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[ Upstream commit 84a53580c5d2138c7361c7c3eea5b31827e63b35 ]
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:
Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
#0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
#1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
#2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'
The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.
Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com>
Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret)
Fixes: 4f4853dc1c9c1 ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3261400639463a853ba2b3be8bd009c2a8089775 ]
We got a recent syzbot report [1] showing a possible misuse
of pfmemalloc page status in TCP zerocopy paths.
Indeed, for pages coming from user space or other layers,
using page_is_pfmemalloc() is moot, and possibly could give
false positives.
There has been attempts to make page_is_pfmemalloc() more robust,
but not using it in the first place in this context is probably better,
removing cpu cycles.
Note to stable teams :
You need to backport 84ce071e38a6 ("net: introduce
__skb_fill_page_desc_noacc") as a prereq.
Race is more probable after commit c07aea3ef4d4
("mm: add a signature in struct page") because page_is_pfmemalloc()
is now using low order bit from page->lru.next, which can change
more often than page->index.
Low order bit should never be set for lru.next (when used as an anchor
in LRU list), so KCSAN report is mostly a false positive.
Backporting to older kernel versions seems not necessary.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in lru_add_fn / tcp_build_frag
write to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18600 on cpu 0:
__list_add include/linux/list.h:73 [inline]
list_add include/linux/list.h:88 [inline]
lruvec_add_folio include/linux/mm_inline.h:105 [inline]
lru_add_fn+0x440/0x520 mm/swap.c:228
folio_batch_move_lru+0x1e1/0x2a0 mm/swap.c:246
folio_batch_add_and_move mm/swap.c:263 [inline]
folio_add_lru+0xf1/0x140 mm/swap.c:490
filemap_add_folio+0xf8/0x150 mm/filemap.c:948
__filemap_get_folio+0x510/0x6d0 mm/filemap.c:1981
pagecache_get_page+0x26/0x190 mm/folio-compat.c:104
grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x2a/0x30 mm/folio-compat.c:116
ext4_da_write_begin+0x2dd/0x5f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2988
generic_perform_write+0x1d4/0x3f0 mm/filemap.c:3738
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x235/0x3e0 fs/ext4/file.c:270
ext4_file_write_iter+0x2e3/0x1210
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2187 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x468/0x760 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:631
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:643 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:640 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x3e/0x50 fs/read_write.c:640
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffffea0004a1d2c8 of 8 bytes by task 18611 on cpu 1:
page_is_pfmemalloc include/linux/mm.h:1740 [inline]
__skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2422 [inline]
skb_fill_page_desc include/linux/skbuff.h:2443 [inline]
tcp_build_frag+0x613/0xb20 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1018
do_tcp_sendpages+0x3e8/0xaf0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1075
tcp_sendpage_locked net/ipv4/tcp.c:1140 [inline]
tcp_sendpage+0x89/0xb0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1150
inet_sendpage+0x7f/0xc0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:833
kernel_sendpage+0x184/0x300 net/socket.c:3561
sock_sendpage+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1054
pipe_to_sendpage+0x128/0x160 fs/splice.c:361
splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:415 [inline]
__splice_from_pipe+0x222/0x4d0 fs/splice.c:559
splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:594 [inline]
generic_splice_sendpage+0x89/0xc0 fs/splice.c:743
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x80/0xa0 fs/splice.c:931
splice_direct_to_actor+0x305/0x620 fs/splice.c:886
do_splice_direct+0xfb/0x180 fs/splice.c:974
do_sendfile+0x3bf/0x910 fs/read_write.c:1249
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1317 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1303 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x10c/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1303
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffffea0004a1d288
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 18611 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2-syzkaller-00248-ge022620b5d05-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/22/2022
Fixes: c07aea3ef4d4 ("mm: add a signature in struct page")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e2b224abd9bf45dcb55750479fc35970725a430b ]
There is a shift wrapping bug in this code so anything thing above
31 will return false.
Fixes: 35c55c9877f8 ("tipc: add neighbor monitoring framework")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9efd23297cca530bb35e1848665805d3fcdd7889 ]
The sch_sfb enqueue() routine assumes the skb is still alive after it has
been enqueued into a child qdisc, using the data in the skb cb field in the
increment_qlen() routine after enqueue. However, the skb may in fact have
been freed, causing a use-after-free in this case. In particular, this
happens if sch_cake is used as a child of sfb, and the GSO splitting mode
of CAKE is enabled (in which case the skb will be split into segments and
the original skb freed).
