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Most allocation sites in the kernel want an explicitly sized allocation
(and not "more"), and that dynamic runtime analysis tools (e.g. KASAN,
UBSAN_BOUNDS, FORTIFY_SOURCE, etc) are looking for precise bounds checking
(i.e. not something that is rounded up). A tiny handful of allocations
were doing an implicit alloc/realloc loop that actually depended on
ksize(), and didn't actually always call realloc. This has created a
long series of bugs and problems over many years related to the runtime
bounds checking, so these callers are finally being adjusted to _not_
depend on the ksize() side-effect, by doing one of several things:
- tracking the allocation size precisely and just never calling ksize()
at all [1].
- always calling realloc and not using ksize() at all. (This solution
ends up actually be a subset of the next solution.)
- using kmalloc_size_roundup() to explicitly round up the desired
allocation size immediately [2].
The bpf/verifier case is this another of this latter case, and is the
last outstanding case to be fixed in the kernel.
Because some of the dynamic bounds checking depends on the size being an
_argument_ to an allocator function (i.e. see the __alloc_size attribute),
the ksize() users are rare, and it could waste local variables, it
was been deemed better to explicitly separate the rounding up from the
allocation itself [3].
Round up allocations with kmalloc_size_roundup() so that the verifier's
use of ksize() is always accurate.
[1] e.g.:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/712f210a457dhttps://git.kernel.org/linus/72c08d9f4c72
[2] e.g.:
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/12d6c1d3a2adhttps://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/ab3f7828c979https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/d6dd508080a3
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0ea1fc165a6c6117f982f4f135093e69cb884930.camel@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221118183409.give.387-kees@kernel.org
Implement bpf_rdonly_cast() which tries to cast the object
to a specified type. This tries to support use case like below:
#define skb_shinfo(SKB) ((struct skb_shared_info *)(skb_end_pointer(SKB)))
where skb_end_pointer(SKB) is a 'unsigned char *' and needs to
be casted to 'struct skb_shared_info *'.
The signature of bpf_rdonly_cast() looks like
void *bpf_rdonly_cast(void *obj, __u32 btf_id)
The function returns the same 'obj' but with PTR_TO_BTF_ID with
btf_id. The verifier will ensure btf_id being a struct type.
Since the supported type cast may not reflect what the 'obj'
represents, the returned btf_id is marked as PTR_UNTRUSTED, so
the return value and subsequent pointer chasing cannot be
used as helper/kfunc arguments.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120195437.3114585-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Implement bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() kfunc which does a type cast
of a uapi ctx object to the corresponding kernel ctx. Previously
if users want to access some data available in kctx but not
in uapi ctx, bpf_probe_read_kernel() helper is needed.
The introduction of bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() allows direct
memory access which makes code simpler and easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120195432.3113982-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Later on, we will introduce kfuncs bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() and
bpf_rdonly_cast() which apply to all program types. Currently kfunc set
only supports individual prog types. This patch added support for kfunc
applying to all program types.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120195426.3113828-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In the unlikely event that bpf_global_ma is not correctly initialized,
instead of checking the boolean everytime bpf_obj_new_impl is called,
simply check it while loading the program and return an error if
bpf_global_ma_set is false.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120212610.2361700-1-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Now that BPF supports adding new kernel functions with kfuncs, and
storing kernel objects in maps with kptrs, we can add a set of kfuncs
which allow struct task_struct objects to be stored in maps as
referenced kptrs. The possible use cases for doing this are plentiful.
During tracing, for example, it would be useful to be able to collect
some tasks that performed a certain operation, and then periodically
summarize who they are, which cgroup they're in, how much CPU time
they've utilized, etc.
In order to enable this, this patch adds three new kfuncs:
struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire(struct task_struct *p);
struct task_struct *bpf_task_kptr_get(struct task_struct **pp);
void bpf_task_release(struct task_struct *p);
A follow-on patch will add selftests validating these kfuncs.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120051004.3605026-4-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Kfuncs currently support specifying the KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag to signal
to the verifier that it should enforce that a BPF program passes it a
"safe", trusted pointer. Currently, "safe" means that the pointer is
either PTR_TO_CTX, or is refcounted. There may be cases, however, where
the kernel passes a BPF program a safe / trusted pointer to an object
that the BPF program wishes to use as a kptr, but because the object
does not yet have a ref_obj_id from the perspective of the verifier, the
program would be unable to pass it to a KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS
kfunc.
The solution is to expand the set of pointers that are considered
trusted according to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, so that programs can invoke kfuncs
with these pointers without getting rejected by the verifier.
There is already a PTR_UNTRUSTED flag that is set in some scenarios,
such as when a BPF program reads a kptr directly from a map
without performing a bpf_kptr_xchg() call. These pointers of course can
and should be rejected by the verifier. Unfortunately, however,
PTR_UNTRUSTED does not cover all the cases for safety that need to
be addressed to adequately protect kfuncs. Specifically, pointers
obtained by a BPF program "walking" a struct are _not_ considered
PTR_UNTRUSTED according to BPF. For example, say that we were to add a
kfunc called bpf_task_acquire(), with KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, to
acquire a struct task_struct *. If we only used PTR_UNTRUSTED to signal
that a task was unsafe to pass to a kfunc, the verifier would mistakenly
allow the following unsafe BPF program to be loaded:
SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
int BPF_PROG(unsafe_acquire_task,
struct task_struct *task,
u64 clone_flags)
{
struct task_struct *acquired, *nested;
nested = task->last_wakee;
/* Would not be rejected by the verifier. */
acquired = bpf_task_acquire(nested);
if (!acquired)
return 0;
bpf_task_release(acquired);
return 0;
}
To address this, this patch defines a new type flag called PTR_TRUSTED
which tracks whether a PTR_TO_BTF_ID pointer is safe to pass to a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc or a BPF helper function. PTR_TRUSTED pointers are
passed directly from the kernel as a tracepoint or struct_ops callback
argument. Any nested pointer that is obtained from walking a PTR_TRUSTED
pointer is no longer PTR_TRUSTED. From the example above, the struct
task_struct *task argument is PTR_TRUSTED, but the 'nested' pointer
obtained from 'task->last_wakee' is not PTR_TRUSTED.
A subsequent patch will add kfuncs for storing a task kfunc as a kptr,
and then another patch will add selftests to validate.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120051004.3605026-3-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
reg_type_str() in the verifier currently only allows a single register
type modifier to be present in the 'prefix' string which is eventually
stored in the env type_str_buf. This currently works fine because there
are no overlapping type modifiers, but once PTR_TRUSTED is added, that
will no longer be the case. This patch updates reg_type_str() to support
having multiple modifiers in the prefix string, and updates the size of
type_str_buf to be 128 bytes.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120051004.3605026-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The old behavior of bpf_map_meta_equal was that it compared timer_off
to be equal (but not spin_lock_off, because that was not allowed), and
did memcmp of kptr_off_tab.
