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there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.
The lengthier patch series are
- "kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation in
arch", from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and consolidation of
the "crashkernel=" kernel parameter handling.
- After much discussion, David Laight's "minmax: Relax type checks in
min() and max()" is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and the
use of min_t() and max_t().
- A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly fix
our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
task_struct.therad_group.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree
and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.
The lengthier patch series are
- 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation
in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and
consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling
- After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in
min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and
the use of min_t() and max_t()
- A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly
fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
task_struct.thread_group"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits)
scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU
scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n
.mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso
mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea
tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions
.mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address
scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv
ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment
proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test
proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall
fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon
do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock
do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread()
ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error()
ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code
treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
fs: ocfs2: check status values
proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm
compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h
...
So happens it already was not doing it, but there is no need to "hope"
as indicated in the comment.
No changes in generated assembly.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231004111916.728135-3-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
__read_mostly predates __ro_after_init. Many variables which are marked
__read_mostly should have been __ro_after_init from day 1.
Also, mark some stuff as "const" and "__init" while I'm at it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max changes due to arm warning]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6bb9c0-abba-4ee4-a7aa-89265e886817@p183
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Overlayfs is going to use those to get write access on the upper mount
during entire copy up without taking freeze protection on upper sb for
the entire copy up.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20230908132900.2983519-3-amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Before exporting these helpers to modules, make their names more
meaningful.
The names mnt_{get,put)_write_access*() were chosen, because they rhyme
with the inode {get,put)_write_access() helpers, which have a very close
meaning for the inode object.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817-anfechtbar-ruhelosigkeit-8c6cca8443fc@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20230908132900.2983519-2-amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'v6.5/vfs.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work to extend move_mount() to allow adding a mount
beneath the topmost mount of a mount stack.
There are two LWN articles about this. One covers the original patch
series in [1]. The other in [2] summarizes the session and roughly the
discussion between Al and me at LSFMM. The second article also goes
into some good questions from attendees.
Since all details are found in the relevant commit with a technical
dive into semantics and locking at the end I'm only adding the
motivation and core functionality for this from commit message and
leave out the invasive details. The code is also heavily commented and
annotated as well which was explicitly requested.
TL;DR:
> mount -t ext4 /dev/sda /mnt
|
└─/mnt /dev/sda ext4
> mount --beneath -t xfs /dev/sdb /mnt
|
└─/mnt /dev/sdb xfs
└─/mnt /dev/sda ext4
> umount /mnt
|
└─/mnt /dev/sdb xfs
The longer motivation is that various distributions are adding or are
in the process of adding support for system extensions and in the
future configuration extensions through various tools. A more detailed
explanation on system and configuration extensions can be found on the
manpage which is listed below at [3].
System extension images may – dynamically at runtime — extend the
/usr/ and /opt/ directory hierarchies with additional files. This is
particularly useful on immutable system images where a /usr/ and/or
/opt/ hierarchy residing on a read-only file system shall be extended
temporarily at runtime without making any persistent modifications.
When one or more system extension images are activated, their /usr/
and /opt/ hierarchies are combined via overlayfs with the same
hierarchies of the host OS, and the host /usr/ and /opt/ overmounted
with it ("merging"). When they are deactivated, the mount point is
disassembled — again revealing the unmodified original host version of
the hierarchy ("unmerging"). Merging thus makes the extension's
resources suddenly appear below the /usr/ and /opt/ hierarchies as if
they were included in the base OS image itself. Unmerging makes them
disappear again, leaving in place only the files that were shipped
with the base OS image itself.
System configuration images are similar but operate on directories
containing system or service configuration.
On nearly all modern distributions mount propagation plays a crucial
role and the rootfs of the OS is a shared mount in a peer group
(usually with peer group id 1):
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/ / ext4 shared:1 29 1
On such systems all services and containers run in a separate mount
namespace and are pivot_root()ed into their rootfs. A separate mount
namespace is almost always used as it is the minimal isolation
mechanism services have. But usually they are even much more isolated
up to the point where they almost become indistinguishable from
containers.
Mount propagation again plays a crucial role here. The rootfs of all
these services is a slave mount to the peer group of the host rootfs.
This is done so the service will receive mount propagation events from
the host when certain files or directories are updated.
In addition, the rootfs of each service, container, and sandbox is
also a shared mount in its separate peer group:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/ / ext4 shared:24 master:1 71 47
For people not too familiar with mount propagation, the master:1 means
that this is a slave mount to peer group 1. Which as one can see is
the host rootfs as indicated by shared:1 above. The shared:24
indicates that the service rootfs is a shared mount in a separate peer
group with peer group id 24.
A service may run other services. Such nested services will also have
a rootfs mount that is a slave to the peer group of the outer service
rootfs mount.
For containers things are just slighly different. A container's rootfs
isn't a slave to the service's or host rootfs' peer group. The rootfs
mount of a container is simply a shared mount in its own peer group:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/home/ubuntu/debian-tree / ext4 shared:99 61 60
So whereas services are isolated OS components a container is treated
like a separate world and mount propagation into it is restricted to a
single well known mount that is a slave to the peer group of the
shared mount /run on the host:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/propagate/debian-tree /run/host/incoming tmpfs master:5 71 68
Here, the master:5 indicates that this mount is a slave to the peer
group with peer group id 5. This allows to propagate mounts into the
container and served as a workaround for not being able to insert
mounts into mount namespaces directly. But the new mount api does
support inserting mounts directly. For the interested reader the
blogpost in [4] might be worth reading where I explain the old and the
new approach to inserting mounts into mount namespaces.
Containers of course, can themselves be run as services. They often
run full systems themselves which means they again run services and
containers with the exact same propagation settings explained above.
The whole system is designed so that it can be easily updated,
including all services in various fine-grained ways without having to
enter every single service's mount namespace which would be
prohibitively expensive. The mount propagation layout has been
carefully chosen so it is possible to propagate updates for system
extensions and configurations from the host into all services.
