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'guarantee' is already removed from cgroup_task_migrate, so remove
the corresponding comments. Some other typos in cgroup are also
changed.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.
A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.
This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.
We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.
I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To keep things sane in the context of file descriptor passing derive the
user namespace that uids are mapped into from the opener of the file
instead of from current.
When writing to the maps file the lower user namespace must always
be the parent user namespace, or setting the mapping simply does
not make sense. Enforce that the opener of the file was in
the parent user namespace or the user namespace whose mapping
is being set.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected
As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only
a single thread.
- Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and
the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected.
Making the constraints in the code clear.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This allows entering a user namespace, and the ability
to store a reference to a user namespace with a bind
mount.
Addition of missing userns_ns_put in userns_install
from Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The task_user_ns function hides the fact that it is getting the user
namespace from struct cred on the task. struct cred may go away as
soon as the rcu lock is released. This leads to a race where we
can dereference a stale user namespace pointer.
To make it obvious a struct cred is involved kill task_user_ns.
To kill the race modify the users of task_user_ns to only
reference the user namespace while the rcu lock is held.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Modify create_new_namespaces to explicitly take a user namespace
parameter, instead of implicitly through the task_struct.
This allows an implementation of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) where
the new user namespace is not stored onto the current task_struct
until after all of the namespaces are created.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into
the setns install methods where the user namespace of the
target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable
call.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
If an unprivileged user has the appropriate capabilities in their
current user namespace allow the creation of new namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
WARN shouldn't be used as a means of communicating failure to a userspace programmer.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120725153908.GA25203@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
It seems that 'ftrace_enabled' flag should not be used inside the tracer
functions. The ftrace core is using this flag for internal purposes, and
the flag wasn't meant to be used in tracers' runtime checks.
stack tracer is the only tracer that abusing the flag. So stop it from
serving as a bad example.
Also, there is a local 'stack_trace_disabled' flag in the stack tracer,
which is never updated; so it can be removed as well.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1342637761-9655-1-git-send-email-anton.vorontsov@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
With the introduction of generic cgroup hierarchy iterators, css_id is
being phased out. It was unnecessarily complex, id'ing the wrong
thing (cgroups need IDs, not CSSes) and has other oddities like not
being available at ->css_alloc().
This patch adds cgroup->id, which is a simple per-hierarchy
ida-allocated ID which is assigned before ->css_alloc() and released
after ->css_free().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Currently CGRP_CPUSET_CLONE_CHILDREN triggers ->post_clone(). Now
that clone_children is cpuset specific, there's no reason to have this
rather odd option activation mechanism in cgroup core. cpuset can
check the flag from its ->css_allocate() and take the necessary
action.
Move cpuset_post_clone() logic to the end of cpuset_css_alloc() and
remove cgroup_subsys->post_clone().
Loosely based on Glauber's "generalize post_clone into post_create"
patch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Original-patch-by: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Original-patch: <1351686554-22592-2-git-send-email-glommer@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
clone_children is only meaningful for cpuset and will stay that way.
Rename the flag to reflect that and update documentation. Also, drop
clone_children() wrapper in cgroup.c. The thin wrapper is used only a
few times and one of them will go away soon.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Rename cgroup_subsys css lifetime related callbacks to better describe
what their roles are. Also, update documentation.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
There could be cases where controllers want to do initialization
operations which may fail from ->post_create(). This patch makes
->post_create() return -errno to indicate failure and online_css()
relay such failures.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
cgroup_create() was ignoring failure of cgroupfs files. Update it
such that, if file creation fails, it rolls back by calling
cgroup_destroy_locked() and returns failure.
Note that error out goto labels are renamed. The labels are a bit
confusing but will become better w/ later cgroup operation renames.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
All cgroup directory i_mutexes nest outside cgroup_mutex; however, new
directory creation is a special case. A new cgroup directory is
created while holding cgroup_mutex. Populating the new directory
requires both the new directory's i_mutex and cgroup_mutex. Because
all directory i_mutexes nest outside cgroup_mutex, grabbing both
requires releasing cgroup_mutex first, which isn't a good idea as the
new cgroup isn't yet ready to be manipulated by other cgroup
opreations.
This is worked around by grabbing the new directory's i_mutex while
holding cgroup_mutex before making it visible. As there's no other
user at that point, grabbing the i_mutex under cgroup_mutex can't lead
to deadlock.
cgroup_create_file() was using I_MUTEX_CHILD to tell lockdep not to
worry about the reverse locking order; however, this creates pseudo
locking dependency cgroup_mutex -> I_MUTEX_CHILD, which isn't true -
all directory i_mutexes are still nested outside cgroup_mutex. This
pseudo locking dependency can lead to spurious lockdep warnings.
