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Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Four misc fixes: each was deemed serious enough to warrant v3.15
inclusion"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/fair: Fix tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() deadlock on rq->lock
sched/dl: Fix race in dl_task_timer()
sched: Fix sched_policy < 0 comparison
sched/numa: Fix use of spin_{un}lock_irq() when interrupts are disabled
Merge futex fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"So with more awake and less futex wreckaged brain, I went through my
list of points again and came up with the following 4 patches.
1) Prevent pi requeueing on the same futex
I kept Kees check for uaddr1 == uaddr2 as a early check for private
futexes and added a key comparison to both futex_requeue and
futex_wait_requeue_pi.
Sebastian, sorry for the confusion yesterday night. I really
misunderstood your question.
You are right the check is pointless for shared futexes where the
same physical address is mapped to two different virtual addresses.
2) Sanity check atomic acquisiton in futex_lock_pi_atomic
That's basically what Darren suggested.
I just simplified it to use futex_top_waiter() to find kernel
internal state. If state is found return -EINVAL and do not bother
to fix up the user space variable. It's corrupted already.
3) Ensure state consistency in futex_unlock_pi
The code is silly versus the owner died bit. There is no point to
preserve it on unlock when the user space thread owns the futex.
What's worse is that it does not update the user space value when
the owner died bit is set. So the kernel itself creates observable
inconsistency.
Another "optimization" is to retry an atomic unlock. That's
pointless as in a sane environment user space would not call into
that code if it could have unlocked it atomically. So we always
check whether there is kernel state around and only if there is
none, we do the unlock by setting the user space value to 0.
4) Sanitize lookup_pi_state
lookup_pi_state is ambigous about TID == 0 in the user space value.
This can be a valid state even if there is kernel state on this
uaddr, but we miss a few corner case checks.
I tried to come up with a smaller solution hacking the checks into
the current cruft, but it turned out to be ugly as hell and I got
more confused than I was before. So I rewrote the sanity checks
along the state documentation with awful lots of commentry"
* emailed patches from Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>:
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.
The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.
Handle the cases explicit:
Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ?
[1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid
[2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid
[3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid
[4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid
[5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid
[6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid
[7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid
[8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid
[9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid
[10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid
[1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
[2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
[3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
[4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
[5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
and exit_pi_state_list()
[6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
[7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
[8] Owner and user space value match
[9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
TID out of sync.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.
Clean it up unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.
Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.
[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() sets cfs_b->timer_active to 0 to
force the period timer restart. It's not safe, because
can lead to deadlock, described in commit 927b54fccb:
"__start_cfs_bandwidth calls hrtimer_cancel while holding rq->lock,
waiting for the hrtimer to finish. However, if sched_cfs_period_timer
runs for another loop iteration, the hrtimer can attempt to take
rq->lock, resulting in deadlock."
Three CPUs must be involved:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
take rq->lock period timer fired
... take cfs_b lock
... ... tg_set_cfs_bandwidth()
throttle_cfs_rq() release cfs_b lock take cfs_b lock
... distribute_cfs_runtime() timer_active = 0
take cfs_b->lock wait for rq->lock ...
__start_cfs_bandwidth()
{wait for timer callback
break if timer_active == 1}
So, CPU0 and CPU1 are deadlocked.
Instead of resetting cfs_b->timer_active, tg_set_cfs_bandwidth can
wait for period timer callbacks (ignoring cfs_b->timer_active) and
restart the timer explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wqdi9g8e.wl\%klamm@yandex-team.ru
Cc: pjt@google.com
Cc: chris.j.arges@canonical.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Throttled task is still on rq, and it may be moved to other cpu
if user is playing with sched_setaffinity(). Therefore, unlocked
task_rq() access makes the race.
Juri Lelli reports he got this race when dl_bandwidth_enabled()
was not set.
Other thing, pointed by Peter Zijlstra:
"Now I suppose the problem can still actually happen when
you change the root domain and trigger a effective affinity
change that way".
To fix that we do the same as made in __task_rq_lock(). We do not
use __task_rq_lock() itself, because it has a useful lockdep check,
which is not correct in case of dl_task_timer(). We do not need
pi_lock locked here. This case is an exception (PeterZ):
"The only reason we don't strictly need ->pi_lock now is because
we're guaranteed to have p->state == TASK_RUNNING here and are
thus free of ttwu races".