The simplest model to update the whole system is to mount on top of
/usr, /opt, or /etc on the host. The new mount on /usr, /opt, or /etc
will then propagate into every service. This works cleanly the first
time. However, when the system is updated multiple times it becomes
necessary to unmount the first update on /opt, /usr, /etc and then
propagate the new update. But this means, there's an interval where
the old base system is accessible. This has to be avoided to protect
against downgrade attacks.
The vfs already exposes a mechanism to userspace whereby mounts can be
mounted beneath an existing mount. Such mounts are internally referred
to as "tucked". The patch series exposes the ability to mount beneath
a top mount through the new MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH flag for the
move_mount() system call. This allows userspace to seamlessly upgrade
mounts. After this series the only thing that will have changed is
that mounting beneath an existing mount can be done explicitly instead
of just implicitly.
The crux is that the proposed mechanism already exists and that it is
so powerful as to cover cases where mounts are supposed to be updated
with new versions. Crucially, it offers an important flexibility.
Namely that updates to a system may either be forced or can be delayed
and the umount of the top mount be left to a service if it is a
cooperative one"
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/927491 [1]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934094 [2]
Link: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/systemd-sysext.8.html [3]
Link: https://brauner.io/2023/02/28/mounting-into-mount-namespaces.html [4]
Link: https://github.com/flatcar/sysext-bakery
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Unified_Kernel_Support_Phase_1
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Unified_Kernel_Support_Phase_2
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/26013
* tag 'v6.5/vfs.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: allow to mount beneath top mount
fs: use a for loop when locking a mount
fs: properly document __lookup_mnt()
fs: add path_mounted()
Provide helpers to set and clear sb->s_readonly_remount including
appropriate memory barriers. Also use this opportunity to document what
the barriers pair with and why they are needed.
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230620112832.5158-1-jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Various distributions are adding or are in the process of adding support
for system extensions and in the future configuration extensions through
various tools. A more detailed explanation on system and configuration
extensions can be found on the manpage which is listed below at [1].
System extension images may – dynamically at runtime — extend the /usr/
and /opt/ directory hierarchies with additional files. This is
particularly useful on immutable system images where a /usr/ and/or
/opt/ hierarchy residing on a read-only file system shall be extended
temporarily at runtime without making any persistent modifications.
When one or more system extension images are activated, their /usr/ and
/opt/ hierarchies are combined via overlayfs with the same hierarchies
of the host OS, and the host /usr/ and /opt/ overmounted with it
("merging"). When they are deactivated, the mount point is disassembled
— again revealing the unmodified original host version of the hierarchy
("unmerging"). Merging thus makes the extension's resources suddenly
appear below the /usr/ and /opt/ hierarchies as if they were included in
the base OS image itself. Unmerging makes them disappear again, leaving
in place only the files that were shipped with the base OS image itself.
System configuration images are similar but operate on directories
containing system or service configuration.
On nearly all modern distributions mount propagation plays a crucial
role and the rootfs of the OS is a shared mount in a peer group (usually
with peer group id 1):
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/ / ext4 shared:1 29 1
On such systems all services and containers run in a separate mount
namespace and are pivot_root()ed into their rootfs. A separate mount
namespace is almost always used as it is the minimal isolation mechanism
services have. But usually they are even much more isolated up to the
point where they almost become indistinguishable from containers.
Mount propagation again plays a crucial role here. The rootfs of all
these services is a slave mount to the peer group of the host rootfs.
This is done so the service will receive mount propagation events from
the host when certain files or directories are updated.
In addition, the rootfs of each service, container, and sandbox is also
a shared mount in its separate peer group:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/ / ext4 shared:24 master:1 71 47
For people not too familiar with mount propagation, the master:1 means
that this is a slave mount to peer group 1. Which as one can see is the
host rootfs as indicated by shared:1 above. The shared:24 indicates that
the service rootfs is a shared mount in a separate peer group with peer
group id 24.
A service may run other services. Such nested services will also have a
rootfs mount that is a slave to the peer group of the outer service
rootfs mount.
For containers things are just slighly different. A container's rootfs
isn't a slave to the service's or host rootfs' peer group. The rootfs
mount of a container is simply a shared mount in its own peer group:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/home/ubuntu/debian-tree / ext4 shared:99 61 60
So whereas services are isolated OS components a container is treated
like a separate world and mount propagation into it is restricted to a
single well known mount that is a slave to the peer group of the shared
mount /run on the host:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION MNT_ID PARENT_ID
/propagate/debian-tree /run/host/incoming tmpfs master:5 71 68
Here, the master:5 indicates that this mount is a slave to the peer
group with peer group id 5. This allows to propagate mounts into the
container and served as a workaround for not being able to insert mounts
into mount namespaces directly. But the new mount api does support
inserting mounts directly. For the interested reader the blogpost in [2]
might be worth reading where I explain the old and the new approach to
inserting mounts into mount namespaces.
Containers of course, can themselves be run as services. They often run
full systems themselves which means they again run services and
containers with the exact same propagation settings explained above.
The whole system is designed so that it can be easily updated, including
all services in various fine-grained ways without having to enter every
single service's mount namespace which would be prohibitively expensive.
The mount propagation layout has been carefully chosen so it is possible
to propagate updates for system extensions and configurations from the
host into all services.
The simplest model to update the whole system is to mount on top of
/usr, /opt, or /etc on the host. The new mount on /usr, /opt, or /etc
will then propagate into every service. This works cleanly the first
time. However, when the system is updated multiple times it becomes
necessary to unmount the first update on /opt, /usr, /etc and then
propagate the new update. But this means, there's an interval where the
old base system is accessible. This has to be avoided to protect against
downgrade attacks.
The vfs already exposes a mechanism to userspace whereby mounts can be
mounted beneath an existing mount. Such mounts are internally referred
to as "tucked". The patch series exposes the ability to mount beneath a
top mount through the new MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH flag for the move_mount()
system call. This allows userspace to seamlessly upgrade mounts. After
this series the only thing that will have changed is that mounting
beneath an existing mount can be done explicitly instead of just
implicitly.
