IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.
This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.
This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.
As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.
On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.
As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.
Add a new helper function, current_in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
--EWB Replaced in_userns with the simpler current_in_userns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This patch replaces use of the obsolete blkcipher with skcipher.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e0619 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int. Do not use a signed
new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value).
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
[PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We always mixed in the parent pointer into the dentry name hash, but we
did it late at lookup time. It turns out that we can simplify that
lookup-time action by salting the hash with the parent pointer early
instead of late.
A few other users of our string hashes also wanted to mix in their own
pointers into the hash, and those are updated to use the same mechanism.
Hash users that don't have any particular initial salt can just use the
NULL pointer as a no-salt.
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The existing ebitmap_netlbl_import() code didn't correctly handle the
case where the ebitmap_node was not aligned/sized to a power of two,
this patch fixes this (on x86_64 ebitmap_node contains six bitmaps
making a range of 0..383).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.
Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.
This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The code is doing the equivalent of the kthread_run macro.
Signed-off-by: Mike Danese <mikedanese@google.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Serge Hallyn pointed out that the current implementation of
security_inode_getsecurity() works if there is only one hook
provided for it, but will fail if there is more than one and
the attribute requested isn't supplied by the first module.
This isn't a problem today, since only SELinux and Smack
provide this hook and there is (currently) no way to enable
both of those modules at the same time. Serge, however, wants
to introduce a capability attribute and an inode_getsecurity
hook in the capability security module to handle it. This
addresses that upcoming problem, will be required for "extreme
stacking" and is just a better implementation.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys. Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.
[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]
Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The current bounds checking of both source and target types
requires allowing any domain that has access to the child
domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which
is undesirable. Drop the target bounds checking.
KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in
commit 7d52a155e3 ("selinux: remove dead code in
type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in
commit 2ae3ba3938 ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in
check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have
required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions
to the child that the child is allowed to itself.
This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both
source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access
if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding
permissions to the parent of the target. Further, this change
reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation
for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve
a bounds violation.
Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both
bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same
permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source
type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed
the same permissions to the target type.
Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic:
1. If we have:
typebounds A B;
then:
allow B self:process <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A self:process <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the
bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed:
allow A B:process <permissions>; or
allow B A:process <permissions>; or
allow A self:process <permissions>;
However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to
satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore
this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only
need to perform one compute_av call).
2. If we have:
typebounds A B;
typebounds A_exec B_exec;
then:
allow B B_exec:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A A_exec:file <permissions>;
is also allowed in policy.
This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as
an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain
in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that
this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having:
allow A B_exec:file <permissions>;
in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to
enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types.
3. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded type T, then:
allow B T:file <permissions>;
will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
allow A T:file <permissions>;
is allowed in policy.
The old logic would have been identical for this example.
4. If we have:
typebounds A B;
and an unbounded domain D, then:
allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic
because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can
allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having
to allow it to do the same to its parent.
The old logic would have required:
allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
to also be allowed in policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Followups to the parallel lookup work:
- update docs
- restore killability of the places that used to take ->i_mutex
killably now that we have down_write_killable() merged
- Additionally, it turns out that I missed a prerequisite for
security_d_instantiate() stuff - ->getxattr() wasn't the only thing
that could be called before dentry is attached to inode; with smack
we needed the same treatment applied to ->setxattr() as well"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separately
switch xattr_handler->set() to passing dentry and inode separately
restore killability of old mutex_lock_killable(&inode->i_mutex) users
add down_write_killable_nested()
update D/f/directory-locking
smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.
Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.
Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Commit 8a56038c2a ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups
when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain:
process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access
-> ptrace_may_access
task_lock(...) is taken
__ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check
-> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
-> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm
task_lock(...) is taken again
task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point,
spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current
process.
Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside
security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's
not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might
involve paging in userspace memory.
It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock
before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be
called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for
example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another
task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and
get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE,
a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time -
see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.)
Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below
security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to
the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the
"comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big
complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM
access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to
copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but
that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look
pretty random to the user.)
Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current
exits kernelspace the next time.
v2: Don't oops on PTRACE_TRACEME, call report_access under
task_lock(current). Also fix nonsensical comment. And don't use
GPF_ATOMIC for memory allocation with no locks held.
This patch is tested both for ptrace attach and ptrace traceme.
Fixes: 8a56038c2a ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
cryptographically via dm-verity).
This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).
- Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
Lots of general fixes and updates.
- SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
seccomp: Fix comment typo
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
Yama: consolidate error reporting
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support SPI based w5100 devices, from Akinobu Mita.
2) Partial Segmentation Offload, from Alexander Duyck.
3) Add GMAC4 support to stmmac driver, from Alexandre TORGUE.
4) Allow cls_flower stats offload, from Amir Vadai.
5) Implement bpf blinding, from Daniel Borkmann.
6) Optimize _ASYNC_ bit twiddling on sockets, unless the socket is
actually using FASYNC these atomics are superfluous. From Eric
Dumazet.
7) Run TCP more preemptibly, also from Eric Dumazet.
8) Support LED blinking, EEPROM dumps, and rxvlan offloading in mlx5e
driver, from Gal Pressman.
9) Allow creating ppp devices via rtnetlink, from Guillaume Nault.
10) Improve BPF usage documentation, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
11) Support tunneling offloads in qed, from Manish Chopra.
12) aRFS offloading in mlx5e, from Maor Gottlieb.
13) Add RFS and RPS support to SCTP protocol, from Marcelo Ricardo
Leitner.
14) Add MSG_EOR support to TCP, this allows controlling packet
coalescing on application record boundaries for more accurate
socket timestamp sampling. From Martin KaFai Lau.
15) Fix alignment of 64-bit netlink attributes across the board, from
Nicolas Dichtel.
16) Per-vlan stats in bridging, from Nikolay Aleksandrov.
17) Several conversions of drivers to ethtool ksettings, from Philippe
Reynes.
18) Checksum neutral ILA in ipv6, from Tom Herbert.
19) Factorize all of the various marvell dsa drivers into one, from
Vivien Didelot
20) Add VF support to qed driver, from Yuval Mintz"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1649 commits)
Revert "phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m"
Revert "phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional"
r8169: default to 64-bit DMA on recent PCIe chips
phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional
phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m
bpf: arm64: remove callee-save registers use for tmp registers
asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions
switchdev: pass pointer to fib_info instead of copy
net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release()
tipc: fix nametable publication field in nl compat
drivers: net: Don't print unpopulated net_device name
qed: add support for dcbx.
ravb: Add missing free_irq() calls to ravb_close()
qed: Remove a stray tab
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phydev from struct net_device
bpf, doc: fix typo on bpf_asm descriptions
stmmac: hardware TX COE doesn't work when force_thresh_dma_mode is set
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phydev from struct net_device
...
Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro:
"'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security
methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the
damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some
enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea.
Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..."
* 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
constify ima_d_path()
constify security_sb_pivotroot()
constify security_path_chroot()
constify security_path_{link,rename}
apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt
constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink}
constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir}
apparmor: constify common_perm_...()
apparmor: constify aa_path_link()
apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm()
constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod
constify security_sb_mount()
constify chown_common/security_path_chown
tomoyo: constify assorted struct path *
apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL
constify vfs_truncate()
constify security_path_truncate()
[apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
Pull parallel filesystem directory handling update from Al Viro.
This is the main parallel directory work by Al that makes the vfs layer
able to do lookup and readdir in parallel within a single directory.
That's a big change, since this used to be all protected by the
directory inode mutex.
The inode mutex is replaced by an rwsem, and serialization of lookups of
a single name is done by a "in-progress" dentry marker.
The series begins with xattr cleanups, and then ends with switching
filesystems over to actually doing the readdir in parallel (switching to
the "iterate_shared()" that only takes the read lock).
A more detailed explanation of the process from Al Viro:
"The xattr work starts with some acl fixes, then switches ->getxattr to
passing inode and dentry separately. This is the point where the
things start to get tricky - that got merged into the very beginning
of the -rc3-based #work.lookups, to allow untangling the
security_d_instantiate() mess. The xattr work itself proceeds to
switch a lot of filesystems to generic_...xattr(); no complications
there.
After that initial xattr work, the series then does the following:
- untangle security_d_instantiate()
- convert a bunch of open-coded lookup_one_len_unlocked() to calls of
that thing; one such place (in overlayfs) actually yields a trivial
conflict with overlayfs fixes later in the cycle - overlayfs ended
up switching to a variant of lookup_one_len_unlocked() sans the
permission checks. I would've dropped that commit (it gets
overridden on merge from #ovl-fixes in #for-next; proper resolution
is to use the variant in mainline fs/overlayfs/super.c), but I
didn't want to rebase the damn thing - it was fairly late in the
cycle...