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3056991400578422@web14g.yandex.ru
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
attr.sched_policy is u32, therefore a comparison against < 0 is never true.
Fix this by casting sched_policy to int.
This issue was reported by coverity CID 1219934.
Fixes: dbdb22754f ("sched: Disallow sched_attr::sched_policy < 0")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401741514-7045-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
As Peter Zijlstra told me, we have the following path:
do_exit()
exit_itimers()
itimer_delete()
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->it_lock, &flags);
timer_delete_hook(timer);
kc->timer_del(timer) := posix_cpu_timer_del()
put_task_struct()
__put_task_struct()
task_numa_free()
spin_lock(&grp->lock);
Which means that task_numa_free() can be called with interrupts
disabled, which means that we should not be using spin_lock_irq() but
spin_lock_irqsave() instead. Otherwise we are enabling interrupts while
holding an interrupt unsafe lock!
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner<tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140527182541.GH11096@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There is still one residue of sysfs remaining: the sb_magic
SYSFS_MAGIC. However this should be kernfs user specific,
so this patch moves it out. Kerrnfs user should specify their
magic number while mouting.
Signed-off-by: Jianyu Zhan <nasa4836@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Various fixlets, mostly related to the (root-only) SCHED_DEADLINE
policy, but also a hotplug bug fix and a fix for a NR_CPUS related
overallocation bug causing a suspend/resume regression"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched: Fix hotplug vs. set_cpus_allowed_ptr()
sched/cpupri: Replace NR_CPUS arrays
sched/deadline: Replace NR_CPUS arrays
sched/deadline: Restrict user params max value to 2^63 ns
sched/deadline: Change sched_getparam() behaviour vs SCHED_DEADLINE
sched: Disallow sched_attr::sched_policy < 0
sched: Make sched_setattr() correctly return -EFBIG
Pull core futex/rtmutex fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Three fixlets for long standing issues in the futex/rtmutex code
unearthed by Dave Jones syscall fuzzer:
- Add missing early deadlock detection checks in the futex code
- Prevent user space from attaching a futex to kernel threads
- Make the deadlock detector of rtmutex work again
Looks large, but is more comments than code change"
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
rtmutex: Fix deadlock detector for real
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check
The current deadlock detection logic does not work reliably due to the
following early exit path:
/*
* Drop out, when the task has no waiters. Note,
* top_waiter can be NULL, when we are in the deboosting
* mode!
*/
if (top_waiter && (!task_has_pi_waiters(task) ||
top_waiter != task_top_pi_waiter(task)))
goto out_unlock_pi;
So this not only exits when the task has no waiters, it also exits
unconditionally when the current waiter is not the top priority waiter
of the task.
So in a nested locking scenario, it might abort the lock chain walk
and therefor miss a potential deadlock.
Simple fix: Continue the chain walk, when deadlock detection is
enabled.
We also avoid the whole enqueue, if we detect the deadlock right away
(A-A). It's an optimization, but also prevents that another waiter who
comes in after the detection and before the task has undone the damage
observes the situation and detects the deadlock and returns
-EDEADLOCK, which is wrong as the other task is not in a deadlock
situation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140522031949.725272460@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull two powerpc fixes from Ben Herrenschmidt:
"Here's a pair of powerpc fixes for 3.15 which are also going to
stable.
One's a fix for building with newer binutils (the problem currently
only affects the BookE kernels but the affected macro might come back
into use on BookS platforms at any time). Unfortunately, the binutils
maintainer did a backward incompatible change to a construct that we
use so we have to add Makefile check.
The other one is a fix for CPUs getting stuck in kexec when running
single threaded. Since we routinely use kexec on power (including in
our newer bootloaders), I deemed that important enough"
* 'merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc:
powerpc, kexec: Fix "Processor X is stuck" issue during kexec from ST mode
powerpc: Fix 64 bit builds with binutils 2.24
If we try to perform a kexec when the machine is in ST (Single-Threaded) mode
(ppc64_cpu --smt=off), the kexec operation doesn't succeed properly, and we
get the following messages during boot:
[ 0.089866] POWER8 performance monitor hardware support registered
[ 0.089985] power8-pmu: PMAO restore workaround active.
