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The put_hash_bucket() is a bit cleaner if it takes an unsigned long
directly instead of a pointer to unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
These are pure cache maintainance routines, so drop the unused
struct device argument.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
pidfd_poll() is defined as returning 'unsigned int' but the
.poll method is declared as returning '__poll_t', a bitwise type.
Fix this by using the proper return type and using the EPOLL
constants instead of the POLL ones, as required for __poll_t.
Fixes: b53b0b9d9a61 ("pidfd: add polling support")
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3
Signed-off-by: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191120003320.31138-1-luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Modify cpuidle_use_deepest_state() to take an additional exit latency
limit argument to be passed to find_deepest_idle_state() and make
cpuidle_idle_call() pass dev->forced_idle_latency_limit_ns to it for
forced idle.
Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
[ rjw: Rebase and rearrange code, subject & changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
In some cases it may be useful to specify an exit latency limit for
the idle state to be used during CPU idle time injection.
Instead of duplicating the information in struct cpuidle_device
or propagating the latency limit in the call stack, replace the
use_deepest_state field with forced_latency_limit_ns to represent
that limit, so that the deepest idle state with exit latency within
that limit is forced (i.e. no governors) when it is set.
A zero exit latency limit for forced idle means to use governors in
the usual way (analogous to use_deepest_state equal to "false" before
this change).
Additionally, add play_idle_precise() taking two arguments, the
duration of forced idle and the idle state exit latency limit, both
in nanoseconds, and redefine play_idle() as a wrapper around that
new function.
This change is preparatory, no functional impact is expected.
Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
[ rjw: Subject, changelog, cpuidle_use_deepest_state() kerneldoc, whitespace ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Switching cpufreq drivers (or switching operation modes of the
intel_pstate driver from "active" to "passive" and vice versa)
does not work on some x86 systems with ACPI after commit
3000ce3c52f8 ("cpufreq: Use per-policy frequency QoS"), because
the ACPI _PPC and thermal code uses the same frequency QoS request
object for a given CPU every time a cpufreq driver is registered
and freq_qos_remove_request() does not invalidate the request after
removing it from its QoS list, so freq_qos_add_request() complains
and fails when that request is passed to it again.
Fix the issue by modifying freq_qos_remove_request() to clear the qos
and type fields of the frequency request pointed to by its argument
after removing it from its QoS list so as to invalidate it.
Fixes: 3000ce3c52f8 ("cpufreq: Use per-policy frequency QoS")
Reported-and-tested-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
attach_to_pi_owner() returns -EAGAIN for various cases:
- Owner task is exiting
- Futex value has changed
The caller drops the held locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and retries the
operation. In case of the owner task exiting this can result in a live
lock.
As a preparatory step for seperating those cases, provide a distinct return
value (EBUSY) for the owner exiting case.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.935606117@linutronix.de
The mutex will be used in subsequent changes to replace the busy looping of
a waiter when the futex owner is currently executing the exit cleanup to
prevent a potential live lock.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.845798895@linutronix.de
exec() attempts to handle potentially held futexes gracefully by running
the futex exit handling code like exit() does.
The current implementation has no protection against concurrent incoming
waiters. The reason is that the futex state cannot be set to
FUTEX_STATE_DEAD after the cleanup because the task struct is still active
and just about to execute the new binary.
While its arguably buggy when a task holds a futex over exec(), for
consistency sake the state handling can at least cover the actual futex
exit cleanup section. This provides state consistency protection accross
the cleanup. As the futex state of the task becomes FUTEX_STATE_OK after the
cleanup has been finished, this cannot prevent subsequent attempts to
attach to the task in case that the cleanup was not successfull in mopping
up all leftovers.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.753355618@linutronix.de
Instead of having a smp_mb() and an empty lock/unlock of task::pi_lock move
the state setting into to the lock section.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.645603214@linutronix.de
Instead of relying on PF_EXITING use an explicit state for the futex exit
and set it in the futex exit function. This moves the smp barrier and the
lock/unlock serialization into the futex code.
As with the DEAD state this is restricted to the exit path as exec
continues to use the same task struct.
This allows to simplify that logic in a next step.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.539409004@linutronix.de
Setting task::futex_state in do_exit() is rather arbitrarily placed for no
reason. Move it into the futex code.