- some filesystems had managed to depend on lookup/lookup exclusion
for *fs-internal* data structures in a way that would break if we
relaxed the VFS exclusion. Fixing hadn't been hard, fortunately.
- core of that series - parallel lookup machinery, replacing
->i_mutex with rwsem, making lookup_slow() take it only shared. At
that point lookups happen in parallel; lookups on the same name
wait for the in-progress one to be done with that dentry.
Surprisingly little code, at that - almost all of it is in
fs/dcache.c, with fs/namei.c changes limited to lookup_slow() -
making it use the new primitive and actually switching to locking
shared.
- parallel readdir stuff - first of all, we provide the exclusion on
per-struct file basis, same as we do for read() vs lseek() for
regular files. That takes care of most of the needed exclusion in
readdir/readdir; however, these guys are trickier than lookups, so
I went for switching them one-by-one. To do that, a new method
'->iterate_shared()' is added and filesystems are switched to it
as they are either confirmed to be OK with shared lock on directory
or fixed to be OK with that. I hope to kill the original method
come next cycle (almost all in-tree filesystems are switched
already), but it's still not quite finished.
- several filesystems get switched to parallel readdir. The
interesting part here is dealing with dcache preseeding by readdir;
that needs minor adjustment to be safe with directory locked only
shared.
Most of the filesystems doing that got switched to in those
commits. Important exception: NFS. Turns out that NFS folks, with
their, er, insistence on VFS getting the fuck out of the way of the
Smart Filesystem Code That Knows How And What To Lock(tm) have
grown the locking of their own. They had their own homegrown
rwsem, with lookup/readdir/atomic_open being *writers* (sillyunlink
is the reader there). Of course, with VFS getting the fuck out of
the way, as requested, the actual smarts of the smart filesystem
code etc. had become exposed...
- do_last/lookup_open/atomic_open cleanups. As the result, open()
without O_CREAT locks the directory only shared. Including the
->atomic_open() case. Backmerge from #for-linus in the middle of
that - atomic_open() fix got brought in.
- then comes NFS switch to saner (VFS-based ;-) locking, killing the
homegrown "lookup and readdir are writers" kinda-sorta rwsem. All
exclusion for sillyunlink/lookup is done by the parallel lookups
mechanism. Exclusion between sillyunlink and rmdir is a real rwsem
now - rmdir being the writer.
Result: NFS lookups/readdirs/O_CREAT-less opens happen in parallel
now.
- the rest of the series consists of switching a lot of filesystems
to parallel readdir; in a lot of cases ->llseek() gets simplified
as well. One backmerge in there (again, #for-linus - rockridge
fix)"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (74 commits)
ext4: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfsplus: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hostfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: handle allocation failures in hpfs_add_pos()
gfs2: switch to ->iterate_shared()
f2fs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
afs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: constify stuff a bit
isofs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
get_acorn_filename(): deobfuscate a bit
btrfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
logfs: no need to lock directory in lseek
switch ecryptfs to ->iterate_shared
9p: switch to ->iterate_shared()
fat: switch to ->iterate_shared()
romfs, squashfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
more trivial ->iterate_shared conversions
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A rather small set of patches from the timer departement:
- Some more y2038 work
- Yet another new clocksource driver
- The usual set of small fixes, cleanups and enhancements"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
clocksource/drivers/tegra: Remove unused suspend/resume code
clockevents/driversi/mps2: add MPS2 Timer driver
dt-bindings: document the MPS2 timer bindings
clocksource/drivers/mtk_timer: Add __init attribute
clockevents/drivers/dw_apb_timer: Implement ->set_state_oneshot_stopped()
time: Introduce do_sys_settimeofday64()
security: Introduce security_settime64()
clocksource: Add missing include of of.h.
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.
Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Backmerge to resolve a conflict in ovl_lookup_real();
"ovl_lookup_real(): use lookup_one_len_unlocked()" instead,
but it was too late in the cycle to rebase.
In netdevice.h we removed the structure in net-next that is being
changes in 'net'. In macsec.c and rtnetlink.c we have overlaps
between fixes in 'net' and the u64 attribute changes in 'net-next'.
The mlx5 conflicts have to do with vxlan support dependencies.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process:
(1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
upon them.
This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.
If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.
(2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the
system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
permit it.
These patches change that:
(1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
when the trust is evaluated only.
