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The "ibm,thread-groups" device-tree property is an array that is used
to indicate if groups of threads within a core share certain
properties. It provides details of which property is being shared by
which groups of threads. This array can encode information about
multiple properties being shared by different thread-groups within the
core.
Example: Suppose,
"ibm,thread-groups" = [1,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15,2,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15]
This can be decomposed up into two consecutive arrays:
a) [1,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15]
b) [2,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15]
where in,
a) provides information of Property "1" being shared by "2" groups,
each with "4" threads each. The "ibm,ppc-interrupt-server#s" of the
first group is {8,10,12,14} and the "ibm,ppc-interrupt-server#s" of
the second group is {9,11,13,15}. Property "1" is indicative of
the thread in the group sharing L1 cache, translation cache and
Instruction Data flow.
b) provides information of Property "2" being shared by "2" groups,
each group with "4" threads. The "ibm,ppc-interrupt-server#s" of
the first group is {8,10,12,14} and the
"ibm,ppc-interrupt-server#s" of the second group is
{9,11,13,15}. Property "2" indicates that the threads in each group
share the L2-cache.
The existing code assumes that the "ibm,thread-groups" encodes
information about only one property. Hence even on platforms which
encode information about multiple properties being shared by the
corresponding groups of threads, the current code will only pick the
first one. (In the above example, it will only consider
[1,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15] but not [2,2,4,8,10,12,14,9,11,13,15]).
This patch extends the parsing support on platforms which encode
information about multiple properties being shared by the
corresponding groups of threads.
Signed-off-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1607596739-32439-2-git-send-email-ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com
POWER10 DD1 has an issue where it generates watchpoint exceptions when
it shouldn't. The conditions where this occur are:
- octword op
- ending address of DAWR range is less than starting address of op
- those addresses need to be in the same or in two consecutive 512B
blocks
- 'op address + 64B' generates an address that has a carry into bit
52 (crosses 2K boundary)
Handle such spurious exception by considering them as extraneous and
emulating/single-steeping instruction without generating an event.
[ravi: Fixed build warning reported by lkp@intel.com]
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106045650.278987-1-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
Idle code no longer uses the .cpu_restore CPU operation to restore
SPRs, so this workaround is no longer required.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190711022404.18132-2-npiggin@gmail.com
This is way to catch some cases of decrementer overflow, when the
decrementer has underflowed an odd number of times, while MSR[EE] was
disabled.
With a typical small decrementer, a timer that fires when MSR[EE] is
disabled will be "lost" if MSR[EE] remains disabled for between 4.3 and
8.6 seconds after the timer expires. In any case, the decrementer
interrupt would be taken at 8.6 seconds and the timer would be found at
that point.
So this check is for catching extreme latency events, and it prevents
those latencies from being a further few seconds long. It's not obvious
this is a good tradeoff. This is already a watchdog magnitude event and
that situation is not improved a significantly with this check. For
large decrementers, it's useless.
Therefore remove this check, which avoids a mftb when enabling hard
disabled interrupts (e.g., when enabling after coming from hardware
interrupt handlers). Perhaps more importantly, it also removes the
clunky MSR[EE] vs PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS incoherency in soft-interrupt replay
which simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201107014336.2337337-1-npiggin@gmail.com
No supported processor implements this mode. Setting the bit in
MSR values can be a bit confusing (and would prevent the bit from
ever being reused). Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106045340.1935841-1-npiggin@gmail.com
Exception fixup doesn't require the heady full regs saving,
do it from do_page_fault() directly.
For that, split bad_page_fault() in two parts.
As bad_page_fault() can also be called from other places than
handle_page_fault(), it will still perform exception fixup and
fallback on __bad_page_fault().
handle_page_fault() directly calls __bad_page_fault() as the
exception fixup will now be done by do_page_fault()
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bd07d6fef9237614cd6d318d8f19faeeadaa816b.1607491748.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
In order to re-enable MMU earlier, ensure ITLB miss exception
cannot clobber SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH0 and SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH1.