Note, this is only done for the exit cleanup as the exec cleanup cannot set
the state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD because the task struct is still in active
use.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.439511191@linutronix.de
To allow separate handling of the futex exit state in the futex exit code
for exit and exec, split futex_mm_release() into two functions and invoke
them from the corresponding exit/exec_mm_release() callsites.
Preparatory only, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.332094221@linutronix.de
mm_release() contains the futex exit handling. mm_release() is called from
do_exit()->exit_mm() and from exec()->exec_mm().
In the exit_mm() case PF_EXITING and the futex state is updated. In the
exec_mm() case these states are not touched.
As the futex exit code needs further protections against exit races, this
needs to be split into two functions.
Preparatory only, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.240518241@linutronix.de
The futex exit handling relies on PF_ flags. That's suboptimal as it
requires a smp_mb() and an ugly lock/unlock of the exiting tasks pi_lock in
the middle of do_exit() to enforce the observability of PF_EXITING in the
futex code.
Add a futex_state member to task_struct and convert the PF_EXITPIDONE logic
over to the new state. The PF_EXITING dependency will be cleaned up in a
later step.
This prepares for handling various futex exit issues later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.149449274@linutronix.de
The futex exit handling is #ifdeffed into mm_release() which is not pretty
to begin with. But upcoming changes to address futex exit races need to add
more functionality to this exit code.
Split it out into a function, move it into futex code and make the various
futex exit functions static.
Preparatory only and no functional change.
Folded build fix from Borislav.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.049705556@linutronix.de
Fix sparse warning:
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:481:5: warning:
symbol 'array_map_mmap' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191119142113.15388-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
The ftrace_graph_stub was created and points to ftrace_stub as a way to
assign the functon graph tracer function pointer to a stub function with a
different prototype than what ftrace_stub has and not trigger the C
verifier. The ftrace_graph_stub was created via the linker script
vmlinux.lds.h. Unfortunately, powerpc already uses the name
ftrace_graph_stub for its internal implementation of the function graph
tracer, and even though powerpc would still build, the change via the linker
script broke function tracer on powerpc from working.
By using the name ftrace_stub_graph, which does not exist anywhere else in
the kernel, this should not be a problem.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573849732.5937.136.camel@lca.pw
Fixes: b83b43ffc6e4 ("fgraph: Fix function type mismatches of ftrace_graph_return using ftrace_stub")
Reorted-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
If a direct ftrace callback is at a location that does not have any other
ftrace helpers attached to it, it is possible to simply just change the
text to call the new caller (if the architecture supports it). But this
requires special architecture code. Currently, modify_ftrace_direct() uses a
trick to add a stub ftrace callback to the location forcing it to call the
ftrace iterator. Then it can change the direct helper to call the new
function in C, and then remove the stub. Removing the stub will have the
location now call the new location that the direct helper is using.
The new helper function does the registering the stub trick, but is a weak
function, allowing an architecture to override it to do something a bit more
direct.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115215125.mbqv7taqnx376yed@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Commit:
5e6c3c7b1ec2 ("perf/aux: Fix tracking of auxiliary trace buffer allocation")
tried to guess the correct combination of arithmetic operations that would
undo the AUX buffer's mlock accounting, and failed, leaking the bottom part
when an allocation needs to be charged partially to both user->locked_vm
and mm->pinned_vm, eventually leaving the user with no locked bonus:
$ perf record -e intel_pt//u -m1,128 uname
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.061 MB perf.data ]
$ perf record -e intel_pt//u -m1,128 uname
Permission error mapping pages.
Consider increasing /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_mlock_kb,
or try again with a smaller value of -m/--mmap_pages.
(current value: 1,128)
Fix this by subtracting both locked and pinned counts when AUX buffer is
unmapped.
Reported-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
update_cfs_rq_load_avg() calls cfs_rq_util_change() every time PELT decays,
which might be inefficient when the cpufreq driver has rate limitation.
