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mips uses a top-down layout by default that exactly fits the generic
functions, so get rid of arch specific code and use the generic version by
selecting ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT.
As ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT selects ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE,
use the generic version of arch_randomize_brk since it also fits. Note
that this commit also removes the possibility for mips to have elf
randomization and no MMU: without MMU, the security added by randomization
is worth nothing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-14-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mips uses TASK_IS_32BIT_ADDR to determine if a task is 32bit, but this
define is mips specific and other arches do not have it: instead, use
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) || is_compat_task() condition.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-13-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit simply bumps up to 32MB and 1GB the random offset of brk,
compared to 8MB and 256MB, for 32bit and 64bit respectively.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-12-alex@ghiti.fr
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mmap base address must be computed wrt stack top address, using TASK_SIZE
is wrong since STACK_TOP and TASK_SIZE are not equivalent.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-11-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit takes care of stack randomization and stack guard gap when
computing mmap base address and checks if the task asked for
randomization. This fixes the problem uncovered and not fixed for arm
here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-1-riel@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-10-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The bounds check used the uninitialized variable vaddr, it should use
the given parameter kaddr instead. When using the uninitialized value
the compiler assumed it to be 0 and optimized this function to just
return 0 in all cases.
This should make the function check the range of the given address and
only do the page map check in case it is in the expected range of
virtual addresses.
Fixes: 074a1e1167 ("MIPS: Bounds check virt_addr_valid")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
Cc: jhogan@kernel.org
Cc: f4bug@amsat.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ysu@wavecomp.com
Cc: jcristau@debian.org
virt_addr_valid() really returns a boolean value, but currently uses an
integer to represent it. Switch to the bool type to make it clearer that
we really are returning a true or false value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
The virt_addr_valid() function is meant to return true iff
virt_to_page() will return a valid struct page reference. This is true
iff the address provided is found within the unmapped address range
between PAGE_OFFSET & MAP_BASE, but we don't currently check for that
condition. Instead we simply mask the address to obtain what will be a
physical address if the virtual address is indeed in the desired range,
shift it to form a PFN & then call pfn_valid(). This can incorrectly
return true if called with a virtual address which, after masking,
happens to form a physical address corresponding to a valid PFN.
For example we may vmalloc an address in the kernel mapped region
starting a MAP_BASE & obtain the virtual address:
addr = 0xc000000000002000
When masked by virt_to_phys(), which uses __pa() & in turn CPHYSADDR(),
we obtain the following (bogus) physical address:
addr = 0x2000
In a common system with PHYS_OFFSET=0 this will correspond to a valid
struct page which should really be accessed by virtual address
PAGE_OFFSET+0x2000, causing virt_addr_valid() to incorrectly return 1
indicating that the original address corresponds to a struct page.
This is equivalent to the ARM64 change made in commit ca219452c6
("arm64: Correctly bounds check virt_addr_valid").
This fixes fallout when hardened usercopy is enabled caused by the
related commit 517e1fbeb6 ("mm/usercopy: Drop extra
is_vmalloc_or_module() check") which removed a check for the vmalloc
range that was present from the introduction of the hardened usercopy
feature.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
References: ca219452c6 ("arm64: Correctly bounds check virt_addr_valid")
References: 517e1fbeb6 ("mm/usercopy: Drop extra is_vmalloc_or_module() check")
Reported-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Tested-by: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
URL: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=929366
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yunqiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".
Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements
the approach.
[1] 04e35f4495 ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
This patch (of 3):
Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c provides our implementations of the arch_mmap_rnd()
& arch_randomize_brk() functions, but doesn't include the
linux/elf-randomize.h header which declares them. This leads to warnings
from sparse:
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c:146:15: warning: symbol 'arch_mmap_rnd' was not
declared. Should it be static?
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c:190:15: warning: symbol 'arch_randomize_brk' was
not declared. Should it be static?
Fix this by including linux/elf-randomize.h to get the declarations of
arch_mmap_rnd() & arch_randomize_brk().
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: trivial@kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17171/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We are going to split more MM APIs out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.
The APIs that we are going to move are:
arch_pick_mmap_layout()
arch_get_unmapped_area()
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
mm_update_next_owner()
Include the header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded limits of 16MB for the randomisation
of mmap within 32bit processes and 256MB in 64bit processes. Since v4.4
other arches support tuning this value in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits.
Add support for this to MIPS.
Set the minimum(default) number of bits randomisation for 32bit to 8 -
which with 4k pagesize is unchanged from the current 16MB total
randomness. The minimum(default) for 64bit is 12bits, again with 4k
pagesize this is the same as the current 256MB.
This patch is necessary for MIPS32 to pass the Android CTS tests, with
the number of random bits set to 15.
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14617/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage
in doing so is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers;
adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what
headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h was the source for init.h (for __init) and for
export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each obj-y/bool instance
for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14033/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, extract the mmap ASLR
selection into a separate function.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since all architectures have been converted to use vm_unmapped_area(),
there is no remaining use for the free_area_cache.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit d3ce884318 "MIPS: Fix modpost error in modules attepting to use
virt_addr_valid()" moved __virt_addr_valid() from a macro in a header
file to a function in ioremap.c. But ioremap.c is only compiled for MIPS
32, and not for MIPS 64.
When compiling for my yeeloong2, which supposedly supports hibernation,
which compiles kernel/power/snapshot.c which calls virt_addr_valid(), I
got this error:
LD init/built-in.o
kernel/built-in.o: In function `memory_bm_free':
snapshot.c:(.text+0x4c9c4): undefined reference to `__virt_addr_valid'
snapshot.c:(.text+0x4ca58): undefined reference to `__virt_addr_valid'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `snapshot_write_next':
(.text+0x4e44c): undefined reference to `__virt_addr_valid'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `snapshot_write_next':
(.text+0x4e890): undefined reference to `__virt_addr_valid'
make[1]: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
make: *** [sub-make] Error 2
I suspect that __virt_addr_valid() is fine for mips 64. I moved it to
mmap.c such that it gets compiled for mips 64 and 32.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/4842/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Update the mips arch_get_unmapped_area[_topdown] functions to make use of
vm_unmapped_area() instead of implementing a brute force search.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove now-unused COLOUR_ALIGN_DOWN()]
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch introduced topdown mmap support in user process address
space allocation policy.
Recently, we ran some large applications that use mmap heavily and
lead to OOM due to inflexible mmap allocation policy on MIPS32.
Since most other major archs supported it for years, it is reasonable
to follow the trend and reduce the pain of porting applications.
Due to cache aliasing concern, arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() and
other helper functions are implemented in arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c.
Signed-off-by: Jian Peng <jipeng2005@gmail.com>
Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/2389/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
