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Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
We got slightly different patches removing a double word
in a comment in net/ipv4/raw.c - picked the version from net.
Simple conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c. Use cached
values instead of VNIC login response buffer (following what
commit 507ebe6444a4 ("ibmvnic: Fix use-after-free of VNIC login
response buffer") did).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.
For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.
An example rule specifying this option is:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c
The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.
The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:
1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.
2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
crash the kernel.
Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.
In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:
1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".
2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
"keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().
Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2c5 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Remove the security_policydb_len() calls from sel_open_policy() and
instead update the inode size from the size returned from
security_read_policy().
Since after this change security_policydb_len() is only called from
security_load_policy(), remove it entirely and just open-code it there.
Also, since security_load_policy() is always called with policy_mutex
held, make it dereference the policy pointer directly and drop the
unnecessary RCU locking.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions. This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are a few bugs in the error handling for security_load_policy().
1) If the newpolicy->sidtab allocation fails then it leads to a NULL
dereference. Also the error code was not set to -ENOMEM on that
path.
2) If policydb_read() failed then we call policydb_destroy() twice
which meands we call kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]) twice.
3) If policydb_load_isids() failed then we call sidtab_destroy() twice
and that results in a double free in the sidtab_destroy_tree()
function because entry.ptr_inner and entry.ptr_leaf are not set to
NULL.
One thing that makes this code nice to deal with is that none of the
functions return partially allocated data. In other words, the
policydb_read() either allocates everything successfully or it frees
all the data it allocates. It never returns a mix of allocated and
not allocated data.
I re-wrote this to only free the successfully allocated data which
avoids the double frees. I also re-ordered selinux_policy_free() so
it's in the reverse order of the allocation function.
Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[PM: partially merged by hand due to merge fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets, add local storage for inodes.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the inode.
i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning inode.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in the
security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other LSMs.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU. This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.
At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi->mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.
Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Drop a repeated word in comments.
{open, is, then}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
[PM: fix subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds further attributes to the event. These attributes are
helpful to understand the context of the message and can be used
to filter the events.
There are three common items. Source context, target context and tclass.
There are also items from the outcome of operation performed.
An event is similar to:
<...>-1309 [002] .... 6346.691689: selinux_audited:
requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
result=-13
scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
With systems where many denials are occurring, it is useful to apply a
filter. The filtering is a set of logic that is inserted with
the filter file. Example:
echo "tclass==\"file\" " > events/avc/selinux_audited/filter
This adds that we only get tclass=file.
The trace can also have extra properties. Adding the user stack
can be done with
echo 1 > options/userstacktrace
Now the output will be
runcon-1365 [003] .... 6960.955530: selinux_audited:
requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
result=-13
scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
runcon-1365 [003] .... 6960.955560: <user stack trace>
=> <00007f325b4ce45b>
=> <00005607093efa57>
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The audit data currently captures which process and which target
is responsible for a denial. There is no data on where exactly in the
process that call occurred. Debugging can be made easier by being able to
reconstruct the unified kernel and userland stack traces [1]. Add a
tracepoint on the SELinux denials which can then be used by userland
(i.e. perf).
Although this patch could manually be added by each OS developer to
trouble shoot a denial, adding it to the kernel streamlines the
developers workflow.
It is possible to use perf for monitoring the event:
# perf record -e avc:selinux_audited -g -a
^C
# perf report -g
[...]
6.40% 6.40% audited=800000 tclass=4
|
__libc_start_main
|
|--4.60%--__GI___ioctl
| entry_SYSCALL_64
| do_syscall_64
| __x64_sys_ioctl
| ksys_ioctl
| binder_ioctl
| binder_set_nice
| can_nice
| capable
| security_capable
| cred_has_capability.isra.0
| slow_avc_audit
| common_lsm_audit
| avc_audit_post_callback
| avc_audit_post_callback
|
It is also possible to use the ftrace interface:
# echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/avc/selinux_audited/enable
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
tracer: nop
entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 1/1 #P:8
[...]
dmesg-3624 [001] 13072.325358: selinux_denied: audited=800000 tclass=4
The tclass value can be mapped to a class by searching
security/selinux/flask.h. The audited value is a bit field of the
permissions described in security/selinux/av_permissions.h for the
corresponding class.