When a task is attached on a CPU, we have this call path:
update_load_avg()
update_cfs_rq_load_avg()
cfs_rq_util_change -- > trig frequency update
attach_entity_load_avg()
cfs_rq_util_change -- > trig frequency update
The 1st frequency update will not take into account the utilization of the
newly attached task and the 2nd one might be discarded because of rate
limitation of the cpufreq driver.
update_cfs_rq_load_avg() is only called by update_blocked_averages()
and update_load_avg() so we can move the call to
cfs_rq_util_change/cpufreq_update_util() into these two functions.
It's also interesting to note that update_load_avg() already calls
cfs_rq_util_change() directly for the !SMP case.
This change will also ensure that cpufreq_update_util() is called even
when there is no more CFS rq in the leaf_cfs_rq_list to update, but only
IRQ, RT or DL PELT signals.
[ mingo: Minor updates. ]
Reported-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net>
Tested-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: juri.lelli@redhat.com
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mgorman@suse.de
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: sargun@sargun.me
Cc: srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Cc: xiezhipeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: 039ae8bcf7a5 ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in the load balancing path")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574083279-799-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add comments to describe each state of goup_type and to add some details
about the load balance at NUMA level.
[ Valentin Schneider: Updates to the comments. ]
[ mingo: Other updates to the comments. ]
Reported-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573570243-1903-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The task, for which the scheduler looks for the idlest group of CPUs, must
be discounted from all statistics in order to get a fair comparison
between groups. This includes utilization, load, nr_running and idle_cpus.
Such unfairness can be easily highlighted with the unixbench execl 1 task.
This test continuously call execve() and the scheduler looks for the idlest
group/CPU on which it should place the task. Because the task runs on the
local group/CPU, the latter seems already busy even if there is nothing
else running on it. As a result, the scheduler will always select another
group/CPU than the local one.
This recovers most of the performance regression on my system from the
recent load-balancer rewrite.
[ mingo: Minor cleanups. ]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Tested-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Morten.Rasmussen@arm.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dietmar.eggemann@arm.com
Cc: hdanton@sina.com
Cc: parth@linux.ibm.com
Cc: pauld@redhat.com
Cc: quentin.perret@arm.com
Cc: riel@surriel.com
Cc: srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: valentin.schneider@arm.com
Fixes: 57abff067a08 ("sched/fair: Rework find_idlest_group()")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1571762798-25900-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add ability to memory-map contents of BPF array map. This is extremely useful
for working with BPF global data from userspace programs. It allows to avoid
typical bpf_map_{lookup,update}_elem operations, improving both performance
and usability.
There had to be special considerations for map freezing, to avoid having
writable memory view into a frozen map. To solve this issue, map freezing and
mmap-ing is happening under mutex now:
- if map is already frozen, no writable mapping is allowed;
- if map has writable memory mappings active (accounted in map->writecnt),
map freezing will keep failing with -EBUSY;
- once number of writable memory mappings drops to zero, map freezing can be
performed again.
Only non-per-CPU plain arrays are supported right now. Maps with spinlocks
can't be memory mapped either.
For BPF_F_MMAPABLE array, memory allocation has to be done through vmalloc()
to be mmap()'able. We also need to make sure that array data memory is
page-sized and page-aligned, so we over-allocate memory in such a way that
struct bpf_array is at the end of a single page of memory with array->value
being aligned with the start of the second page. On deallocation we need to
accomodate this memory arrangement to free vmalloc()'ed memory correctly.
One important consideration regarding how memory-mapping subsystem functions.
Memory-mapping subsystem provides few optional callbacks, among them open()
and close(). close() is called for each memory region that is unmapped, so
that users can decrease their reference counters and free up resources, if
necessary. open() is *almost* symmetrical: it's called for each memory region
that is being mapped, **except** the very first one. So bpf_map_mmap does
initial refcnt bump, while open() will do any extra ones after that. Thus
number of close() calls is equal to number of open() calls plus one more.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191117172806.2195367-4-andriin@fb.com
Similarly to bpf_map's refcnt/usercnt, convert bpf_prog's refcnt to atomic64
and remove artificial 32k limit. This allows to make bpf_prog's refcounting
non-failing, simplifying logic of users of bpf_prog_add/bpf_prog_inc.
Validated compilation by running allyesconfig kernel build.