[ 5.095419] Processor 1 is stuck.
[ 10.097933] Processor 2 is stuck.
[ 15.100480] Processor 3 is stuck.
[ 20.102982] Processor 4 is stuck.
[ 25.105489] Processor 5 is stuck.
[ 30.108005] Processor 6 is stuck.
[ 35.110518] Processor 7 is stuck.
[ 40.113369] Processor 9 is stuck.
[ 45.115879] Processor 10 is stuck.
[ 50.118389] Processor 11 is stuck.
[ 55.120904] Processor 12 is stuck.
[ 60.123425] Processor 13 is stuck.
[ 65.125970] Processor 14 is stuck.
[ 70.128495] Processor 15 is stuck.
[ 75.131316] Processor 17 is stuck.
Note that only the sibling threads are stuck, while the primary threads (0, 8,
16 etc) boot just fine. Looking closer at the previous step of kexec, we observe
that kexec tries to wakeup (bring online) the sibling threads of all the cores,
before performing kexec:
[ 9464.131231] Starting new kernel
[ 9464.148507] kexec: Waking offline cpu 1.
[ 9464.148552] kexec: Waking offline cpu 2.
[ 9464.148600] kexec: Waking offline cpu 3.
[ 9464.148636] kexec: Waking offline cpu 4.
[ 9464.148671] kexec: Waking offline cpu 5.
[ 9464.148708] kexec: Waking offline cpu 6.
[ 9464.148743] kexec: Waking offline cpu 7.
[ 9464.148779] kexec: Waking offline cpu 9.
[ 9464.148815] kexec: Waking offline cpu 10.
[ 9464.148851] kexec: Waking offline cpu 11.
[ 9464.148887] kexec: Waking offline cpu 12.
[ 9464.148922] kexec: Waking offline cpu 13.
[ 9464.148958] kexec: Waking offline cpu 14.
[ 9464.148994] kexec: Waking offline cpu 15.
[ 9464.149030] kexec: Waking offline cpu 17.
Instrumenting this piece of code revealed that the cpu_up() operation actually
fails with -EBUSY. Thus, only the primary threads of all the cores are online
during kexec, and hence this is a sure-shot receipe for disaster, as explained
in commit e8e5c2155b (powerpc/kexec: Fix orphaned offline CPUs across kexec),
as well as in the comment above wake_offline_cpus().
It turns out that cpu_up() was returning -EBUSY because the variable
'cpu_hotplug_disabled' was set to 1; and this disabling of CPU hotplug was done
by migrate_to_reboot_cpu() inside kernel_kexec().
Now, migrate_to_reboot_cpu() was originally written with the assumption that
any further code will not need to perform CPU hotplug, since we are anyway in
the reboot path. However, kexec is clearly not such a case, since we depend on
onlining CPUs, atleast on powerpc.
So re-enable cpu-hotplug after returning from migrate_to_reboot_cpu() in the
kexec path, to fix this regression in kexec on powerpc.
Also, wrap the cpu_up() in powerpc kexec code within a WARN_ON(), so that we
can catch such issues more easily in the future.
Fixes: c97102ba96 (kexec: migrate to reboot cpu)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest commit is an irqtime accounting loop latency fix, the rest
are misc fixes all over the place: deadline scheduling, docs, numa,
balancer and a bad to-idle latency fix"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/numa: Initialize newidle balance stats in sd_numa_init()
sched: Fix updating rq->max_idle_balance_cost and rq->next_balance in idle_balance()
sched: Skip double execution of pick_next_task_fair()
sched: Use CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES instead of MAX_RT_PRIO in cpupri check
sched/deadline: Fix memory leak
sched/deadline: Fix sched_yield() behavior
sched: Sanitize irq accounting madness
sched/docbook: Fix 'make htmldocs' warnings caused by missing description
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest changes are fixes for races that kept triggering Trinity
crashes, plus liblockdep build fixes and smaller misc fixes.