[1] https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/native_stack_dump
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Suggested-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In order to avoid concurrency issues around selinuxfs resource availability
during policy load, we first create new directories out of tree for
reloaded resources, then swap them in, and finally delete the old versions.
This fix focuses on concurrency in each of the two subtrees swapped, and
not concurrency between the trees. This means that it is still possible
that subsequent reads to eg the booleans directory and the class directory
during a policy load could see the old state for one and the new for the other.
The problem of ensuring that policy loads are fully atomic from the perspective
of userspace is larger than what is dealt with here. This commit focuses on
ensuring that the directories contents always match either the new or the old
policy state from the perspective of userspace.
In the previous implementation, on policy load /sys/fs/selinux is updated
by deleting the previous contents of
/sys/fs/selinux/{class,booleans} and then recreating them. This means
that there is a period of time when the contents of these directories do not
exist which can cause race conditions as userspace relies on them for
information about the policy. In addition, it means that error recovery in
the event of failure is challenging.
In order to demonstrate the race condition that this series fixes, you
can use the following commands:
while true; do cat /sys/fs/selinux/class/service/perms/status
>/dev/null; done &
while true; do load_policy; done;
In the existing code, this will display errors fairly often as the class
lookup fails. (In normal operation from systemd, this would result in a
permission check which would be allowed or denied based on policy settings
around unknown object classes.) After applying this patch series you
should expect to no longer see such error messages.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Switch class and policy_capabilities directory names to be referred to with
global constants, consistent with booleans directory name. This will allow
for easy consistency of naming in future development.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Make sel_make_bools and sel_make_classes take the specific elements of
selinux_fs_info that they need rather than the entire struct.
This will allow a future patch to pass temporary elements that are not in
the selinux_fs_info struct to these functions so that the original elements
can be preserved until we are ready to perform the switch over.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Separating the cleanup from the creation will simplify two things in
future patches in this series. First, the creation can be made generic,
to create directories not tied to the selinux_fs_info structure. Second,
we will ultimately want to reorder creation and deletion so that the
deletions aren't performed until the new directory structures have already
been moved into place.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently SELinux denies attempts to remove the security.selinux xattr
always, even when permissive or no policy is loaded. This was originally
motivated by the view that all files should be labeled, even if that label
is unlabeled_t, and we shouldn't permit files that were once labeled to
have their labels removed entirely. This however prevents removing
SELinux xattrs in the case where one "disables" SELinux by not loading
a policy (e.g. a system where runtime disable is removed and selinux=0
was not specified). Allow removing the xattr before SELinux is
initialized. We could conceivably permit it even after initialization
if permissive, or introduce a separate permission check here.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
exceptions may be traversed using list_for_each_entry_rcu()
outside of an RCU read side critical section BUT under the
protection of decgroup_mutex. Hence add the corresponding
lockdep expression to fix the following false-positive
warning:
[ 2.304417] =============================
[ 2.304418] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 2.304420] 5.5.4-stable #17 Tainted: G E
[ 2.304422] -----------------------------
[ 2.304424] security/device_cgroup.c:355 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci
Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
CC: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Certain SELinux security server functions (e.g. security_port_sid,
called during bind) were not explicitly testing to see if SELinux
has been initialized (i.e. initial policy loaded) and handling
the no-policy-loaded case. In the past this happened to work
because the policydb was statically allocated and could always
be accessed, but with the recent encapsulation of policy state
and conversion to dynamic allocation, we can no longer access
the policy state prior to initialization. Add a test of
!selinux_initialized(state) to all of the exported functions that
were missing them and handle appropriately.
Fixes: 461698026ffa ("selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocation check of newpolicy->sidtab is null checking if
newpolicy is null and not newpolicy->sidtab. Fix this.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Logically dead code")
Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Refactor the logic for changing SELinux policy booleans in a similar
manner to the refactoring of policy load, thereby reducing the
size of the critical section when the policy write-lock is held
and making it easier to convert the policy rwlock to RCU in the
future. Instead of directly modifying the policydb in place, modify
a copy and then swap it into place through a single pointer update.
Only fully copy the portions of the policydb that are affected by
boolean changes to avoid the full cost of a deep policydb copy.
Introduce another level of indirection for the sidtab since changing
booleans does not require updating the sidtab, unlike policy load.
While we are here, create a common helper for notifying
other kernel components and userspace of a policy change and call it
from both security_set_bools() and selinux_policy_commit().