Today, there are two scenarios where a mount can be mounted beneath an
existing mount instead of on top of it:
(1) When a service or container is started in a new mount namespace and
pivot_root()s into its new rootfs. The way this is done is by
mounting the new rootfs beneath the old rootfs:
fd_newroot = open("/var/lib/machines/fedora", ...);
fd_oldroot = open("/", ...);
fchdir(fd_newroot);
pivot_root(".", ".");
After the pivot_root(".", ".") call the new rootfs is mounted
beneath the old rootfs which can then be unmounted to reveal the
underlying mount:
fchdir(fd_oldroot);
umount2(".", MNT_DETACH);
Since pivot_root() moves the caller into a new rootfs no mounts must
be propagated out of the new rootfs as a consequence of the
pivot_root() call. Thus, the mounts cannot be shared.
(2) When a mount is propagated to a mount that already has another mount
mounted on the same dentry.
The easiest example for this is to create a new mount namespace. The
following commands will create a mount namespace where the rootfs
mount / will be a slave to the peer group of the host rootfs /
mount's peer group. IOW, it will receive propagation from the host:
mount --make-shared /
unshare --mount --propagation=slave
Now a new mount on the /mnt dentry in that mount namespace is
created. (As it can be confusing it should be spelled out that the
tmpfs mount on the /mnt dentry that was just created doesn't
propagate back to the host because the rootfs mount / of the mount
namespace isn't a peer of the host rootfs.):
mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION
└─/mnt tmpfs tmpfs
Now another terminal in the host mount namespace can observe that
the mount indeed hasn't propagated back to into the host mount
namespace. A new mount can now be created on top of the /mnt dentry
with the rootfs mount / as its parent:
mount --bind /opt /mnt
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION
└─/mnt /dev/sda2[/opt] ext4 shared:1
The mount namespace that was created earlier can now observe that
the bind mount created on the host has propagated into it:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE PROPAGATION
└─/mnt /dev/sda2[/opt] ext4 master:1
└─/mnt tmpfs tmpfs
But instead of having been mounted on top of the tmpfs mount at the
/mnt dentry the /opt mount has been mounted on top of the rootfs
mount at the /mnt dentry. And the tmpfs mount has been remounted on
top of the propagated /opt mount at the /opt dentry. So in other
words, the propagated mount has been mounted beneath the preexisting
mount in that mount namespace.
Mount namespaces make this easy to illustrate but it's also easy to
mount beneath an existing mount in the same mount namespace
(The following example assumes a shared rootfs mount / with peer
group id 1):
mount --bind /opt /opt
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE MNT_ID PARENT_ID PROPAGATION
└─/opt /dev/sda2[/opt] ext4 188 29 shared:1
If another mount is mounted on top of the /opt mount at the /opt
dentry:
mount --bind /tmp /opt
The following clunky mount tree will result:
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE MNT_ID PARENT_ID PROPAGATION
└─/opt /dev/sda2[/tmp] ext4 405 29 shared:1
└─/opt /dev/sda2[/opt] ext4 188 405 shared:1
└─/opt /dev/sda2[/tmp] ext4 404 188 shared:1
The /tmp mount is mounted beneath the /opt mount and another copy is
mounted on top of the /opt mount. This happens because the rootfs /
and the /opt mount are shared mounts in the same peer group.
When the new /tmp mount is supposed to be mounted at the /opt dentry
then the /tmp mount first propagates to the root mount at the /opt
dentry. But there already is the /opt mount mounted at the /opt
dentry. So the old /opt mount at the /opt dentry will be mounted on
top of the new /tmp mount at the /tmp dentry, i.e. @opt->mnt_parent
is @tmp and @opt->mnt_mountpoint is /tmp (Note that @opt->mnt_root
is /opt which is what shows up as /opt under SOURCE). So again, a
mount will be mounted beneath a preexisting mount.
(Fwiw, a few iterations of mount --bind /opt /opt in a loop on a
shared rootfs is a good example of what could be referred to as
mount explosion.)
The main point is that such mounts allows userspace to umount a top
mount and reveal an underlying mount. So for example, umounting the
tmpfs mount on /mnt that was created in example (1) using mount
namespaces reveals the /opt mount which was mounted beneath it.
In (2) where a mount was mounted beneath the top mount in the same mount
namespace unmounting the top mount would unmount both the top mount and
the mount beneath. In the process the original mount would be remounted
on top of the rootfs mount / at the /opt dentry again.
This again, is a result of mount propagation only this time it's umount
propagation. However, this can be avoided by simply making the parent
mount / of the @opt mount a private or slave mount. Then the top mount
and the original mount can be unmounted to reveal the mount beneath.
These two examples are fairly arcane and are merely added to make it
clear how mount propagation has effects on current and future features.
More common use-cases will just be things like:
mount -t btrfs /dev/sdA /mnt
mount -t xfs /dev/sdB --beneath /mnt
umount /mnt
after which we'll have updated from a btrfs filesystem to a xfs
filesystem without ever revealing the underlying mountpoint.
The crux is that the proposed mechanism already exists and that it is so
powerful as to cover cases where mounts are supposed to be updated with
new versions. Crucially, it offers an important flexibility. Namely that
updates to a system may either be forced or can be delayed and the
umount of the top mount be left to a service if it is a cooperative one.
This adds a new flag to move_mount() that allows to explicitly move a
beneath the top mount adhering to the following semantics:
* Mounts cannot be mounted beneath the rootfs. This restriction
encompasses the rootfs but also chroots via chroot() and pivot_root().
To mount a mount beneath the rootfs or a chroot, pivot_root() can be
used as illustrated above.