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191117172806.2195367-3-andriin@fb.com
92117d8443bc ("bpf: fix refcnt overflow") turned refcounting of bpf_map into
potentially failing operation, when refcount reaches BPF_MAX_REFCNT limit
(32k). Due to using 32-bit counter, it's possible in practice to overflow
refcounter and make it wrap around to 0, causing erroneous map free, while
there are still references to it, causing use-after-free problems.
But having a failing refcounting operations are problematic in some cases. One
example is mmap() interface. After establishing initial memory-mapping, user
is allowed to arbitrarily map/remap/unmap parts of mapped memory, arbitrarily
splitting it into multiple non-contiguous regions. All this happening without
any control from the users of mmap subsystem. Rather mmap subsystem sends
notifications to original creator of memory mapping through open/close
callbacks, which are optionally specified during initial memory mapping
creation. These callbacks are used to maintain accurate refcount for bpf_map
(see next patch in this series). The problem is that open() callback is not
supposed to fail, because memory-mapped resource is set up and properly
referenced. This is posing a problem for using memory-mapping with BPF maps.
One solution to this is to maintain separate refcount for just memory-mappings
and do single bpf_map_inc/bpf_map_put when it goes from/to zero, respectively.
There are similar use cases in current work on tcp-bpf, necessitating extra
counter as well. This seems like a rather unfortunate and ugly solution that
doesn't scale well to various new use cases.
Another approach to solve this is to use non-failing refcount_t type, which
uses 32-bit counter internally, but, once reaching overflow state at UINT_MAX,
stays there. This utlimately causes memory leak, but prevents use after free.
But given refcounting is not the most performance-critical operation with BPF
maps (it's not used from running BPF program code), we can also just switch to
64-bit counter that can't overflow in practice, potentially disadvantaging
32-bit platforms a tiny bit. This simplifies semantics and allows above
described scenarios to not worry about failing refcount increment operation.
In terms of struct bpf_map size, we are still good and use the same amount of
space:
BEFORE (3 cache lines, 8 bytes of padding at the end):
struct bpf_map {
const struct bpf_map_ops * ops __attribute__((__aligned__(64))); /* 0 8 */
struct bpf_map * inner_map_meta; /* 8 8 */
void * security; /* 16 8 */
enum bpf_map_type map_type; /* 24 4 */
u32 key_size; /* 28 4 */
u32 value_size; /* 32 4 */
u32 max_entries; /* 36 4 */
u32 map_flags; /* 40 4 */
int spin_lock_off; /* 44 4 */
u32 id; /* 48 4 */
int numa_node; /* 52 4 */
u32 btf_key_type_id; /* 56 4 */
u32 btf_value_type_id; /* 60 4 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
struct btf * btf; /* 64 8 */
struct bpf_map_memory memory; /* 72 16 */
bool unpriv_array; /* 88 1 */
bool frozen; /* 89 1 */
/* XXX 38 bytes hole, try to pack */
/* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */
atomic_t refcnt __attribute__((__aligned__(64))); /* 128 4 */
atomic_t usercnt; /* 132 4 */
struct work_struct work; /* 136 32 */
char name[16]; /* 168 16 */
/* size: 192, cachelines: 3, members: 21 */
/* sum members: 146, holes: 1, sum holes: 38 */
/* padding: 8 */
/* forced alignments: 2, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 38 */
} __attribute__((__aligned__(64)));
AFTER (same 3 cache lines, no extra padding now):
struct bpf_map {
const struct bpf_map_ops * ops __attribute__((__aligned__(64))); /* 0 8 */
struct bpf_map * inner_map_meta; /* 8 8 */
void * security; /* 16 8 */
enum bpf_map_type map_type; /* 24 4 */
u32 key_size; /* 28 4 */
u32 value_size; /* 32 4 */
u32 max_entries; /* 36 4 */
u32 map_flags; /* 40 4 */
int spin_lock_off; /* 44 4 */
u32 id; /* 48 4 */
int numa_node; /* 52 4 */
u32 btf_key_type_id; /* 56 4 */
u32 btf_value_type_id; /* 60 4 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
struct btf * btf; /* 64 8 */
struct bpf_map_memory memory; /* 72 16 */
bool unpriv_array; /* 88 1 */
bool frozen; /* 89 1 */
/* XXX 38 bytes hole, try to pack */
/* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */
atomic64_t refcnt __attribute__((__aligned__(64))); /* 128 8 */
atomic64_t usercnt; /* 136 8 */
struct work_struct work; /* 144 32 */
char name[16]; /* 176 16 */
/* size: 192, cachelines: 3, members: 21 */
/* sum members: 154, holes: 1, sum holes: 38 */
/* forced alignments: 2, forced holes: 1, sum forced holes: 38 */
