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The kasan_report() functions belongs to report.c, as it's a common
functions that does error reporting.
Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/78a81fde6eeda9db72a7fd55fbc33173a515e4b1.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN uses a single cc-option invocation to disable both conserve-stack
and stack-protector flags. The former flag is not present in Clang,
which causes cc-option to fail, and results in stack-protector being
enabled.
Fix by using separate cc-option calls for each flag. Also collect all
flags in a variable to avoid calling cc-option multiple times for
different files.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c2f0c8e4048852ae014f4a391d96ca42d27e3255.1590779332.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During early boot, while KASAN is not yet initialized, it is possible to
enter reporting code-path and end up in kasan_report().
While uninitialized, the branch there prevents generating any reports,
however, under certain circumstances when branches are being traced
(TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING), we may recurse deep enough to cause kernel
reboots without warning.
To prevent similar issues in future, we should disable branch tracing
for the core runtime.
[elver@google.com: remove duplicate DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING, per Qian Cai]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200517011732.GE24705@shao2-debian/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200522075207.157349-1-elver@google.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r//20200517011732.GE24705@shao2-debian/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200519182459.87166-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN is currently missing declarations for __asan_report* and __hwasan*
functions. This can lead to compiler warnings.
Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/45b445a76a79208918f0cc44bfabebaea909b54d.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN is incompatible with some kernel debugging/tracing features.
There's been multiple patches that disable those feature for some of
KASAN files one by one. Instead of prolonging that, disable these
features for all KASAN files at once.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29bd753d5ff5596425905b0b07f51153e2345cc1.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
filter_irq_stacks() can be used by other tools (e.g. KMSAN), so it needs
to be moved to a common location. lib/stackdepot.c seems a good place, as
filter_irq_stacks() is usually applied to the output of
stack_trace_save().
This patch has been previously mailed as part of KMSAN RFC patch series.
[glider@google.co: nds32: linker script: add SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT\
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121002.241430-1-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: add IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to linker script]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121124.243352-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220141916.55455-3-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4.
The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in
memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an
undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.
[1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/
This patch (of 2):
KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(),
and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected
by KASAN.
If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as
out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed
turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
KASAN report is shown below:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72
CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
show_stack+0x14/0x20
dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
__kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
kasan_report+0xc/0x18
check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
memmove+0x34/0x88
kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
[peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This tag contains a handful of patches that I'd like to target for this merge
window:
* Support for kasan.
* 32-bit physical addresses on rv32i-based systems.
* Support for CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
* DT entry for the FU540 GPIO controller, which has recently had a device
driver merged.
These boot a buildroot-based system on QEMU's virt board for me.
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Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.6-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
"This contains a handful of patches for this merge window:
- Support for kasan
- 32-bit physical addresses on rv32i-based systems
- Support for CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
- DT entry for the FU540 GPIO controller, which has recently had a
device driver merged
These boot a buildroot-based system on QEMU's virt board for me"
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.6-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
riscv: dts: Add DT support for SiFive FU540 GPIO driver
riscv: mm: add support for CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
riscv: keep 32-bit kernel to 32-bit phys_addr_t
kasan: Add riscv to KASAN documentation.
riscv: Add KASAN support
kasan: No KASAN's memmove check if archs don't have it.
If archs don't have memmove then the C implementation from lib/string.c is used,
and then it's instrumented by compiler. So there is no need to add KASAN's
memmove to manual checks.
Signed-off-by: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Make #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier
to understand by computing the address of the original access and
printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch.
This turns an error like this:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
into this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
[0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef]
The hook is placed in architecture-independent code, but is currently
only wired up to the X86 exception handler because I'm not sufficiently
familiar with the address space layout and exception handling mechanisms
on other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-4-jannh@google.com
With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y any use of memory obtained via vm_map_ram()
will crash because there is no shadow backing that memory.
Instead of sprinkling additional kasan_populate_vmalloc() calls all over
the vmalloc code, move it into alloc_vmap_area(). This will fix
vm_map_ram() and simplify the code a bit.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205095942.1761-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204204534.32202-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9e ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I hit the following compile error in arch/x86/
mm/kasan/common.c: In function kasan_populate_vmalloc:
mm/kasan/common.c:797:2: error: implicit declaration of function flush_cache_vmap; did you mean flush_rcu_work? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
flush_cache_vmap(shadow_start, shadow_end);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
flush_rcu_work
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1575363013-43761-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9e ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace 1 << compound_order(page) with compound_nr(page). Minor
improvements in readability.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-4-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Make working with compound pages easier", v2.