Do so by using SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH2 and SPRN_M_TW instead, like
the DTLB miss exception.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/abc78e8e9577d473691ebb9996c6413b37bfd9ca.1606231483.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
There is no big poing in not pinning kernel text anymore, as now
we can keep pinned TLB even with things like DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
Remove CONFIG_PIN_TLB_TEXT, making it always right.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[mpe: Drop ifdef around mmu_pin_tlb() to fix build errors]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/203b89de491e1379f1677a2685211b7c32adfff0.1606231483.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Since commit e611939fc8 ("powerpc/mm: Ensure change_page_attr()
doesn't invalidate pinned TLBs"), pinned TLBs are not anymore
invalidated by __kernel_map_pages() when CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is
selected.
Remove the dependency on CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e796c5fcb5898de827c803cf1ab8ba1d7a5d4b76.1606231483.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
On hash 32 bits, handling minor protection faults like unsetting
dirty flag is heavy if done from the normal page_fault processing,
because it implies hash table software lookup for flushing the entry
and then a DSI is taken anyway to add the entry back.
When KUAP was implemented, as explained in commit a68c31fc01
("powerpc/32s: Implement Kernel Userspace Access Protection"),
protection faults has been diverted from hash_page() because
hash_page() was not able to identify a KUAP fault.
Implement KUAP verification in hash_page(), by clearing write
permission when the access is a kernel access and Ks is 1.
This works regardless of the address because kernel segments always
have Ks set to 0 while user segments have Ks set to 0 only
when kernel write to userspace is granted.
Then protection faults can be handled by hash_page() even for KUAP.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8a4ffe4798e9ea32aaaccdf85e411bb1beed3500.1605542955.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
book3s/32 has two main families:
- CPU with 603 cores that don't have HASH PTE table and
perform SW TLB loading.
- Other CPUs based on 604+ cores that have HASH PTE table.
This leads to some complex logic and additionnal code to
support both. This makes sense for distribution kernels
that aim at running on any CPU, but when you are fine
tuning a kernel for an embedded 603 based board you
don't need all the HASH logic.
Allow selection of support for each family, in order to opt
out unneeded parts of code. At least one must be selected.
Note that some of the CPU supporting HASH also support SW TLB
loading, however it is not supported by Linux kernel at the
time being, because they do not have alternate registers in
the TLB miss exception handlers.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8dde0cdb629a71abc29b0d85a52a86e920376cb6.1603348103.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Commit bd59380c5b ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
introduced the following error when invoking the errinjct userspace
tool:
[root@ltcalpine2-lp5 librtas]# errinjct open
[327884.071171] sys_rtas: RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?
[327884.071186] sys_rtas: token=0x26, nargs=0 (called by errinjct)
errinjct: Could not open RTAS error injection facility
errinjct: librtas: open: Unexpected I/O error
The entry for ibm,open-errinjct in rtas_filter array has a typo where
the "j" is omitted in the rtas call name. After fixing this typo the
errinjct tool functions again as expected.
[root@ltcalpine2-lp5 linux]# errinjct open
RTAS error injection facility open, token = 1
Fixes: bd59380c5b ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208195434.8289-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
rtas_suspend_cpu() no longer has users; remove it and
__rtas_suspend_cpu() which now becomes unused as well.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-22-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
rtas_ibm_suspend_me_unsafe() is now unused; remove it and
rtas_percpu_suspend_me() which becomes unused as a result.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-17-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
sys_rtas() cannot call ibm,suspend-me directly in the same way it
handles other inputs. Instead it must dispatch the request to code
that can first perform the H_JOIN sequence before any call to
ibm,suspend-me can succeed. Over time kernel/rtas.c has accreted a fair
amount of platform-specific code to implement this.
Since a different, more robust implementation of the suspend sequence
is now in the pseries platform code, we want to dispatch the request
there.
Note that invoking ibm,suspend-me via the RTAS syscall is all but
deprecated; this change preserves ABI compatibility for old programs
while providing to them the benefit of the new partition suspend
implementation. This is a behavior change in that the kernel performs
the device tree update and firmware activation before returning, but
experimentation indicates this is tolerated fine by legacy user space.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-16-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Provide a documented wrapper function for the ibm,activate-firmware
service, which must be called after a partition migration or
hibernation.