Fix this by copying the sfb cb data to the stack before enqueueing the skb,
and using this stack copy in increment_qlen() instead of the skb pointer
itself.
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-18231
Fixes: e13e02a3c68d ("net_sched: SFB flow scheduler")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0d40f728e28393a8817d1fcae923dfa3409e488c ]
rxkad_verify_packet_2() has a small stack-allocated sglist of 4 elements,
but if that isn't sufficient for the number of fragments in the socket
buffer, we try to allocate an sglist large enough to hold all the
fragments.
However, for large packets with a lot of fragments, this isn't sufficient
and we need at least one additional fragment.
The problem manifests as skb_to_sgvec() returning -EMSGSIZE and this then
getting returned by userspace. Most of the time, this isn't a problem as
rxrpc sets a limit of 5692, big enough for 4 jumbo subpackets to be glued
together; occasionally, however, the server will ignore the reported limit
and give a packet that's a lot bigger - say 19852 bytes with ->nr_frags
being 7. skb_to_sgvec() then tries to return a "zeroth" fragment that
seems to occur before the fragments counted by ->nr_frags and we hit the
end of the sglist too early.
Note that __skb_to_sgvec() also has an skb_walk_frags() loop that is
recursive up to 24 deep. I'm not sure if I need to take account of that
too - or if there's an easy way of counting those frags too.
Fix this by counting an extra frag and allocating a larger sglist based on
that.
Fixes: d0d5c0cd1e71 ("rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()")
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ac56a0b48da86fd1b4389632fb7c4c8a5d86eefa ]
Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing
it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets
thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't
get ICMP packets through the UDP ->sk_error_report() callback. In fact, it
doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP
packets.
Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for
UDP tunnels. If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to
see ICMP packets. The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP
header of the original packet that caused the notification.
An alternative would be to call the ->error_handler() hook - but that
requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error()
do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want
to parse them there and then, not queue them).
Changes
=======
ver #3)
- Fixed an uninitialised variable.
ver #2)
- Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals.
Fixes: 5271953cad31 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0efe125cfb99e6773a7434f3463f7c2fa28f3a43 ]
Ensure the match happens in the right direction, previously the
destination used was the server, not the NAT host, as the comment
shows the code intended.
Additionally nf_nat_irc uses port 0 as a signal and there's no valid way
it can appear in a DCC message, so consider port 0 also forged.
Fixes: 869f37d8e48f ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack/nf_nat: add IRC helper port")
Signed-off-by: David Leadbeater <dgl@dgl.cx>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d047283a7034140ea5da759a494fd2274affdd46 ]
The IPv6 path already drops dst in the daddr changed case, but the IPv4
path does not. This change makes the two code paths consistent.
Further, it is possible that there is already a metadata_dst allocated from
ingress that might already be attached to skbuff->dst while following
the bridge path. If it is not released before setting a new
metadata_dst, it will be leaked. This is similar to what is done in
bpf_set_tunnel_key() or ip6_route_input().
It is important to note that the memory being leaked is not the dst
being set in the bridge code, but rather memory allocated from some
other code path that is not being freed correctly before the skb dst is
overwritten.
An example of the leakage fixed by this commit found using kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff888010112b00 (size 256):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294762496 (age 32.012s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 16 f1 83 ff ff ff ff ................
e1 4e f6 82 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .N..............
backtrace:
[<00000000d79567ea>] metadata_dst_alloc+0x1b/0xe0
[<00000000be113e13>] udp_tun_rx_dst+0x174/0x1f0
[<00000000a36848f4>] geneve_udp_encap_recv+0x350/0x7b0
[<00000000d4afb476>] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x380/0x560
[<00000000ac064aea>] udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x75/0x90
[<000000009a8ee8c5>] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd8/0x230
[<00000000ef4980bb>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x7a/0xa0
[<00000000d7533c8c>] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0
[<00000000a879497d>] process_backlog+0x93/0x190
[<00000000e41ade9f>] __napi_poll+0x28/0x170
[<00000000b4c0906b>] net_rx_action+0x14f/0x2a0
[<00000000b20dd5d4>] __do_softirq+0xf4/0x305
[<000000003a7d7e15>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc3/0x140
[<00000000968d39a2>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9e/0xc0
[<000000009e920794>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[<000000008942add0>] native_safe_halt+0x13/0x20
Florian Westphal says: "Original code was likely fine because nothing
ever did set a skb->dst entry earlier than bridge in those days."
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Harsh Modi <harshmodi@google.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c624c58e08b15105662b9ab9be23d14a6b945a49 ]
skb_copy_bits() could fail, which requires a check on the return
value.