The liblockdep bits in perf/urgent are a pull mistake - they should
have been in locking/urgent - but by the time I noticed other commits
were added and testing was done :-/ Sorry about that"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf: Fix a race between ring_buffer_detach() and ring_buffer_attach()
perf: Prevent false warning in perf_swevent_add
perf: Limit perf_event_attr::sample_period to 63 bits
tools/liblockdep: Remove all build files when doing make clean
tools/liblockdep: Build liblockdep from tools/Makefile
perf/x86/intel: Fix Silvermont's event constraints
perf: Fix perf_event_init_context()
perf: Fix race in removing an event
Lai found that:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 13 at arch/x86/kernel/smp.c:124 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x2d/0x4b()
...
migration_cpu_stop+0x1d/0x22
was caused by set_cpus_allowed_ptr() assuming that cpu_active_mask is
always a sub-set of cpu_online_mask.
This isn't true since 5fbd036b55 ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness").
So set active and online at the same time to avoid this particular
problem.
Fixes: 5fbd036b55 ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael wang <wangyun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53758B12.8060609@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tejun reported that his resume was failing due to order-3 allocations
from sched_domain building.
Replace the NR_CPUS arrays in there with a dynamically allocated
array.
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-7cysnkw1gik45r864t1nkudh@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tejun reported that his resume was failing due to order-3 allocations
from sched_domain building.
Replace the NR_CPUS arrays in there with a dynamically allocated
array.
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kat4gl1m5a6dwy6nzuqox45e@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Michael Kerrisk noticed that creating SCHED_DEADLINE reservations
with certain parameters (e.g, a runtime of something near 2^64 ns)
can cause a system freeze for some amount of time.
The problem is that in the interface we have
u64 sched_runtime;
while internally we need to have a signed runtime (to cope with
budget overruns)
s64 runtime;
At the time we setup a new dl_entity we copy the first value in
the second. The cast turns out with negative values when
sched_runtime is too big, and this causes the scheduler to go crazy
right from the start.
Moreover, considering how we deal with deadlines wraparound
(s64)(a - b) < 0
we also have to restrict acceptable values for sched_{deadline,period}.
This patch fixes the thing checking that user parameters are always
below 2^63 ns (still large enough for everyone).
It also rewrites other conditions that we check, since in
__checkparam_dl we don't have to deal with deadline wraparounds
and what we have now erroneously fails when the difference between
values is too big.
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Dario Faggioli<raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140513141131.20d944f81633ee937f256385@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The way we read POSIX one should only call sched_getparam() when
sched_getscheduler() returns either SCHED_FIFO or SCHED_RR.
Given that we currently return sched_param::sched_priority=0 for all
others, extend the same behaviour to SCHED_DEADLINE.
Requested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512205034.GH13467@laptop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The scheduler uses policy=-1 to preserve the current policy state to
implement sys_sched_setparam(), this got exposed to userspace by
accident through sys_sched_setattr(), cure this.
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140509085311.GJ30445@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The documented[1] behavior of sched_attr() in the proposed man page text is:
sched_attr::size must be set to the size of the structure, as in
sizeof(struct sched_attr), if the provided structure is smaller
than the kernel structure, any additional fields are assumed
'0'. If the provided structure is larger than the kernel structure,
the kernel verifies all additional fields are '0' if not the
syscall will fail with -E2BIG.
As currently implemented, sched_copy_attr() returns -EFBIG for
for this case, but the logic in sys_sched_setattr() converts that
error to -EFAULT. This patch fixes the behavior.
[1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1615615/focus=1697760
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/536CEC17.9070903@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull more cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"Three more patches to fix cgroup_freezer breakage due to the recent
cgroup internal locking changes - an operation cgroup_freezer was
using now requires sleepable context and cgroup_freezer was invoking
that while holding a spin lock. cgroup_freezer was using an overly
elaborate hierarchical locking scheme.
While it's possible to convert the hierarchical spinlocks directly to
mutexes, this patch simplifies the overall locking so that it uses a
global mutex. This has the added benefit of avoiding iterating
potentially huge number of tasks under a spinlock. While the patch is
on the larger side in the devel cycle, the changes made are mostly
straight-forward and the locking logic is a lot simpler afterwards"
* 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
cgroup: fix rcu_read_lock() leak in update_if_frozen()
cgroup_freezer: replace freezer->lock with freezer_mutex
cgroup: introduce task_css_is_root()
Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single bug fix for a long standing issue:
- Updating the expiry value of a relative timer _after_ letting the
idle logic select a target cpu for the timer based on its stale
expiry value is outright stupid. Thanks to Viresh for spotting the
brainfart"
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
hrtimer: Set expiry time before switch_hrtimer_base()
Alexander noticed that we use RCU iteration on rb->event_list but do
not use list_{add,del}_rcu() to add,remove entries to that list, nor
do we observe proper grace periods when re-using the entries.