Based on an old (2004) patch by Kaigai Kohei [1] to convert the policy
rwlock to RCU that was deferred at the time since it did not
significantly improve performance and introduced complexity. Peter
Enderborg later submitted a patch series to convert to RCU [2] that
would have made changing booleans a much more expensive operation
by requiring a full policydb_write();policydb_read(); sequence to
deep copy the entire policydb and also had concerns regarding
atomic allocations.
This change is now simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate
policy state in the selinux_policy struct and to refactor
policy load. After this change, the last major obstacle to
converting the policy rwlock to RCU is likely the sidtab live
convert support.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With the refactoring of the policy load logic in the security
server from the previous change, it is now possible to split out
the committing of the new policy from security_load_policy() and
perform it only after successful updating of selinuxfs. Change
security_load_policy() to return the newly populated policy
data structures to the caller, export selinux_policy_commit()
for external callers, and introduce selinux_policy_cancel() to
provide a way to cancel the policy load in the event of an error
during updating of the selinuxfs directory tree. Further, rework
the interfaces used by selinuxfs to get information from the policy
when creating the new directory tree to take and act upon the
new policy data structure rather than the current/active policy.
Update selinuxfs to use these updated and new interfaces. While
we are here, stop re-creating the policy_capabilities directory
on each policy load since it does not depend on the policy, and
stop trying to create the booleans and classes directories during
the initial creation of selinuxfs since no information is available
until first policy load.
After this change, a failure while updating the booleans and class
directories will cause the entire policy load to be canceled, leaving
the original policy intact, and policy load notifications to userspace
will only happen after a successful completion of updating those
directories. This does not (yet) provide full atomicity with respect
to the updating of the directory trees themselves.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Encapsulate the policy state in its own structure (struct
selinux_policy) that is separately allocated but referenced from the
selinux_ss structure. The policy state includes the SID table
(particularly the context structures), the policy database, and the
mapping between the kernel classes/permissions and the policy values.
Refactor the security server portion of the policy load logic to
cleanly separate loading of the new structures from committing the new
policy. Unify the initial policy load and reload code paths as much
as possible, avoiding duplicated code. Make sure we are taking the
policy read-lock prior to any dereferencing of the policy. Move the
copying of the policy capability booleans into the state structure
outside of the policy write-lock because they are separate from the
policy and are read outside of any policy lock; possibly they should
be using at least READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE or smp_load_acquire/store_release.
These changes simplify the policy loading logic, reduce the size of
the critical section while holding the policy write-lock, and should
facilitate future changes to e.g. refactor the entire policy reload
logic including the selinuxfs code to make the updating of the policy
and the selinuxfs directory tree atomic and/or to convert the policy
read-write lock to RCU.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Presently mdp does not enable any SELinux policy capabilities
in the dummy policy it generates. Thus, policies derived from
it will by default lack various features commonly used in modern
policies such as open permission, extended socket classes, network
peer controls, etc. Split the policy capability definitions out into
their own headers so that we can include them into mdp without pulling in
other kernel headers and extend mdp generate policycap statements for the
policy capabilities known to the kernel. Policy authors may wish to
selectively remove some of these from the generated policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
- most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction,
mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util,
memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap),
- various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops,
checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump,
exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc).
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (164 commits)
mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings
mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting
mm/x86: use general page fault accounting
mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting
mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting
mm/sh: use general page fault accounting
mm/s390: use general page fault accounting
mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting
mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting
mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting
mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting
mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting
mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting
mm/mips: use general page fault accounting
mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting
mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting
mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting
mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting
mm/csky: use general page fault accounting
...
After the cleanup of page fault accounting, gup does not need to pass
task_struct around any more. Remove that parameter in the whole gup
stack.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200707225021.200906-26-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"
* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"
* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
integrity: Add errno field in audit message
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Minor fixes to Smack for the v5.9 release.
All were found by automated checkers and have straightforward
resolution"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds
Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
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Merge tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
"This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.
Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).
Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:
- The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
VM to significantly decrease the startup time.
- In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
CRIU.
- Container migration as a non-root user.
In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).
To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
"Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
unprivileged users to restore processes.
To make this possible the following permissions are altered:
- Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.
In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
to illustrate this fact.
The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.