Use mutex_trylock() instead. This will always succeed and lockdep
doesn't create any locking dependency for it.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Now that cgroup_unload_subsys() can tell whether the root css is
online or not, we can safely call cgroup_unload_subsys() after idr
init failure in cgroup_load_subsys().
Replace the manual unrolling and invoke cgroup_unload_subsys() on
failure. This drops cgroup_mutex inbetween but should be safe as the
subsystem will fail try_module_get() and thus can't be mounted
inbetween. As this means that cgroup_unload_subsys() can be called
before css_sets are rehashed, remove BUG_ON() on %NULL
css_set->subsys[] from cgroup_unload_subsys().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
New helpers on/offline_css() respectively wrap ->post_create() and
->pre_destroy() invocations. online_css() sets CSS_ONLINE after
->post_create() is complete and offline_css() invokes ->pre_destroy()
iff CSS_ONLINE is set and clears it while also handling the temporary
dropping of cgroup_mutex.
This patch doesn't introduce any behavior change at the moment but
will be used to improve cgroup_create() failure path and allow
->post_create() to fail.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Separate out cgroup_destroy_locked() from cgroup_destroy(). This will
be later used in cgroup_create() failure path.
While at it, add lockdep asserts on i_mutex and cgroup_mutex, and move
@d and @parent assignments to their declarations.
This patch doesn't introduce any functional difference.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
* If idr init fails, cgroup_load_subsys() cleared dummytop->subsys[]
before calilng ->destroy() making CSS inaccessible to the callback,
and didn't unlink ss->sibling. As no modular controller uses
->use_id, this doesn't cause any actual problems.
* cgroup_unload_subsys() was forgetting to free idr, call
->pre_destroy() and clear ->active. As there currently is no
modular controller which uses ->use_id, ->pre_destroy() or ->active,
this doesn't cause any actual problems.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Make cgroup_init_subsys() grab cgroup_mutex while initializing a
subsystem so that all helpers and callbacks are called under the
context they expect. This isn't strictly necessary as
cgroup_init_subsys() doesn't race with anybody but will allow adding
lockdep assertions.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Consistently use @css and @dummytop in these two functions instead of
referring to them indirectly.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Currently, CSS_* flags are defined as bit positions and manipulated
using atomic bitops. There's no reason to use atomic bitops for them
and bit positions are clunkier to deal with than bit masks. Make
CSS_* bit masks instead and use the usual C bitwise operators to
access them.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
cgroup->dentry is marked and used as a RCU pointer; however, it isn't
one - the final dentry put doesn't go through call_rcu(). cgroup and
dentry share the same RCU freeing rule via synchronize_rcu() in
cgroup_diput() (kfree_rcu() used on cgrp is unnecessary). If cgrp is
accessible under RCU read lock, so is its dentry and dereferencing
cgrp->dentry doesn't need any further RCU protection or annotation.
While not being accurate, before the previous patch, the RCU accessors
served a purpose as memory barriers - cgroup->dentry used to be
assigned after the cgroup was made visible to cgroup_path(), so the
assignment and dereferencing in cgroup_path() needed the memory
barrier pair. Now that list_add_tail_rcu() happens after
cgroup->dentry is assigned, this no longer is necessary.
Remove the now unnecessary and misleading RCU annotations from
cgroup->dentry. To make up for the removal of rcu_dereference_check()
in cgroup_path(), add an explicit rcu_lockdep_assert(), which asserts
the dereference rule of @cgrp, not cgrp->dentry.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
While creating a new cgroup, cgroup_create() links the newly allocated
cgroup into various places before trying to create its directory.
Because cgroup life-cycle is tied to the vfs objects, this makes it
impossible to use cgroup_rmdir() for rolling back creation - the
removal logic depends on having full vfs objects.
This patch moves directory creation above linking and collect linking
operations to one place. This allows directory creation failure to
share error exit path with css allocation failures and any failure
sites afterwards (to be added later) can use cgroup_rmdir() logic to
undo creation.
Note that this also makes the memory barriers around cgroup->dentry,
which currently is misleadingly using RCU operations, unnecessary.
This will be handled in the next patch.
While at it, locking BUG_ON() on i_mutex is converted to
lockdep_assert_held().
v2: Patch originally removed %NULL dentry check in cgroup_path();
however, Li pointed out that this patch doesn't make it
unnecessary as ->create() may call cgroup_path(). Drop the
change for now.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
The operation order of cgroup creation is about to change and
cgroup_create_dir() is more of a hindrance than a proper abstraction.
Open-code it by moving the parent nlink adjustment next to self nlink
adjustment in cgroup_create_file() and the rest to cgroup_create().
