To avoid this problem we change get_expiry() to report the error quite
separately from the expiry time. The error is now the return value.
The expiry time is reported through a by-reference parameter.
Reported-by: Jerry Zhang <jerry@skydio.com>
Tested-by: Jerry Zhang <jerry@skydio.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Scott reports that when the new GSS krb5 Kunit tests are built as
a separate module and loaded, the RFC 6803 and RFC 8009 checksum
tests all fail, even though they pass when run under kunit.py.
It appears that passing a buffer backed by static const memory to
gss_krb5_checksum() is a problem. A printk in checksum_case() shows
the correct plaintext, but by the time the buffer has been converted
to a scatterlist and arrives at checksummer(), it contains all
zeroes.
Replacing this buffer with one that is dynamically allocated fixes
the issue.
Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Fixes: 02142b2ca8 ("SUNRPC: Add checksum KUnit tests for the RFC 6803 encryption types")
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The usage_data[] array in rfc6803_encrypt_case() is uninitialised, so clear
it as it may cause the tests to fail otherwise.
Fixes: b958cff6b2 ("SUNRPC: Add encryption KUnit tests for the RFC 6803 encryption types")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/380323.1681314997@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Anna says:
> KASAN reports [...] a slab-out-of-bounds in gss_krb5_checksum(),
> and it can cause my client to panic when running cthon basic
> tests with krb5p.
> Running faddr2line gives me:
>
> gss_krb5_checksum+0x4b6/0x630:
> ahash_request_free at
> /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/./include/crypto/hash.h:619
> (inlined by) gss_krb5_checksum at
> /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c:358
My diagnosis is that the memcpy() at the end of gss_krb5_checksum()
reads past the end of the buffer containing the checksum data
because the callers have ignored gss_krb5_checksum()'s API contract:
* Caller provides the truncation length of the output token (h) in
* cksumout.len.
Instead they provide the fixed length of the hmac buffer. This
length happens to be larger than the value returned by
crypto_ahash_digestsize().
Change these errant callers to work like krb5_etm_{en,de}crypt().
As a defensive measure, bound the length of the byte copy at the
end of gss_krb5_checksum().
Kunit sez:
Testing complete. Ran 68 tests: passed: 68
Elapsed time: 81.680s total, 5.875s configuring, 75.610s building, 0.103s running
Reported-by: Anna Schumaker <schumaker.anna@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8270dbfceb ("SUNRPC: Obscure Kerberos integrity keys")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 73657420 when execute
[73657420] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Tainted: G N 6.2.0-rc7-00133-g373f26a81164-dirty #9
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at 0x73657420
LR is at kunit_run_tests+0x3e0/0x5f4
On x86 with GCC 12, the missing array terminators did not seem to
matter. Other platforms appear to be more picky.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Allow the new GSS Kerberos encryption type test suites to run
outside of the kunit infrastructure. Replace the assertion that
fires when lookup_enctype() so that the case is skipped instead of
failing outright.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
I'm guessing that the warning fired because there's some code path
that is called on module unload where the gss_krb5_enctypes file
was never set up.
name 'gss_krb5_enctypes'
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6187 at fs/proc/generic.c:712 remove_proc_entry+0x38d/0x460 fs/proc/generic.c:712
destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c:1543 [inline]
gss_svc_shutdown_net+0x7d/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c:2120
ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:169
setup_net+0x9bd/0xe60 net/core/net_namespace.c:356
copy_net_ns+0x320/0x6b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:483
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
copy_namespaces+0x410/0x500 kernel/nsproxy.c:179
copy_process+0x311d/0x76b0 kernel/fork.c:2272
kernel_clone+0xeb/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:2684
__do_sys_clone+0xba/0x100 kernel/fork.c:2825
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reported-by: syzbot+04a8437497bcfb4afa95@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
With the KUnit infrastructure recently added, we are free to define
other unit tests particular to our implementation. As an example,
I've added a self-test that encrypts then decrypts a string, and
checks the result.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 8009 provides sample encryption results. Add KUnit tests to
ensure our implementation derives the expected results for the
provided sample input.
I hate how large this test is, but using non-standard key usage
values means rfc8009_encrypt_case() can't simply reuse ->import_ctx
to allocate and key its ciphers; and the test provides its own
confounders, which means krb5_etm_encrypt() can't be used directly.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 8009 provides sample checksum results. Add KUnit tests to ensure
our implementation derives the expected results for the provided
sample input.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 8009 provides sample key derivation results, so Kunit tests are
added to ensure our implementation derives the expected keys for the
provided sample input.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The Camellia enctypes use a new KDF, so add some tests to ensure it
is working properly.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Add Kunit tests for ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96. The test
vectors come from RFC 3962 Appendix B.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 3961 Appendix A provides tests for the KDF specified in that
document as well as other parts of Kerberos. The other three usage
scenarios in Section 10 are not implemented by the Linux kernel's
RPCSEC GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism, so tests are not added for those.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
I plan to add KUnit tests that will need enctype profile
information. Export the enctype profile lookup function.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The Kerberos RFCs provide test vectors to verify the operation of
an implementation. Introduce a KUnit test framework to exercise the
Linux kernel's implementation of Kerberos.