* The source mount must be a private mount to force the kernel to
allocate a new, unused peer group id. This isn't a required
restriction but a voluntary one. It avoids repeating a semantical
quirk that already exists today. If bind mounts which already have a
peer group id are inserted into mount trees that have the same peer
group id this can cause a lot of mount propagation events to be
generated (For example, consider running mount --bind /opt /opt in a
loop where the parent mount is a shared mount.).
* Avoid getting rid of the top mount in the kernel. Cooperative services
need to be able to unmount the top mount themselves.
This also avoids a good deal of additional complexity. The umount
would have to be propagated which would be another rather expensive
operation. So namespace_lock() and lock_mount_hash() would potentially
have to be held for a long time for both a mount and umount
propagation. That should be avoided.
* The path to mount beneath must be mounted and attached.
* The top mount and its parent must be in the caller's mount namespace
and the caller must be able to mount in that mount namespace.
* The caller must be able to unmount the top mount to prove that they
could reveal the underlying mount.
* The propagation tree is calculated based on the destination mount's
parent mount and the destination mount's mountpoint on the parent
mount. Of course, if the parent of the destination mount and the
destination mount are shared mounts in the same peer group and the
mountpoint of the new mount to be mounted is a subdir of their
->mnt_root then both will receive a mount of /opt. That's probably
easier to understand with an example. Assuming a standard shared
rootfs /:
mount --bind /opt /opt
mount --bind /tmp /opt
will cause the same mount tree as:
mount --bind /opt /opt
mount --beneath /tmp /opt
because both / and /opt are shared mounts/peers in the same peer
group and the /opt dentry is a subdirectory of both the parent's and
the child's ->mnt_root. If a mount tree like that is created it almost
always is an accident or abuse of mount propagation. Realistically
what most people probably mean in this scenarios is:
mount --bind /opt /opt
mount --make-private /opt
mount --make-shared /opt
This forces the allocation of a new separate peer group for the /opt
mount. Aferwards a mount --bind or mount --beneath actually makes
sense as the / and /opt mount belong to different peer groups. Before
that it's likely just confusion about what the user wanted to achieve.
* Refuse MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH if:
(1) the @mnt_from has been overmounted in between path resolution and
acquiring @namespace_sem when locking @mnt_to. This avoids the
proliferation of shadow mounts.
(2) if @to_mnt is moved to a different mountpoint while acquiring
@namespace_sem to lock @to_mnt.
(3) if @to_mnt is unmounted while acquiring @namespace_sem to lock
@to_mnt.
(4) if the parent of the target mount propagates to the target mount
at the same mountpoint.
This would mean mounting @mnt_from on @mnt_to->mnt_parent and then
propagating a copy @c of @mnt_from onto @mnt_to. This defeats the
whole purpose of mounting @mnt_from beneath @mnt_to.
(5) if the parent mount @mnt_to->mnt_parent propagates to @mnt_from at
the same mountpoint.
If @mnt_to->mnt_parent propagates to @mnt_from this would mean
propagating a copy @c of @mnt_from on top of @mnt_from. Afterwards
@mnt_from would be mounted on top of @mnt_to->mnt_parent and
@mnt_to would be unmounted from @mnt->mnt_parent and remounted on
@mnt_from. But since @c is already mounted on @mnt_from, @mnt_to
would ultimately be remounted on top of @c. Afterwards, @mnt_from
would be covered by a copy @c of @mnt_from and @c would be covered
by @mnt_from itself. This defeats the whole purpose of mounting
@mnt_from beneath @mnt_to.
Cases (1) to (3) are required as they deal with races that would cause
bugs or unexpected behavior for users. Cases (4) and (5) refuse
semantical quirks that would not be a bug but would cause weird mount
trees to be created. While they can already be created via other means
(mount --bind /opt /opt x n) there's no reason to repeat past mistakes
in new features.
Link: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/systemd-sysext.8.html [1]
Link: https://brauner.io/2023/02/28/mounting-into-mount-namespaces.html [2]
Link: https://github.com/flatcar/sysext-bakery
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Unified_Kernel_Support_Phase_1
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Unified_Kernel_Support_Phase_2
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/26013
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230202-fs-move-mount-replace-v4-4-98f3d80d7eaa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Currently, lock_mount() uses a goto to retry the lookup until it
succeeded in acquiring the namespace_lock() preventing the top mount
from being overmounted. While that's perfectly fine we want to lookup
the mountpoint on the parent of the top mount in later patches. So adapt
the code to make this easier to implement. Also, the for loop is
arguably a little cleaner and makes the code easier to follow. No
functional changes intended.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230202-fs-move-mount-replace-v4-3-98f3d80d7eaa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The comment on top of __lookup_mnt() states that it finds the first
mount implying that there could be multiple mounts mounted at the same
dentry with the same parent.
On older kernels "shadow mounts" could be created during mount
propagation. So if a mount @m in the destination propagation tree
already had a child mount @p mounted at @mp then any mount @n we
propagated to @m at the same @mp would be appended after the preexisting
mount @p in @mount_hashtable. This was a completely direct way of
creating shadow mounts.
That direct way is gone but there are still subtle ways to create shadow
mounts. For example, when attaching a source mnt @mnt to a shared mount.
The root of the source mnt @mnt might be overmounted by a mount @o after
we finished path lookup but before we acquired the namespace semaphore
to copy the source mount tree @mnt.
After we acquired the namespace lock @mnt is copied including @o
covering it. After we attach @mnt to a shared mount @dest_mnt we end up
propagation it to all it's peer and slaves @d. If @d already has a mount
@n mounted on top of it we tuck @mnt beneath @n. This means, we mount
@mnt at @d and mount @n on @mnt. Now we have both @o and @n mounted on
the same mountpoint at @mnt.
