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Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments.
Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave
page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be
“proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave.
In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also
supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library. The runtime helps
build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it
got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle.
The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers,
registered by the library. But, being process-wide, shared state, signal
handling and shared libraries do not mix well.
Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions
(EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information
about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime.
Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in
RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler
will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a
user-provided callback at the time of the exception.
The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX,
R8 and R9 registers. This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C
prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV
ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and
the runtime.
[ bp: Change vsgx.o build dependency to CONFIG_X86_SGX. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org
The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do
“stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand over the keys to
the castle , an enclave must often prove that it is running on an
SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in
providing proof.
There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this
happen:
1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs
the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on
a single system, or even in a single application.
2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly
whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they
do not exist.
3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these
enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special
hardware key.
They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as
proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These
certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key.
Any user who can create a provisioning enclave can access the
processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and
fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create
normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be
able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions
scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges.
Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which allows
creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more
strict permissions than the plain enclave device.
The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for
this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty.
This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an
argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl().
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-16-jarkko@kernel.org
Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are
malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or,
they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run
after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the
transition from being malleable to locked-down.
Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can
no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the
enclave can be measured to verify its integrity.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-15-jarkko@kernel.org
SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be
populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the
EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction.
Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and
optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the
hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity.
The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the
enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has
sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_
measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize.
Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to
initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-14-jarkko@kernel.org
Add an ioctl() that performs the ECREATE function of the ENCLS
instruction, which creates an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS).
Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in
enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-13-jarkko@kernel.org