If the function is absent or the call fails, the OS will continue to
run normally with the current firmware, so there is no need to perform
any recovery. Just log it and continue.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-6-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Now that the name is available, provide a simple wrapper for
ibm,suspend-me which returns both a Linux errno and optionally the
actual RTAS status to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-5-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
The pseries partition suspend sequence requires that all active CPUs
call H_JOIN, which suspends all but one of them with interrupts
disabled. The "chosen" CPU is then to call ibm,suspend-me to complete
the suspend. Upon returning from ibm,suspend-me, the chosen CPU is to
use H_PROD to wake the joined CPUs.
Using on_each_cpu() for this, as rtas_ibm_suspend_me() does to
implement partition migration, is susceptible to deadlock with other
users of on_each_cpu() and with users of stop_machine APIs. The
callback passed to on_each_cpu() is not allowed to synchronize with
other CPUs in the way it is used here.
Complicating the fix is the fact that rtas_ibm_suspend_me() also
occupies the function name that should be used to provide a more
conventional wrapper for ibm,suspend-me. Rename rtas_ibm_suspend_me()
to rtas_ibm_suspend_me_unsafe() to free up the name and indicate that
it should not gain users.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-4-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
While drmgr has had work in some areas to make its RTAS syscall
interactions endian-neutral, its code for performing partition
migration via the syscall has never worked on LE. While it is able to
complete ibm,suspend-me successfully, it crashes when attempting the
subsequent ibm,update-nodes call.
drmgr is the only known (or plausible) user of ibm,suspend-me,
ibm,update-nodes, and ibm,update-properties, so allow them only in
big-endian configurations.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
There is no defconfig selecting CONFIG_E200, and no platform.
e200 is an earlier version of booke, a predecessor of e500,
with some particularities like an unified cache instead of both an
instruction cache and a data cache.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Acked-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/34ebc3ba2c768d97f363bd5f2deea2356e9ae127.1605589460.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
When a passthrough IO adapter is removed from a pseries machine using hash
MMU and the XIVE interrupt mode, the POWER hypervisor expects the guest OS
to clear all page table entries related to the adapter. If some are still
present, the RTAS call which isolates the PCI slot returns error 9001
"valid outstanding translations" and the removal of the IO adapter fails.
This is because when the PHBs are scanned, Linux maps automatically the
INTx interrupts in the Linux interrupt number space but these are never
removed.
This problem can be fixed by adding the corresponding unmap operation when
the device is removed. There's no pcibios_* hook for the remove case, but
the same effect can be achieved using a bus notifier.
Because INTx are shared among PHBs (and potentially across the system),
this adds tracking of virq to unmap them only when the last user is gone.
[aik: added refcounter]
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Tested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202005222.5477-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
As stated in platform/44x/Kconfig, CONFIG_PPC_47x is not
compatible with 440 and 460 variants.
This is confirmed in asm/cache.h as L1_CACHE_SHIFT is different
for 47x, meaning a kernel built for 47x will not run correctly
on a 440.
In cputable, opt out all 440 and 460 variants when CONFIG_PPC_47x
is set. Also add a default match dedicated to 470.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/822833ce3dc10634339818f7d1ab616edf63b0c6.1603041883.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Use SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH2 as an alternative scratch register in
the early part of DSI prolog in order to avoid clobbering
SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH0/1 used by other prologs.
The 603 doesn't like a jump from DataLoadTLBMiss to the 10 nops
that are now in the beginning of DSI exception as a result of
the feature section. To workaround this, add a jump as alternative.
It also avoids fetching 10 nops for nothing.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f9f8df2a2be93568768ef1ac793639f7914cf103.1606285014.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
On the 603, SDR1 is not used.
In order to free SPRN_SPRG2, use SPRN_SDR1 to store the pgdir
phys addr.
But only some bits of SDR1 can be used (0xffff01ff).
As the pgdir is 4k aligned, rotate it by 4 bits to the left.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7370574b49d8476878ce5480726197993cb76108.1606285014.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Since commit 2b279c0348 ("powerpc/32s: Allow mapping with BATs with
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC"), there is no real situation where mapping without
BATs is required.
In order to simplify memory handling, always map kernel text
and rodata with BATs even when "nobats" kernel parameter is set.