Explain this in the documentation as this is pretty subtle.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230202-fs-move-mount-replace-v4-2-98f3d80d7eaa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Add a small helper to check whether a path refers to the root of the
mount instead of open-coding this everywhere.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230202-fs-move-mount-replace-v4-1-98f3d80d7eaa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fget updates from Al Viro:
"fget() to fdget() conversions"
* tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fuse_dev_ioctl(): switch to fdget()
cgroup_get_from_fd(): switch to fdget_raw()
bpf: switch to fdget_raw()
build_mount_idmapped(): switch to fdget()
kill the last remaining user of proc_ns_fget()
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convert sgx_set_attribute() to fdget()/fdput()
convert setns(2) to fdget()/fdput()
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Merge tag 'v6.4/vfs.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains a pile of various smaller fixes. Most of them aren't
very interesting so this just highlights things worth mentioning:
- Various filesystems contained the same little helper to convert
from the mode of a dentry to the DT_* type of that dentry.
They have now all been switched to rely on the generic
fs_umode_to_dtype() helper. All custom helpers are removed (Jeff)
- Fsnotify now reports ACCESS and MODIFY events for splice
(Chung-Chiang Cheng)
- After converting timerfd a long time ago to rely on
wait_event_interruptible_*() apis, convert eventfd as well. This
removes the complex open-coded wait code (Wen Yang)
- Simplify sysctl registration for devpts, avoiding the declaration
of two tables. Instead, just use a prefixed path with
register_sysctl() (Luis)
- The setattr_should_drop_sgid() helper is now exported so NFS can
use it. By switching NFS to this helper an NFS setgid inheritance
bug is fixed (me)"
* tag 'v6.4/vfs.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: hfsplus: remove WARN_ON() from hfsplus_cat_{read,write}_inode()
pnode: pass mountpoint directly
eventfd: use wait_event_interruptible_locked_irq() helper
splice: report related fsnotify events
fs: consolidate duplicate dt_type helpers
nfs: use vfs setgid helper
Update relatime comments to include equality
fs/buffer: Remove redundant assignment to err
fs_context: drop the unused lsm_flags member
fs/namespace: fnic: Switch to use %ptTd
Documentation: update idmappings.rst
devpts: simplify two-level sysctl registration for pty_kern_table
eventpoll: align comment with nested epoll limitation
Use %ptTd instead of open-coded variant to print contents
of time64_t type in human readable form.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Pull ipc namespace update from Al Viro:
"Rik's patches reducing the amount of synchronize_rcu() triggered by
ipc namespace destruction.
I've some pending stuff reducing that on the normal umount side, but
it's nowhere near ready and Rik's stuff shouldn't be held back due to
conflicts - I'll just redo the parts of my series that stray into
ipc/*"
* 'work.namespace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
ipc,namespace: batch free ipc_namespace structures
ipc,namespace: make ipc namespace allocation wait for pending free
Instead of waiting for an RCU grace period between each ipc_namespace
structure that is being freed, wait an RCU grace period for every batch
of ipc_namespace structures.
Thanks to Al Viro for the suggestion of the helper function.
This speeds up the run time of the test case that allocates ipc_namespaces
in a loop from 6 minutes, to a little over 1 second:
real 0m1.192s
user 0m0.038s
sys 0m1.152s
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that we converted everything to just rely on struct mnt_idmap move it all
into a separate file. This ensure that no code can poke around in struct
mnt_idmap without any dedicated helpers and makes it easier to extend it in the
future. Filesystems will now not be able to conflate mount and filesystem
idmappings as they are two distinct types and require distinct helpers that
cannot be used interchangeably. We are now also able to extend struct mnt_idmap
as we see fit.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Remove legacy file_mnt_user_ns() and mnt_user_ns().
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.mnt_idmap.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
"Last cycle we've already made the interaction with idmapped mounts
more robust and type safe by introducing the vfs{g,u}id_t type. This
cycle we concluded the conversion and removed the legacy helpers.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached
to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy
to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem - with
namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for
filesystem developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can
be a potential source for bugs.
Instead of passing the plain namespace we introduce a dedicated type
struct mnt_idmap and replace the pointer with a pointer to a struct
mnt_idmap. There are no semantic or size changes for the mount struct
caused by this.
We then start converting all places aware of idmapped mounts to rely
on struct mnt_idmap. Once the conversion is done all helpers down to
the really low-level make_vfs{g,u}id() and from_vfs{g,u}id() will take
a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This
way it becomes impossible to conflate the two removing and thus
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. Fwiw, I fixed some issues in
that area a while ago in ntfs3 and ksmbd in the past. Afterwards only
low-level code can ultimately use the associated namespace for any
permission checks. Even most of the vfs can be completely obivious
about this ultimately and filesystems will never interact with it in
any form in the future.
A struct mnt_idmap currently encompasses a simple refcount and pointer
to the relevant namespace the mount is idmapped to. If a mount isn't
idmapped then it will point to a static nop_mnt_idmap and if it
doesn't that it is idmapped. As usual there are no allocations or
anything happening for non-idmapped mounts. Everthing is carefully
written to be a nop for non-idmapped mounts as has always been the
case.
If an idmapped mount is created a struct mnt_idmap is allocated and a
reference taken on the relevant namespace. Each mount that gets
idmapped or inherits the idmap simply bumps the reference count on
struct mnt_idmap. Just a reminder that we only allow a mount to change
it's idmapping a single time and only if it hasn't already been
attached to the filesystems and has no active writers.
The actual changes are fairly straightforward but this will have huge
benefits for maintenance and security in the long run even if it
causes some churn.
Note that this also makes it possible to extend struct mount_idmap in
the future. For example, it would be possible to place the namespace
pointer in an anonymous union together with an idmapping struct. This
would allow us to expose an api to userspace that would let it specify
idmappings directly instead of having to go through the detour of
setting up namespaces at all"
* tag 'fs.idmapped.mnt_idmap.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
acl: conver higher-level helpers to rely on mnt_idmap
fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts
copy_mnt_ns() has the old tree copied, with mntns binding *and* anything
bound on top of them skipped. Then it proceeds to walk both trees in
parallel. Unfortunately, it doesn't get the "skip the stuff we'd skipped
when copying" quite right. Consequences are minor (the ->mnt_root
comparison will return the situation to sanity pretty soon and the worst
we get is the unexpected subset of opened non-directories being switched
to new namespace), but it's confusing enough and it's not hard to get
the expected behaviour...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Last cycle we've already made the interaction with idmapped mounts more
robust and type safe by introducing the vfs{g,u}id_t type. This cycle we
concluded the conversion and removed the legacy helpers.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to
a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate filesystem and mount namespaces and what different roles they
have to play. Especially for filesystem developers without much
experience in this area this is an easy source for bugs.