These three patches add three helpers and convert the appropriate
places to use them.
This patch (of 3):
It's unnecessarily hard to find out the size of a potentially huge page.
Replace 'PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page)' with page_size(page).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-2-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based
mode. The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound"
error instead of "invalid-access" error. This will make it easier for
programmers to see the memory corruption problem.
We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace,
we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good
guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's
"use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The code like this:
ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
page = virt_to_page(ptr);
offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
kfree(page_address(page) + offset);
may produce false-positive invalid-free reports on the kernel with
CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y.
In the example above we lose the original tag assigned to 'ptr', so
kfree() gets the pointer with 0xFF tag. In kfree() we check that 0xFF
tag is different from the tag in shadow hence print false report.
Instead of just comparing tags, do the following:
1) Check that shadow doesn't contain KASAN_TAG_INVALID. Otherwise it's
double-free and it doesn't matter what tag the pointer have.
2) If pointer tag is different from 0xFF, make sure that tag in the
shadow is the same as in the pointer.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819172540.19581-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This changes {,__}kasan_check_{read,write} functions to return a boolean
denoting if the access was valid or not.
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: include types.h for "bool"]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705184949.13cdd021@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-3-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "mm/kasan: Add object validation in ksize()", v3.
This patch (of 5):
This introduces __kasan_check_{read,write}. __kasan_check functions may
be used from anywhere, even compilation units that disable instrumentation
selectively.
This change eliminates the need for the __KASAN_INTERNAL definition.
[elver@google.com: v5]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190708170706.174189-2-elver@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-2-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This adds support for printing stack frame description on invalid stack
accesses. The frame description is embedded by the compiler, which is
parsed and then pretty-printed.
Currently, we can only print the stack frame info for accesses to the
task's own stack, but not accesses to other tasks' stacks.
Example of what it looks like:
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
addr ffff8880673ef98a is located in stack of task insmod/2008 at offset 106 in frame:
kasan_stack_oob+0x0/0xf5 [test_kasan]
this frame has 2 objects:
[32, 36) 'i'
[96, 106) 'stack_array'
Memory state around the buggy address:
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198435
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522100048.146841-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When building with -Wuninitialized and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS unset, Clang
warns:
mm/kasan/common.c:484:40: warning: variable 'tag' is uninitialized when
used here [-Wuninitialized]
kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
^~~
set_tag ignores tag in this configuration but clang doesn't realize it at
this point in its pipeline, as it points to arch_kasan_set_tag as being
the point where it is used, which will later be expanded to (void
*)(object) without a use of tag. Initialize tag to 0xff, as it removes
this warning and doesn't change the meaning of the code.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/465
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502163057.6603-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mostly just incremental improvements here:
- Introduce AT_HWCAP2 for advertising CPU features to userspace
- Expose SVE2 availability to userspace
- Support for "data cache clean to point of deep persistence" (DC PODP)
- Honour "mitigations=off" on the cmdline and advertise status via sysfs
- CPU timer erratum workaround (Neoverse-N1 #1188873)
- Introduce perf PMU driver for the SMMUv3 performance counters
- Add config option to disable the kuser helpers page for AArch32 tasks
- Futex modifications to ensure liveness under contention
- Rework debug exception handling to seperate kernel and user handlers
- Non-critical fixes and cleanup
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"Mostly just incremental improvements here:
- Introduce AT_HWCAP2 for advertising CPU features to userspace
- Expose SVE2 availability to userspace
- Support for "data cache clean to point of deep persistence" (DC PODP)
- Honour "mitigations=off" on the cmdline and advertise status via
sysfs
- CPU timer erratum workaround (Neoverse-N1 #1188873)
- Introduce perf PMU driver for the SMMUv3 performance counters
- Add config option to disable the kuser helpers page for AArch32 tasks
- Futex modifications to ensure liveness under contention
- Rework debug exception handling to seperate kernel and user
handlers
- Non-critical fixes and cleanup"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (92 commits)
Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst
arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB
arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
arm64: Fix size of __early_cpu_boot_status
clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Use arch_timer_read_counter to access stable counters
clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Remove use of workaround static key
clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Drop use of static key in arch_timer_reg_read_stable
clocksource/arm_arch_timer: Direcly assign set_next_event workaround
arm64: Use arch_timer_read_counter instead of arch_counter_get_cntvct
watchdog/sbsa: Use arch_timer_read_counter instead of arch_counter_get_cntvct
ARM: vdso: Remove dependency with the arch_timer driver internals
arm64: Apply ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 to Neoverse-N1
arm64: Add part number for Neoverse N1
arm64: Make ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 depend on COMPAT
arm64: Restrict ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 mitigation to AArch32
arm64: mm: Remove pte_unmap_nested()
arm64: Fix compiler warning from pte_unmap() with -Wunused-but-set-variable
arm64: compat: Reduce address limit for 64K pages
...
