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For each inode in the IMA policy, an iint is allocated. To support
larger hash digests, the iint digest size changed from 20 bytes to
the maximum supported hash digest size. Instead of allocating the
maximum size, which most likely is not needed, this patch dynamically
allocates the needed hash storage.
Changelog:
- fix krealloc bug
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
For possibility to use xattr type for new signature formats,
pass full xattr to the signature verification function.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
All files on the filesystem, currently, are hashed using the same hash
algorithm. In preparation for files from different packages being
signed using different hash algorithms, this patch adds support for
reading the signature hash algorithm from the 'security.ima' extended
attribute and calculates the appropriate file data hash based on it.
Changelog:
- fix scripts Lindent and checkpatch msgs - Mimi
- fix md5 support for older version, which occupied 20 bytes in the
xattr, not the expected 16 bytes. Fix the comparison to compare
only the first 16 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In preparation of supporting more hash algorithms with larger hash sizes
needed for signature verification, this patch replaces the 20 byte sized
digest, with a more flexible structure. The new structure includes the
hash algorithm, digest size, and digest.
Changelog:
- recalculate filedata hash for the measurement list, if the signature
hash digest size is greater than 20 bytes.
- use generic HASH_ALGO_
- make ima_calc_file_hash static
- scripts lindent and checkpatch fixes
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to
security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit'
boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig
help text to reflect the actual code.
Changelog:
- Fixed ifdef inclusion of integrity_audit_msg() (Fengguang Wu)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.
Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.
While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.
Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done
using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
With the new IMA policy 'appraise_type=' option, different hooks
can require different methods for appraising a file's integrity.
For example, the existing 'ima_appraise_tcb' policy defines a
generic rule, requiring all root files to be appraised, without
specfying the appraisal method. A more specific rule could require
all kernel modules, for example, to be signed.
appraise fowner=0 func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
appraise fowner=0
As a result, the integrity appraisal results for the same inode, but
for different hooks, could differ. This patch caches the integrity
appraisal results on a per hook basis.
Changelog v2:
- Rename ima_cache_status() to ima_set_cache_status()
- Rename and move get_appraise_status() to ima_get_cache_status()
Changelog v0:
- include IMA_APPRAISE/APPRAISED_SUBMASK in IMA_DO/DONE_MASK (Dmitry)
- Support independent MODULE_CHECK appraise status.
- fixed IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE/APPRAISED flags
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
In preparation for hook specific appraise status results, increase
the iint flags size.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch reduces size of the iint structure by 8 bytes.
It saves about 15% of iint cache memory.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA audit hashes patches introduced new IMA flags and required
space went beyond 8 bits. Currently the only flag is IMA_DIGSIG.
This patch use 16 bit short instead of 8 bit char.
Without this fix IMA signature will be replaced with hash, which
should not happen.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This adds an 'audit' policy action which audit logs file measurements.
Changelog v6:
- use new action flag handling (Dmitry Kasatkin).
- removed whitespace (Mimi)
Changelog v5:
- use audit_log_untrustedstring.
Changelog v4:
- cleanup digest -> hash conversion.
- use filename rather than d_path in ima_audit_measurement.
Changelog v3:
- Use newly exported audit_log_task_info for logging pid/ppid/uid/etc.
- Update the ima_policy ABI documentation.
Changelog v2:
- Use 'audit' action rather than 'measure_and_audit' to permit
auditing in the absence of measuring..
Changelog v1:
- Initial posting.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Make the IMA action flag handling generic in order to support
additional new actions, without requiring changes to the base
implementation. New actions, like audit logging, will only
need to modify the define statements.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch adds support for digital signature based integrity appraisal.
With this patch, 'security.ima' contains either the file data hash or
a digital signature of the file data hash. The file data hash provides
the security attribute of file integrity. In addition to file integrity,
a digital signature provides the security attribute of authenticity.
Unlike EVM, when the file metadata changes, the digital signature is
replaced with an HMAC, modification of the file data does not cause the
'security.ima' digital signature to be replaced with a hash. As a
result, after any modification, subsequent file integrity appraisals
would fail.
Although digitally signed files can be modified, but by not updating
'security.ima' to reflect these modifications, in essence digitally
signed files could be considered 'immutable'.
IMA uses a different keyring than EVM. While the EVM keyring should not
be updated after initialization and locked, the IMA keyring should allow
updating or adding new keys when upgrading or installing packages.
Changelog v4:
- Change IMA_DIGSIG to hex equivalent
Changelog v3:
- Permit files without any 'security.ima' xattr to be labeled properly.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA-appraisal currently verifies the integrity of a file based on a
known 'good' measurement value. This patch reserves the first byte
of 'security.ima' as a place holder for the type of method used for
verifying file data integrity.
Changelog v1:
- Use the newly defined 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Similar to SIGNATURE, rename INTEGRITY_DIGSIG to INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima,
and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also
allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys.
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only
added from initramfs.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
We will use digital signatures in addtion to hmac.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security
xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We
anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.
This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for
the type of method.
Changelog v6:
- move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h
- defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data
(based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- removed unnecessary memset
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation
Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names
Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
(Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