This patch doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Not strictly necessary but it's annoying to have uninitialized
list_head around.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
vtime_account() is only called from irq entry. irqs
are always disabled at this point so we can safely
remove the irq disabling guards on that function.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
On ia64 and powerpc, vtime context switch only consists
in flushing system and user pending time, plus a few
arch housekeeping.
Consolidate that into a generic implementation. s390 is
a special case because pending user and system time accounting
there is hard to dissociate. So it's keeping its own implementation.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Prepending irq-unsafe vtime APIs with underscores was actually
a bad idea as the result is a big mess in the API namespace that
is even waiting to be further extended. Also these helpers
are always called from irq safe callers except kvm. Just
provide a vtime_account_system_irqsafe() for this specific
case so that we can remove the underscore prefix on other
vtime functions.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Now that we have been through every permission check in the kernel
having uid == 0 and gid == 0 in your local user namespace no
longer adds any special privileges. Even having a full set
of caps in your local user namespace is safe because capabilies
are relative to your local user namespace, and do not confer
unexpected privileges.
Over the long term this should allow much more of the kernels
functionality to be safely used by non-root users. Functionality
like unsharing the mount namespace that is only unsafe because
it can fool applications whose privileges are raised when they
are executed. Since those applications have no privileges in
a user namespaces it becomes safe to spoof and confuse those
applications all you want.
Those capabilities will still need to be enabled carefully because
we may still need things like rlimits on the number of unprivileged
mounts but that is to avoid DOS attacks not to avoid fooling root
owned processes.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces
does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children
created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init
process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children
of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process
that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map.
A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was
settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from
pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare.
I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following
appears to be a representative sample of their logic.
{
setup stuff include pam
child = fork();
if (!child) {
setuid()
exec /bin/bash
}
waitpid(child);
pam and other cleanup
}
As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user
space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space
process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further
most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which
means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to
the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more
comprehensible.
The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is
that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly.
Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct
pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not
the least of which is that glibc caches getpid().
These semantics are implemented by having two notions
of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns
which is the pid namspace the process was created with
and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to
that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored
in the struct pid of the task.
Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children
that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Instead of setting child_reaper and SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE one way
for the system init process, and another way for pid namespace
init processes test pid->nr == 1 and use the same code for both.
For the global init this results in SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE being set
much earlier in the initialization process.
This is a small cleanup and it paves the way for allowing unshare and
enter of the pid namespace as that path like our global init also will
not set CLONE_NEWPID.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Pid namespaces are designed to be inescapable so verify that the
passed in pid namespace is a child of the currently active
pid namespace or the currently active pid namespace itself.
Allowing the currently active pid namespace is important so
the effects of an earlier setns can be cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns will
soon be allowed to support unshare and setns.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of current->ns_proxy->pid_ns. However
that leads to strange cases like trying to have a single process be
init in multiple pid namespaces, which is racy and hard to think
about.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of task_active_pid_ns(current). While
that seems less racy it does not provide any utility.
Therefore define the semantics of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns to be that the
pid namespace creation fails. That is easy to implement and easy
to think about.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Looking at pid_ns->nr_hashed is a bit simpler and it works for
disjoint process trees that an unshare or a join of a pid_namespace
may create.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Set nr_hashed to -1 just before we schedule the work to cleanup proc.
Test nr_hashed just before we hash a new pid and if nr_hashed is < 0
fail.
This guaranteees that processes never enter a pid namespaces after we
have cleaned up the state to support processes in a pid namespace.
Currently sending SIGKILL to all of the process in a pid namespace as
init exists gives us this guarantee but we need something a little
stronger to support unsharing and joining a pid namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The expressions tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.
Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.
So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.
In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Capture the the user namespace that creates the pid namespace
- Use that user namespace to test if it is ok to write to
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid.
Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> noticed I was missing a put_user_ns
in when destroying a pid_ns. I have foloded his patch into this one
so that bisects will work properly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The user namespace which creates a new network namespace owns that
namespace and all resources created in it. This way we can target
capability checks for privileged operations against network resources to
the user_ns which created the network namespace in which the resource
lives. Privilege to the user namespace which owns the network
namespace, or any parent user namespace thereof, provides the same
privilege to the network resource.
This patch is reworked from a version originally by
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The user namespace which creates a new network namespace owns that
namespace and all resources created in it. This way we can target
capability checks for privileged operations against network resources to
the user_ns which created the network namespace in which the resource
lives. Privilege to the user namespace which owns the network
namespace, or any parent user namespace thereof, provides the same
privilege to the network resource.
This patch is reworked from a version originally by
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