Now, we memcmp the btf_record of two bpf_map structs, which has all
fields.
We preserve backwards compat as we kzalloc the array, so if only spin
lock and timer exist in map, we only compare offset while the rest of
unused members in the btf_field struct are zeroed out.
In case of kptr, btf and everything else is of vmlinux or module, so as
long type is same it will match, since kernel btf, module, dtor pointer
will be same across maps.
Now with list_head in the mix, things are a bit complicated. We
implicitly add a requirement that both BTFs are same, because struct
btf_field_list_head has btf and value_rec members.
We obviously shouldn't force BTFs to be equal by default, as that breaks
backwards compatibility.
Currently it is only implicitly required due to list_head matching
struct btf and value_rec member. value_rec points back into a btf_record
stashed in the map BTF (btf member of btf_field_list_head). So that
pointer and btf member has to match exactly.
Document all these subtle details so that things don't break in the
future when touching this code.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-19-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit implements the delayed release logic for bpf_list_push_front
and bpf_list_push_back.
Once a node has been added to the list, it's pointer changes to
PTR_UNTRUSTED. However, it is only released once the lock protecting the
list is unlocked. For such PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC with PTR_UNTRUSTED
set but an active ref_obj_id, it is still permitted to read them as long
as the lock is held. Writing to them is not allowed.
This allows having read access to push items we no longer own until we
release the lock guarding the list, allowing a little more flexibility
when working with these APIs.
Note that enabling write support has fairly tricky interactions with
what happens inside the critical section. Just as an example, currently,
bpf_obj_drop is not permitted, but if it were, being able to write to
the PTR_UNTRUSTED pointer while the object gets released back to the
memory allocator would violate safety properties we wish to guarantee
(i.e. not crashing the kernel). The memory could be reused for a
different type in the BPF program or even in the kernel as it gets
eventually kfree'd.
Not enabling bpf_obj_drop inside the critical section would appear to
prevent all of the above, but that is more of an artifical limitation
right now. Since the write support is tangled with how we handle
potential aliasing of nodes inside the critical section that may or may
not be part of the list anymore, it has been deferred to a future patch.
Acked-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-18-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a linked list API for use in BPF programs, where it expects
protection from the bpf_spin_lock in the same allocation as the
bpf_list_head. For now, only one bpf_spin_lock can be present hence that
is assumed to be the one protecting the bpf_list_head.
The following functions are added to kick things off:
// Add node to beginning of list
void bpf_list_push_front(struct bpf_list_head *head, struct bpf_list_node *node);
// Add node to end of list
void bpf_list_push_back(struct bpf_list_head *head, struct bpf_list_node *node);
// Remove node at beginning of list and return it
struct bpf_list_node *bpf_list_pop_front(struct bpf_list_head *head);
// Remove node at end of list and return it
struct bpf_list_node *bpf_list_pop_back(struct bpf_list_head *head);
The lock protecting the bpf_list_head needs to be taken for all
operations. The verifier ensures that the lock that needs to be taken is
always held, and only the correct lock is taken for these operations.
These checks are made statically by relying on the reg->id preserved for
registers pointing into regions having both bpf_spin_lock and the
objects protected by it. The comment over check_reg_allocation_locked in
this change describes the logic in detail.
Note that bpf_list_push_front and bpf_list_push_back are meant to
consume the object containing the node in the 1st argument, however that
specific mechanism is intended to not release the ref_obj_id directly
until the bpf_spin_unlock is called. In this commit, nothing is done,
but the next commit will be introducing logic to handle this case, so it
has been left as is for now.
bpf_list_pop_front and bpf_list_pop_back delete the first or last item
of the list respectively, and return pointer to the element at the
list_node offset. The user can then use container_of style macro to get
the actual entry type. The verifier however statically knows the actual
type, so the safety properties are still preserved.
With these additions, programs can now manage their own linked lists and
store their objects in them.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-17-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Pointer increment on seeing PTR_MAYBE_NULL is already protected against,
hence make an exception for PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC while still
keeping the warning for other unintended cases that might creep in.
bpf_list_pop_{front,_back} helpers planned to be introduced in next
commit will return a MEM_ALLOC register with incremented offset pointing
to bpf_list_node field. The user is supposed to then obtain the pointer
to the entry using container_of after NULL checking it. The current
restrictions trigger a warning when doing the NULL checking. Revisiting
the reason, it is meant as an assertion which seems to actually work and
catch the bad case.
Hence, under no other circumstances can reg->off be non-zero for a
register that has the PTR_MAYBE_NULL type flag set.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-16-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce bpf_obj_drop, which is the kfunc used to free allocated
objects (allocated using bpf_obj_new). Pairing with bpf_obj_new, it
implicitly destructs the fields part of object automatically without
user intervention.
Just like the previous patch, btf_struct_meta that is needed to free up
the special fields is passed as a hidden argument to the kfunc.
For the user, a convenience macro hides over the kernel side kfunc which
is named bpf_obj_drop_impl.
Continuing the previous example:
void prog(void) {
struct foo *f;
f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f));
if (!f)
return;
bpf_obj_drop(f);
}
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-15-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce type safe memory allocator bpf_obj_new for BPF programs. The
kernel side kfunc is named bpf_obj_new_impl, as passing hidden arguments
to kfuncs still requires having them in prototype, unlike BPF helpers
which always take 5 arguments and have them checked using bpf_func_proto
in verifier, ignoring unset argument types.
Introduce __ign suffix to ignore a specific kfunc argument during type
checks, then use this to introduce support for passing type metadata to
the bpf_obj_new_impl kfunc.
The user passes BTF ID of the type it wants to allocates in program BTF,
the verifier then rewrites the first argument as the size of this type,
after performing some sanity checks (to ensure it exists and it is a
struct type).
The second argument is also fixed up and passed by the verifier. This is
the btf_struct_meta for the type being allocated. It would be needed
mostly for the offset array which is required for zero initializing
special fields while leaving the rest of storage in unitialized state.
It would also be needed in the next patch to perform proper destruction
of the object's special fields.
Under the hood, bpf_obj_new will call bpf_mem_alloc and bpf_mem_free,
using the any context BPF memory allocator introduced recently. To this
end, a global instance of the BPF memory allocator is initialized on
boot to be used for this purpose. This 'bpf_global_ma' serves all
allocations for bpf_obj_new. In the future, bpf_obj_new variants will
allow specifying a custom allocator.
Note that now that bpf_obj_new can be used to allocate objects that can
be linked to BPF linked list (when future linked list helpers are
available), we need to also free the elements using bpf_mem_free.
However, since the draining of elements is done outside the
bpf_spin_lock, we need to do migrate_disable around the call since
bpf_list_head_free can be called from map free path where migration is
enabled. Otherwise, when called from BPF programs migration is already
disabled.