Instead of passing the plain namespace we introduce a dedicated type
struct mnt_idmap and replace the pointer with a pointer to a struct
mnt_idmap. There are no semantic or size changes for the mount struct
caused by this.
We then start converting all places aware of idmapped mounts to rely on
struct mnt_idmap. Once the conversion is done all helpers down to the
really low-level make_vfs{g,u}id() and from_vfs{g,u}id() will take a
struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way
it becomes impossible to conflate the two, removing and thus eliminating
the possibility of any bugs. Fwiw, I fixed some issues in that area a
while ago in ntfs3 and ksmbd in the past. Afterwards, only low-level
code can ultimately use the associated namespace for any permission
checks. Even most of the vfs can be ultimately completely oblivious
about this and filesystems will never interact with it directly in any
form in the future.
A struct mnt_idmap currently encompasses a simple refcount and a pointer
to the relevant namespace the mount is idmapped to. If a mount isn't
idmapped then it will point to a static nop_mnt_idmap. If it is an
idmapped mount it will point to a new struct mnt_idmap. As usual there
are no allocations or anything happening for non-idmapped mounts.
Everthing is carefully written to be a nop for non-idmapped mounts as
has always been the case.
If an idmapped mount or mount tree is created a new struct mnt_idmap is
allocated and a reference taken on the relevant namespace. For each
mount in a mount tree that gets idmapped or a mount that inherits the
idmap when it is cloned the reference count on the associated struct
mnt_idmap is bumped. Just a reminder that we only allow a mount to
change it's idmapping a single time and only if it hasn't already been
attached to the filesystems and has no active writers.
The actual changes are fairly straightforward. This will have huge
benefits for maintenance and security in the long run even if it causes
some churn. I'm aware that there's some cost for all of you. And I'll
commit to doing this work and make this as painless as I can.
Note that this also makes it possible to extend struct mount_idmap in
the future. For example, it would be possible to place the namespace
pointer in an anonymous union together with an idmapping struct. This
would allow us to expose an api to userspace that would let it specify
idmappings directly instead of having to go through the detour of
setting up namespaces at all.
This just adds the infrastructure and doesn't do any conversions.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Idmapped mounts should not allow a user to map file ownsership into a
range of ids which is not under the control of that user. However, we
currently don't check whether the mounter is privileged wrt to the
target user namespace.
Currently no FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems support idmapped mounts, thus
this is not a problem as only CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns is allowed
to set up idmapped mounts. But this could change in the future, so add a
check to refuse to create idmapped mounts when the mounter does not have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the target user namespace.
Fixes: bd303368b7 ("fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems")
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816164752.2595240-1-sforshee@digitalocean.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The tricky case (__legitimize_mnt() failing after having grabbed
a reference) can be trivially dealt with by leaving nd->path.mnt
non-NULL, for terminate_walk() to drop it.
legitimize_mnt() becomes static after that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you
must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several
failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't
hit those particular failure exits without fault injection, though.
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Merge tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro:
"Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling.
The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you
must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several
failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit
those particular failure exits without fault injection, though"
* tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h
blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount()
m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb...
linux/mount.h: trim includes
uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
Hold writers when changing a mount's idmapping to make it more robust.
The vfs layer takes care to retrieve the idmapping of a mount once
ensuring that the idmapping used for vfs permission checking is
identical to the idmapping passed down to the filesystem.
For ioctl codepaths the filesystem itself is responsible for taking the
idmapping into account if they need to. While all filesystems with
FS_ALLOW_IDMAP raised take the same precautions as the vfs we should
enforce it explicitly by making sure there are no active writers on the
relevant mount while changing the idmapping.
This is similar to turning a mount ro with the difference that in
contrast to turning a mount ro changing the idmapping can only ever be
done once while a mount can transition between ro and rw as much as it
wants.
This is a minor user-visible change. But it is extremely unlikely to
matter. The caller must've created a detached mount via OPEN_TREE_CLONE
and then handed that O_PATH fd to another process or thread which then
must've gotten a writable fd for that mount and started creating files
in there while the caller is still changing mount properties. While not
impossible it will be an extremely rare corner-case and should in
general be considered a bug in the application. Consider making a mount
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC or MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV while allowing someone else to
perform lookups or exec'ing in parallel by handing them a copy of the
OPEN_TREE_CLONE fd or another fd beneath that mount.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510095840.152264-1-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
aio: drop needless assignment in aio_read()
clean overflow checks in count_mounts() a bit
seq_file: fix NULL pointer arithmetic warning
uml/x86: use x86 load_unaligned_zeropad()
asm/user.h: killed unused macros
constify struct path argument of finish_automount()/do_add_mount()
fs: Remove FIXME comment in generic_write_checks()
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Merge tag 'fs.rt.v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull mount attributes PREEMPT_RT update from Christian Brauner:
"This contains Sebastian's fix to make changing mount
attributes/getting write access compatible with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT.
The change only applies when users explicitly opt-in to real-time via
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT otherwise things are exactly as before. We've waited
quite a long time with this to make sure folks could take a good look"
* tag 'fs.rt.v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
fs/namespace: Boost the mount_lock.lock owner instead of spinning on PREEMPT_RT.
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Merge tag 'fs.v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull mount_setattr updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains a few more patches to massage the mount_setattr()
codepaths and one minor fix to reuse a helper we added some time back.
The final two patches do similar cleanups in different ways. One patch
is mine and the other is Al's who was nice enough to give me a branch
for it.