With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
possible and has already been tested by various users"
[1] LPC 2018
1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
LPC 2019
1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s
[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155
[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed
because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into
exec and cleaning up what I can.
This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different
implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning
the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the
interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize
and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of
changes this cycle.
- Implement kernel_execve
- Make the user mode driver code a better citizen
With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of
parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is
now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play
games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of
Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more
difficult"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
exec: Implement kernel_execve
exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages
exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common
exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm
exec: Factor out alloc_bprm
exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h
umd: Stop using split_argv
umd: Remove exit_umh
bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid
exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll
umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid
bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data
exec: Remove do_execve_file
umh: Stop calling do_execve_file
umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver
umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name
umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info
umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support
umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file.
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Aside from some smaller bug fixes, here are the highlights:
- add a new backlog wait metric to the audit status message, this is
intended to help admins determine how long processes have been
waiting for the audit backlog queue to clear
- generate audit records for nftables configuration changes
- generate CWD audit records for for the relevant LSM audit records"
* tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply
audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
audit: use the proper gfp flags in the audit_log_nfcfg() calls
audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs
audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg
audit: log nftables configuration change events
audit: Use struct_size() helper in alloc_chunk
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Beyond the usual smattering of bug fixes, we've got three small
improvements worth highlighting:
- improved SELinux policy symbol table performance due to a reworking
of the insert and search functions
- allow reading of SELinux labels before the policy is loaded,
allowing for some more "exotic" initramfs approaches
- improved checking an error reporting about process
class/permissions during SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: complete the inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: prepare for inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: specialize symtab insert and search functions
selinux: Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
selinux: fixed a checkpatch warning with the sizeof macro
selinux: log error messages on required process class / permissions
scripts/selinux/mdp: fix initial SID handling
selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
- Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)
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Merge tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull automatic variable initialization updates from Kees Cook:
"This adds the "zero" init option from Clang, which is being used
widely in production builds of Android and Chrome OS (though it also
keeps the "pattern" init, which is better for debug builds).
- Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)"
* tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
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Merge tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull core block updates from Jens Axboe:
"Good amount of cleanups and tech debt removals in here, and as a
result, the diffstat shows a nice net reduction in code.
- Softirq completion cleanups (Christoph)
- Stop using ->queuedata (Christoph)
- Cleanup bd claiming (Christoph)
- Use check_events, moving away from the legacy media change
(Christoph)
- Use inode i_blkbits consistently (Christoph)
- Remove old unused writeback congestion bits (Christoph)
- Cleanup/unify submission path (Christoph)
- Use bio_uninit consistently, instead of bio_disassociate_blkg
(Christoph)
- sbitmap cleared bits handling (John)
- Request merging blktrace event addition (Jan)
- sysfs add/remove race fixes (Luis)
- blk-mq tag fixes/optimizations (Ming)
- Duplicate words in comments (Randy)
- Flush deferral cleanup (Yufen)
- IO context locking/retry fixes (John)
- struct_size() usage (Gustavo)
- blk-iocost fixes (Chengming)
- blk-cgroup IO stats fixes (Boris)
- Various little fixes"
* tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (135 commits)
block: blk-timeout: delete duplicated word
block: blk-mq-sched: delete duplicated word
block: blk-mq: delete duplicated word
block: genhd: delete duplicated words
block: elevator: delete duplicated word and fix typos
block: bio: delete duplicated words
block: bfq-iosched: fix duplicated word
iocost_monitor: start from the oldest usage index
iocost: Fix check condition of iocg abs_vdebt
block: Remove callback typedefs for blk_mq_ops
block: Use non _rcu version of list functions for tag_set_list
blk-cgroup: show global disk stats in root cgroup io.stat
blk-cgroup: make iostat functions visible to stat printing
block: improve discard bio alignment in __blkdev_issue_discard()
block: change REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET and REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL to be odd numbers
block: defer flush request no matter whether we have elevator
block: make blk_timeout_init() static
block: remove retry loop in ioc_release_fn()
block: remove unnecessary ioc nested locking
block: integrate bd_start_claiming into __blkdev_get
...
The variable ret is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.
Fixes: eb5798f2e28f ("integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".
Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
audit_log_string() was inteded to be an internal audit function and
since there are only two internal uses, remove them. Purge all external
uses of it by restructuring code to use an existing audit_log_format()
or using audit_log_format().
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/84
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