A convenience macro is included in the bpf_experimental.h header to hide
over the ugly details of the implementation, leading to user code
looking similar to a language level extension which allocates and
constructs fields of a user type.
struct bar {
struct bpf_list_node node;
};
struct foo {
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(bar, node);
};
void prog(void) {
struct foo *f;
f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f));
if (!f)
return;
...
}
A key piece of this story is still missing, i.e. the free function,
which will come in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-14-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow passing known constant scalars as arguments to kfuncs that do not
represent a size parameter. We use mark_chain_precision for the constant
scalar argument to mark it precise. This makes the search pruning
optimization of verifier more conservative for such kfunc calls, and
each non-distinct argument is considered unequivalent.
We will use this support to then expose a bpf_obj_new function where it
takes the local type ID of a type in program BTF, and returns a
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC to the local type, and allows programs to
allocate their own objects.
Each type ID resolves to a distinct type with a possibly distinct size,
hence the type ID constant matters in terms of program safety and its
precision needs to be checked between old and cur states inside regsafe.
The use of mark_chain_precision enables this.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-13-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
As we continue to add more features, argument types, kfunc flags, and
different extensions to kfuncs, the code to verify the correctness of
the kfunc prototype wrt the passed in registers has become ad-hoc and
ugly to read. To make life easier, and make a very clear split between
different stages of argument processing, move all the code into
verifier.c and refactor into easier to read helpers and functions.
This also makes sharing code within the verifier easier with kfunc
argument processing. This will be more and more useful in later patches
as we are now moving to implement very core BPF helpers as kfuncs, to
keep them experimental before baking into UAPI.
Remove all kfunc related bits now from btf_check_func_arg_match, as
users have been converted away to refactored kfunc argument handling.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-12-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
There is no need to restrict users from locking bpf_spin_lock in map
values of inner maps. Each inner map lookup gets a unique reg->id
assigned to the returned PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE which will be preserved after
the NULL check. Distinct lookups into different inner map get unique
IDs, and distinct lookups into same inner map also get unique IDs.
Hence, lift the restriction by removing the check return -ENOTSUPP in
map_in_map.c. Later commits will add comprehensive test cases to ensure
that invalid cases are rejected.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-11-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Global variables reside in maps accessible using direct_value_addr
callbacks, so giving each load instruction's rewrite a unique reg->id
disallows us from holding locks which are global.
The reason for preserving reg->id as a unique value for registers that
may point to spin lock is that two separate lookups are treated as two
separate memory regions, and any possible aliasing is ignored for the
purposes of spin lock correctness.
This is not great especially for the global variable case, which are
served from maps that have max_entries == 1, i.e. they always lead to
map values pointing into the same map value.
So refactor the active_spin_lock into a 'active_lock' structure which
represents the lock identity, and instead of the reg->id, remember two
fields, a pointer and the reg->id. The pointer will store reg->map_ptr
or reg->btf. It's only necessary to distinguish for the id == 0 case of
global variables, but always setting the pointer to a non-NULL value and
using the pointer to check whether the lock is held simplifies code in
the verifier.
This is generic enough to allow it for global variables, map lookups,
and allocated objects at the same time.
Note that while whether a lock is held can be answered by just comparing
active_lock.ptr to NULL, to determine whether the register is pointing
to the same held lock requires comparing _both_ ptr and id.
Finally, as a result of this refactoring, pseudo load instructions are
not given a unique reg->id, as they are doing lookup for the same map
value (max_entries is never greater than 1).
Essentially, we consider that the tuple of (ptr, id) will always be
unique for any kind of argument to bpf_spin_{lock,unlock}.
Note that this can be extended in the future to also remember offset
used for locking, so that we can introduce multiple bpf_spin_lock fields
in the same allocation.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-10-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow locking a bpf_spin_lock in an allocated object, in addition to
already supported map value pointers. The handling is similar to that of
map values, by just preserving the reg->id of PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC
as well, and adjusting process_spin_lock to work with them and remember
the id in verifier state.
Refactor the existing process_spin_lock to work with PTR_TO_BTF_ID |
MEM_ALLOC in addition to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. We need to update the
reg_may_point_to_spin_lock which is used in mark_ptr_or_null_reg to
preserve reg->id, that will be used in env->cur_state->active_spin_lock
to remember the currently held spin lock.
Also update the comment describing bpf_spin_lock implementation details
to also talk about PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC type.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-9-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Ensure that there can be no ownership cycles among different types by
way of having owning objects that can hold some other type as their
element. For instance, a map value can only hold allocated objects, but
these are allowed to have another bpf_list_head. To prevent unbounded
recursion while freeing resources, elements of bpf_list_head in local
kptrs can never have a bpf_list_head which are part of list in a map
value. Later patches will verify this by having dedicated BTF selftests.
Also, to make runtime destruction easier, once btf_struct_metas is fully
populated, we can stash the metadata of the value type directly in the
metadata of the list_head fields, as that allows easier access to the
value type's layout to destruct it at runtime from the btf_field entry
of the list head itself.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-8-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow specifying bpf_spin_lock, bpf_list_head, bpf_list_node fields in a
allocated object.
Also update btf_struct_access to reject direct access to these special
fields.
A bpf_list_head allows implementing map-in-map style use cases, where an
allocated object with bpf_list_head is linked into a list in a map
value. This would require embedding a bpf_list_node, support for which
is also included. The bpf_spin_lock is used to protect the bpf_list_head
and other data.
While we strictly don't require to hold a bpf_spin_lock while touching
the bpf_list_head in such objects, as when have access to it, we have
complete ownership of the object, the locking constraint is still kept
and may be conditionally lifted in the future.
Note that the specification of such types can be done just like map
values, e.g.:
struct bar {
struct bpf_list_node node;
};
struct foo {
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(bar, node);
struct bpf_list_node node;
};
struct map_value {
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(foo, node);
};
To recognize such types in user BTF, we build a btf_struct_metas array
of metadata items corresponding to each BTF ID. This is done once during
the btf_parse stage to avoid having to do it each time during the
verification process's requirement to inspect the metadata.
Moreover, the computed metadata needs to be passed to some helpers in
future patches which requires allocating them and storing them in the
BTF that is pinned by the program itself, so that valid access can be
assumed to such data during program runtime.
A key thing to note is that once a btf_struct_meta is available for a
type, both the btf_record and btf_field_offs should be available. It is
critical that btf_field_offs is available in case special fields are
present, as we extensively rely on special fields being zeroed out in
map values and allocated objects in later patches. The code ensures that
by bailing out in case of errors and ensuring both are available
together. If the record is not available, the special fields won't be
recognized, so not having both is also fine (in terms of being a
verification error and not a runtime bug).
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce support for representing pointers to objects allocated by the
BPF program, i.e. PTR_TO_BTF_ID that point to a type in program BTF.
This is indicated by the presence of MEM_ALLOC type flag in reg->type to
avoid having to check btf_is_kernel when trying to match argument types
in helpers.
