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The driver can be compile tested with !CONFIG_OF making certain data
unused:
drivers/nvmem/stm32-romem.c:271:34: error: ‘stm32_romem_of_match’ defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404172148.82422-27-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
On STM32MP15x SoC, the SMC backend is optional when OP-TEE is used;
the PTA BSEC should be used as it is done on STM32MP13x platform,
but the BSEC SMC can be also used: it is a legacy mode in OP-TEE,
not recommended but used in previous OP-TEE firmware.
The presence of OP-TEE is dynamically detected in STM32MP15x device tree
and the supported NVMEM backend is dynamically detected:
- PTA with stm32_bsec_pta_find
- SMC with stm32_bsec_check
With OP-TEE but without PTA and SMC detection, the probe is deferred for
STM32MP15x devices.
On STM32MP13x platform, only the PTA is supported with cfg->ta = true
and this detection is skipped.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230206134356.839737-19-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
For boot with OP-TEE on STM32MP13, the communication with the secure
world no more use STMicroelectronics SMC but communication with the
STM32MP BSEC TA, for data access (read/write) or lock operation:
- all the request are sent to OP-TEE trusted application,
- for upper OTP with ECC protection and with word programming only
each OTP are permanently locked when programmed to avoid ECC error
on the second write operation
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230206134356.839737-18-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Inform NVMEM framework of type attribute for stm32-romem as NVMEM_TYPE_OTP
so userspace is able to know how the data is stored in BSEC.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118063932.6418-4-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
As the upper OTPs are ECC protected, they support only one 32 bits word
programming.
For a second modification of this word, these ECC become invalid and
this OTP will be no more accessible, the shadowed value is invalid.
This patch adds a warning to indicate an upper OTP update, because this
operation is dangerous as OTP is not locked by the driver after the first
update to avoid a second update.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118063932.6418-3-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Support STM32MP15_BSEC_NUM_LOWER in stm32 romem config to prepare
the next SoC in STM32MP family.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118063932.6418-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
On STM32MP15, OTP area may be read/written by using BSEC (boot, security
and OTP control). BSEC registers set is composed of various regions, among
which control registers and OTP shadow registers.
Secure monitor calls are involved in this process to allow (or deny)
access to the full range of OTP data.
This adds support for reading and writing OTP data using SMC services.
Data content can be aligned on 16-bits or 8-bits. Then take care of it,
since BSEC data is 32-bits wide.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