} __attribute__((__aligned__(64)));
This patch, while modifying all users of bpf_map_inc, also cleans up its
interface to match bpf_map_put with separate operations for bpf_map_inc and
bpf_map_inc_with_uref (to match bpf_map_put and bpf_map_put_with_uref,
respectively). Also, given there are no users of bpf_map_inc_not_zero
specifying uref=true, remove uref flag and default to uref=false internally.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191117172806.2195367-2-andriin@fb.com
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-11-15
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 1 non-merge commits during the last 9 day(s) which contain
a total of 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix a missing unlock of bpf_devs_lock in bpf_offload_dev_create()'s
error path, from Dan.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some uclamp helpers had their return type changed from 'unsigned int' to
'enum uclamp_id' by commit
0413d7f33e60 ("sched/uclamp: Always use 'enum uclamp_id' for clamp_id values")
but it happens that some do return a value in the [0, SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE]
range, which should really be unsigned int. The affected helpers are
uclamp_none(), uclamp_rq_max_value() and uclamp_eff_value(). Fix those up.
Note that this doesn't lead to any obj diff using a relatively recent
aarch64 compiler (8.3-2019.03). The current code of e.g. uclamp_eff_value()
properly returns an 11 bit value (bits_per(1024)) and doesn't seem to do
anything funny. I'm still marking this as fixing the above commit to be on
the safe side.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Dietmar.Eggemann@arm.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: patrick.bellasi@matbug.net
Cc: qperret@google.com
Cc: surenb@google.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Fixes: 0413d7f33e60 ("sched/uclamp: Always use 'enum uclamp_id' for clamp_id values")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115103908.27610-1-valentin.schneider@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes: a handful of AUX event handling related fixes, a Sparse
fix and two ABI fixes"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Fix missing static inline on perf_cgroup_switch()
perf/core: Consistently fail fork on allocation failures
perf/aux: Disallow aux_output for kernel events
perf/core: Reattach a misplaced comment
perf/aux: Fix the aux_output group inheritance fix
perf/core: Disallow uncore-cgroup events
On certain QTI chipsets some GPIOs are direct-connect interrupts to the
GIC to be used as regular interrupt lines. When the GPIOs are not used
for interrupt generation the interrupt line is disabled. But disabling
the interrupt at GIC does not prevent the interrupt to be reported as
pending at GIC_ISPEND. Later, when drivers call enable_irq() on the
interrupt, an unwanted interrupt occurs.
Introduce get and set methods for irqchip's parent to clear it's pending
irq state. This then can be invoked by the GPIO interrupt controller on
the parents in it hierarchy to clear the interrupt before enabling the
interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <mkshah@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Lina Iyer <ilina@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573855915-9841-7-git-send-email-ilina@codeaurora.org
[updated commit text and minor code fixes]
The main motivation to add set_tid to clone3() is CRIU.
To restore a process with the same PID/TID CRIU currently uses
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid. It writes the desired (PID - 1) to
ns_last_pid and then (quickly) does a clone(). This works most of the
time, but it is racy. It is also slow as it requires multiple syscalls.
Extending clone3() to support *set_tid makes it possible restore a
process using CRIU without accessing /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid and
race free (as long as the desired PID/TID is available).
This clone3() extension places the same restrictions (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
on clone3() with *set_tid as they are currently in place for ns_last_pid.
The original version of this change was using a single value for
set_tid. At the 2019 LPC, after presenting set_tid, it was, however,
decided to change set_tid to an array to enable setting the PID of a
process in multiple PID namespaces at the same time. If a process is
created in a PID namespace it is possible to influence the PID inside
and outside of the PID namespace. Details also in the corresponding
selftest.