Signed-off-by: Li Zhong <floridsleeves@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cf97769c761abfeac8931b35fe0e1a8d5fabc9d8 ]
When a TCP sends more bytes than allowed by the receive window, all future
packets can be marked as invalid.
This can clog up the conntrack table because of 5-day default timeout.
Sequence of packets:
01 initiator > responder: [S], seq 171, win 5840, options [mss 1330,sackOK,TS val 63 ecr 0,nop,wscale 1]
02 responder > initiator: [S.], seq 33211, ack 172, win 65535, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 010 ecr 63,nop,wscale 8]
03 initiator > responder: [.], ack 33212, win 2920, options [nop,nop,TS val 068 ecr 010], length 0
04 initiator > responder: [P.], seq 172:240, ack 33212, win 2920, options [nop,nop,TS val 279 ecr 010], length 68
Window is 5840 starting from 33212 -> 39052.
05 responder > initiator: [.], ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 872 ecr 279], length 0
06 responder > initiator: [.], seq 33212:34530, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 1318
This is fine, conntrack will flag the connection as having outstanding
data (UNACKED), which lowers the conntrack timeout to 300s.
07 responder > initiator: [.], seq 34530:35848, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 1318
08 responder > initiator: [.], seq 35848:37166, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 1318
09 responder > initiator: [.], seq 37166:38484, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 1318
10 responder > initiator: [.], seq 38484:39802, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 1318
Packet 10 is already sending more than permitted, but conntrack doesn't
validate this (only seq is tested vs. maxend, not 'seq+len').
38484 is acceptable, but only up to 39052, so this packet should
not have been sent (or only 568 bytes, not 1318).
At this point, connection is still in '300s' mode.
Next packet however will get flagged:
11 responder > initiator: [P.], seq 39802:40128, ack 240, win 256, options [nop,nop,TS val 892 ecr 279], length 326
nf_ct_proto_6: SEQ is over the upper bound (over the window of the receiver) .. LEN=378 .. SEQ=39802 ACK=240 ACK PSH ..
Now, a couple of replies/acks comes in:
12 initiator > responder: [.], ack 34530, win 4368,
[.. irrelevant acks removed ]
16 initiator > responder: [.], ack 39802, win 8712, options [nop,nop,TS val 296201291 ecr 2982371892], length 0
This ack is significant -- this acks the last packet send by the
responder that conntrack considered valid.
This means that ack == td_end. This will withdraw the
'unacked data' flag, the connection moves back to the 5-day timeout
of established conntracks.
17 initiator > responder: ack 40128, win 10030, ...
This packet is also flagged as invalid.
Because conntrack only updates state based on packets that are
considered valid, packet 11 'did not exist' and that gets us:
nf_ct_proto_6: ACK is over upper bound 39803 (ACKed data not seen yet) .. SEQ=240 ACK=40128 WINDOW=10030 RES=0x00 ACK URG
Because this received and processed by the endpoints, the conntrack entry
remains in a bad state, no packets will ever be considered valid again:
30 responder > initiator: [F.], seq 40432, ack 2045, win 391, ..
31 initiator > responder: [.], ack 40433, win 11348, ..
32 initiator > responder: [F.], seq 2045, ack 40433, win 11348 ..
... all trigger 'ACK is over bound' test and we end up with
non-early-evictable 5-day default timeout.
NB: This patch triggers a bunch of checkpatch warnings because of silly
indent. I will resend the cleanup series linked below to reduce the
indent level once this change has propagated to net-next.
I could route the cleanup via nf but that causes extra backport work for
stable maintainers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20220720175228.17880-1-fw@strlen.de/T/#mb1d7147d36294573cc4f81d00f9f8dadfdd06cd8
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f0da47118c7e93cdbbc6fb403dd729a5f2c90ee3 upstream.
Upon reception, a packet must be categorized, either it's destination is
the host, or it is another host. A packet with no destination addressing
fields may be valid in two situations:
- the packet has no source field: only ACKs are built like that, we
consider the host as the destination.
- the packet has a valid source field: it is directed to the PAN
coordinator, as for know we don't have this information we consider we
are not the PAN coordinator.
There was likely a copy/paste error made during a previous cleanup
because the if clause is now containing exactly the same condition as in
the switch case, which can never be true. In the past the destination
address was used in the switch and the source address was used in the
if, which matches what the spec says.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ae531b9475f6 ("ieee802154: use ieee802154_addr instead of *_sa variants")
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826142954.254853-1-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 278d3ba61563ceed3cb248383ced19e14ec7bc1f upstream.