Whenever walking such types, any pointers being walked will always yield
a SCALAR instead of pointer. In the future we might permit kptr inside
such allocated objects (either kernel or program allocated), and it will
then form a PTR_TO_BTF_ID of the respective type.
For now, such allocated objects will always be referenced in verifier
context, hence ref_obj_id == 0 for them is a bug. It is allowed to write
to such objects, as long fields that are special are not touched
(support for which will be added in subsequent patches). Note that once
such a pointer is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, it is no longer allowed to write
to it.
No PROBE_MEM handling is therefore done for loads into this type unless
PTR_UNTRUSTED is part of the register type, since they can never be in
an undefined state, and their lifetime will always be valid.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Far too much code simply assumes that both btf_record and btf_field_offs
are set to valid pointers together, or both are unset. They go together
hand in hand as btf_record describes the special fields and
btf_field_offs is compact representation for runtime copying/zeroing.
It is very difficult to make this clear in the code when the only
exception to this universal invariant is inner_map_meta which is used
as reg->map_ptr in the verifier. This is simply a bug waiting to happen,
as in verifier context we cannot easily distinguish if PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
is coming from an inner map, and if we ever end up using field_offs for
any reason in the future, we will silently ignore the special fields for
inner map case (as NULL is not an error but unset field_offs).
Hence, simply copy field_offs from inner map together with btf_record.
While at it, refactor code to unwind properly on errors with gotos.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Whenever btf_record_dup fails, we must free inner_map_meta that was
allocated before.
This fixes a memory leak (in case of errors) during inner map creation.
Fixes: aa3496accc41 ("bpf: Refactor kptr_off_tab into btf_record")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Since the commit being fixed, we now miss freeing btf_record for local
storage maps which will have a btf_record populated in case they have
bpf_spin_lock element.
This was missed because I made the choice of offloading the job to free
kptr_off_tab (now btf_record) to the map_free callback when adding
support for kptrs.
Revisiting the reason for this decision, there is the possibility that
the btf_record gets used inside map_free callback (e.g. in case of maps
embedding kptrs) to iterate over them and free them, hence doing it
before the map_free callback would be leaking special field memory, and
do invalid memory access. The btf_record keeps module references which
is critical to ensure the dtor call made for referenced kptr is safe to
do.
If doing it after map_free callback, the map area is already freed, so
we cannot access bpf_map structure anymore.
To fix this and prevent such lapses in future, move bpf_map_free_record
out of the map_free callback, and do it after map_free by remembering
the btf_record pointer. There is no need to access bpf_map structure in
that case, and we can avoid missing this case when support for new map
types is added for other special fields.
Since a btf_record and its btf_field_offs are used together, for
consistency delay freeing of field_offs as well. While not a problem
right now, a lot of code assumes that either both record and field_offs
are set or none at once.
Note that in case of map of maps (outer maps), inner_map_meta->record is
only used during verification, not to free fields in map value, hence we
simply keep the bpf_map_free_record call as is in bpf_map_meta_free and
never touch map->inner_map_meta in bpf_map_free_deferred.
Add a comment making note of these details.
Fixes: db559117828d ("bpf: Consolidate spin_lock, timer management into btf_record")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Instead of returning directly with -EOPNOTSUPP for the timer case, we
need to free the btf_record before returning to userspace.
Fixes: db559117828d ("bpf: Consolidate spin_lock, timer management into btf_record")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by:
@@
expression E;
@@
- prandom_u32_max
+ get_random_u32_below
(E)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> # for damon
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> # for arm
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Currently bpf_map_do_batch() first invokes fdget(batch.map_fd) to get
the target map file, then it invokes generic_map_update_batch() to do
batch update. generic_map_update_batch() will get the target map file
by using fdget(batch.map_fd) again and pass it to bpf_map_update_value().
The problem is map file returned by the second fdget() may be NULL or a
totally different file compared by map file in bpf_map_do_batch(). The
reason is that the first fdget() only guarantees the liveness of struct
file instead of file descriptor and the file description may be released
by concurrent close() through pick_file().
It doesn't incur any problem as for now, because maps with batch update
support don't use map file in .map_fd_get_ptr() ops. But it is better to
fix the potential access of an invalid map file.
Using __bpf_map_get() again in generic_map_update_batch() can not fix
the problem, because batch.map_fd may be closed and reopened, and the
returned map file may be different with map file got in
bpf_map_do_batch(), so just passing the map file directly to
.map_update_batch() in bpf_map_do_batch().
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221116075059.1551277-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Propagate nullness information for branches of register to register
equality compare instructions. The following rules are used:
- suppose register A maybe null
- suppose register B is not null
- for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch
- for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch
E.g. for program like below:
r6 = skb->sk;
r7 = sk_fullsock(r6);
r0 = sk_fullsock(r6);
if (r0 == 0) return 0; (a)
if (r0 != r7) return 0; (b)
*r7->type; (c)
return 0;
It is safe to dereference r7 at point (c), because of (a) and (b).
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115224859.2452988-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
For queueing packets in XDP we want to add a new redirect map type with
support for 64-bit indexes. To prepare fore this, expand the width of the
'key' argument to the bpf_redirect_map() helper. Since BPF registers are
always 64-bit, this should be safe to do after the fact.
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221108140601.149971-3-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Instead of having to pass multiple arguments that describe the register,
pass the bpf_reg_state into the btf_struct_access callback. Currently,
all call sites simply reuse the btf and btf_id of the reg they want to
check the access of. The only exception to this pattern is the callsite
in check_ptr_to_map_access, hence for that case create a dummy reg to
simulate PTR_TO_BTF_ID access.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-8-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently, verifier uses MEM_ALLOC type tag to specially tag memory
returned from bpf_ringbuf_reserve helper. However, this is currently
only used for this purpose and there is an implicit assumption that it
only refers to ringbuf memory (e.g. the check for ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in check_func_arg_reg_off).
Hence, rename MEM_ALLOC to MEM_RINGBUF to indicate this special
relationship and instead open the use of MEM_ALLOC for more generic
allocations made for user types.
Also, since ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL is unused, simply drop it.
Finally, update selftests using 'alloc_' verifier string to 'ringbuf_'.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently, the verifier has two return types, RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM, and
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL, however the former is confusingly named to
imply that it carries MEM_ALLOC, while only the latter does. This causes
confusion during code review leading to conclusions like that the return
value of RET_PTR_TO_DYNPTR_MEM_OR_NULL (which is RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM |
PTR_MAYBE_NULL) may be consumable by bpf_ringbuf_{submit,commit}.
Rename it to make it clear MEM_ALLOC needs to be tacked on top of
RET_PTR_TO_MEM.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add the support on the map side to parse, recognize, verify, and build
metadata table for a new special field of the type struct bpf_list_head.
