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Get rid of the old iterators, alloc/free functions and adjust the core code
accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210749.117395027@linutronix.de
Use the new iterator functions and add locking where required.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210749.063705667@linutronix.de
There is no real reason to do several loops over the MSI descriptors
instead of just doing one loop. In case of an error everything is undone
anyway so it does not matter whether it's a partial or a full rollback.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210749.010234767@linutronix.de
The allocation code is overly complex. It tries to have the MSI index space
packed, which is not working when an interrupt is freed. There is no
requirement for this. The only requirement is that the MSI index is unique.
Move the MSI descriptor allocation into msi_domain_populate_irqs() and use
the Linux interrupt number as MSI index which fulfils the unique
requirement.
This requires to lock the MSI descriptors which makes the lock order
reverse to the regular MSI alloc/free functions vs. the domain
mutex. Assign a seperate lockdep class for these MSI device domains.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210748.956731741@linutronix.de
Provide domain info flags which tell the core to allocate simple
descriptors or to free descriptors when the interrupts are freed and
implement the required functionality.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.928198636@linutronix.de
Provide msi_alloc_msi_desc() which takes a template MSI descriptor for
initializing a newly allocated descriptor. This allows to simplify various
usage sites of alloc_msi_entry() and moves the storage handling into the
core code.
For simple cases where only a linear vector space is required provide
msi_add_simple_msi_descs() which just allocates a linear range of MSI
descriptors and fills msi_desc::msi_index accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.873833567@linutronix.de
In preparation for dynamic handling of MSI-X interrupts provide a new set
of MSI descriptor accessor functions and iterators. They are benefitial per
se as they allow to cleanup quite some code in various MSI domain
implementations.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.818635078@linutronix.de
Usage sites which do allocations of the MSI descriptors before invoking
msi_domain_alloc_irqs() require to lock the MSI decriptors accross the
operation.
Provide entry points which can be called with the MSI mutex held and lock
the mutex in the existing entry points.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.765371053@linutronix.de
For upcoming runtime extensions of MSI-X interrupts it's required to
protect the MSI descriptor list. Add a mutex to struct msi_device_data and
provide lock/unlock functions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.708877269@linutronix.de
It's only required when MSI is in use.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206210747.650487479@linutronix.de
This allows drivers to retrieve the Linux interrupt number instead of
fiddling with MSI descriptors.
msi_get_virq() returns the Linux interrupt number or 0 in case that there
is no entry for the given MSI index.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210221814.780824745@linutronix.de
No more users. Refactor the core code accordingly and move the global
interface under CONFIG_PCI_MSI_ARCH_FALLBACKS.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210221814.168362229@linutronix.de
Add new allocation functions which can be activated by domain info
flags. They store the groups pointer in struct msi_device_data.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210221813.988659194@linutronix.de
Create struct msi_device_data and add a pointer of that type to struct
dev_msi_info, which is part of struct device. Provide an allocator function
which can be invoked from the MSI interrupt allocation code pathes.
Add a properties field to the data structure as a first member so the
allocation size is not zero bytes. The field will be uses later on.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210221813.676660809@linutronix.de
to determine whether this is MSI or MSIX instead of consulting MSI
descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210221813.434156196@linutronix.de
Make the bounds propagation in __reg_assign_32_into_64() slightly more
robust and readable by aligning it similarly as we did back in the
__reg_combine_64_into_32() counterpart. Meaning, only propagate or
pessimize them as a smin/smax pair.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
For the case where both s32_{min,max}_value bounds are positive, the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() directly propagates them to their 64 bit
counterparts, otherwise it pessimises them into [0,u32_max] universe and
tries to refine them later on by learning through the tnum as per comment
in mentioned function. However, that does not always happen, for example,
in mov32 operation we call zext_32_to_64(dst_reg) which invokes the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() as is without subsequent bounds update as
elsewhere thus no refinement based on tnum takes place.
Thus, not calling into the __update_reg_bounds() / __reg_deduce_bounds() /
__reg_bound_offset() triplet as we do, for example, in case of ALU ops via
adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(), will lead to more pessimistic bounds when
dumping the full register state:
Before fix:
0: (b4) w0 = -1
1: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
1: (bc) w0 = w0
2: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
Technically, the smin_value=0 and smax_value=4294967295 bounds are not
incorrect, but given the register is still a constant, they break assumptions
about const scalars that smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value.
