2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Mickaël Salaün	06a1c40a09	landlock: Format with clang-format ... Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover, this will help maintain style consistency between different developers. This contains only whitespace changes. Automatically formatted with: clang-format-14 -i security/landlock/*.[ch] include/uapi/linux/landlock.h Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-3-mic@digikod.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>	2022-05-09 12:31:10 +02:00
Mickaël Salaün	afe81f7541	landlock: Add ptrace restrictions ... Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>	2021-04-22 12:22:10 -07:00