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Need to tell the compiler that the acl entries follow the acl header.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Also don't bother to set up a .get_acl method for symlinks as we do not
support access control (ACLs or even mode bits) for symlinks in Linux.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Replace the ->check_acl method with a ->get_acl method that simply reads an
ACL from disk after having a cache miss. This means we can replace the ACL
checking boilerplate code with a single implementation in namei.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
casting int * to mode_t * is not a good thing - on a *lot* of big-endian
architectures mode_t happens to be smaller than int and there it breaks
quite spectaculary...
Fucked-up-by: commit cfc8dc6f6f
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This avoids an indirect call in the VFS for each path component lookup.
Well, at least as long as you own the directory in question, and the ACL
check is unnecessary.
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
jffs2_get_acl() can now become static again.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
[In commit 9ed437c50d we fixed a problem
with standard permissions on newly-created inodes, when POSIX ACLs are
enabled. This cleans it up...]
The attached patch separate jffs2_init_acl() into two parts.
The one is jffs2_init_acl_pre() called from jffs2_new_inode().
It compute ACL oriented inode->i_mode bits, and allocate in-memory ACL
objects associated with the new inode just before when inode meta
infomation is written to the medium.
The other is jffs2_init_acl_post() called from jffs2_symlink(),
jffs2_mkdir(), jffs2_mknod() and jffs2_do_create().
It actually writes in-memory ACL objects into the medium next to
the success of writing meta-information.
In the current implementation, we have to write a same inode meta
infomation twice when inode->i_mode is updated by the default ACL.
However, we can avoid the behavior by putting an updated i_mode
before it is written at first, as jffs2_init_acl_pre() doing.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
When POSIX ACL support was enabled, we weren't writing correct
legacy modes to the medium on inode creation, or when the ACL was set.
This meant that the permissions would be incorrect after the file system
was remounted.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
In particular, remove the bit in the LICENCE file about contacting
Red Hat for alternative arrangements. Their errant IS department broke
that arrangement a long time ago -- the policy of collecting copyright
assignments from contributors came to an end when the plug was pulled on
the servers hosting the project, without notice or reason.
We do still dual-license it for use with eCos, with the GPL+exception
licence approved by the FSF as being GPL-compatible. It's just that nobody
has the right to license it differently.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
jffs2_clear_acl() which releases acl caches allocated by kmalloc()
was defined but it was never called. Thus, we faced to the risk
of memory leaking.
This patch plugs jffs2_clear_acl() into jffs2_do_clear_inode().
It ensures to release acl cache when inode is cleared.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
jffs2_acl_header, jffs2_acl_entry and jffs2_acl_entry_short were redefined
with using 'struct' instead of 'typedef' in kernel implementation.
[1/10] jffs2-xattr-v5.1-01-remove_typedef_kernel.patch
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
This attached patches provide xattr support including POSIX-ACL and
SELinux support on JFFS2 (version.5).
There are some significant differences from previous version posted
at last December.
The biggest change is addition of EBS(Erase Block Summary) support.
Currently, both kernel and usermode utility (sumtool) can recognize
xattr nodes which have JFFS2_NODETYPE_XATTR/_XREF nodetype.
In addition, some bugs are fixed.
- A potential race condition was fixed.
- Unexpected fail when updating a xattr by same name/value pair was fixed.
- A bug when removing xattr name/value pair was fixed.
The fundamental structures (such as using two new nodetypes and exclusion
mechanism by rwsem) are unchanged. But most of implementation were reviewed
and updated if necessary.
Espacially, we had to change several internal implementations related to
load_xattr_datum() to avoid a potential race condition.
[1/2] xattr_on_jffs2.kernel.version-5.patch
[2/2] xattr_on_jffs2.utils.version-5.patch
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