(2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a
key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
created in one keyring and then linked across.
This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It
is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
keyrings such as the system keyrings.
[*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.
(3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
contents of the system keyring.
A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.
(4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
root of the trust relationship.
(5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
key_preparsed_payload::trusted.
This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.
Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:
(*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where
UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.
(*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.
(*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
be vouched for by either ring of system keys.
(*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
the new secondary keyring.
(*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.
(*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
system keyrings.
If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
the builtin system keyring only.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This patch fixes the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration
ordering used for displaying the IMA policy.
Fixes: d9ddf077bb ("ima: support for kexec image and initramfs")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files"
stopped identifying empty files as new files. However new empty files
can be created using the mknodat syscall. On systems with IMA-appraisal
enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended
attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in
order to write the file data contents. This patch defines a new hook
named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using
mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written.
In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature
are considered "immutable" and can not be modified. The file contents
need to be written, before signing the file. This patch relaxes this
requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written
before the file contents.
Changelog:
- defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima
(based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments)
- removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0)
(based on Al's review)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to
re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file"
status nor the security.ima xattr. The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and
IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific. This patch
only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags.
With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the
file signature on new files.
Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
The execstack check was only being applied on the main
process stack. Thread stacks allocated via mmap were
only subject to the execmem permission check. Augment
the check to apply to the current thread stack as well.
Note that this does NOT prevent making a different thread's
stack executable.
Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.
This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.
Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
function to use the 64bit types.
This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
converted.
None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
the patch is not making any functional changes.
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
[jstultz: Reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Use a common error reporting function for Yama violation reports, and give
more detail into the process command lines.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch adds a new RTM_GETSTATS message to query link stats via netlink
from the kernel. RTM_NEWLINK also dumps stats today, but RTM_NEWLINK
returns a lot more than just stats and is expensive in some cases when
frequent polling for stats from userspace is a common operation.
RTM_GETSTATS is an attempt to provide a light weight netlink message
to explicity query only link stats from the kernel on an interface.
The idea is to also keep it extensible so that new kinds of stats can be
added to it in the future.
This patch adds the following attribute for NETDEV stats:
struct nla_policy ifla_stats_policy[IFLA_STATS_MAX + 1] = {
[IFLA_STATS_LINK_64] = { .len = sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats64) },
};
Like any other rtnetlink message, RTM_GETSTATS can be used to get stats of
a single interface or all interfaces with NLM_F_DUMP.
Future possible new types of stat attributes:
link af stats:
- IFLA_STATS_LINK_IPV6 (nested. for ipv6 stats)
- IFLA_STATS_LINK_MPLS (nested. for mpls/mdev stats)
extended stats:
- IFLA_STATS_LINK_EXTENDED (nested. extended software netdev stats like bridge,
vlan, vxlan etc)
- IFLA_STATS_LINK_HW_EXTENDED (nested. extended hardware stats which are
available via ethtool today)
This patch also declares a filter mask for all stat attributes.
User has to provide a mask of stats attributes to query. filter mask
can be specified in the new hdr 'struct if_stats_msg' for stats messages.
Other important field in the header is the ifindex.
This api can also include attributes for global stats (eg tcp) in the future.
When global stats are included in a stats msg, the ifindex in the header
must be zero. A single stats message cannot contain both global and
netdev specific stats. To easily distinguish them, netdev specific stat
attributes name are prefixed with IFLA_STATS_LINK_
Without any attributes in the filter_mask, no stats will be returned.
This patch has been tested with mofified iproute2 ifstat.
Suggested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if
the security server is not yet initialized.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay
the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security
label when we are in the process of setting it.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with
in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG(). This patch changes this to
index which isn't a type.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.
Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.
The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
that the values are only needed in userspace.
Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.
Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Solved TODO task: big keys saved to shmem file are now stored encrypted.
The encryption key is randomly generated and saved to payload[big_key_data].
Signed-off-by: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The payload preparsing routine for user keys makes a copy of the payload
provided by the caller and stashes it in the key_preparsed_payload struct for
->instantiate() or ->update() to use. However, ->update() takes another copy
of this to attach to the keyring. ->update() should be using this directly
and clearing the pointer in the preparse data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Commit d43de6c780 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to
the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA,
but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by
userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the
system trusted keyrings.
EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if
no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the
signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned.
If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is
the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys
between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to
the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain -
provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings.
The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its
own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.
Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().
Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The skb_owned_by hook was added with the commit ca10b9e9a8
("selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook") and later removed
when said commit was reverted.
Later on, when switching to list of hooks, a field named
'skb_owned_by' was included into the security_hook_head struct,
but without any users nor caller.
This commit removes the said left-over field.
Fixes: b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load.
Add module_load permission to the system class.
Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the
finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has
permission module_load for the target type.
Example for finit_module:
allow foo bar_file:system module_load;
Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when
calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source
type has permission module_load with itself as the target object
because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process.
Example for init_module:
allow foo foo:system module_load;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if
the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the
revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not
INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We don't have to worry about socket inodes being invalidated so
use inode_security_novalidate() to fetch the inode's security blob.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).
There's a background article at LWN.net:
https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/
The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a
fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
virtual memory range.
This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also
allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
below).
This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
if a user-space application calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
and unwritable.
So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security
advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.
We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.
There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
pull request.
Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
(like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's
any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
flip the default"
* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
...
Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1.
Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of
refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been
doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the
shortlog.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
iEYEABECAAYFAlbp8z8ACgkQMUfUDdst+ym1vwCgnOOCORaZyeQ4QrcxPAK5pHFn
VrMAoNHvDgNYtG+Hmzv25Lgp3HnysPin
=MLRG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty
Pull tty/serial updates from Greg KH:
"Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1.
Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of
refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been
doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the
shortlog.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"
* tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (220 commits)
serial: 8250: describe CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA
serial: samsung: optimize UART rx fifo access routine
serial: pl011: add mark/space parity support
serial: sa1100: make sa1100_register_uart_fns a function
tty: serial: 8250: add MOXA Smartio MUE boards support
serial: 8250: convert drivers to use up_to_u8250p()
serial: 8250/mediatek: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m
serial: 8250/ingenic: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m
serial: 8250/uniphier: fix modular build
Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_ingenic.c explicitly non-modular"
Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_mtk.c explicitly non-modular"
serial: mvebu-uart: initial support for Armada-3700 serial port
serial: mctrl_gpio: Add missing module license
serial: ifx6x60: avoid uninitialized variable use
tty/serial: at91: fix bad offset for UART timeout register
tty/serial: at91: restore dynamic driver binding
serial: 8250: Add hardware dependency to RT288X option
TTY, devpts: document pty count limiting
tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1
drivers: tty: goldfish: Add device tree bindings
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
fixes scattered across the subsystem.
IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
and appraised"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
X.509: Support leap seconds
Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
X.509: Fix leap year handling again
PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
ima: require signed IMA policy
ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
ima: load policy using path
...
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.
To make this work, the following changes have been made:
(1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the
padding and returns just the message hash.
(2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this,
and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.
(3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
and and has been merged into public_key.c.
(4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.
Thoughts:
(*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates
registered that share most of the code?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added.
v1:
- initialize the policy flag
- include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself.
Changelog v4:
- use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the
branches - Dmitry
- Use the id mapping - Dmitry
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies
since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents
of the policy directly in, as follows:
cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy
If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load
the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file
signature if it has one. This patch adds support to load the IMA
policy with a given path as follows:
echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
Changelog v4+:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers
v3:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch
v2:
- after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read()
to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi)
- Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined.
Example policy rules:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
enum kernel_read_file_id {
...
READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_MAX_ID
enum ima_hooks {
...
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
eg: enum ima_hooks {
FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
MMAP_CHECK,
In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
would need to specify a struct containing a union.
struct caller_id {
union {
enum ima_hooks func_id;
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
};
};
Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
perhaps changing the enumeration name.
For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks.
Changelog v4:
- replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks
id mapping array - Dmitry
- renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to
preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.
This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.
The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.
This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.
Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once.
This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.
Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.
Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
v1:
- split patch
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not
allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use
the non-validating version of inode_security() instead.
Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the
hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch
defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the
caller identifier as an argument.
Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY.
Changelog v3:
- Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux.
These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just
this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but
important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first
attempt at resolving some of these differences.
This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel
with the corresponding security post-read hook and function.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu
v3:
- additional bounds checking - Luis
v2:
- To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the modular code that is essentially orphaned, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.
This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections
should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce
protections when working on our own task, but not when on others.
We call these "current" and "remote" operations.
This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant:
get_user_pages_remote()
Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on
non-current tsk/mm.
We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used
for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior.