To create a process with the following PIDs:
PID NS level Requested PID
0 (host) 31496
1 42
2 1
For that example the two newly introduced parameters to struct
clone_args (set_tid and set_tid_size) would need to be:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid[2] = 31496;
set_tid_size = 3;
If only the PIDs of the two innermost nested PID namespaces should be
defined it would look like this:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid_size = 2;
The PID of the newly created process would then be the next available
free PID in the PID namespace level 0 (host) and 42 in the PID namespace
at level 1 and the PID of the process in the innermost PID namespace
would be 1.
The set_tid array is used to specify the PID of a process starting
from the innermost nested PID namespaces up to set_tid_size PID namespaces.
set_tid_size cannot be larger then the current PID namespace level.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115123621.142252-1-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Allow FENTRY/FEXIT BPF programs to attach to other BPF programs of any type
including their subprograms. This feature allows snooping on input and output
packets in XDP, TC programs including their return values. In order to do that
the verifier needs to track types not only of vmlinux, but types of other BPF
programs as well. The verifier also needs to translate uapi/linux/bpf.h types
used by networking programs into kernel internal BTF types used by FENTRY/FEXIT
BPF programs. In some cases LLVM optimizations can remove arguments from BPF
subprograms without adjusting BTF info that LLVM backend knows. When BTF info
disagrees with actual types that the verifiers sees the BPF trampoline has to
fallback to conservative and treat all arguments as u64. The FENTRY/FEXIT
program can still attach to such subprograms, but it won't be able to recognize
pointer types like 'struct sk_buff *' and it won't be able to pass them to
bpf_skb_output() for dumping packets to user space. The FENTRY/FEXIT program
would need to use bpf_probe_read_kernel() instead.
The BPF_PROG_LOAD command is extended with attach_prog_fd field. When it's set
to zero the attach_btf_id is one vmlinux BTF type ids. When attach_prog_fd
points to previously loaded BPF program the attach_btf_id is BTF type id of
main function or one of its subprograms.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-18-ast@kernel.org
Make the verifier check that BTF types of function arguments match actual types
passed into top-level BPF program and into BPF-to-BPF calls. If types match
such BPF programs and sub-programs will have full support of BPF trampoline. If
types mismatch the trampoline has to be conservative. It has to save/restore
five program arguments and assume 64-bit scalars.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-17-ast@kernel.org
Annotate BPF program context types with program-side type and kernel-side type.
This type information is used by the verifier. btf_get_prog_ctx_type() is
used in the later patches to verify that BTF type of ctx in BPF program matches to
kernel expected ctx type. For example, the XDP program type is:
BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, xdp, struct xdp_md, struct xdp_buff)
That means that XDP program should be written as:
int xdp_prog(struct xdp_md *ctx) { ... }
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-16-ast@kernel.org
btf_resolve_helper_id() caching logic is a bit racy, since under root the
verifier can verify several programs in parallel. Fix it with READ/WRITE_ONCE.
Fix the type as well, since error is also recorded.
Fixes: a7658e1a4164 ("bpf: Check types of arguments passed into helpers")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-15-ast@kernel.org
Introduce BPF trampoline concept to allow kernel code to call into BPF programs
with practically zero overhead. The trampoline generation logic is
architecture dependent. It's converting native calling convention into BPF
calling convention. BPF ISA is 64-bit (even on 32-bit architectures). The
registers R1 to R5 are used to pass arguments into BPF functions. The main BPF
program accepts only single argument "ctx" in R1. Whereas CPU native calling
convention is different. x86-64 is passing first 6 arguments in registers
and the rest on the stack. x86-32 is passing first 3 arguments in registers.
sparc64 is passing first 6 in registers. And so on.
The trampolines between BPF and kernel already exist. BPF_CALL_x macros in
include/linux/filter.h statically compile trampolines from BPF into kernel
helpers. They convert up to five u64 arguments into kernel C pointers and
integers. On 64-bit architectures this BPF_to_kernel trampolines are nops. On
32-bit architecture they're meaningful.
The opposite job kernel_to_BPF trampolines is done by CAST_TO_U64 macros and
__bpf_trace_##call() shim functions in include/trace/bpf_probe.h. They convert
kernel function arguments into array of u64s that BPF program consumes via
R1=ctx pointer.