Pull stack trace updates from Ingo Molnar:
"So Thomas looked at the stacktrace code recently and noticed a few
weirdnesses, and we all know how such stories of crummy kernel code
meeting German engineering perfection end: a 45-patch series to clean
it all up! :-)
Here's the changes in Thomas's words:
'Struct stack_trace is a sinkhole for input and output parameters
which is largely pointless for most usage sites. In fact if embedded
into other data structures it creates indirections and extra storage
overhead for no benefit.
Looking at all usage sites makes it clear that they just require an
interface which is based on a storage array. That array is either on
stack, global or embedded into some other data structure.
Some of the stack depot usage sites are outright wrong, but
fortunately the wrongness just causes more stack being used for
nothing and does not have functional impact.
Another oddity is the inconsistent termination of the stack trace
with ULONG_MAX. It's pointless as the number of entries is what
determines the length of the stored trace. In fact quite some call
sites remove the ULONG_MAX marker afterwards with or without nasty
comments about it. Not all architectures do that and those which do,
do it inconsistenly either conditional on nr_entries == 0 or
unconditionally.
The following series cleans that up by:
1) Removing the ULONG_MAX termination in the architecture code
2) Removing the ULONG_MAX fixups at the call sites
3) Providing plain storage array based interfaces for stacktrace
and stackdepot.
4) Cleaning up the mess at the callsites including some related
cleanups.
5) Removing the struct stack_trace based interfaces
This is not changing the struct stack_trace interfaces at the
architecture level, but it removes the exposure to the generic
code'"
* 'core-stacktrace-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits)
x86/stacktrace: Use common infrastructure
stacktrace: Provide common infrastructure
lib/stackdepot: Remove obsolete functions
stacktrace: Remove obsolete functions
livepatch: Simplify stack trace retrieval
tracing: Remove the last struct stack_trace usage
tracing: Simplify stack trace retrieval
tracing: Make ftrace_trace_userstack() static and conditional
tracing: Use percpu stack trace buffer more intelligently
tracing: Simplify stacktrace retrieval in histograms
lockdep: Simplify stack trace handling
lockdep: Remove save argument from check_prev_add()
lockdep: Remove unused trace argument from print_circular_bug()
drm: Simplify stacktrace handling
dm persistent data: Simplify stack trace handling
dm bufio: Simplify stack trace retrieval
btrfs: ref-verify: Simplify stack trace retrieval
dma/debug: Simplify stracktrace retrieval
fault-inject: Simplify stacktrace retrieval
mm/page_owner: Simplify stack trace handling
...
In preparation for arm64 supporting ftrace built on other compiler
options, let's have Makefiles remove the $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) flags,
whatever these may be, rather than assuming '-pg'.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
KASAN inserts extra code for every LOAD/STORE emitted by te compiler.
Much of this code is simple and safe to run with AC=1, however the
kasan_report() function, called on error, is most certainly not safe
to call with AC=1.
Therefore wrap kasan_report() in user_access_{save,restore}; which for
x86 SMAP, saves/restores EFLAGS and clears AC before calling the real
function.
Also ensure all the functions are without __fentry__ hook. The
function tracer is also not safe.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
set_tag() compiles away when CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=n, so make
arch_kasan_set_tag() a static inline function to fix warnings below.
mm/kasan/common.c: In function '__kasan_kmalloc':
mm/kasan/common.c:475:5: warning: variable 'tag' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
u8 tag;
^~~
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190307185244.54648-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call
panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by
panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include
only relevant ones.
The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one
below with manual massaging of format strings.
@@
expression ptr, size, align;
@@
ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align);
+ if (!ptr)
+ panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align);
[anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky]
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS]
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390]
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen]
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k]
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kasan_p4d_table(), kasan_pmd_table() and kasan_pud_table() are declared
as returning bool, but return 0 instead of false, which produces a
coccinelle warning. Fix it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1fa6fadf644859e8a6a8ecce258444b49be8c7ee.1551716733.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Fixes: 0207df4fa1 ("kernel/memremap, kasan: make ZONE_DEVICE with work with KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Building little-endian allmodconfig kernels on arm64 started failing
with the generated atomic.h implementation, since we now try to call
kasan helpers from the EFI stub:
aarch64-linux-gnu-ld: drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.stub.o: in function `atomic_set':
include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:44: undefined reference to `__efistub_kasan_check_write'
I suspect that we get similar problems in other files that explicitly
disable KASAN for some reason but call atomic_t based helper functions.