After fix:
0: (b4) w0 = -1
1: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
1: (bc) w0 = w0
2: R0_w=invP4294967295
(id=0,imm=ffffffff,
smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)
Without the smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value invariant
being intact for const scalars, it is possible to leak out kernel pointers
from unprivileged user space if the latter is enabled. For example, when such
registers are involved in pointer arithmtics, then adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
will taint the destination register into an unknown scalar, and the latter
can be exported and stored e.g. into a BPF map value.
Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
If the audit daemon were ever to get stuck in a stopped state the
kernel's kauditd_thread() could get blocked attempting to send audit
records to the userspace audit daemon. With the kernel thread
blocked it is possible that the audit queue could grow unbounded as
certain audit record generating events must be exempt from the queue
limits else the system enter a deadlock state.
This patch resolves this problem by lowering the kernel thread's
socket sending timeout from MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT to HZ/10 and tweaks
the kauditd_send_queue() function to better manage the various audit
queues when connection problems occur between the kernel and the
audit daemon. With this patch, the backlog may temporarily grow
beyond the defined limits when the audit daemon is stopped and the
system is under heavy audit pressure, but kauditd_thread() will
continue to make progress and drain the queues as it would for other
connection problems. For example, with the audit daemon put into a
stopped state and the system configured to audit every syscall it
was still possible to shutdown the system without a kernel panic,
deadlock, etc.; granted, the system was slow to shutdown but that is
to be expected given the extreme pressure of recording every syscall.
The timeout value of HZ/10 was chosen primarily through
experimentation and this developer's "gut feeling". There is likely
no one perfect value, but as this scenario is limited in scope (root
privileges would be needed to send SIGSTOP to the audit daemon), it
is likely not worth exposing this as a tunable at present. This can
always be done at a later date if it proves necessary.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b52330bbfe63 ("audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking")
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Due to the audit control mutex necessary for serializing audit
userspace messages we haven't been able to block/penalize userspace
processes that attempt to send audit records while the system is
under audit pressure. The result is that privileged userspace
applications have a priority boost with respect to audit as they are
not bound by the same audit queue throttling as the other tasks on
the system.
This patch attempts to restore some balance to the system when under
audit pressure by blocking these privileged userspace tasks after
they have finished their audit processing, and dropped the audit
control mutex, but before they return to userspace.
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG on a high level has the following parameters:
.-[old-val] .-[new-val]
BPF_R0 = cmpxchg{32,64}(DST_REG + insn->off, BPF_R0, SRC_REG)
`-[mem-loc] `-[old-val]
Given a BPF insn can only have two registers (dst, src), the R0 is fixed and
used as an auxilliary register for input (old value) as well as output (returning
old value from memory location). While the verifier performs a number of safety
checks, it misses to reject unprivileged programs where R0 contains a pointer as
old value.
Through brute-forcing it takes about ~16sec on my machine to leak a kernel pointer
with BPF_CMPXCHG. The PoC is basically probing for kernel addresses by storing the
guessed address into the map slot as a scalar, and using the map value pointer as
R0 while SRC_REG has a canary value to detect a matching address.
Fix it by checking R0 for pointers, and reject if that's the case for unprivileged
programs.
Fixes: 5ffa25502b5a ("bpf: Add instructions for atomic_[cmp]xchg")
Reported-by: Ryota Shiga (Flatt Security)
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The change in commit 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.
The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.
One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.
Fixes: 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH")
Reported-by: <n4ke4mry@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Make use of struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded calucation.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/160
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
== Background ==
Support for large, "dynamic" fpstates was recently merged. This
included code to ensure that sigaltstacks are sufficiently sized for
these large states. A new lock was added to remove races between
enabling large features and setting up sigaltstacks.
== Problem ==
The new lock (sigaltstack_lock()) is acquired in the sigreturn path
before restoring the old sigaltstack. Unfortunately, contention on the
new lock causes a measurable signal handling performance regression [1].
However, the common case is that no *changes* are made to the
sigaltstack state at sigreturn.
== Solution ==
do_sigaltstack() acquires sigaltstack_lock() and is used for both
sys_sigaltstack() and restoring the sigaltstack in sys_sigreturn().
Check for changes to the sigaltstack before taking the lock. If no
changes were made, return before acquiring the lock.
This removes lock contention from the common-case sigreturn path.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211207012128.GA16074@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Fixes: 3aac3ebea08f ("x86/signal: Implement sigaltstack size validation")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210225503.12734-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
If a cset is already on preloaded list, this means we have already setup
this cset properly for migration.
This patch just relocates the root cgrp lookup which isn't used anyway
when the cset is already on the preloaded list.