Since his came in later and my branch had been sitting in -next for
quite some time we just put his on top instead of swap them"
* tag 'fs.v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
mount_setattr(): clean the control flow and calling conventions
fs: clean up mount_setattr control flow
fs: don't open-code mnt_hold_writers()
fs: simplify check in mount_setattr_commit()
fs: add mnt_allow_writers() and simplify mount_setattr_prepare()
Commit f8b92ba67c ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp
expiry") introduced a mount warning regarding filesystem timestamp
limits, that is printed upon each writable mount or remount.
This can result in a lot of unnecessary messages in the kernel log in
setups where filesystems are being frequently remounted (or mounted
multiple times).
Avoid this by setting a superblock flag which indicates that the warning
has been emitted at least once for any particular mount, as suggested in
[1].
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/CAHk-=wim6VGnxQmjfK_tDg6fbHYKL4EFkmnTjVr9QnRqjDBAeA@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220119202934.26495-1-ailiop@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
separate the "cleanup" and "apply" codepaths (they have almost no overlap),
fold the "cleanup" into "prepare" (which eliminates the need of ->revert)
and make loops more idiomatic.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Simplify the control flow of mount_setattr_{prepare,commit} so they
become easier to follow. We kept using both an integer error variable
that was passed by pointer as well as a pointer as an indicator for
whether or not we need to revert or commit the prepared changes.
Simplify this and just use the pointer. If we successfully changed
properties the revert pointer will be NULL and if we failed to change
properties it will indicate where we failed and thus need to stop
reverting.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203131411.3093040-8-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Remove sb_prepare_remount_readonly()'s open-coded mnt_hold_writers()
implementation with the real helper we introduced in commit fbdc2f6c40
("fs: split out functions to hold writers").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203131411.3093040-7-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
In order to determine whether we need to call mnt_unhold_writers() in
mount_setattr_commit() we currently do not just check whether
MNT_WRITE_HOLD is set but also if a read-only mount was requested.
However, checking whether MNT_WRITE_HOLD is set is enough. Setting
MNT_WRITE_HOLD requires lock_mount_hash() to be held and it must be
unset before calling unlock_mount_hash(). This guarantees that if we see
MNT_WRITE_HOLD we know that we were the ones who set it earlier. We
don't need to care about why we set it. Plus, leaving this additional
read-only check in makes the code more confusing because it implies that
MNT_WRITE_HOLD could've been set by another thread when it really can't.
Remove it and update the associated comment.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203131411.3093040-6-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Add a tiny helper that lets us simplify the control-flow and can be used
in the next patch to avoid adding another condition open-coded into
mount_setattr_prepare(). Instead we can add it into the new helper.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203131411.3093040-5-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
When I introduced mnt_{hold,unhold}_writers() in commit fbdc2f6c40
("fs: split out functions to hold writers") I did not add kernel doc for
them. Fix this and introduce proper documentation.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203131411.3093040-4-brauner@kernel.org
Fixes: fbdc2f6c40 ("fs: split out functions to hold writers")
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Wraparound checks in there are redundant (x + y < x and
x + y < y are equivalent when x and y are both unsigned int).
IMO more straightforward code would be better here...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This moves the namespace sysctls to its own file as part of the
kernel/sysctl.c spring cleaning
Since we have now removed all sysctls for "fs", we now have to declare
it on the filesystem code, we do that using the new helper, which
reduces boiler plate code.
We rename init_fs_shared_sysctls() to init_fs_sysctls() to reflect that
now fs/sysctls.c is taking on the burden of being the first to register
the base directory as well.
Lastly, since init code will load in the order in which we link it we
have to move the sysctl code to be linked in early, so that its early
init routine runs prior to other fs code. This way, other filesystem
code can register their own sysctls using the helpers after this:
* register_sysctl_init()
* register_sysctl()
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211129211943.640266-3-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Cc: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull fs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work to enable the idmapping infrastructure to
support idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping.
In addition this contains various cleanups that avoid repeated
open-coding of the same functionality and simplify the code in quite a
few places.
We also finish the renaming of the mapping helpers we started a few
kernel releases back and move them to a dedicated header to not
continue polluting the fs header needlessly with low-level idmapping
helpers. With this series the fs header only contains idmapping
helpers that interact with fs objects.
Currently we only support idmapped mounts for filesystems mounted
without an idmapping themselves. This was a conscious decision
mentioned in multiple places (cf. [1]).
As explained at length in [3] it is perfectly fine to extend support
for idmapped mounts to filesystem's mounted with an idmapping should
the need arise. The need has been there for some time now (cf. [2]).
Before we can port any filesystem that is mountable with an idmapping
to support idmapped mounts in the coming cycles, we need to first
extend the mapping helpers to account for the filesystem's idmapping.
This again, is explained at length in our documentation at [3] and
also in the individual commit messages so here's an overview.
Currently, the low-level mapping helpers implement the remapping
algorithms described in [3] in a simplified manner as we could rely on
the fact that all filesystems supporting idmapped mounts are mounted
without an idmapping.
In contrast, filesystems mounted with an idmapping are very likely to
not use an identity mapping and will instead use a non-identity
mapping. So the translation step from or into the filesystem's
idmapping in the remapping algorithm cannot be skipped for such
filesystems.
Non-idmapped filesystems and filesystems not supporting idmapped
mounts are unaffected by this change as the remapping algorithms can
take the same shortcut as before. If the low-level helpers detect that
they are dealing with an idmapped mount but the underlying filesystem
is mounted without an idmapping we can rely on the previous shortcut
and can continue to skip the translation step from or into the
filesystem's idmapping. And of course, if the low-level helpers detect
that they are not dealing with an idmapped mount they can simply
return the relevant id unchanged; no remapping needs to be performed
at all.