Merge ring_buffer_detach() into ring_buffer_attach() such that
attaching to the NULL buffer is detaching.
Furthermore, ensure that between any 'detach' and 'attach' of the same
event we observe the required grace period, but only when strictly
required. In effect this means that only ioctl(.request =
PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT) will wait for a grace period, while the
normal initial attach and final detach will not be delayed.
This patch should, I think, do the right thing under all
circumstances, the 'normal' cases all should never see the extra grace
period, but the two cases:
1) PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT on an event which already has a
ring_buffer set, will now observe the required grace period between
removing itself from the old and attaching itself to the new buffer.
This case is 'simple' in that both buffers are present in
perf_event_set_output() one could think an unconditional
synchronize_rcu() would be sufficient; however...
2) an event that has a buffer attached, the buffer is destroyed
(munmap) and then the event is attached to a new/different buffer
using PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT.
This case is more complex because the buffer destruction does:
ring_buffer_attach(.rb = NULL)
followed by the ioctl() doing:
ring_buffer_attach(.rb = foo);
and we still need to observe the grace period between these two
calls due to us reusing the event->rb_entry list_head.
In order to make 2 happen we use Paul's latest cond_synchronize_rcu()
call.
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140507123526.GD13658@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The perf cpu offline callback takes down all cpu context
events and releases swhash->swevent_hlist.
This could race with task context software event being just
scheduled on this cpu via perf_swevent_add while cpu hotplug
code already cleaned up event's data.
The race happens in the gap between the cpu notifier code
and the cpu being actually taken down. Note that only cpu
ctx events are terminated in the perf cpu hotplug code.
It's easily reproduced with:
$ perf record -e faults perf bench sched pipe
while putting one of the cpus offline:
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
Console emits following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 at kernel/events/core.c:5672 perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 2845 Comm: sched-pipe Tainted: G W 3.14.0+ #256
Hardware name: Intel Corporation Montevina platform/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS AMVACRB1.86C.0066.B00.0805070703 05/07/2008
0000000000000009 ffff880077233ab8 ffffffff81665a23 0000000000200005
0000000000000000 ffff880077233af8 ffffffff8104732c 0000000000000046
ffff88007467c800 0000000000000002 ffff88007a9cf2a0 0000000000000001
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81665a23>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
[<ffffffff8104732c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
[<ffffffff8104737a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[<ffffffff8110fb3d>] perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff811162ae>] event_sched_in.isra.75+0x9e/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8111646a>] group_sched_in+0x6a/0x1f0
[<ffffffff81083dd5>] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0xa0
[<ffffffff811167e6>] ctx_sched_in+0x1f6/0x450
[<ffffffff8111757b>] perf_event_sched_in+0x6b/0xa0
[<ffffffff81117a4b>] perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81117ece>] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x43e/0x460
[<ffffffff81096f1e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.18+0xe/0x30
[<ffffffff8107b3c8>] finish_task_switch+0xb8/0x100
[<ffffffff8166a7de>] __schedule+0x30e/0xad0
[<ffffffff81172dd2>] ? pipe_read+0x3e2/0x560
[<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
[<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
[<ffffffff8166b464>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x44/0x70
[<ffffffff816707f0>] retint_kernel+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff8109e60a>] ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1a/0x90
[<ffffffff812a4234>] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67
[<ffffffff81679321>] ? sysret_check+0x5/0x56
Fixing this by tracking the cpu hotplug state and displaying
the WARN only if current cpu is initialized properly.
Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1396861448-10097-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Vince reported that using a large sample_period (one with bit 63 set)
results in wreckage since while the sample_period is fundamentally
unsigned (negative periods don't make sense) the way we implement
things very much rely on signed logic.
So limit sample_period to 63 bits to avoid tripping over this.
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-p25fhunibl4y3qi0zuqmyf4b@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.
Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.
We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com
That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
- it can detect that issue early
- it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out
If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.