[tj@kernel.org: rephrase the commit log]
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
This patch enables KCSAN for arm64, with updates to build rules
to not use KCSAN for several incompatible compilation units.
Recent GCC version(at least GCC10) made outline-atomics as the
default option(unlike Clang), which will cause linker errors
for kernel/kcsan/core.o. Disables the out-of-line atomics by
no-outline-atomics to fix the linker errors.
Meanwhile, as Mark said[1], some latent issues are needed to be
fixed which isn't just a KCSAN problem, we make the KCSAN depends
on EXPERT for now.
Tested selftest and kcsan_test(built with GCC11 and Clang 13),
and all passed.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YadiUPpJ0gADbiHQ@FVFF77S0Q05N
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> # kernel/kcsan
Tested-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211211131734.126874-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: added comment to justify EXPERT]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
On arm64, user space counter access will be controlled differently
compared to x86. On x86, access in the strictest mode is enabled for all
tasks in an MM when any event is mmap'ed. For arm64, access is
explicitly requested for an event and only enabled when the event's
context is active. This avoids hooks into the arch context switch code
and gives better control of when access is enabled.
In order to configure user space access when the PMU is enabled, it is
necessary to know if any event (currently active or not) in the current
context has user space accessed enabled. Add a counter similar to other
counters in the context to avoid walking the event list every time.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208201124.310740-3-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
In non trivial scenarios, the action id alone is not sufficient to
identify the program causing the warning. Before the previous patch,
the generated stack-trace pointed out at least the involved device
driver.
Let's additionally include the program name and id, and the relevant
device name.
If the user needs additional infos, he can fetch them via a kernel
probe, leveraging the arguments added here.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ddb96bb975cbfddb1546cf5da60e77d5100b533c.1638189075.git.pabeni@redhat.com
In validate_change(), there is a check since v2.6.12 to make sure that
each of the child cpusets must be a subset of a parent cpuset. IOW, it
allows child cpusets to restrict what changes can be made to a parent's
"cpuset.cpus". This actually violates one of the core principles of the
default hierarchy where a cgroup higher up in the hierarchy should be
able to change configuration however it sees fit as deligation breaks
down otherwise.
To address this issue, the check is now removed for the default hierarchy
to free parent cpusets from being restricted by child cpusets. The
check will still apply for legacy hierarchy.
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
The exit code of kernel threads has different semantics than the
exit_code of userspace tasks. To avoid confusion and allow
the userspace implementation to change as needed move
the kernel thread exit code into struct kthread.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Today the rules are a bit iffy and arbitrary about which kernel
threads have struct kthread present. Both idle threads and thread
started with create_kthread want struct kthread present so that is
effectively all kernel threads. Make the rule that if PF_KTHREAD
and the task is running then struct kthread is present.
This will allow the kernel thread code to using tsk->exit_code
with different semantics from ordinary processes.
To make ensure that struct kthread is present for all
kernel threads move it's allocation into copy_process.
Add a deallocation of struct kthread in exec for processes
that were kernel threads.
Move the allocation of struct kthread for the initial thread
earlier so that it is not repeated for each additional idle
thread.
Move the initialization of struct kthread into set_kthread_struct
so that the structure is always and reliably initailized.
Clear set_child_tid in free_kthread_struct to ensure the kthread
struct is reliably freed during exec. The function
free_kthread_struct does not need to clear vfork_done during exec as
exec_mm_release called from exec_mmap has already cleared vfork_done.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Update complete_and_exit to call kthread_exit instead of do_exit.
Change the name to reflect this change in functionality. All of the
users of complete_and_exit are causing the current kthread to exit so
this change makes it clear what is happening.
Move the implementation of kthread_complete_and_exit from
kernel/exit.c to to kernel/kthread.c. As this function is kthread
specific it makes most sense to live with the kthread functions.
There are no functional change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Update module_put_and_exit to call kthread_exit instead of do_exit.
Change the name to reflect this change in functionality. All of the
users of module_put_and_exit are causing the current kthread to exit
so this change makes it clear what is happening. There is no
functional change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The way the per task_struct exit_code is used by kernel threads is not
quite compatible how it is used by userspace applications. The low
byte of the userspace exit_code value encodes the exit signal. While
kthreads just use the value as an int holding ordinary kernel function
exit status like -EPERM.
Add kthread_exit to clearly separate the two kinds of uses.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that there are no more modular uses of do_exit remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When the kernel detects it is oops or otherwise force killing a task
while it exits the code poorly attempts to permanently stop the task
from scheduling.