We can fix this by checking the predefined __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ macro
that the compiler sets instead of checking CONFIG_KASAN, but this in
turn requires a small hack in mm/kasan/common.c so we do see the extern
declaration there instead of the inline function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211133453.2835077-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: b1864b828644 ("locking/atomics: build atomic headers as required")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel. It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1]. And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported. There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.
This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC <
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow. It probably adds
performance penalty too.
Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.
While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting. This is also fixed now.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are two issues with assigning random percpu seeds right now:
1. We use for_each_possible_cpu() to iterate over cpus, but cpumask is
not set up yet at the moment of kasan_init(), and thus we only set
the seed for cpu #0.
2. A call to get_random_u32() always returns the same number and produces
a message in dmesg, since the random subsystem is not yet initialized.
Fix 1 by calling kasan_init_tags() after cpumask is set up.
Fix 2 by using get_cycles() instead of get_random_u32(). This gives us
lower quality random numbers, but it's good enough, as KASAN is meant to
be used as a debugging tool and not a mitigation.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1f815cc914b61f3516ed4cc9bfd9eeca9bd5d9de.1550677973.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called: kasan_slab_alloc()
and kasan_kmalloc(). Right now we assign a tag twice, once in each of the
hooks. Fix it by assigning a tag only in the former hook.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ce8c6431da735aa7ec051fd6497153df690eb021.1549921721.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When option CONFIG_KASAN is enabled toghether with ftrace, function
ftrace_graph_caller() gets in to a recursion, via functions
kasan_check_read() and kasan_check_write().
Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179
179 mcount_get_pc x0 // function's pc
(gdb) bt
#0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179
#1 0xffffff90101406c8 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151
#2 0xffffff90106fd084 in kasan_check_write (p=0xffffffc06c170878, size=4) at ../mm/kasan/common.c:105
#3 0xffffff90104a2464 in atomic_add_return (v=<optimized out>, i=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:71
#4 atomic_inc_return (v=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-fallback.h:284
#5 trace_graph_entry (trace=0xffffffc03f5ff380) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:441
#6 0xffffff9010481774 in trace_graph_entry_watchdog (trace=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_selftest.c:741
#7 0xffffff90104a185c in function_graph_enter (ret=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728, retp=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:196
#8 0xffffff9010140628 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743592948977792, parent=0xffffffc03f5ff418, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728) at ../arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c:231
#9 0xffffff90101406f4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182
Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?)
(gdb)
Rework so that the kasan implementation isn't traced.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181212183447.15890-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now tag-based KASAN can retag the memory that is reallocated via
krealloc and return a differently tagged pointer even if the same slab
object gets used and no reallocated technically happens.
There are a few issues with this approach. One is that krealloc callers
can't rely on comparing the return value with the passed argument to
check whether reallocation happened. Another is that if a caller knows
that no reallocation happened, that it can access object memory through
the old pointer, which leads to false positives. Look at
nf_ct_ext_add() to see an example.
Fix this by keeping the same tag if the memory don't actually gets
reallocated during krealloc.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb2a71d17ed072bcc528cbee46fcbd71a6da3be4.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of changing cache->align to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE
in kasan_cache_create() we can reuse the ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN macro.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52ddd881916bcc153a9924c154daacde78522227.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Add support for fast mremap".
This series speeds up the mremap(2) syscall by copying page tables at
the PMD level even for non-THP systems. There is concern that the extra
'address' argument that mremap passes to pte_alloc may do something
subtle architecture related in the future that may make the scheme not
work. Also we find that there is no point in passing the 'address' to
pte_alloc since its unused. This patch therefore removes this argument
tree-wide resulting in a nice negative diff as well. Also ensuring
along the way that the enabled architectures do not do anything funky
with the 'address' argument that goes unnoticed by the optimization.
Build and boot tested on x86-64. Build tested on arm64. The config
enablement patch for arm64 will be posted in the future after more
testing.
The changes were obtained by applying the following Coccinelle script.
(thanks Julia for answering all Coccinelle questions!).
Following fix ups were done manually:
* Removal of address argument from pte_fragment_alloc
* Removal of pte_alloc_one_fast definitions from m68k and microblaze.