On 32bit-UP u64_stats_fetch_begin() disables only preemption. If the
reader is in preemptible context and the writer side
(u64_stats_update_begin*()) runs in an interrupt context (IRQ or
softirq) then the writer can update the stats during the read operation.
This update remains undetected.
Use u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq() to ensure the stats fetch on 32bit-UP
are not interrupted by a writer. 32bit-SMP remains unaffected by this
change.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Catherine Sullivan <csully@google.com>
Cc: David Awogbemila <awogbemila@google.com>
Cc: Dimitris Michailidis <dmichail@fungible.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hans Ulli Kroll <ulli.kroll@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jeroen de Borst <jeroendb@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oss-drivers@corigine.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb55dc09b5dd040232d5de32812cc83001a23da6 upstream.
__mkroute_input() uses fib_validate_source() to trigger an icmp redirect.
My understanding is that fib_validate_source() is used to know if the src
address and the gateway address are on the same link. For that,
fib_validate_source() returns 1 (same link) or 0 (not the same network).
__mkroute_input() is the only user of these positive values, all other
callers only look if the returned value is negative.
Since the below patch, fib_validate_source() didn't return anymore 1 when
both addresses are on the same network, because the route lookup returns
RT_SCOPE_LINK instead of RT_SCOPE_HOST. But this is, in fact, right.
Let's adapat the test to return 1 again when both addresses are on the same
link.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 747c14307214 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <yujie.liu@intel.com>
Reported-by: Heng Qi <hengqi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829100121.3821-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 60deb9f10eec5c6a20252ed36238b55d8b614a2c upstream.
ieee80211_scan_rx() tries to access scan_req->flags after a
null check, but a UAF is observed when the scan is completed
and __ieee80211_scan_completed() executes, which then calls
cfg80211_scan_done() leading to the freeing of scan_req.
Since scan_req is rcu_dereference()'d, prevent the racing in
__ieee80211_scan_completed() by ensuring that from mac80211's
POV it is no longer accessed from an RCU read critical section
before we call cfg80211_scan_done().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f9acff9bf08a845f225d
Reported-by: syzbot+f9acff9bf08a845f225d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <code@siddh.me>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819200340.34826-1-code@siddh.me
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 15bc8966b6d3a5b9bfe4c9facfa02f2b69b1e5f0 upstream.
When we are not connected to a channel, sending channel "switch"
announcement doesn't make any sense.
The BSS list is empty in that case. This causes the for loop in
cfg80211_get_bss() to be bypassed, so the function returns NULL
(check line 1424 of net/wireless/scan.c), causing the WARN_ON()
in ieee80211_ibss_csa_beacon() to get triggered (check line 500
of net/mac80211/ibss.c), which was consequently reported on the
syzkaller dashboard.
Thus, check if we have an existing connection before generating
the CSA beacon in ieee80211_ibss_finish_csa().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd7760e62c2a ("mac80211: add support for CSA in IBSS mode")
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=05603ef4ae8926761b678d2939a3b2ad28ab9ca6
Reported-by: syzbot+b6c9fe29aefe68e4ad34@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <code@siddh.me>
Tested-by: syzbot+b6c9fe29aefe68e4ad34@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220814151512.9985-1-code@siddh.me
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a8424a9b4522a3ab9f32175ad6d848739079071f ]
For passive connections, the refcount increment has been done in
smc_clcsock_accept()-->smc_sock_alloc().
Fixes: 3b2dec2603d5 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc")
Signed-off-by: Yacan Liu <liuyacan@corp.netease.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830152314.838736-1-liuyacan@corp.netease.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0b4f688d53fdc2a731b9d9cdf0c96255bc024ea6 ]
This reverts commit 90fabae8a2c225c4e4936723c38857887edde5cc.
Patch was applied hastily, revert and let the v2 be reviewed.
Fixes: 90fabae8a2c2 ("sch_cake: Return __NET_XMIT_STOLEN when consuming enqueued skb")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87wnao2ha3.fsf@toke.dk/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8c70521238b7863c2af607e20bcba20f974c969b ]
challenge_timestamp can be read an written by concurrent threads.
This was expected, but we need to annotate the race to avoid potential issues.
Following patch moves challenge_timestamp and challenge_count
to per-netns storage to provide better isolation.
Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 90fabae8a2c225c4e4936723c38857887edde5cc ]
When the GSO splitting feature of sch_cake is enabled, GSO superpackets
will be broken up and the resulting segments enqueued in place of the
original skb. In this case, CAKE calls consume_skb() on the original skb,
but still returns NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. This can confuse parent qdiscs into
assuming the original skb still exists, when it really has been freed. Fix
this by adding the __NET_XMIT_STOLEN flag to the return value in this case.