The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and
calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This
makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access
and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted
to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not
be enforced.
Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: jack@suse.cz
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now
mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in
userspace).
The defconfig references were removed with:
perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \
`git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y`
and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Without this, using SOCK_DESTROY in enforcing mode results in:
SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=21 for sclass=32
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void
parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Compiler warns us a lot that it can't find include folder because it's
provided in relative form.
CC security/selinux/netlabel.o
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
Add $(srctree) prefix to the path.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
[PM: minor description edits to fit under 80char width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP should only be applied to a key if the keyring it is being
linked into has KEY_FLAG_KEEP set.
To this end, partially revert the following patch:
commit 1d6d167c2e
Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu Jan 7 07:46:36 2016 -0500
KEYS: refcount bug fix
to undo the change that made it unconditional (Mimi got it right the first
time).
Without undoing this change, it becomes impossible to delete, revoke or
invalidate keys added to keyrings through __key_instantiate_and_link()
where the keyring has itself been linked to. To test this, run the
following command sequence:
keyctl newring foo @s
keyctl add user a a %:foo
keyctl unlink %user:a %:foo
keyctl clear %:foo
With the commit mentioned above the third and fourth commands fail with
EPERM when they should succeed.
Reported-by: Stephen Gallager <sgallagh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Access to tty->tty_files list is always per-tty, never for all ttys
simultaneously. Replace global tty_files_lock spinlock with per-tty
->files_lock. Initialize when the ->tty_files list is inited, in
alloc_tty_struct().
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.
Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.
One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of
course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I
*am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
taken shared.
There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then:
-----
| This is an automated patch using
|
| sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
| sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
|
| with a very few manual fixups
-----
I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
merges)"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
[s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
[um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
...
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"Andreas' xattr cleanup series.
It's a followup to his xattr work that went in last cycle; -0.5KLoC"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
xattr handlers: Simplify list operation
ocfs2: Replace list xattr handler operations
nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattr
xfs: Change how listxattr generates synthetic attributes
tmpfs: listxattr should include POSIX ACL xattrs
tmpfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
btrfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
vfs: Distinguish between full xattr names and proper prefixes
posix acls: Remove duplicate xattr name definitions
gfs2: Remove gfs2_xattr_acl_chmod
vfs: Remove vfs_xattr_cmp
Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about
10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call
to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below
the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be
removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original
performance.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch fixes the key_ref leak, removes the unnecessary KEY_FLAG_KEEP
test before setting the flag, and cleans up the if/then brackets style
introduced in commit:
d3600bc KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it
just parses its contents. So the use of get_zeroed_page()
doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(),
which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
A _lot_ of ->write() instances were open-coding it; some are
converted to memdup_user_nul(), a lot more remain...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long. We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().
Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.
If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.
Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so
print the triggering command name and pid.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.
Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and
try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU
context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for
the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry
parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid
label.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.
Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing
inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they
will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
The trusted keys option parsing allows specifying the same option
multiple times. The last option value specified is used.
This is problematic because:
* No gain.
* This makes complicated to specify options that are dependent on other
options.
This patch changes the behavior in a way that option can be specified
only once.
Reported-by: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.
In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.
IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'
This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb89 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it
was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to
evm_verifyxattr().
When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to
re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example, after setting a digital
signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the
iint->flags that there is an EVM signature.
This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN
state.
Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the
kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process.
This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key
directly without using the KEY subsystem.
Changes in v4:
* kernel-doc style for evm_set_key
Changes in v3:
* error reporting moved to evm_set_key
* EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key
* added bitop to prevent key setting race
Changes in v2:
* use size_t for key size instead of signed int
* provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
* provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Previously non-zero indicated
that the HMAC key was loaded. When EVM loads the X509 before calling
'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start
signature based verification.
This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded.
Changes in v3:
* print error message if key is not set
Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated
Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
directly.
Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.
This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
commit fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.
Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.
2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering
the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
from Rasmus Villemoes.
4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.
5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.
6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd
Bergmann.
8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.
9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.
10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca.
11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
Francesco Ruggeri.
12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
from Jarod Wilson.
13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
net: fix a race in dst_release()
net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
...
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not
available for request sockets.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd08953
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.
Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
...
In commit e446f9dfe1 ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.
Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.
Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'
This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.
This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.
E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
---------------------------------------------------------------
770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032
At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_struct
Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).
Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.
Commit 95dbf73931 ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because
they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for
duplication and validation seems better.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by
kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