This patch set is doing the same job as __bpf_trace_##call() static
trampolines, but dynamically for any kernel function. There are ~22k global
kernel functions that are attachable via nop at function entry. The function
arguments and types are described in BTF. The job of btf_distill_func_proto()
function is to extract useful information from BTF into "function model" that
architecture dependent trampoline generators will use to generate assembly code
to cast kernel function arguments into array of u64s. For example the kernel
function eth_type_trans has two pointers. They will be casted to u64 and stored
into stack of generated trampoline. The pointer to that stack space will be
passed into BPF program in R1. On x86-64 such generated trampoline will consume
16 bytes of stack and two stores of %rdi and %rsi into stack. The verifier will
make sure that only two u64 are accessed read-only by BPF program. The verifier
will also recognize the precise type of the pointers being accessed and will
not allow typecasting of the pointer to a different type within BPF program.
The tracing use case in the datacenter demonstrated that certain key kernel
functions have (like tcp_retransmit_skb) have 2 or more kprobes that are always
active. Other functions have both kprobe and kretprobe. So it is essential to
keep both kernel code and BPF programs executing at maximum speed. Hence
generated BPF trampoline is re-generated every time new program is attached or
detached to maintain maximum performance.
To avoid the high cost of retpoline the attached BPF programs are called
directly. __bpf_prog_enter/exit() are used to support per-program execution
stats. In the future this logic will be optimized further by adding support
for bpf_stats_enabled_key inside generated assembly code. Introduction of
preemptible and sleepable BPF programs will completely remove the need to call
to __bpf_prog_enter/exit().
Detach of a BPF program from the trampoline should not fail. To avoid memory
allocation in detach path the half of the page is used as a reserve and flipped
after each attach/detach. 2k bytes is enough to call 40+ BPF programs directly
which is enough for BPF tracing use cases. This limit can be increased in the
future.
BPF_TRACE_FENTRY programs have access to raw kernel function arguments while
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT programs have access to kernel return value as well. Often
kprobe BPF program remembers function arguments in a map while kretprobe
fetches arguments from a map and analyzes them together with return value.
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT accelerates this typical use case.
Recursion prevention for kprobe BPF programs is done via per-cpu
bpf_prog_active counter. In practice that turned out to be a mistake. It
caused programs to randomly skip execution. The tracing tools missed results
they were looking for. Hence BPF trampoline doesn't provide builtin recursion
prevention. It's a job of BPF program itself and will be addressed in the
follow up patches.
BPF trampoline is intended to be used beyond tracing and fentry/fexit use cases
in the future. For example to remove retpoline cost from XDP programs.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-5-ast@kernel.org
Add bpf_arch_text_poke() helper that is used by BPF trampoline logic to patch
nops/calls in kernel text into calls into BPF trampoline and to patch
calls/nops inside BPF programs too.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-4-ast@kernel.org
Currently passing alignment greater than 4 to bpf_jit_binary_alloc does
not work: in such cases it silently aligns only to 4 bytes.
On s390, in order to load a constant from memory in a large (>512k) BPF
program, one must use lgrl instruction, whose memory operand must be
aligned on an 8-byte boundary.
This patch makes it possible to request 8-byte alignment from
bpf_jit_binary_alloc, and also makes it issue a warning when an
unsupported alignment is requested.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191115123722.58462-1-iii@linux.ibm.com
An additional check has been recently added to ensure that a RCU related lock
is held while the RCU list is iterated.
The `pwqs' are sometimes iterated without a RCU lock but with the &wq->mutex
acquired leading to a warning.
Teach list_for_each_entry_rcu() that the RCU usage is okay if &wq->mutex
is acquired during the list traversal.
Fixes: 28875945ba98d ("rcu: Add support for consolidated-RCU reader checking")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Both unregister_ftrace_direct() and modify_ftrace_direct() needs to
normalize the ip passed in to match the rec->ip, as it is acceptable to have
the ip on the ftrace call site but not the start. There are also common
validity checks with the record found by the ip, these should be done for
both unregister_ftrace_direct() and modify_ftrace_direct().