The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
While updating cgroup_freezer locking, 68fafb77d827 ("cgroup_freezer:
replace freezer->lock with freezer_mutex") introduced a bug in
update_if_frozen() where it returns with rcu_read_lock() held. Fix it
by adding rcu_read_unlock() before returning.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
After 96d365e0b8 ("cgroup: make css_set_lock a rwsem and rename it
to css_set_rwsem"), css task iterators requires sleepable context as
it may block on css_set_rwsem. I missed that cgroup_freezer was
iterating tasks under IRQ-safe spinlock freezer->lock. This leads to
errors like the following on freezer state reads and transitions.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /work
/os/work/kernel/locking/rwsem.c:20
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 462, name: bash
5 locks held by bash/462:
#0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811f0843>] vfs_write+0x1a3/0x1c0
#1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8126d78b>] kernfs_fop_write+0xbb/0x170
#2: (s_active#70){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8126d793>] kernfs_fop_write+0xc3/0x170
#3: (freezer_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81135981>] freezer_write+0x61/0x1e0
#4: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81135973>] freezer_write+0x53/0x1e0
Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff81104404>] console_unlock+0x1e4/0x460
CPU: 3 PID: 462 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.15.0-rc1-work+ #10
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
ffff88000916a6d0 ffff88000e0a3da0 ffffffff81cf8c96 0000000000000000
ffff88000e0a3dc8 ffffffff810cf4f2 ffffffff82388040 ffff880013aaf740
0000000000000002 ffff88000e0a3de8 ffffffff81d05974 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81cf8c96>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
[<ffffffff810cf4f2>] __might_sleep+0x162/0x260
[<ffffffff81d05974>] down_read+0x24/0x60
[<ffffffff81133e87>] css_task_iter_start+0x27/0x70
[<ffffffff8113584d>] freezer_apply_state+0x5d/0x130
[<ffffffff81135a16>] freezer_write+0xf6/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8112eb88>] cgroup_file_write+0xd8/0x230
[<ffffffff8126d7b7>] kernfs_fop_write+0xe7/0x170
[<ffffffff811f0756>] vfs_write+0xb6/0x1c0
[<ffffffff811f121d>] SyS_write+0x4d/0xc0
[<ffffffff81d08292>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
freezer->lock used to be used in hot paths but that time is long gone
and there's no reason for the lock to be IRQ-safe spinlock or even
per-cgroup. In fact, given the fact that a cgroup may contain large
number of tasks, it's not a good idea to iterate over them while
holding IRQ-safe spinlock.
Let's simplify locking by replacing per-cgroup freezer->lock with
global freezer_mutex. This also makes the comments explaining the
intricacies of policy inheritance and the locking around it as the
states are protected by a common mutex.
The conversion is mostly straight-forward. The followings are worth
mentioning.
* freezer_css_online() no longer needs double locking.
* freezer_attach() now performs propagation simply while holding
freezer_mutex. update_if_frozen() race no longer exists and the
comment is removed.
* freezer_fork() now tests whether the task is in root cgroup using
the new task_css_is_root() without doing rcu_read_lock/unlock(). If
not, it grabs freezer_mutex and performs the operation.
* freezer_read() and freezer_change_state() grab freezer_mutex across
the whole operation and pin the css while iterating so that each
descendant processing happens in sleepable context.
Fixes: 96d365e0b8 ("cgroup: make css_set_lock a rwsem and rename it to css_set_rwsem")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Determining the css of a task usually requires RCU read lock as that's
the only thing which keeps the returned css accessible till its
reference is acquired; however, testing whether a task belongs to the
root can be performed without dereferencing the returned css by
comparing the returned pointer against the root one in init_css_set[]
which never changes.
Implement task_css_is_root() which can be invoked in any context.
This will be used by the scheduled cgroup_freezer change.
v2: cgroup no longer supports modular controllers. No need to export
init_css_set. Pointed out by Li.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Pull workqueue fixes from Tejun Heo:
"Fixes for two bugs in workqueue.