These checks guarantee that only the minimal amount of work is
performed. As before, if idmapped mounts aren't used the low-level
helpers are idempotent and no work is performed at all"
Link: 2ca4dcc490 ("fs/mount_setattr: tighten permission checks") [1]
Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/issues/10374 [2]
Link: Documentations/filesystems/idmappings.rst [3]
Link: a65e58e791 ("fs: document and rename fsid helpers") [4]
* tag 'fs.idmapped.v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems
fs: add i_user_ns() helper
fs: port higher-level mapping helpers
fs: remove unused low-level mapping helpers
fs: use low-level mapping helpers
docs: update mapping documentation
fs: account for filesystem mappings
fs: tweak fsuidgid_has_mapping()
fs: move mapping helpers
fs: add is_idmapped_mnt() helper
Make sure that finish_mount_kattr() is called after mount_kattr was
succesfully built in both the success and failure case to prevent
leaking any references we took when we built it. We returned early if
path lookup failed thereby risking to leak an additional reference we
took when building mount_kattr when an idmapped mount was requested.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9caccd4154 ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In previous patches we added new and modified existing helpers to handle
idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. In this final
patch we convert all relevant places in the vfs to actually pass the
filesystem's idmapping into these helpers.
With this the vfs is in shape to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems
mounted with an idmapping. Note that this is just the generic
infrastructure. Actually adding support for idmapped mounts to a
filesystem mountable with an idmapping is follow-up work.
In this patch we extend the definition of an idmapped mount from a mount
that that has the initial idmapping attached to it to a mount that has
an idmapping attached to it which is not the same as the idmapping the
filesystem was mounted with.
As before we do not allow the initial idmapping to be attached to a
mount. In addition this patch prevents that the idmapping the filesystem
was mounted with can be attached to a mount created based on this
filesystem.
This has multiple reasons and advantages. First, attaching the initial
idmapping or the filesystem's idmapping doesn't make much sense as in
both cases the values of the i_{g,u}id and other places where k{g,u}ids
are used do not change. Second, a user that really wants to do this for
whatever reason can just create a separate dedicated identical idmapping
to attach to the mount. Third, we can continue to use the initial
idmapping as an indicator that a mount is not idmapped allowing us to
continue to keep passing the initial idmapping into the mapping helpers
to tell them that something isn't an idmapped mount even if the
filesystem is mounted with an idmapping.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-11-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-11-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-11-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Multiple places open-code the same check to determine whether a given
mount is idmapped. Introduce a simple helper function that can be used
instead. This allows us to get rid of the fragile open-coding. We will
later change the check that is used to determine whether a given mount
is idmapped. Introducing a helper allows us to do this in a single
place instead of doing it for multiple places.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-2-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-2-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The MNT_WRITE_HOLD flag is used to hold back any new writers while the
mount point is about to be made read-only. __mnt_want_write() then loops
with disabled preemption until this flag disappears. Callers of
mnt_hold_writers() (which sets the flag) hold the spinlock_t of
mount_lock (seqlock_t) which disables preemption on !PREEMPT_RT and
ensures the task is not scheduled away so that the spinning side spins
for a long time.
On PREEMPT_RT the spinlock_t does not disable preemption and so it is
possible that the task setting MNT_WRITE_HOLD is preempted by task with
higher priority which then spins infinitely waiting for MNT_WRITE_HOLD
to get removed.
Acquire mount_lock::lock which is held by setter of MNT_WRITE_HOLD. This
will PI-boost the owner and wait until the lock is dropped and which
means that MNT_WRITE_HOLD is cleared again.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025152218.opvcqfku2lhqvp4o@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211125120711.dgbsienyrsxfzpoi@linutronix.de
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
Container admin can create new namespaces and force kernel to allocate up
to several pages of memory for the namespaces and its associated
structures.
Net and uts namespaces have enabled accounting for such allocations. It
makes sense to account for rest ones to restrict the host's memory
consumption from inside the memcg-limited container.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5525bcbf-533e-da27-79b7-158686c64e13@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Yutian Yang <nglaive@gmail.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "memcg accounting from OpenVZ", v7.
OpenVZ uses memory accounting 20+ years since v2.2.x linux kernels.
Initially we used our own accounting subsystem, then partially committed
it to upstream, and a few years ago switched to cgroups v1. Now we're
rebasing again, revising our old patches and trying to push them upstream.
We try to protect the host system from any misuse of kernel memory
allocation triggered by untrusted users inside the containers.
Patch-set is addressed mostly to cgroups maintainers and cgroups@ mailing
list, though I would be very grateful for any comments from maintainersi
of affected subsystems or other people added in cc:
Compared to the upstream, we additionally account the following kernel objects:
- network devices and its Tx/Rx queues
- ipv4/v6 addresses and routing-related objects
- inet_bind_bucket cache objects
- VLAN group arrays
- ipv6/sit: ip_tunnel_prl
- scm_fp_list objects used by SCM_RIGHTS messages of Unix sockets
- nsproxy and namespace objects itself
- IPC objects: semaphores, message queues and share memory segments
- mounts
- pollfd and select bits arrays
- signals and posix timers
- file lock
- fasync_struct used by the file lease code and driver's fasync queues
- tty objects
- per-mm LDT
We have an incorrect/incomplete/obsoleted accounting for few other kernel
objects: sk_filter, af_packets, netlink and xt_counters for iptables.
They require rework and probably will be dropped at all.
Also we're going to add an accounting for nft, however it is not ready
yet.
We have not tested performance on upstream, however, our performance team
compares our current RHEL7-based production kernel and reports that they
are at least not worse as the according original RHEL7 kernel.
This patch (of 10):
The kernel allocates ~400 bytes of 'struct mount' for any new mount.
Creating a new mount namespace clones most of the parent mounts, and this
can be repeated many times. Additionally, each mount allocates up to
PATH_MAX=4096 bytes for mnt->mnt_devname.
It makes sense to account for these allocations to restrict the host's
memory consumption from inside the memcg-limited container.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/045db11f-4a45-7c9b-2664-5b32c2b44943@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Yutian Yang <nglaive@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