Fixes: 0c850344d388 ("sch_cake: Conditionally split GSO segments")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-18231
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831092103.442868-1-toke@toke.dk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8fc29ff3910f3af08a7c40a75d436b5720efe2bf ]
strp_init() is called just a few lines above this csk->sk_user_data
check, it also initializes strp->work etc., therefore, it is
unnecessary to call strp_done() to cancel the freshly initialized
work.
And if sk_user_data is already used by KCM, psock->strp should not be
touched, particularly strp->work state, so we need to move strp_init()
after the csk->sk_user_data check.
This also makes a lockdep warning reported by syzbot go away.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9fc084a4348493ef65d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e696806ef96cdd2d87cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e5571240236c ("kcm: Check if sk_user_data already set in kcm_attach")
Fixes: dff8baa26117 ("kcm: Call strp_stop before strp_done in kcm_attach")
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220827181314.193710-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f612466ebecb12a00d9152344ddda6f6345f04dc ]
In attach_default_qdiscs(), if a dev has multiple queues and queue 0 fails
to attach qdisc because there is no memory in attach_one_default_qdisc().
Then dev->qdisc will be noop_qdisc by default. But the other queues may be
able to successfully attach to default qdisc.
In this case, the fallback to noqueue process will be triggered. If the
original attached qdisc is not released and a new one is directly
attached, this will cause netdevice reference leaks.
The following is the bug log:
veth0: default qdisc (fq_codel) fail, fallback to noqueue
unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become free. Usage count = 32
leaked reference.
qdisc_alloc+0x12e/0x210
qdisc_create_dflt+0x62/0x140
attach_one_default_qdisc.constprop.41+0x44/0x70
dev_activate+0x128/0x290
__dev_open+0x12a/0x190
__dev_change_flags+0x1a2/0x1f0
dev_change_flags+0x23/0x60
do_setlink+0x332/0x1150
__rtnl_newlink+0x52f/0x8e0
rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x70
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x140/0x3b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100
netlink_unicast+0x1bb/0x290
netlink_sendmsg+0x37c/0x4e0
sock_sendmsg+0x5f/0x70
____sys_sendmsg+0x208/0x280
Fix this bug by clearing any non-noop qdiscs that may have been assigned
before trying to re-attach.
Fixes: bf6dba76d278 ("net: sched: fallback to qdisc noqueue if default qdisc setup fail")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826090055.24424-1-wanghai38@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b05972f01e7d30419987a1f221b5593668fd6448 ]
The issue is the same to commit c2999f7fb05b ("net: sched: multiq: don't
call qdisc_put() while holding tree lock"). Qdiscs call qdisc_put() while
holding sch tree spinlock, which results sleeping-while-atomic BUG.
Fixes: c266f64dbfa2 ("net: sched: protect block state with mutex")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826013930.340121-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d776763f48084926b5d9e25507a3ddb7c9243d5e ]
The return type is supposed to be ssize_t, which is signed long,
but "r" was declared as unsigned int. This means that on 64 bit systems
we return positive values instead of negative error codes.
Fixes: 80a3511d70e8 ("cfg80211: add debugfs HT40 allow map")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YutvOQeJm0UjLhwU@kili
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 583585e48d965338e73e1eb383768d16e0922d73 ]
Fix one kernel NULL pointer dereference as below:
[ 224.462334] Call Trace:
[ 224.462394] __tcp_bpf_recvmsg+0xd3/0x380
[ 224.462441] ? sock_has_perm+0x78/0xa0
[ 224.462463] tcp_bpf_recvmsg+0x12e/0x220
[ 224.462494] inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0xd0
[ 224.462534] __sys_recvfrom+0xc8/0x130
[ 224.462574] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1df/0x2e0
[ 224.462606] ? __do_page_fault+0x2de/0x500
[ 224.462635] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x24/0x30
[ 224.462660] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
[ 224.462709] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
In commit 9974d37ea75f ("skmsg: Fix invalid last sg check in
sk_msg_recvmsg()"), we change last sg check to sg_is_last(),
but in sockmap redirection case (without stream_parser/stream_verdict/
skb_verdict), we did not mark the end of the scatterlist. Check the
sk_msg_alloc, sk_msg_page_add, and bpf_msg_push_data functions, they all
do not mark the end of sg. They are expected to use sg.end for end
judgment. So the judgment of '(i != msg_rx->sg.end)' is added back here.
