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Fix the following fallthrough warning (arm64-randconfig with Clang):
drivers/pci/proc.c:234:3: warning: fallthrough annotation in unreachable code [-Wimplicit-fallthrough]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/60edca25.k00ut905IFBjPyt5%25lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Since 3234ac664a ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims
the region") /dev/kmem zaps PTEs when the kernel requests exclusive
acccess to an iomem region. And with CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM, this is
the default for all driver uses.
Except there are two more ways to access PCI BARs: sysfs and proc mmap
support. Let's plug that hole.
For revoke_devmem() to work we need to link our vma into the same
address_space, with consistent vma->vm_pgoff. ->pgoff is already
adjusted, because that's how (io_)remap_pfn_range works, but for the
mapping we need to adjust vma->vm_file->f_mapping. The cleanest way is
to adjust this at at ->open time:
- for sysfs this is easy, now that binary attributes support this. We
just set bin_attr->mapping when mmap is supported
- for procfs it's a bit more tricky, since procfs PCI access has only
one file per device, and access to a specific resource first needs
to be set up with some ioctl calls. But mmap is only supported for
the same resources as sysfs exposes with mmap support, and otherwise
rejected, so we can set the mapping unconditionally at open time
without harm.
A special consideration is for arch_can_pci_mmap_io() - we need to
make sure that the ->f_mapping doesn't alias between ioport and iomem
space. There are only 2 ways in-tree to support mmap of ioports: generic
PCI mmap (ARCH_GENERIC_PCI_MMAP_RESOURCE), and sparc as the single
architecture hand-rolling. Both approaches support ioport mmap through a
special PFN range and not through magic PTE attributes. Aliasing is
therefore not a problem.
The only difference in access checks left is that sysfs PCI mmap does
not check for CAP_RAWIO. I'm not really sure whether that should be
added or not.
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210204165831.2703772-3-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
There's three ways to access PCI BARs from userspace: /dev/mem, sysfs
files, and the old proc interface. Two check against
iomem_is_exclusive, proc never did. And with CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM,
this starts to matter, since we don't want random userspace having
access to PCI BARs while a driver is loaded and using it.
Fix this by adding the same iomem_is_exclusive() check we already have
on the sysfs side in pci_mmap_resource().
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
References: 90a545e981 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201127164131.2244124-9-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Code that iterates over all standard PCI BARs typically uses
PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END. However, that requires the unusual test
"i <= PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END" rather than something the typical
"i < PCI_STD_NUM_BARS".
Add a definition for PCI_STD_NUM_BARS and change loops to use the more
idiomatic C style to help avoid fencepost errors.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190927234026.23342-1-efremov@linux.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190927234308.23935-1-efremov@linux.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190916204158.6889-3-efremov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.ibm.com> # arch/s390/
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> # video/fbdev/
Acked-by: Gustavo Pimentel <gustavo.pimentel@synopsys.com> # pci/controller/dwc/
Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> # scsi/pm8001/
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> # scsi/pm8001/
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # memstick/
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The driver name in /proc/bus/pci/devices can be printed without a printf
format specification, so use seq_puts() instead of seq_printf().
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a6b110cb-0d0e-5dc3-9ca1-9041609cf74c@web.de
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
[bhelgaas: commit log]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
drivers/pci/proc.c: In function ‘proc_bus_pci_ioctl’:
drivers/pci/proc.c:216:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (arch_can_pci_mmap_wc()) {
^
drivers/pci/proc.c:225:2: note: here
default:
^~~~~~~
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c: In function ‘pcifront_backend_changed’:
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c:1105:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (xdev->state == XenbusStateClosed)
^
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c:1108:2: note: here
case XenbusStateClosing:
^~~~
Notice that, in this particular case, the /* fall through */
comment is placed at the very bottom of the case statement,
which is what GCC is expecting to find.
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.
All trivial callers converted over.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Remove pointless comments that tell us the file name, remove blank line
comments, follow multi-line comment conventions. No functional change
intended.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In all cases we know which BAR it is. Passing it in means that arch code
(or generic code; watch this space) won't have to go looking for it again.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
This is relatively esoteric, and knowing that we don't have it makes life
easier in some cases rather than just an eventual -EINVAL from
pci_mmap_page_range().
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Most of the almost-identical versions of pci_mmap_page_range() silently
ignore the 'write_combine' argument and give uncached mappings.
Yet we allow the PCIIOC_WRITE_COMBINE ioctl in /proc/bus/pci, expose the
'resourceX_wc' file in sysfs, and allow an attempted mapping to apparently
succeed.
To fix this, introduce a macro arch_can_pci_mmap_wc() which indicates
whether the platform can do a write-combining mapping. On x86 this ends up
being pat_enabled(), while the few other platforms that support it can just
set it to a literal '1'.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
The /proc/bus/pci mmap interface allows the user to specify whether they
want WC or not. Don't let them do so on non-prefetchable BARs.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Don't match MMIO maps with I/O BARs and vice versa.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
PCI exposes files like /proc/bus/pci/00/00.0 in procfs. These files
support operations like this:
ioctl(fd, PCIIOC_MMAP_IS_IO); # request I/O port space
ioctl(fd, PCIIOC_WRITE_COMBINE, 1); # request write-combining
mmap(fd, ...)
Write combining is useful on PCI memory space, but I don't think it makes
sense on PCI I/O port space.
We *could* change proc_bus_pci_ioctl() to make it impossible to set
mmap_state == pci_mmap_io and write_combine at the same time, but that
would break the following sequence, which is currently legal:
mmap(fd, ...) # default is I/O, non-combining
ioctl(fd, PCIIOC_WRITE_COMBINE, 1); # request write-combining
ioctl(fd, PCIIOC_MMAP_IS_MEM); # request memory space
mmap(fd, ...) # get write-combining mapping
Ignore the write-combining flag when mapping I/O port space.