To parameterize the bpf_list_head for a certain value type and the
list_node member it will accept in that value type, we use BTF
declaration tags.
The definition of bpf_list_head in a map value will be done as follows:
struct foo {
struct bpf_list_node node;
int data;
};
struct map_value {
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(foo, node);
};
Then, the bpf_list_head only allows adding to the list 'head' using the
bpf_list_node 'node' for the type struct foo.
The 'contains' annotation is a BTF declaration tag composed of four
parts, "contains:name:node" where the name is then used to look up the
type in the map BTF, with its kind hardcoded to BTF_KIND_STRUCT during
the lookup. The node defines name of the member in this type that has
the type struct bpf_list_node, which is actually used for linking into
the linked list. For now, 'kind' part is hardcoded as struct.
This allows building intrusive linked lists in BPF, using container_of
to obtain pointer to entry, while being completely type safe from the
perspective of the verifier. The verifier knows exactly the type of the
nodes, and knows that list helpers return that type at some fixed offset
where the bpf_list_node member used for this list exists. The verifier
also uses this information to disallow adding types that are not
accepted by a certain list.
For now, no elements can be added to such lists. Support for that is
coming in future patches, hence draining and freeing items is done with
a TODO that will be resolved in a future patch.
Note that the bpf_list_head_free function moves the list out to a local
variable under the lock and releases it, doing the actual draining of
the list items outside the lock. While this helps with not holding the
lock for too long pessimizing other concurrent list operations, it is
also necessary for deadlock prevention: unless every function called in
the critical section would be notrace, a fentry/fexit program could
attach and call bpf_map_update_elem again on the map, leading to the
same lock being acquired if the key matches and lead to a deadlock.
While this requires some special effort on part of the BPF programmer to
trigger and is highly unlikely to occur in practice, it is always better
if we can avoid such a condition.
While notrace would prevent this, doing the draining outside the lock
has advantages of its own, hence it is used to also fix the deadlock
related problem.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In f71b2f64177a ("bpf: Refactor map->off_arr handling"), map->off_arr
was refactored to be btf_field_offs. The number of field offsets is
equal to maximum possible fields limited by BTF_FIELDS_MAX. Hence, reuse
BTF_FIELDS_MAX as spin_lock and timer no longer are to be handled
specially for offset sorting, fix the comment, and remove incorrect
WARN_ON as its rec->cnt can never exceed this value. The reason to keep
separate constant was the it was always more 2 more than total kptrs.
This is no longer the case.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Andrii Nakryiko says:
====================
bpf-next 2022-11-11
We've added 49 non-merge commits during the last 9 day(s) which contain
a total of 68 files changed, 3592 insertions(+), 1371 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Veristat tool improvements to support custom filtering, sorting, and replay
of results, from Andrii Nakryiko.
2) BPF verifier precision tracking fixes and improvements,
from Andrii Nakryiko.
3) Lots of new BPF documentation for various BPF maps, from Dave Tucker,
Donald Hunter, Maryam Tahhan, Bagas Sanjaya.
4) BTF dedup improvements and libbpf's hashmap interface clean ups, from
Eduard Zingerman.
5) Fix veth driver panic if XDP program is attached before veth_open, from
John Fastabend.
6) BPF verifier clean ups and fixes in preparation for follow up features,
from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
7) Add access to hwtstamp field from BPF sockops programs,
from Martin KaFai Lau.
8) Various fixes for BPF selftests and samples, from Artem Savkov,
Domenico Cerasuolo, Kang Minchul, Rong Tao, Yang Jihong.
9) Fix redirection to tunneling device logic, preventing skb->len == 0, from
Stanislav Fomichev.
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (49 commits)
selftests/bpf: fix veristat's singular file-or-prog filter
selftests/bpf: Test skops->skb_hwtstamp
selftests/bpf: Fix incorrect ASSERT in the tcp_hdr_options test
bpf: Add hwtstamp field for the sockops prog
selftests/bpf: Fix xdp_synproxy compilation failure in 32-bit arch
bpf, docs: Document BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY
docs/bpf: Document BPF map types QUEUE and STACK
docs/bpf: Document BPF ARRAY_OF_MAPS and HASH_OF_MAPS
docs/bpf: Document BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP map
docs/bpf: Document BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE map
libbpf: Hashmap.h update to fix build issues using LLVM14
bpf: veth driver panics when xdp prog attached before veth_open
selftests: Fix test group SKIPPED result
selftests/bpf: Tests for btf_dedup_resolve_fwds
libbpf: Resolve unambigous forward declarations
libbpf: Hashmap interface update to allow both long and void* keys/values
samples/bpf: Fix sockex3 error: Missing BPF prog type
selftests/bpf: Fix u32 variable compared with less than zero
Documentation: bpf: Escape underscore in BPF type name prefix
selftests/bpf: Use consistent build-id type for liburandom_read.so
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111233733.1088228-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
pcpu_freelist_populate() initializes nr_elems / num_possible_cpus() + 1
free nodes for some CPUs, and then possibly one CPU with fewer nodes,
followed by remaining cpus with 0 nodes. For example, when nr_elems == 256
and num_possible_cpus() == 32, CPU 0~27 each gets 9 free nodes, CPU 28 gets
4 free nodes, CPU 29~31 get 0 free nodes, while in fact each CPU should get
8 nodes equally.
This patch initializes nr_elems / num_possible_cpus() free nodes for each
CPU firstly, then allocates the remaining free nodes by one for each CPU
until no free nodes left.
Fixes: e19494edab82 ("bpf: introduce percpu_freelist")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221110122128.105214-1-xukuohai@huawei.com
Add documentation for BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP including
kernel version introduced, usage and examples.
Co-developed-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221107165207.2682075-2-mtahhan@redhat.com
kmemleak reports this issue:
unreferenced object 0xffff88817139d000 (size 2048):
comm "test_progs", pid 33246, jiffies 4307381979 (age 45851.820s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<0000000045f075f0>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
[<0000000098b7c90a>] __check_func_call+0x316/0x1230
[<00000000b4c3c403>] check_helper_call+0x172e/0x4700
[<00000000aa3875b7>] do_check+0x21d8/0x45e0
[<000000001147357b>] do_check_common+0x767/0xaf0
[<00000000b5a595b4>] bpf_check+0x43e3/0x5bc0
[<0000000011e391b1>] bpf_prog_load+0xf26/0x1940
[<0000000007f765c0>] __sys_bpf+0xd2c/0x3650
[<00000000839815d6>] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xc0
[<00000000946ee250>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[<0000000000506b7f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root case here is: In function prepare_func_exit(), the callee is
not released in the abnormal scenario after "state->curframe--;". To
fix, move "state->curframe--;" to the very bottom of the function,
right when we free callee and reset frame[] pointer to NULL, as Andrii
suggested.
In addition, function __check_func_call() has a similar problem. In
the abnormal scenario before "state->curframe++;", the callee also
should be released by free_func_state().
Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper")
Fixes: fd978bf7fd31 ("bpf: Add reference tracking to verifier")
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1667884291-15666-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
When building with clang:
kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c:126:33: error: pointer type mismatch ('void *' and 'unsigned int (*)(const void *, const struct bpf_insn *, bpf_func_t)' (aka 'unsigned int (*)(const void *, const struct bpf_insn *, unsigned int (*)(const void *, const struct bpf_insn *))')) [-Werror,-Wpointer-type-mismatch]
__BPF_DISPATCHER_UPDATE(d, new ?: &bpf_dispatcher_nop_func);
~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/bpf.h:1045:54: note: expanded from macro '__BPF_DISPATCHER_UPDATE'
__static_call_update((_d)->sc_key, (_d)->sc_tramp, (_new))
^~~~
1 error generated.
The warning is pointing out that the type of new ('void *') and
&bpf_dispatcher_nop_func are not compatible, which could have side
effects coming out of a conditional operator due to promotion rules.
Add the explicit cast to 'void *' to make it clear that this is
expected, as __BPF_DISPATCHER_UPDATE() expands to a call to
__static_call_update(), which expects a 'void *' as its final argument.
Fixes: c86df29d11df ("bpf: Convert BPF_DISPATCHER to use static_call() (not ftrace)")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1755
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <bot@kernelci.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107170711.42409-1-nathan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
The dispatcher function is currently abusing the ftrace __fentry__
call location for its own purposes -- this obviously gives trouble
when the dispatcher and ftrace are both in use.
A previous solution tried using __attribute__((patchable_function_entry()))
which works, except it is GCC-8+ only, breaking the build on the
earlier still supported compilers. Instead use static_call() -- which
has its own annotations and does not conflict with ftrace -- to
rewrite the dispatch function.
By using: return static_call()(ctx, insni, bpf_func) you get a perfect
forwarding tail call as function body (iow a single jmp instruction).
By having the default static_call() target be bpf_dispatcher_nop_func()
it retains the default behaviour (an indirect call to the argument
function). Only once a dispatcher program is attached is the target
rewritten to directly call the JIT'ed image.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y1/oBlK0yFk5c/Im@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221103120647.796772565@infradead.org
Because __attribute__((patchable_function_entry)) is only available
since GCC-8 this solution fails to build on the minimum required GCC
version.
Undo these changes so we might try again -- without cluttering up the
patches with too many changes.
This is an almost complete revert of:
dbe69b299884 ("bpf: Fix dispatcher patchable function entry to 5 bytes nop")
ceea991a019c ("bpf: Move bpf_dispatcher function out of ftrace locations")
(notably the arch/x86/Kconfig hunk is kept).
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/439d8dc735bb4858875377df67f1b29a@AcuMS.aculab.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221103120647.728830733@infradead.org
Exploit the property of about-to-be-checkpointed state to be able to
forget all precise markings up to that point even more aggressively. We
now clear all potentially inherited precise markings right before
checkpointing and branching off into child state. If any of children
states require precise knowledge of any SCALAR register, those will be
propagated backwards later on before this state is finalized, preserving
correctness.
There is a single selftests BPF program change, but tremendous one: 25x
reduction in number of verified instructions and states in
trace_virtqueue_add_sgs.
Cilium results are more modest, but happen across wider range of programs.
SELFTESTS RESULTS
=================
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/imprecise-early-results.csv ~/imprecise-aggressive-results.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
------------------- ----------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
loop6.bpf.linked1.o trace_virtqueue_add_sgs 398057 15114 -382943 (-96.20%) 8717 336 -8381 (-96.15%)
------------------- ----------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
CILIUM RESULTS
==============
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/imprecise-early-results-cilium.csv ~/imprecise-aggressive-results-cilium.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
------------- -------------------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 23426 23221 -205 (-0.88%) 1537 1515 -22 (-1.43%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv6 13009 12904 -105 (-0.81%) 719 708 -11 (-1.53%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 5261 5196 -65 (-1.24%) 247 243 -4 (-1.62%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ipv6_egress 3446 3406 -40 (-1.16%) 203 198 -5 (-2.46%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 23426 23221 -205 (-0.88%) 1537 1515 -22 (-1.43%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv6 13009 12904 -105 (-0.81%) 719 708 -11 (-1.53%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv4_ct_egress 5074 4897 -177 (-3.49%) 255 248 -7 (-2.75%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv4_ct_ingress 5100 4923 -177 (-3.47%) 255 248 -7 (-2.75%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv4_ct_ingress_policy_only 5100 4923 -177 (-3.47%) 255 248 -7 (-2.75%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv6_ct_egress 4558 4536 -22 (-0.48%) 188 187 -1 (-0.53%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv6_ct_ingress 4578 4556 -22 (-0.48%) 188 187 -1 (-0.53%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv6_ct_ingress_policy_only 4578 4556 -22 (-0.48%) 188 187 -1 (-0.53%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 5261 5196 -65 (-1.24%) 247 243 -4 (-1.62%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 5261 5196 -65 (-1.24%) 247 243 -4 (-1.62%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_ipv6_egress 3482 3442 -40 (-1.15%) 204 201 -3 (-1.47%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 17200 15619 -1581 (-9.19%) 1111 1010 -101 (-9.09%)
------------- -------------------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104163649.121784-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Setting reg->precise to true in current state is not necessary from
correctness standpoint, but it does pessimise the whole precision (or
rather "imprecision", because that's what we want to keep as much as
possible) tracking. Why is somewhat subtle and my best attempt to
explain this is recorded in an extensive comment for __mark_chain_precise()
function. Some more careful thinking and code reading is probably required
still to grok this completely, unfortunately. Whiteboarding and a bunch
of extra handwaiving in person would be even more helpful, but is deemed
impractical in Git commit.
Next patch pushes this imprecision property even further, building on top of
the insights described in this patch.
End results are pretty nice, we get reduction in number of total instructions
and states verified due to a better states reuse, as some of the states are now
more generic and permissive due to less unnecessary precise=true requirements.