Fixes: 9974d37ea75f ("skmsg: Fix invalid last sg check in sk_msg_recvmsg()")
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220809094915.150391-1-liujian56@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d5485d9dd24e1d04e5509916515260186eb1455c upstream.
It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() from hardware interrupt
context or with interrupts being disabled. So add all skb to
a tmp list, then free them after spin_unlock_irqrestore() at
once.
Fixes: 66ba215cb513 ("neigh: fix possible DoS due to net iface start/stop loop")
Suggested-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc633700f00f726e027846a318c5ffeb8deaaeda upstream.
User can use AF_PACKET socket to send packets with the length of 0.
When min_header_len equals to 0, packet_snd will call __dev_queue_xmit
to send packets, and sock->type can be any type.
Reported-by: syzbot+5ea725c25d06fb9114c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fd1894224407 ("bpf: Don't redirect packets with invalid pkt_len")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 66ba215cb51323e4e55e38fd5f250e0fae0cbc94 ]
Normal processing of ARP request (usually this is Ethernet broadcast
packet) coming to the host is looking like the following:
* the packet comes to arp_process() call and is passed through routing
procedure
* the request is put into the queue using pneigh_enqueue() if
corresponding ARP record is not local (common case for container
records on the host)
* the request is processed by timer (within 80 jiffies by default) and
ARP reply is sent from the same arp_process() using
NEIGH_CB(skb)->flags & LOCALLY_ENQUEUED condition (flag is set inside
pneigh_enqueue())
And here the problem comes. Linux kernel calls pneigh_queue_purge()
which destroys the whole queue of ARP requests on ANY network interface
start/stop event through __neigh_ifdown().
This is actually not a problem within the original world as network
interface start/stop was accessible to the host 'root' only, which
could do more destructive things. But the world is changed and there
are Linux containers available. Here container 'root' has an access
to this API and could be considered as untrusted user in the hosting
(container's) world.
Thus there is an attack vector to other containers on node when
container's root will endlessly start/stop interfaces. We have observed
similar situation on a real production node when docker container was
doing such activity and thus other containers on the node become not
accessible.
The patch proposed doing very simple thing. It drops only packets from
the same namespace in the pneigh_queue_purge() where network interface
state change is detected. This is enough to prevent the problem for the
whole node preserving original semantics of the code.
v2:
- do del_timer_sync() if queue is empty after pneigh_queue_purge()
v3:
- rebase to net tree
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: kernel@openvz.org
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Investigated-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2a0133723f9ebeb751cfce19f74ec07e108bef1f upstream.
Syzkaller reports refcount bug as follows:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3605 at lib/refcount.c:19 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:19
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 3605 Comm: syz-executor208 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-03023-g7e062cda7d90 #0
<TASK>
__refcount_add_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:163 [inline]
__refcount_inc_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:227 [inline]
refcount_inc_not_zero include/linux/refcount.h:245 [inline]
sk_psock_get+0x3bc/0x410 include/linux/skmsg.h:439
tls_data_ready+0x6d/0x1b0 net/tls/tls_sw.c:2091
tcp_data_ready+0x106/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4983
tcp_data_queue+0x25f2/0x4c90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5057
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1774/0x4e80 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6659
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x339/0x980 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1682
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1061 [inline]
__release_sock+0x134/0x3b0 net/core/sock.c:2849
release_sock+0x54/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3404
inet_shutdown+0x1e0/0x430 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:909
__sys_shutdown_sock net/socket.c:2331 [inline]
__sys_shutdown_sock net/socket.c:2325 [inline]
__sys_shutdown+0xf1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2343
__do_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2351 [inline]
__se_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2349 [inline]
__x64_sys_shutdown+0x50/0x70 net/socket.c:2349
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
</TASK>
During SMC fallback process in connect syscall, kernel will
replaces TCP with SMC. In order to forward wakeup
smc socket waitqueue after fallback, kernel will sets
clcsk->sk_user_data to origin smc socket in
smc_fback_replace_callbacks().
Later, in shutdown syscall, kernel will calls
sk_psock_get(), which treats the clcsk->sk_user_data
as psock type, triggering the refcnt warning.
So, the root cause is that smc and psock, both will use
sk_user_data field. So they will mismatch this field
easily.
This patch solves it by using another bit(defined as
SK_USER_DATA_PSOCK) in PTRMASK, to mark whether
sk_user_data points to a psock object or not.
This patch depends on a PTRMASK introduced in commit f1ff5ce2cd5e
("net, sk_msg: Clear sk_user_data pointer on clone if tagged").