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
As an instruction pointer passed into register_ftrace_direct() may just
exist on the ftrace call site, but may not be the start of the call site
itself, register_ftrace_direct() still needs to update test if a direct call
exists on the normalized site, as only one direct call is allowed at any one
time.
Fixes: 763e34e74bb7d ("ftrace: Add register_ftrace_direct()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The direct->count wasn't being updated properly, where it only was updated
when the first entry was added, but should be updated every time.
Fixes: 013bf0da04748 ("ftrace: Add ftrace_find_direct_func()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Robust futexes utilize the robust_list mechanism to allow the kernel to
release futexes which are held when a task exits. The exit can be voluntary
or caused by a signal or fault. This prevents that waiters block forever.
The futex operations in user space store a pointer to the futex they are
either locking or unlocking in the op_pending member of the per task robust
list.
After a lock operation has succeeded the futex is queued in the robust list
linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.
After an unlock operation has succeeded the futex is removed from the
robust list linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.
The robust list exit code checks for the pending operation and any futex
which is queued in the linked list. It carefully checks whether the futex
value is the TID of the exiting task. If so, it sets the OWNER_DIED bit and
tries to wake up a potential waiter.
This is race free for the lock operation but unlock has two race scenarios
where waiters might not be woken up. These issues can be observed with
regular robust pthread mutexes. PI aware pthread mutexes are not affected.
(1) Unlocking task is killed after unlocking the futex value in user space
before being able to wake a waiter.
pthread_mutex_unlock()
|
V
atomic_exchange_rel (&mutex->__data.__lock, 0)
<------------------------killed
lll_futex_wake () |
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(enter kernel)
|
V
do_exit()
exit_mm()
mm_release()
exit_robust_list()
handle_futex_death()
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(uval = 0)
|
V
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned by
the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters which in consequence
block infinitely.
(2) Waiting task is killed after a wakeup and before it can acquire the
futex in user space.
OWNER WAITER
futex_wait()
pthread_mutex_unlock() |
| |
|(__lock = 0) |
| |
V |
futex_wake() ------------> wakeup()
|
|(return to userspace)
|(__lock = 0)
|
V
oldval = mutex->__data.__lock
<-----------------killed
atomic_compare_and_exchange_val_acq (&mutex->__data.__lock, |
id | assume_other_futex_waiters, 0) |
|
|
(enter kernel)|
|
V
do_exit()
|
|
V
handle_futex_death()
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(uval = 0)
|
V
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned
by the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters, which seems to
be correct as the exiting task does not own the futex value, but
the consequence is that other waiters wont be woken up and block
infinitely.
In both scenarios the following conditions are true:
- task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
- user space futex value == 0
- Regular futex (not PI)
If these conditions are met then it is reasonably safe to wake up a
potential waiter in order to prevent the above problems.
As this might be a false positive it can cause spurious wakeups, but the
waiter side has to handle other types of unrelated wakeups, e.g. signals
gracefully anyway. So such a spurious wakeup will not affect the
correctness of these operations.
This workaround must not touch the user space futex value and cannot set
the OWNER_DIED bit because the lock value is 0, i.e. uncontended. Setting
OWNER_DIED in this case would result in inconsistent state and subsequently
in malfunction of the owner died handling in user space.
The rest of the user space state is still consistent as no other task can
observe the list_op_pending entry in the exiting tasks robust list.
The eventually woken up waiter will observe the uncontended lock value and
take it over.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog and comment. Made the return explicit and not
depend on the subsequent check and added constants to hand into
handle_futex_death() instead of plain numbers. Fixed a few coding
style issues. ]
Fixes: 0771dfefc9e5 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core")
Signed-off-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573010582-35297-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224555.943191378@linutronix.de
Pull misc vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Assorted fixes all over the place; some of that is -stable fodder,
some regressions from the last window"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_parent is not stable either
ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable
ecryptfs: fix unlink and rmdir in face of underlying fs modifications
audit_get_nd(): don't unlock parent too early
exportfs_decode_fh(): negative pinned may become positive without the parent locked
cgroup: don't put ERR_PTR() into fc->root
autofs: fix a leak in autofs_expire_indirect()
aio: Fix io_pgetevents() struct __compat_aio_sigset layout
fs/namespace.c: fix use-after-free of mount in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry()
