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Add an ioctl FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA which will allow reading verity
metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:
- The Merkle tree
- The fsverity_descriptor (not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if present
This ioctl has similar semantics to pread(). It is passed the type of
metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and
size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.
Separate patches will add support for each of the above metadata types.
This patch just adds the ioctl itself.
This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is
stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but
that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor are defined by how fs-verity
file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section
of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in
which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't
previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.
- The built-in signature is the value passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that
takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the
client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file.
This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the
server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to
export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs".
This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which
provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the
traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and
perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that
have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or
requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it
in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient
and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is
useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature
verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210115181819.34732-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
To meet some users' needs, add optional support for having fs-verity
handle a portion of the authentication policy in the kernel. An
".fs-verity" keyring is created to which X.509 certificates can be
added; then a sysctl 'fs.verity.require_signatures' can be set to cause
the kernel to enforce that all fs-verity files contain a signature of
their file measurement by a key in this keyring.
See the "Built-in signature verification" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl retrieves the file measurement
that fs-verity calculated for the given file and is enforcing for reads;
i.e., reads that don't match this hash will fail. This ioctl can be
used for authentication or logging of file measurements in userspace.
See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.
See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add functions that verify data pages that have been read from a
fs-verity file, against that file's Merkle tree. These will be called
from filesystems' ->readpage() and ->readpages() methods.
Since data verification can block, a workqueue is provided for these
methods to enqueue verification work from their bio completion callback.
See the "Verifying data" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for more information.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add the fsverity_file_open() function, which prepares an fs-verity file
to be read from. If not already done, it loads the fs-verity descriptor
from the filesystem and sets up an fsverity_info structure for the inode
which describes the Merkle tree and contains the file measurement. It
also denies all attempts to open verity files for writing.
This commit also begins the include/linux/fsverity.h header, which
declares the interface between fs/verity/ and filesystems.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add the beginnings of the fs/verity/ support layer, including the
Kconfig option and various helper functions for hashing. To start, only
SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