// Options: --include-headers --no-includes
// Note: I split the 'identifier fn' line, so if you are manually
// running it, please unsplit it so it runs for you.
virtual patch
@pte_alloc_func_def depends on patch exists@
identifier E2;
identifier fn =~
"^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$";
type T2;
@@
fn(...
- , T2 E2
)
{ ... }
@pte_alloc_func_proto_noarg depends on patch exists@
type T1, T2, T3, T4;
identifier fn =~ "^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$";
@@
(
- T3 fn(T1, T2);
+ T3 fn(T1);
|
- T3 fn(T1, T2, T4);
+ T3 fn(T1, T2);
)
@pte_alloc_func_proto depends on patch exists@
identifier E1, E2, E4;
type T1, T2, T3, T4;
identifier fn =~
"^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$";
@@
(
- T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2);
+ T3 fn(T1 E1);
|
- T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2, T4 E4);
+ T3 fn(T1 E1, T2 E2);
)
@pte_alloc_func_call depends on patch exists@
expression E2;
identifier fn =~
"^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$";
@@
fn(...
-, E2
)
@pte_alloc_macro depends on patch exists@
identifier fn =~
"^(__pte_alloc|pte_alloc_one|pte_alloc|__pte_alloc_kernel|pte_alloc_one_kernel)$";
identifier a, b, c;
expression e;
position p;
@@
(
- #define fn(a, b, c) e
+ #define fn(a, b) e
|
- #define fn(a, b) e
+ #define fn(a) e
)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108181201.88826-2-joelaf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.
Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things. It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds a "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0" mark to all source
files under mm/kasan.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bce2d1e618afa5142e81961ab8fa4b4165337380.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds __must_check annotations to kasan hooks that return a
pointer to make sure that a tagged pointer always gets propagated.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03b269c5e453945f724bfca3159d4e1333a8fb1c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tag-based KASAN doesn't check memory accesses through pointers tagged with
0xff. When page_address is used to get pointer to memory that corresponds
to some page, the tag of the resulting pointer gets set to 0xff, even
though the allocated memory might have been tagged differently.
For slab pages it's impossible to recover the correct tag to return from
page_address, since the page might contain multiple slab objects tagged
with different values, and we can't know in advance which one of them is
going to get accessed. For non slab pages however, we can recover the tag
in page_address, since the whole page was marked with the same tag.
This patch adds tagging to non slab memory allocated with pagealloc. To
set the tag of the pointer returned from page_address, the tag gets stored
to page->flags when the memory gets allocated.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d758ddcef46a5abc9970182b9137e2fbee202a2c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit adds tag-based KASAN specific hooks implementation and
adjusts common generic and tag-based KASAN ones.
1. When a new slab cache is created, tag-based KASAN rounds up the size of
the objects in this cache to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (== 16).
2. On each kmalloc tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, sets the shadow
memory, that corresponds to this object to this tag, and embeds this
tag value into the top byte of the returned pointer.
3. On each kfree tag-based KASAN poisons the shadow memory with a random
tag to allow detection of use-after-free bugs.
The rest of the logic of the hook implementation is very much similar to
the one provided by generic KASAN. Tag-based KASAN saves allocation and
free stack metadata to the slab object the same way generic KASAN does.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bda78069e3b8422039794050ddcb2d53d053ed41.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit adds rountines, that print tag-based KASAN error reports.
Those are quite similar to generic KASAN, the difference is:
1. The way tag-based KASAN finds the first bad shadow cell (with a
mismatching tag). Tag-based KASAN compares memory tags from the shadow
memory to the pointer tag.
2. Tag-based KASAN reports all bugs with the "KASAN: invalid-access"
header.
Also simplify generic KASAN find_first_bad_addr.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee6897b1bd077732a315fd84c6b4f234dbfdfcb.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move generic KASAN specific error reporting routines to generic_report.c
without any functional changes, leaving common error reporting code in
report.c to be later reused by tag-based KASAN.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ba48c32f8e5aefedee78998ccff0413bee9e0f5b.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit adds a few helper functions, that are meant to be used to work
with tags embedded in the top byte of kernel pointers: to set, to get or
to reset the top byte.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6c6437bb8e143bc44f42c3c259c62e734be7935.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A tag-based KASAN shadow memory cell contains a memory tag, that
corresponds to the tag in the top byte of the pointer, that points to that
memory. The native top byte value of kernel pointers is 0xff, so with
tag-based KASAN we need to initialize shadow memory to 0xff.
[cai@lca.pw: arm64: skip kmemleak for KASAN again\
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181226020550.63712-1-cai@lca.pw
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5cc1b789aad7c99cf4f3ec5b328b147ad53edb40.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