For there will possibly be more flags in the sk_user_data field,
this patch also refactor sk_user_data flags code to be more generic
to improve its maintainability.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f26f85569bd179c18ce@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ef3905aa3b5b3e222ee6eb0210bfd999417a8cc upstream.
Got crash when doing pressure test of mptcp:
===========================================================================
dst_release: dst:ffffa06ce6e5c058 refcnt:-1
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffa06ce6e5c058
PGD 190a01067 P4D 190a01067 PUD 43fffb067 PMD 22e403063 PTE 8000000226e5c063
Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 7823 Comm: kworker/7:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.2.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
? skb_release_head_state+0x68/0x100
? skb_release_all+0xe/0x30
? kfree_skb+0x32/0xa0
? mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x57e/0x750
? __mptcp_retrans+0x21b/0x3c0
? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70
? mptcp_worker+0x25e/0x320
? process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
? kthread+0x112/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
===========================================================================
In __mptcp_alloc_tx_skb skb was allocated and skb->tcp_tsorted_anchor will
be initialized, in under memory pressure situation sk_wmem_schedule will
return false and then kfree_skb. In this case skb->_skb_refdst is not null
because_skb_refdst and tcp_tsorted_anchor are stored in the same mem, and
kfree_skb will try to release dst and cause crash.
Fixes: f70cad1085d1 ("mptcp: stop relying on tcp_tx_skb_cache")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonglong Li <liyonglong@chinatelecom.cn>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220317220953.426024-1-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b0f571ecd7943423c25947439045f0d352ca3dbf ]
Fix three bugs in the rxrpc's sendmsg implementation:
(1) rxrpc_new_client_call() should release the socket lock when returning
an error from rxrpc_get_call_slot().
(2) rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_intr() will return without the call mutex
held in the event that we're interrupted by a signal whilst waiting
for tx space on the socket or relocking the call mutex afterwards.
Fix this by: (a) moving the unlock/lock of the call mutex up to
rxrpc_send_data() such that the lock is not held around all of
rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window*() and (b) indicating to higher callers
whether we're return with the lock dropped. Note that this means
recvmsg() will not block on this call whilst we're waiting.
(3) After dropping and regaining the call mutex, rxrpc_send_data() needs
to go and recheck the state of the tx_pending buffer and the
tx_total_len check in case we raced with another sendmsg() on the same
call.
Thinking on this some more, it might make sense to have different locks for
sendmsg() and recvmsg(). There's probably no need to make recvmsg() wait
for sendmsg(). It does mean that recvmsg() can return MSG_EOR indicating
that a call is dead before a sendmsg() to that call returns - but that can
currently happen anyway.
Without fix (2), something like the following can be induced:
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
5.16.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-------------------------------------
syz-executor011/3597 is trying to release lock (&call->user_mutex) at:
[<ffffffff885163a3>] rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0xc13/0x1350 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:748
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
no locks held by syz-executor011/3597.
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_unlock_imbalance_bug include/trace/events/lock.h:58 [inline]
__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5306 [inline]
lock_release.cold+0x49/0x4e kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5657
__mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x99/0x5e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:900
rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0xc13/0x1350 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:748
rxrpc_sendmsg+0x420/0x630 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c:561
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[Thanks to Hawkins Jiawei and Khalid Masum for their attempts to fix this]
Fixes: bc5e3a546d55 ("rxrpc: Use MSG_WAITALL to tell sendmsg() to temporarily ignore signals")
Reported-by: syzbot+7f0483225d0c94cb3441@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Tested-by: syzbot+7f0483225d0c94cb3441@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
cc: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
cc: Khalid Masum <khalid.masum.92@gmail.com>
cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166135894583.600315.7170979436768124075.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3c9ba81d72047f2e81bb535d42856517b613aba7 ]
While reading sysctl_somaxconn, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a5612ca10d1aa05624ebe72633e0c8c792970833 ]
While reading sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net, it can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 856c395cfa63 ("net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa45d484c52c73f79db2c23b0cdfc6c6455093ad ]
While reading netdev_budget_usecs, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 7acf8a1e8a28 ("Replace 2 jiffies with sysctl netdev_budget_usecs to enable softirq tuning")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 657b991afb89d25fe6c4783b1b75a8ad4563670d ]
While reading sysctl_max_skb_frags, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 5f74f82ea34c ("net:Add sysctl_max_skb_frags")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f70cad1085d1e01d3ec73c1078405f906237feee ]
We want to revert the skb TX cache, but MPTCP is currently
using it unconditionally.