Also fix the 603 TLB miss exceptions that don't require anymore
kernel page table if DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/da51f7ec632825a4ce43290a904aad61648408c0.1606285013.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
PowerISA v3.1 introduces new control bit (PMCCEXT) for restricting
access to group B PMU registers in problem state when
MMCR0 PMCC=0b00. In problem state and when MMCR0 PMCC=0b00,
setting the Monitor Mode Control Register bit 54 (MMCR0 PMCCEXT),
will restrict read permission on Group B Performance Monitor
Registers (SIER, SIAR, SDAR and MMCR1). When this bit is set to zero,
group B registers will be readable. In other platforms (like power9),
the older behaviour is retained where group B PMU SPRs are readable.
Patch adds support for MMCR0 PMCCEXT bit in power10 by enabling
this bit during boot and during the PMU event enable/disable callback
functions.
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1606409684-1589-8-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
If FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP is disabled, kernel will continue to run with the same AMR
value with which it was entered. Hence there is a high chance that
we can return without restoring the AMR value. This also helps the case
when applications are not using the pkey feature. In this case, different
applications will have the same AMR values and hence we can avoid restoring
AMR in this case too.
Also avoid isync() if not really needed.
Do the same for IAMR.
null-syscall benchmark results:
With smap/smep disabled:
Without patch:
957.95 ns 2778.17 cycles
With patch:
858.38 ns 2489.30 cycles
With smap/smep enabled:
Without patch:
1017.26 ns 2950.36 cycles
With patch:
1021.51 ns 2962.44 cycles
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-23-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Now that kernel correctly store/restore userspace AMR/IAMR values, avoid
manipulating AMR and IAMR from the kernel on behalf of userspace.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-15-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
On fork, we inherit from the parent and on exec, we should switch to default_amr values.
Also, avoid changing the AMR register value within the kernel. The kernel now runs with
different AMR values.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-13-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Child thread.kuap value is inherited from the parent in copy_thread_tls. We still
need to make sure when the child returns from a fork in the kernel we start with the kernel
default AMR value.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-12-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
This prepare kernel to operate with a different value than userspace AMR/IAMR.
For this, AMR/IAMR need to be saved and restored on entry and return from the
kernel.
With KUAP we modify kernel AMR when accessing user address from the kernel
via copy_to/from_user interfaces. We don't need to modify IAMR value in
similar fashion.
If MMU_FTR_PKEY is enabled we need to save AMR/IAMR in pt_regs on entering
kernel from userspace. If not we can assume that AMR/IAMR is not modified
from userspace.
We need to save AMR if we have MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUAP feature enabled and we are
interrupted within kernel. This is required so that if we get interrupted
within copy_to/from_user we continue with the right AMR value.
If we hae MMU_FTR_BOOK3S_KUEP enabled we need to restore IAMR on
return to userspace beause kernel will be running with a different
IAMR value.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-11-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
In later patches during exec, we would like to access default regs.amr to
control access to the user mapping. Having thread.regs set early makes the
code changes simpler.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-10-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
The config CONFIG_PPC_PKEY is used to select the base support that is
required for PPC_MEM_KEYS, KUAP, and KUEP. Adding this dependency
reduces the code complexity(in terms of #ifdefs) and enables us to
move some of the initialization code to pkeys.c
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127044424.40686-4-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
"Host" caused machine check is printed when the kernel sees a MCE
hit in this kernel or userspace, and "Guest" if it hit one of its
guests. This is confusing when a guest kernel handles a hypervisor-
delivered MCE, it also prints "Host".
Just remove "Host". "Guest" is adequate to make the distinction.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-8-npiggin@gmail.com
Don't treat ERAT MCEs as SLB, don't save the SLB and use a specific
ERAT flush to recover it.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-7-npiggin@gmail.com
KVM has strategies to perform machine check recovery. If a MCE hits
in a guest, have the low level handler just decode and save the MCE
but not try to recover anything, so KVM can deal with it.
The host does not own SLBs and does not need to report the SLB state
in case of a multi-hit for example, or know about the virtual memory
map of the guest.
UE and memory poisoning of guest pages in the host is one thing that
is possibly not completely robust at the moment, but this too needs
to go via KVM (possibly via the guest and back out to host via hcall)
rather than being handled at a low level in the host handler.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-3-npiggin@gmail.com
