IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
Use cap_capable() rather than capable() in the Smack privilege
check as the former does not invoke other security module
privilege check, while the later does. This becomes important
when stacking. It may be a problem even with minor modules.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not
appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this
pile, sorry"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs/affs: add rename exchange
fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods
Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx()
fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects
fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL
remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu()
fs: completely ignore unknown open flags
fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
fs: remove _submit_bh()
fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()
fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h
fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS
fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks
fs/affs: remove node generation check
fs/affs: import amigaffs.h
fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context
(smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls
__kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)),
it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789cad ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is
no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private
inode including anon_inode for file functions.
It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd,
but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected.
It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped,
because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes.
As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor.
In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode
label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken.
One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd.
Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be
disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject,
this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc()
for proper logging and SMACK access check.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed
using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected
structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu"
macro to fetch the rcu protected entry.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK
module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while
inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been
observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module
takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field
using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is
being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though
they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete
repeated initialization.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
"smk_set_access()" function adds a new rule entry in subject label specific
list(rule_list) and in global rule list(smack_rule_list) both. Mutex lock
(rule_lock) is used to avoid simultaneous updates. But this lock is subject
label specific lock. If 2 processes tries to add different rules(i.e with
different subject labels) simultaneously, then both the processes can take
the "rule_lock" respectively. So it will cause a problem while adding
entries in master rule list.
Now a new mutex lock(smack_master_list_lock) has been taken to add entry in
smack_rule_list to avoid simultaneous updates of different rules.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind
call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label
(SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns
with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label
is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook
To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label()
function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the
socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it
means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry
else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is
closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the
"smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in
"smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket
security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry
is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket.
If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially
"smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after
creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client
tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same
IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different
SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using
"test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test",
then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp
server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check
for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the
earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on
the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list.
Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the
"smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes.
Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same
port but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries
will be added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in
smk_ipv6_port_check() function, port entry is searched on the basis of
both port and protocol.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list
in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race
condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while
working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is
reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the
same port list, which can cause the major problems.
To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism
has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will
also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than
modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
- more ->d_init() stuff (work.dcache)
- pathname resolution cleanups (work.namei)
- a few missing iov_iter primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and
friends. Either copy the full requested amount, advance the iterator
and return true, or fail, return false and do _not_ advance the
iterator. Quite a few open-coded callers converted (and became more
readable and harder to fuck up that way) (work.iov_iter)
- several assorted patches, the big one being logfs removal
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
logfs: remove from tree
vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors
namei: fold should_follow_link() with the step into not-followed link
namei: pass both WALK_GET and WALK_MORE to should_follow_link()
namei: invert WALK_PUT logics
namei: shift interpretation of LOOKUP_FOLLOW inside should_follow_link()
namei: saner calling conventions for mountpoint_last()
namei.c: get rid of user_path_parent()
switch getfrag callbacks to ..._full() primitives
make skb_add_data,{_nocache}() and skb_copy_to_page_nocache() advance only on success
[iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends
don't open-code file_inode()
ceph: switch to use of ->d_init()
ceph: unify dentry_operations instances
lustre: switch to use of ->d_init()
The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label
serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary.
While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that
the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that
is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid
label could never happen in a functional system, has
never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd
really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is
removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses
GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is
called by smack_parse_opts_str().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host
addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading
to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the
check into the right place.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function.
smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating
memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function.
If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling
function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup.
In smack_cred_free() function first credential is extracted and
then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security
field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this
function may return before and memory will not be freed.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels.
Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr()
hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted
from applying web ("@") label.
Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr()
hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission
is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or
web ("@").
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being
parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling
mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability.
This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add
SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack
by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user.
Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function
may return with EPERM error.
First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes
and smk_flags.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket
Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems
like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case,
received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny.
Signed-off-by: jooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"xattr stuff from Andreas
This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from
->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr
xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling
vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling
vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag
vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c
ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop
sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names
kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros
xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a
signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either
a write or an append operation. The original choice to make
both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery
is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not.
This patch provides the option of making signal delivery
an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal
delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reuse existing functionality from memdup_user() instead of keeping
duplicate source code.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled
either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding
the same.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- TPM core and driver updates/fixes
- IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
- Lots of Apparmor fixes
- Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
syscall #"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
tpm: Factor out common startup code
tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
...
Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
"This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is
to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This
patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
goal.
While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns
would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues
made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
everyone.
At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:
- Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.
- Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.
By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security
modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This
also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
owning user namespace of the filesystem.
One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code
simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).
This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough
adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions
are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
contains owner information.
These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.
- Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
/proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
privileged user.
- The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
instead.
Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused
problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.
There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
what is in this set of changes.
- Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
during mount.
- Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
security xattrs accordingly.
- Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already
does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
generalize this case).
Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:
- Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability]
- Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
the superblock owner to perform them.
- Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
normally.
I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
locked down and handled generically.
Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
changes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
...
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.
This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.
If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.
Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.
Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.
sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
We always mixed in the parent pointer into the dentry name hash, but we
did it late at lookup time. It turns out that we can simplify that
lookup-time action by salting the hash with the parent pointer early
instead of late.
A few other users of our string hashes also wanted to mix in their own
pointers into the hash, and those are updated to use the same mechanism.
Hash users that don't have any particular initial salt can just use the
NULL pointer as a no-salt.
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.
Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.
This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.
Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.
Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
