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The recent rework introduced a possible randconfig build failure
when CONFIG_CRYPTO configured to only allow modules:
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_crypt':
big_key.c:(.text+0x29f): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setkey'
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_init':
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x1a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_aead'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x45): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setauthsize'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x77): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `gcm_hash_crypt_remain_continue':
gcm.c:(.text+0x167): undefined reference to `crypto_ahash_finup'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `crypto_gcm_exit_tfm':
gcm.c:(.text+0x847): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
When we 'select CRYPTO' like the other users, we always get a
configuration that builds.
Fixes: 428490e38b ("security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.
It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.
So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:
* Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
guess or predict keys.
* Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
* Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
compare identical plaintext blocks.
* Key re-use.
* Faulty memory zeroing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.
This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for
several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile.
At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the
keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error.
This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to
make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit
architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT.
[DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric
Biggers]
Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that
also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash
cipher support required for the KDF operation.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Since BIG_KEYS can't be compiled as module it requires one of the "stdrng"
providers to be compiled into kernel. Otherwise big_key_crypto_init() fails
on crypto_alloc_rng step and next dereference of big_key_skcipher (e.g. in
big_key_preparse()) results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: 13100a72f4 ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.
Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.
The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
that the values are only needed in userspace.
Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.
Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Solved TODO task: big keys saved to shmem file are now stored encrypted.
The encryption key is randomly generated and saved to payload[big_key_data].
Signed-off-by: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Now that /proc/keys is used by libkeyutils to look up a key by type and
description, we should make it unconditional and remove
CONFIG_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS.
Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Having the big_keys functionality as a module is very marginally useful.
The userspace code that would use this functionality will get odd error
messages from the keys layer if the module isn't loaded. The code itself
is fairly small, so just have this as a boolean option and not a tristate.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos
caches held within the kernel.
This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's
processes so that the user's cron jobs can work.
The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like:
struct user_namespace
\___ .krb_cache keyring - The register
\___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache
\___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob
\___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob
Or possibly:
struct user_namespace
\___ .krb_cache keyring - The register
\___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache
\___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache
\___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache
\___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key
\___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
\___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
\___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel
support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want.
The user asks for their Kerberos cache by:
krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring);
The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
mess with the cache.
The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read,
search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a
chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link.
Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a
timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring
goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to
three days.
Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the
register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key
search and garbage collection facilities are available.
The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left
in it is then automatically gc'd.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus
swapspace when memory is tight. This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using
the previously added associative array implementation. Currently the maximum
capacity is:
(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *)
which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500. However, since this is being
used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that. The new implementation
gives us effectively unlimited capacity.
With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion
after this patch is applied. The alterations are because (a) keyrings that
are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have
changed a bit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