Rework the MPTCP tx code, so that tcp_tx_skb_cache is not
needed anymore: do the whole coalescing check, skb allocation
skb initialization/update inside mptcp_sendmsg_frag(), quite
alike the current TCP code.
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 04d8825c30b718781197c8f07b1915a11bfb8685 ]
the tcp_skb_entail() helper is actually skb_entail(), renamed
to provide proper scope.
The two helper will be used by the next patch.
RFC -> v1:
- rename skb_entail to tcp_skb_entail (Eric)
Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2e0c42374ee32e72948559d2ae2f7ba3dc6b977c ]
While reading netdev_budget, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 51b0bdedb8e7 ("[NET]: Separate two usages of netdev_max_backlog.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e59ef36f0795696ab229569c153936bfd068d21c ]
While reading sysctl_net_busy_read, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 2d48d67fa8cd ("net: poll/select low latency socket support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d2154b0afa73c0159b2856f875c6b4fe7cf6a95e ]
While reading sysctl_tstamp_allow_data, it can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: b245be1f4db1 ("net-timestamp: no-payload only sysctl")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7de6d09f51917c829af2b835aba8bb5040f8e86a ]
While reading sysctl_optmem_max, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 61adf447e38664447526698872e21c04623afb8e ]
While reading netdev_tstamp_prequeue, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 3b098e2d7c69 ("net: Consistent skb timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5dcd08cd19912892586c6082d56718333e2d19db ]
While reading netdev_max_backlog, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
While at it, we remove the unnecessary spaces in the doc.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf955b5ab8f6f7b0632cdef8e36b14e4f6e77829 ]
While reading weight_p, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need
to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Also, dev_[rt]x_weight can be read/written at the same time. So, we
need to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() for its access. Moreover, to
use the same weight_p while changing dev_[rt]x_weight, we add a mutex
in proc_do_dev_weight().
Fixes: 3d48b53fb2ae ("net: dev_weight: TX/RX orthogonality")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1227c1771dd2ad44318aa3ab9e3a293b3f34ff2a ]
While reading sysctl_[rw]mem_(max|default), they can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9afb4b27349a499483ae0134282cefd0c90f480f ]
To clear the flow table on flow table free, the following sequence
normally happens in order:
1) gc_step work is stopped to disable any further stats/del requests.
2) All flow table entries are set to teardown state.
3) Run gc_step which will queue HW del work for each flow table entry.
4) Waiting for the above del work to finish (flush).
5) Run gc_step again, deleting all entries from the flow table.
6) Flow table is freed.
But if a flow table entry already has pending HW stats or HW add work
step 3 will not queue HW del work (it will be skipped), step 4 will wait
for the pending add/stats to finish, and step 5 will queue HW del work
which might execute after freeing of the flow table.
To fix the above, this patch flushes the pending work, then it sets the
teardown flag to all flows in the flowtable and it forces a garbage
collector run to queue work to remove the flows from hardware, then it
flushes this new pending work and (finally) it forces another garbage
collector run to remove the entry from the software flowtable.
Stack trace:
[47773.882335] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.883634] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888103b45aa8 by task kworker/u20:6/543704
[47773.885634] CPU: 3 PID: 543704 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[47773.886745] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009)
[47773.888438] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del flow_offload_work_handler [nf_flow_table]
[47773.889727] Call Trace:
[47773.890214] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[47773.890818] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140
[47773.892990] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[47773.894459] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[47773.895174] down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.899706] nf_flow_offload_tuple+0x24f/0x3c0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.907137] flow_offload_work_handler+0x72d/0xbe0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.913372] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[47773.921325]
[47773.921325] Allocated by task 592159:
[47773.922031] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.922730] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[47773.923411] tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x3cb/0x1230 [act_ct]
[47773.924363] tcf_ct_init+0x71c/0x1156 [act_ct]
[47773.925207] tcf_action_init_1+0x45b/0x700
[47773.925987] tcf_action_init+0x453/0x6b0
[47773.926692] tcf_exts_validate+0x3d0/0x600
[47773.927419] fl_change+0x757/0x4a51 [cls_flower]
[47773.928227] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070
[47773.936652]
[47773.936652] Freed by task 543704:
[47773.937303] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.938039] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[47773.938731] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[47773.939467] __kasan_slab_free+0xe7/0x120
[47773.940194] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x86/0x190
[47773.941038] kfree+0xce/0x3a0
[47773.941644] tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work
Original patch description and stack trace by Paul Blakey.
Fixes: c29f74e0df7a ("netfilter: nf_flow_table: hardware offload support")
Reported-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
