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The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq"
Both of these look wrong to me. As Steve Grubb pointed out:
"What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ. The other PATH
records probably should not be there."
Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it
should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of
the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting. With this change, we get
a single PATH record that looks more like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914
dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0
In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is
added. If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers
of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is
inactive.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd.
Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
that.
In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.
So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
new idiom.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7
Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The userspace audit tools didn't like the existing formatting of the
AUDIT_ANOM_LINK event. It needed to be expanded to emit an AUDIT_PATH
event as well, so this implements the change. The bulk of the patch is
moving code out of auditsc.c into audit.c and audit.h for general use.
It expands audit_log_name to include an optional "struct path" argument
for the simple case of just needing to report a pathname. This also
makes
audit_log_task_info available when syscall auditing is not enabled,
since
it is needed in either case for process details.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
We have a number of places we were reimplementing the same code to write
out lsm labels. Just do it one darn place.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks like this one has been around since 5195d8e21:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_free_names’:
kernel/auditsc.c:998: error: ‘i’ undeclared (first use in this function)
...and this warning:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_putname’:
kernel/auditsc.c:2045: warning: ‘i’ may be used uninitialized in this function
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
RHBZ: 785936
If the audit system collects a record about one process sending a signal
to another process it includes in that collection the 'secid' or 'an int
used to represet an LSM label.' If there is no LSM enabled it will
collect a 0. The problem is that when we attempt to print that record
we ask the LSM to convert the secid back to a string. Since there is no
LSM it returns EOPNOTSUPP.
Most code in the audit system checks if the secid is 0 and does not
print LSM info in that case. The signal information code however forgot
that check. Thus users will see a message in syslog indicating that
converting the sid to string failed. Add the right check.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
> audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.
Fair enough. I'd go futher...
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.
Signed-off-by: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
__audit_socketcall is an extern function.
better to check its parameters by itself.
also can return error code, when fail (find invalid parameters).
also use macro instead of real hard code number
also give related comments for it.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
[eparis: fix the return value when !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
filename should be destroyed via final_putname() instead of __putname()
Otherwise this result in following BUGON() in case of long names:
kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:3006!
Call Trace:
kmem_cache_free+0x1c1/0x850
audit_putname+0x88/0x90
putname+0x73/0x80
sys_symlinkat+0x120/0x150
sys_symlink+0x16/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Introduced-in: 7950e3852
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It is useful to extend GID/EGID comparation logic to be able to
match not only the exact EID/EGID values but the group/egroup also.
Signed-off-by: Matvejchikov Ilya <matvejchikov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It's possible for audit_log_start() to return NULL. Handle it in the
various callers.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@google.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors.
In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a
record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes
userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered
malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull big execve/kernel_thread/fork unification series from Al Viro:
"All architectures are converted to new model. Quite a bit of that
stuff is actually shared with architecture trees; in such cases it's
literally shared branch pulled by both, not a cherry-pick.
A lot of ugliness and black magic is gone (-3KLoC total in this one):
- kernel_thread()/kernel_execve()/sys_execve() redesign.
We don't do syscalls from kernel anymore for either kernel_thread()
or kernel_execve():
kernel_thread() is essentially clone(2) with callback run before we
return to userland, the callbacks either never return or do
successful do_execve() before returning.
kernel_execve() is a wrapper for do_execve() - it doesn't need to
do transition to user mode anymore.
As a result kernel_thread() and kernel_execve() are
arch-independent now - they live in kernel/fork.c and fs/exec.c
resp. sys_execve() is also in fs/exec.c and it's completely
architecture-independent.
- daemonize() is gone, along with its parts in fs/*.c
- struct pt_regs * is no longer passed to do_fork/copy_process/
copy_thread/do_execve/search_binary_handler/->load_binary/do_coredump.