One is exiting with internal mutex held in a failure path of
wq_update_unbound_numa(). The other is a subtle and unlikely
use-after-possible-last-put in the rescuer logic. Both have been
around for quite some time now and are unlikely to have triggered
noticeably often. All patches are marked for -stable backport"
* 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
workqueue: fix a possible race condition between rescuer and pwq-release
workqueue: make rescuer_thread() empty wq->maydays list before exiting
workqueue: fix bugs in wq_update_unbound_numa() failure path
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"During recent restructuring, device_cgroup unified config input check
and enforcement logic; unfortunately, it turned out to share too much.
Aristeu's patches fix the breakage and marked for -stable backport.
The other two patches are fallouts from kernfs conversion. The blkcg
change is temporary and will go away once kernfs internal locking gets
simplified (patches pending)"
* 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
blkcg: use trylock on blkcg_pol_mutex in blkcg_reset_stats()
device_cgroup: check if exception removal is allowed
device_cgroup: fix the comment format for recently added functions
device_cgroup: rework device access check and exception checking
cgroup: fix the retry path of cgroup_mount()
Pull x86 fixes from Peter Anvin:
"A somewhat unpleasantly large collection of small fixes. The big ones
are the __visible tree sweep and a fix for 'earlyprintk=efi,keep'. It
was using __init functions with predictably suboptimal results.
Another key fix is a build fix which would produce output that simply
would not decompress correctly in some configuration, due to the
existing Makefiles picking up an unfortunate local label and mistaking
it for the global symbol _end.
Additional fixes include the handling of 64-bit numbers when setting
the vdso data page (a latent bug which became manifest when i386
started exporting a vdso with time functions), a fix to the new MSR
manipulation accessors which would cause features to not get properly
unblocked, a build fix for 32-bit userland, and a few new platform
quirks"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86, vdso, time: Cast tv_nsec to u64 for proper shifting in update_vsyscall()
x86: Fix typo in MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID macro
x86: Fix typo preventing msr_set/clear_bit from having an effect
x86/intel: Add quirk to disable HPET for the Baytrail platform
x86/hpet: Make boot_hpet_disable extern
x86-64, build: Fix stack protector Makefile breakage with 32-bit userland
x86/reboot: Add reboot quirk for Certec BPC600
asmlinkage: Add explicit __visible to drivers/*, lib/*, kernel/*
asmlinkage, x86: Add explicit __visible to arch/x86/*
asmlinkage: Revert "lto: Make asmlinkage __visible"
x86, build: Don't get confused by local symbols
x86/efi: earlyprintk=efi,keep fix
The first is a long standing bug that causes bogus data to show up
in the refcnt field of the module_refcnt tracepoint. It was
introduced by a merge conflict resolution back in 2.6.35-rc days.
The result should be refcnt = incs - decs, but instead it did
refcnt = incs + decs.
The second fix is to a bug that was introduced in this merge window
that allowed for a tracepoint funcs pointer to be used after it
was freed. Moving the location of where the probes are released
solved the problem.
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Merge tag 'trace-fixes-v3.15-rc4-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains two fixes.
The first is a long standing bug that causes bogus data to show up in
the refcnt field of the module_refcnt tracepoint. It was introduced
by a merge conflict resolution back in 2.6.35-rc days.
The result should be 'refcnt = incs - decs', but instead it did
'refcnt = incs + decs'.
The second fix is to a bug that was introduced in this merge window
that allowed for a tracepoint funcs pointer to be used after it was
freed. Moving the location of where the probes are released solved
the problem"
* tag 'trace-fixes-v3.15-rc4-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracepoint: Fix use of tracepoint funcs after rcu free
trace: module: Maintain a valid user count
Commit de7b297390 "tracepoint: Use struct pointer instead of name hash
for reg/unreg tracepoints" introduces a use after free by calling
release_probes on the old struct tracepoint array before the newly
allocated array is published with rcu_assign_pointer. There is a race
window where tracepoints (RCU readers) can perform a
"use-after-grace-period-after-free", which shows up as a GPF in
stress-tests.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53698021.5020108@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1399549669-25465-1-git-send-email-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Fixes: de7b297390 "tracepoint: Use struct pointer instead of name hash for reg/unreg tracepoints"
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The following commit:
e5fc66119e ("sched: Fix race in idle_balance()")
can potentially cause rq->max_idle_balance_cost to not be updated,
even when load_balance(NEWLY_IDLE) is attempted and the per-sd
max cost value is updated.