SELFTESTS RESULTS
=================
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/subprog-precise-results.csv ~/imprecise-early-results.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
--------------------------------------- ---------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
bpf_iter_ksym.bpf.linked1.o dump_ksym 347 285 -62 (-17.87%) 20 19 -1 (-5.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.linked1.o on_event 3678 3736 +58 (+1.58%) 276 285 +9 (+3.26%)
setget_sockopt.bpf.linked1.o skops_sockopt 4038 3947 -91 (-2.25%) 347 343 -4 (-1.15%)
test_l4lb.bpf.linked1.o balancer_ingress 4559 2611 -1948 (-42.73%) 118 105 -13 (-11.02%)
test_l4lb_noinline.bpf.linked1.o balancer_ingress 6279 6268 -11 (-0.18%) 237 236 -1 (-0.42%)
test_misc_tcp_hdr_options.bpf.linked1.o misc_estab 1307 1303 -4 (-0.31%) 100 99 -1 (-1.00%)
test_sk_lookup.bpf.linked1.o ctx_narrow_access 456 447 -9 (-1.97%) 39 38 -1 (-2.56%)
test_sysctl_loop1.bpf.linked1.o sysctl_tcp_mem 1389 1384 -5 (-0.36%) 26 25 -1 (-3.85%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o egress_fwdns_prio101 518 485 -33 (-6.37%) 51 46 -5 (-9.80%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o egress_host 519 468 -51 (-9.83%) 50 44 -6 (-12.00%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o ingress_fwdns_prio101 842 1000 +158 (+18.76%) 73 88 +15 (+20.55%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o syncookie_tc 405757 373173 -32584 (-8.03%) 25735 22882 -2853 (-11.09%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o syncookie_xdp 479055 371590 -107465 (-22.43%) 29145 22207 -6938 (-23.81%)
--------------------------------------- ---------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
Slight regression in test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o/ingress_fwdns_prio101
is left for a follow up, there might be some more precision-related bugs
in existing BPF verifier logic.
CILIUM RESULTS
==============
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/subprog-precise-results-cilium.csv ~/imprecise-early-results-cilium.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
------------- ------------------------------ --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
bpf_host.o cil_from_host 762 556 -206 (-27.03%) 43 37 -6 (-13.95%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 23541 23426 -115 (-0.49%) 1538 1537 -1 (-0.07%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 33592 33566 -26 (-0.08%) 2163 2161 -2 (-0.09%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 23541 23426 -115 (-0.49%) 1538 1537 -1 (-0.07%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 33581 33543 -38 (-0.11%) 2160 2157 -3 (-0.14%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 21659 20920 -739 (-3.41%) 1440 1376 -64 (-4.44%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv6 17084 17039 -45 (-0.26%) 907 905 -2 (-0.22%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 73442 73430 -12 (-0.02%) 4370 4369 -1 (-0.02%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 152114 151895 -219 (-0.14%) 6493 6479 -14 (-0.22%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 17377 17200 -177 (-1.02%) 1125 1111 -14 (-1.24%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 6405 6397 -8 (-0.12%) 309 308 -1 (-0.32%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_rev_nodeport_lb4 7126 6934 -192 (-2.69%) 414 402 -12 (-2.90%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_rev_nodeport_lb6 18059 17905 -154 (-0.85%) 1105 1096 -9 (-0.81%)
------------- ------------------------------ --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104163649.121784-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Stop forcing precise=true for SCALAR registers when BPF program has any
subprograms. Current restriction means that any BPF program, as soon as
it uses subprograms, will end up not getting any of the precision
tracking benefits in reduction of number of verified states.
This patch keeps the fallback mark_all_scalars_precise() behavior if
precise marking has to cross function frames. E.g., if subprogram
requires R1 (first input arg) to be marked precise, ideally we'd need to
backtrack to the parent function and keep marking R1 and its
dependencies as precise. But right now we give up and force all the
SCALARs in any of the current and parent states to be forced to
precise=true. We can lift that restriction in the future.
But this patch fixes two issues identified when trying to enable
precision tracking for subprogs.
First, prevent "escaping" from top-most state in a global subprog. While
with entry-level BPF program we never end up requesting precision for
R1-R5 registers, because R2-R5 are not initialized (and so not readable
in correct BPF program), and R1 is PTR_TO_CTX, not SCALAR, and so is
implicitly precise. With global subprogs, though, it's different, as
global subprog a) can have up to 5 SCALAR input arguments, which might
get marked as precise=true and b) it is validated in isolation from its
main entry BPF program. b) means that we can end up exhausting parent
state chain and still not mark all registers in reg_mask as precise,
which would lead to verifier bug warning.
To handle that, we need to consider two cases. First, if the very first
state is not immediately "checkpointed" (i.e., stored in state lookup
hashtable), it will get correct first_insn_idx and last_insn_idx
instruction set during state checkpointing. As such, this case is
already handled and __mark_chain_precision() already handles that by
just doing nothing when we reach to the very first parent state.
st->parent will be NULL and we'll just stop. Perhaps some extra check
for reg_mask and stack_mask is due here, but this patch doesn't address
that issue.
More problematic second case is when global function's initial state is
immediately checkpointed before we manage to process the very first
instruction. This is happening because when there is a call to global
subprog from the main program the very first subprog's instruction is
marked as pruning point, so before we manage to process first
instruction we have to check and checkpoint state. This patch adds
a special handling for such "empty" state, which is identified by having
st->last_insn_idx set to -1. In such case, we check that we are indeed
validating global subprog, and with some sanity checking we mark input
args as precise if requested.
Note that we also initialize state->first_insn_idx with correct start
insn_idx offset. For main program zero is correct value, but for any
subprog it's quite confusing to not have first_insn_idx set. This
doesn't have any functional impact, but helps with debugging and state
printing. We also explicitly initialize state->last_insns_idx instead of
relying on is_state_visited() to do this with env->prev_insns_idx, which
will be -1 on the very first instruction. This concludes necessary
changes to handle specifically global subprog's precision tracking.
Second identified problem was missed handling of BPF helper functions
that call into subprogs (e.g., bpf_loop and few others). From precision
tracking and backtracking logic's standpoint those are effectively calls
into subprogs and should be called as BPF_PSEUDO_CALL calls.
This patch takes the least intrusive way and just checks against a short
list of current BPF helpers that do call subprogs, encapsulated in
is_callback_calling_function() function. But to prevent accidentally
forgetting to add new BPF helpers to this "list", we also do a sanity
check in __check_func_call, which has to be called for each such special
BPF helper, to validate that BPF helper is indeed recognized as
callback-calling one. This should catch any missed checks in the future.
Adding some special flags to be added in function proto definitions
seemed like an overkill in this case.
With the above changes, it's possible to remove forceful setting of
reg->precise to true in __mark_reg_unknown, which turns on precision
tracking both inside subprogs and entry progs that have subprogs. No
warnings or errors were detected across all the selftests, but also when
validating with veristat against internal Meta BPF objects and Cilium
objects. Further, in some BPF programs there are noticeable reduction in
number of states and instructions validated due to more effective
precision tracking, especially benefiting syncookie test.