This patch should have no functional effect, based on this analysis of all
implementations of pci_mmap_page_range():
- ia64 mips parisc sh unicore32 x86 do not support mapping of I/O port
space at all.
- arm cris microblaze mn10300 sparc xtensa support mapping of I/O port
space, but ignore the write_combine argument to pci_mmap_page_range().
- powerpc supports mapping of I/O port space and uses write_combine, and
it disables write combining for I/O port space in
__pci_mmap_set_pgprot().
This patch makes it possible to remove __pci_mmap_set_pgprot() from
powerpc, which simplifies that path.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Fix various whitespace errors.
No functional change.
[bhelgaas: fix other similar problems]
Signed-off-by: Ryan Desfosses <ryan@desfo.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Fix whitespace, capitalization, and spelling errors. No functional change.
I know "busses" is not an error, but "buses" was more common, so I used it
consistently.
Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <rybczynska@gmail.com> (pci_reset_bridge_secondary_bus())
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
The only part of proc_dir_entry the code outside of fs/proc
really cares about is PDE(inode)->data. Provide a helper
for that; static inline for now, eventually will be moved
to fs/proc, along with the knowledge of struct proc_dir_entry
layout.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=48981
Peter reported that /proc/bus/pci/??/??.? does not work for 3.6.
This is because the device configuration space registers are
not accessible if the corresponding parent bridge is suspended or
the device is put into D3cold state.
This is the same as /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:??:??.?/config access
issue. So the function used to solve sysfs issue is used to solve
this issue.
This patch moves pci_config_pm_runtime_get()/_put() from pci/pci-sysfs.c
to pci/pci.c and makes them extern so they can be used by both the
sysfs and proc paths.
[bhelgaas: changelog, references, reporters]
Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=48981
Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49031
Reported-by: Forrest Loomis <cybercyst@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Peter <lekensteyn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Micael Dias <kam1kaz3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.6+
This removes unused code that was already commented out.
Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
The big kernel lock has been removed from all these files at some point,
leaving only the #include.
Remove this too as a cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The checks for valid mmaps of PCI resources made through /proc/bus/pci files
that were introduced in 9eff02e204 have several
problems:
1. mmap() calls on /proc/bus/pci files are made with real file offsets > 0,
whereas under /sys/bus/pci/devices, the start of the resource corresponds
to offset 0. This may lead to false negatives in pci_mmap_fits(), which
implicitly assumes the /sys/bus/pci/devices layout.
2. The loop in proc_bus_pci_mmap doesn't skip empty resouces. This leads
to false positives, because pci_mmap_fits() doesn't treat empty resources
correctly (the calculated size is 1 << (8*sizeof(resource_size_t)-PAGE_SHIFT)
in this case!).
3. If a user maps resources with BAR > 0, pci_mmap_fits will emit bogus
WARNINGS for the first resources that don't fit until the correct one is found.
On many controllers the first 2-4 BARs are used, and the others are empty.
In this case, an mmap attempt will first fail on the non-empty BARs
(including the "right" BAR because of 1.) and emit bogus WARNINGS because
of 3., and finally succeed on the first empty BAR because of 2.
This is certainly not the intended behaviour.
This patch addresses all 3 issues.
Updated with an enum type for the additional parameter for pci_mmap_fits().
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
All operations in the pci procfs ioctl functions are
atomic, so no lock is needed here.
Also add a compat_ioctl method, since all the commands
are compatible in 32 bit mode.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
This patch moves all definitions of the PCI resource names to an 'enum',
and also replaces some hard-coded resource variables with symbol
names. This change eases introduction of device specific resources.
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <yu.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
/proc/bus/pci allows you to mmap resource ranges too, so we should probably be
checking to make sure the mapping is somewhat valid. Uses the same code as the recent sysfs mmap range checking patch from Linus.
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
This patch removes CVS keywords that weren't updated for a long time
from comments.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Use proc_create()/proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data
be setup before gluing PDE to main tree.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Osterlund <petero2@telia.com>
Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove proc_bus export and variable itself. Using pathnames works fine
and is slightly more understandable and greppable.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix wrong counter check for proc_dir_entry in pci_proc_detach_device().
The pci_proc_detach_device() returns with -EBUSY before calling
remove_proc_entry() if the reference counter of proc_dir_entry is not
0. But this check is wrong and pci_proc_detach_device() always fails
because the reference counter of proc_dir_entry is initialized with 1
at creating time and decremented in remove_proc_entry(). This bug
cause strange behaviour as followings:
- Accessing /proc/bus/pci/XXXX/YY file after hot-removing pci adapter
card causes kernel panic.
- Repeating hot-add/hot-remove of pci adapter card increases files
with the same name under /proc/bus/pci/XXXX/ directory. For example:
# pwd
/proc/bus/pci/0002:09
# ls
01.0
# for i in `seq 5`
> do
> echo 0 > /sys/bus/pci/slots/0009_0032/power
> echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/slots/0009_0032/power
> done
# ls
01.0 01.0 01.0 01.0 01.0 01.0
The pci_proc_detach_device() should check if the reference counter is
not larger than 1 instead.
Signed-off-by: Kenji Kaneshige <kaneshige.kenji@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When a /proc/bus/pci file is written to, the size of that PCI device's
configuration space must be written to the inode. Otherwise, it is
possible for the file to specify a size of 0 on stat if a task is holding
the same file open.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