I say poorly because it is possible for a task in TASK_UINTERRUPTIBLE
to be woken up.
As it makes no sense for the task to continue call do_task_dead
instead which actually does the work and permanently removes the task
from the scheduler. Guaranteeing the task will never be woken
up again.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The beginning of do_exit has become cluttered and difficult to read as
it is filled with checks to handle things that can only happen when
the kernel is operating improperly.
Now that we have a dedicated function for cleaning up a task when the
kernel is operating improperly move the checks there.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There are two big uses of do_exit. The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call. The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.
Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure. In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.
Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.
As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Adding following helpers for tracing programs:
Get n-th argument of the traced function:
long bpf_get_func_arg(void *ctx, u32 n, u64 *value)
Get return value of the traced function:
long bpf_get_func_ret(void *ctx, u64 *value)
Get arguments count of the traced function:
long bpf_get_func_arg_cnt(void *ctx)
The trampoline now stores number of arguments on ctx-8
address, so it's easy to verify argument index and find
return value argument's position.
Moving function ip address on the trampoline stack behind
the number of functions arguments, so it's now stored on
ctx-16 address if it's needed.
All helpers above are inlined by verifier.
Also bit unrelated small change - using newly added function
bpf_prog_has_trampoline in check_get_func_ip.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211208193245.172141-5-jolsa@kernel.org
Adding support to access arguments with int pointer arguments
in tracing programs.
Currently we allow tracing programs to access only pointers to
string (char pointer), void pointers and pointers to structs.
If we try to access argument which is pointer to int, verifier
will fail to load the program with;
R1 type=ctx expected=fp
; int BPF_PROG(fmod_ret_test, int _a, __u64 _b, int _ret)
0: (bf) r6 = r1
; int BPF_PROG(fmod_ret_test, int _a, __u64 _b, int _ret)
1: (79) r9 = *(u64 *)(r6 +8)
func 'bpf_modify_return_test' arg1 type INT is not a struct
There is no harm for the program to access int pointer argument.
We are already doing that for string pointer, which is pointer
to int with 1 byte size.
Changing the is_string_ptr to generic integer check and renaming
it to btf_type_is_int.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211208193245.172141-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Coverity issued the following warning:
6685 cands = bpf_core_add_cands(cands, main_btf, 1);
6686 if (IS_ERR(cands))
>>> CID 1510300: (RETURN_LOCAL)
>>> Returning pointer "cands" which points to local variable "local_cand".
6687 return cands;
It's a false positive.
Add ERR_CAST() to silence it.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The helper compares two strings: one string is a null-terminated
read-only string, and another string has const max storage size
but doesn't need to be null-terminated. It can be used to compare
file name in tracing or LSM program.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211210141652.877186-2-houtao1@huawei.com
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"21 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: MAINTAINERS, mailmap, and mm
(mlock, pagecache, damon, slub, memcg, hugetlb, and pagecache)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (21 commits)
mm: bdi: initialize bdi_min_ratio when bdi is unregistered
hugetlbfs: fix issue of preallocation of gigantic pages can't work
mm/memcg: relocate mod_objcg_mlstate(), get_obj_stock() and put_obj_stock()
mm/slub: fix endianness bug for alloc/free_traces attributes
selftests/damon: split test cases
selftests/damon: test debugfs file reads/writes with huge count
selftests/damon: test wrong DAMOS condition ranges input
selftests/damon: test DAMON enabling with empty target_ids case
selftests/damon: skip test if DAMON is running
mm/damon/vaddr-test: remove unnecessary variables
mm/damon/vaddr-test: split a test function having >1024 bytes frame size
mm/damon/vaddr: remove an unnecessary warning message
mm/damon/core: remove unnecessary error messages
mm/damon/dbgfs: remove an unnecessary error message
mm/damon/core: use better timer mechanisms selection threshold
mm/damon/core: fix fake load reports due to uninterruptible sleeps
timers: implement usleep_idle_range()
filemap: remove PageHWPoison check from next_uptodate_page()
mailmap: update email address for Guo Ren
MAINTAINERS: update kdump maintainers
...
Make use of memset_startat helper to simplify the code, there should be
no functional change as a result of this patch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210012245.207489-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
synth_events is returning -EINVAL if the dyn_event create command does
not contain ' \t'. This prevents other systems from getting called back.
synth_events needs to return -ECANCELED in these cases when the command
is not targeting the synth_event system.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20210930223821.11025-1-beaub@linux.microsoft.com
Fixes: c9e759b1e8456 ("tracing: Rework synthetic event command parsing")
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