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/baseline-results.csv ~/subprog-precise-results.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
---------------------------------------- -------------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.linked1.o on_event 3966 3678 -288 (-7.26%) 306 276 -30 (-9.80%)
pyperf_global.bpf.linked1.o on_event 7563 7530 -33 (-0.44%) 520 517 -3 (-0.58%)
pyperf_subprogs.bpf.linked1.o on_event 36358 36934 +576 (+1.58%) 2499 2531 +32 (+1.28%)
setget_sockopt.bpf.linked1.o skops_sockopt 3965 4038 +73 (+1.84%) 343 347 +4 (+1.17%)
test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.linked1.o cls_redirect 64965 64901 -64 (-0.10%) 4619 4612 -7 (-0.15%)
test_misc_tcp_hdr_options.bpf.linked1.o misc_estab 1491 1307 -184 (-12.34%) 110 100 -10 (-9.09%)
test_pkt_access.bpf.linked1.o test_pkt_access 354 349 -5 (-1.41%) 25 24 -1 (-4.00%)
test_sock_fields.bpf.linked1.o egress_read_sock_fields 435 375 -60 (-13.79%) 22 20 -2 (-9.09%)
test_sysctl_loop2.bpf.linked1.o sysctl_tcp_mem 1508 1501 -7 (-0.46%) 29 28 -1 (-3.45%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o egress_fwdns_prio100 468 435 -33 (-7.05%) 45 41 -4 (-8.89%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o ingress_fwdns_prio100 398 408 +10 (+2.51%) 42 39 -3 (-7.14%)
test_tc_dtime.bpf.linked1.o ingress_fwdns_prio101 1096 842 -254 (-23.18%) 97 73 -24 (-24.74%)
test_tcp_hdr_options.bpf.linked1.o estab 2758 2408 -350 (-12.69%) 208 181 -27 (-12.98%)
test_urandom_usdt.bpf.linked1.o urand_read_with_sema 466 448 -18 (-3.86%) 31 28 -3 (-9.68%)
test_urandom_usdt.bpf.linked1.o urand_read_without_sema 466 448 -18 (-3.86%) 31 28 -3 (-9.68%)
test_urandom_usdt.bpf.linked1.o urandlib_read_with_sema 466 448 -18 (-3.86%) 31 28 -3 (-9.68%)
test_urandom_usdt.bpf.linked1.o urandlib_read_without_sema 466 448 -18 (-3.86%) 31 28 -3 (-9.68%)
test_xdp_noinline.bpf.linked1.o balancer_ingress_v6 4302 4294 -8 (-0.19%) 257 256 -1 (-0.39%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o syncookie_tc 583722 405757 -177965 (-30.49%) 35846 25735 -10111 (-28.21%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o syncookie_xdp 609123 479055 -130068 (-21.35%) 35452 29145 -6307 (-17.79%)
---------------------------------------- -------------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104163649.121784-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When equivalent completed state is found and it has additional precision
restrictions, BPF verifier propagates precision to
currently-being-verified state chain (i.e., including parent states) so
that if some of the states in the chain are not yet completed, necessary
precision restrictions are enforced.
Unfortunately, right now this happens only for the last frame (deepest
active subprogram's frame), not all the frames. This can lead to
incorrect matching of states due to missing precision marker. Currently
this doesn't seem possible as BPF verifier forces everything to precise
when validated BPF program has any subprograms. But with the next patch
lifting this restriction, this becomes problematic.
In fact, without this fix, we'll start getting failure in one of the
existing test_verifier test cases:
#906/p precise: cross frame pruning FAIL
Unexpected success to load!
verification time 48 usec
stack depth 0+0
processed 26 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 3 total_states 17 peak_states 17 mark_read 8
This patch adds precision propagation across all frames.
Fixes: a3ce685dd01a ("bpf: fix precision tracking")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104163649.121784-3-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When processing ALU/ALU64 operations (apart from BPF_MOV, which is
handled correctly already; and BPF_NEG and BPF_END are special and don't
have source register), if destination register is already marked
precise, this causes problem with potentially missing precision tracking
for the source register. E.g., when we have r1 >>= r5 and r1 is marked
precise, but r5 isn't, this will lead to r5 staying as imprecise. This
is due to the precision backtracking logic stopping early when it sees
r1 is already marked precise. If r1 wasn't precise, we'd keep
backtracking and would add r5 to the set of registers that need to be
marked precise. So there is a discrepancy here which can lead to invalid
and incompatible states matched due to lack of precision marking on r5.
If r1 wasn't precise, precision backtracking would correctly mark both
r1 and r5 as precise.
This is simple to fix, though. During the forward instruction simulation
pass, for arithmetic operations of `scalar <op>= scalar` form (where
<op> is ALU or ALU64 operations), if destination register is already
precise, mark source register as precise. This applies only when both
involved registers are SCALARs. `ptr += scalar` and `scalar += ptr`
cases are already handled correctly.
This does have (negative) effect on some selftest programs and few
Cilium programs. ~/baseline-tmp-results.csv are veristat results with
this patch, while ~/baseline-results.csv is without it. See post
scriptum for instructions on how to make Cilium programs testable with
veristat. Correctness has a price.
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,insns,states ~/baseline-results.csv ~/baseline-tmp-results.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
----------------------- -------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
bpf_cubic.bpf.linked1.o bpf_cubic_cong_avoid 997 1700 +703 (+70.51%) 62 90 +28 (+45.16%)
test_l4lb.bpf.linked1.o balancer_ingress 4559 5469 +910 (+19.96%) 118 126 +8 (+6.78%)
----------------------- -------------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
$ ./veristat -C -e file,prog,verdict,insns,states ~/baseline-results-cilium.csv ~/baseline-tmp-results-cilium.csv | grep -v '+0'
File Program Total insns (A) Total insns (B) Total insns (DIFF) Total states (A) Total states (B) Total states (DIFF)
------------- ------------------------------ --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 4448 5261 +813 (+18.28%) 234 247 +13 (+5.56%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ipv6_egress 3396 3446 +50 (+1.47%) 201 203 +2 (+1.00%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 4448 5261 +813 (+18.28%) 234 247 +13 (+5.56%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 4448 5261 +813 (+18.28%) 234 247 +13 (+5.56%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 71736 73442 +1706 (+2.38%) 4295 4370 +75 (+1.75%)
------------- ------------------------------ --------------- --------------- ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- -------------------
P.S. To make Cilium ([0]) programs libbpf-compatible and thus
veristat-loadable, apply changes from topmost commit in [1], which does
minimal changes to Cilium source code, mostly around SEC() annotations
and BPF map definitions.
[0] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/
[1] https://github.com/anakryiko/cilium/commits/libbpf-friendliness
Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221104163649.121784-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor map->off_arr handling into generic functions that can work on
their own without hardcoding map specific code. The btf_fields_offs
structure is now returned from btf_parse_field_offs, which can be reused
later for types in program BTF.
All functions like copy_map_value, zero_map_value call generic
underlying functions so that they can also be reused later for copying
to values allocated in programs which encode specific fields.
Later, some helper functions will also require access to this
btf_field_offs structure to be able to skip over special fields at
runtime.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221103191013.1236066-9-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Kees Cook
Yonghong Song
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
David Vernet
Jakub Kicinski
Jason A. Donenfeld
Hou Tao
Eduard Zingerman
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
Xu Kuohai
Maryam Tahhan
Wang Yufen
Nathan Chancellor
Peter Zijlstra
Andrii Nakryiko