Start with test cases for the RFC 3961-defined n-fold function. The
sample vectors for that are found in RFC 3961 Section 10.
Run the GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism's unit tests with this command:
$ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \
--kunitconfig ./net/sunrpc/.kunitconfig
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The goal is to leave only protocol-defined items in gss_krb5.h so
that it can be easily replaced by a generic header. Implementation
specific items are moved to the new internal header.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Add the RFC 6803 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The Camellia enctypes use the KDF_FEEDBACK_CMAC Key Derivation
Function defined in RFC 6803 Section 3.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 6803 defines two encryption types that use Camellia ciphers (RFC
3713) and CMAC digests. Implement support for those in SunRPC's GSS
Kerberos 5 mechanism.
There has not been an explicit request to support these enctypes.
However, this new set of enctypes provides a good alternative to the
AES-SHA1 enctypes that are to be deprecated at some point.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Add the RFC 8009 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Link: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=400
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
RFC 8009 enctypes use different crypt formulae than previous
Kerberos 5 encryption types. Section 1 of RFC 8009 explains the
reason for this change:
> The new types conform to the framework specified in [RFC3961],
> but do not use the simplified profile, as the simplified profile
> is not compliant with modern cryptographic best practices such as
> calculating Message Authentication Codes (MACs) over ciphertext
> rather than plaintext.
Add new .encrypt and .decrypt functions to handle this variation.
The new approach described above is referred to as Encrypt-then-MAC
(or EtM). Hence the names of the new functions added here are
prefixed with "krb5_etm_".
A critical second difference with previous crypt formulae is that
the cipher state is included in the computed HMAC. Note however that
for RPCSEC, the initial cipher state is easy to compute on both
initiator and acceptor because it is always all zeroes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The RFC 8009 encryption types use a different key derivation
function than the RFC 3962 encryption types. The new key derivation
function is defined in Section 3 of RFC 8009.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Fill in entries in the supported_gss_krb5_enctypes array for the
encryption types defined in RFC 8009. These new enctypes use the
SHA-256 and SHA-384 message digest algorithms (as defined in
FIPS-180) instead of the deprecated SHA-1 algorithm, and are thus
more secure.
Note that NIST has scheduled SHA-1 for deprecation:
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm
Thus these new encryption types are placed under a separate CONFIG
option to enable distributors to separately introduce support for
the AES-SHA2 enctypes and deprecate support for the current set of
AES-SHA1 encryption types as their user space allows.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cryptosystem profile enctypes all use cipher block chaining
with ciphertext steal (CBC-with-CTS). However enctypes that are
currently supported in the Linux kernel SunRPC implementation
use only the encrypt-&-MAC approach. The RFC 8009 enctypes use
encrypt-then-MAC, which performs encryption and checksumming in
a different order.
Refactor to make it possible to share the CBC with CTS encryption
and decryption mechanisms between e&M and etM enctypes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits. Add new fields to struct
gss_krb5_enctype that specify the key lengths individually, and
where needed, use the correct new field instead of ->keylength.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Although the Kerberos specs have always listed separate subkey
lengths, the Linux kernel's SunRPC GSS Kerberos enctype profiles
assume the base key and the derived keys have identical lengths.
The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits.
To support that enctype, parametrize context_v2_alloc_cipher() so
that each of its call sites can pass in its desired key length. For
now it will be the same length as before (gk5e->keylength), but a
subsequent patch will change this.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
De-duplicate some common code.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Each Kerberos enctype can have a different KDF. Refactor the key
derivation path to support different KDFs for the enctypes
introduced in subsequent patches.
In particular, expose the key derivation function in struct
gss_krb5_enctype instead of the enctype's preferred random-to-key
function. The latter is usually the identity function and is only
ever called during key derivation, so have each KDF call it
directly.
A couple of extra clean-ups:
- Deduplicate the set_cdata() helper
- Have ->derive_key return negative errnos, in accordance with usual
kernel coding conventions
This patch is a little bigger than I'd like, but these are all
mechanical changes and they are all to the same areas of code. No
behavior change is intended.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Clean up: there is now only one encrypt and only one decrypt method,
thus there is no longer a need for the v2-suffixed method names.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