Preeti noticed a similar issue with updating rq->next_balance.
In this patch, we fix this by making sure we still check/update those values
even if a task gets enqueued while browsing the domains.
Signed-off-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Preeti U Murthy <preeti@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: morten.rasmussen@arm.com
Cc: aswin@hp.com
Cc: daniel.lezcano@linaro.org
Cc: alex.shi@linaro.org
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398725155-7591-2-git-send-email-jason.low2@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tim wrote:
"The current code will call pick_next_task_fair a second time in the
slow path if we did not pull any task in our first try. This is
really unnecessary as we already know no task can be pulled and it
doubles the delay for the cpu to enter idle.
We instrumented some network workloads and that saw that
pick_next_task_fair is frequently called twice before a cpu enters
idle. The call to pick_next_task_fair can add non trivial latency as
it calls load_balance which runs find_busiest_group on an hierarchy of
sched domains spanning the cpus for a large system. For some 4 socket
systems, we saw almost 0.25 msec spent per call of pick_next_task_fair
before a cpu can be idled."
Optimize the second call away for the common case and document the
dependency.
Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140424100047.GP11096@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The check at the beginning of cpupri_find() makes sure that the task_pri
variable does not exceed the cp->pri_to_cpu array length. But that length
is CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES not MAX_RT_PRIO, where it will miss the last two
priorities in that array.
As task_pri is computed from convert_prio() which should never be bigger
than CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES, if the check should cause a panic if it is
hit.
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1397015410.5212.13.camel@marge.simpson.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
yield_task_dl() is broken:
o it forces current to be throttled setting its runtime to zero;
o it sets current's dl_se->dl_new to one, expecting that dl_task_timer()
will queue it back with proper parameters at replenish time.
Unfortunately, dl_task_timer() has this check at the very beginning:
if (!dl_task(p) || dl_se->dl_new)
goto unlock;
So, it just bails out and the task is never replenished. It actually
yielded forever.
To fix this, introduce a new flag indicating that the task properly yielded
the CPU before its current runtime expired. While this is a little overdoing
at the moment, the flag would be useful in the future to discriminate between
"good" jobs (of which remaining runtime could be reclaimed, i.e. recycled)
and "bad" jobs (for which dl_throttled task has been set) that needed to be
stopped.
Reported-by: yjay.kim <yjay.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429103953.e68eba1b2ac3309214e3dc5a@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Russell reported, that irqtime_account_idle_ticks() takes ages due to:
for (i = 0; i < ticks; i++)
irqtime_account_process_tick(current, 0, rq);
It's sad, that this code was written way _AFTER_ the NOHZ idle
functionality was available. I charge myself guitly for not paying
attention when that crap got merged with commit abb74cefa ("sched:
Export ns irqtimes through /proc/stat")
So instead of looping nr_ticks times just apply the whole thing at
once.
As a side note: The whole cputime_t vs. u64 business in that context
wants to be cleaned up as well. There is no point in having all these
back and forth conversions. Lets standardise on u64 nsec for all
kernel internal accounting and be done with it. Everything else does
not make sense at all for fine grained accounting. Frederic, can you
please take care of that?
Reported-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Cc: Shaun Ruffell <sruffell@digium.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.02.1405022307000.6261@ionos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When removing a (sibling) event we do:
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
perf_group_detach(event);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
<hole>
perf_remove_from_context(event);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
...
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
Now, assuming the event is a sibling, it will be 'unreachable' for
things like ctx_sched_out() because that iterates the
groups->siblings, and we just unhooked the sibling.
So, if during <hole> we get ctx_sched_out(), it will miss the event
and not call event_sched_out() on it, leaving it programmed on the
PMU.
The subsequent perf_remove_from_context() call will find the ctx is
inactive and only call list_del_event() to remove the event from all
other lists.
Hereafter we can proceed to free the event; while still programmed!
Close this hole by moving perf_group_detach() inside the same
ctx->lock region(s) perf_remove_from_context() has.
The condition on inherited events only in __perf_event_exit_task() is
likely complete crap because non-inherited events are part of groups
too and we're tearing down just the same. But leave that for another
patch.
Most-likely-Fixes: e03a9a55b4 ("perf: Change close() semantics for group events")
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140505093124.GN17778@laptop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