- sys_fork()/sys_vfork()/sys_clone() unified; some architectures
still need wrappers (ones with callee-saved registers not saved in
pt_regs on syscall entry), but the main part of those suckers is in
kernel/fork.c now."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: (113 commits)
do_coredump(): get rid of pt_regs argument
print_fatal_signal(): get rid of pt_regs argument
ptrace_signal(): get rid of unused arguments
get rid of ptrace_signal_deliver() arguments
new helper: signal_pt_regs()
unify default ptrace_signal_deliver
flagday: kill pt_regs argument of do_fork()
death to idle_regs()
don't pass regs to copy_process()
flagday: don't pass regs to copy_thread()
bfin: switch to generic vfork, get rid of pointless wrappers
xtensa: switch to generic clone()
openrisc: switch to use of generic fork and clone
unicore32: switch to generic clone(2)
score: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
c6x: sanitize copy_thread(), get rid of clone(2) wrapper, switch to generic clone()
take sys_fork/sys_vfork/sys_clone prototypes to linux/syscalls.h
mn10300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
h8300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
tile: switch to generic clone()
...
Conflicts:
arch/microblaze/include/asm/Kbuild
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.
Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.
Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.
For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.
This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.
If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In the cases where we already know the length of the parent, pass it as
a parm so we don't need to recompute it. In the cases where we don't
know the length, pass in AUDIT_NAME_FULL (-1) to indicate that it should
be determined.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.
Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.
While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For now, we just have two possibilities:
UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else
In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.
Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If name is NULL then the condition in the loop will never be true. Also,
with this change, we can eliminate the check for n->name == NULL since
the equivalence check will never be true if it is.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In some cases, we were passing in NULL even when we have a dentry.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some security modules and oprofile still uses VM_EXECUTABLE for retrieving
a task's executable file. After this patch they will use mm->exe_file
directly. mm->exe_file is protected with mm->mmap_sem, so locking stays
the same.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [arch/tile]
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [tomoyo]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
- Explicitly format uids gids in audit messges in the initial user
namespace. This is safe because auditd is restrected to be in
the initial user namespace.
- Convert audit_sig_uid into a kuid_t.
- Enable building the audit code and user namespaces at the same time.
The net result is that the audit subsystem now uses kuid_t and kgid_t whenever
possible making it almost impossible to confuse a raw uid_t with a kuid_t
preventing bugs.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.
Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.
Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.
Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.
Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The audit filter code guarantees that uid are always compared with
uids and gids are always compared with gids, as the comparason
operations are type specific. Take advantage of this proper to define
audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator which use the type safe
comparasons from uidgid.h.
Build on audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator and replace
audit_compare_id with audit_compare_uid and audit_compare_gid. This
is one of those odd cases where being type safe and duplicating code
leads to simpler shorter and more concise code.
Don't allow bitmask operations in uid and gid comparisons in
audit_data_to_entry. Bitmask operations are already denined in
audit_rule_to_entry.
Convert constants in audit_rule_to_entry and audit_data_to_entry into
kuids and kgids when appropriate.
Convert the uid and gid field in struct audit_names to be of type
kuid_t and kgid_t respectively, so that the new uid and gid comparators
can be applied in a type safe manner.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At the suggestion of eparis@redhat.com, move this chunk of task
logging from audit_log_exit to audit_log_task_info and export this
function so it's usuable elsewhere in the kernel.
This patch is against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next-ima-appraisal
Changelog v2:
- add empty audit_log_task_info if CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL isn't set.
Changelog v1:
- Initial post.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: make compat= permanent in the record
v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
(suggested by eparis@redhat.com)
v*: original by keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fix new kernel-doc warnings in auditsc.c:
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'success'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'return_code'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): Excess function parameter 'pt_regs' description in '__audit_syscall_exit'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix,
which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*()
functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the loop, a size_t "len" is used to hold the return value of
audit_log_single_execve_arg(), which returns -1 on error. In that
case the error handling (len <= 0) will be bypassed since "len" is
unsigned, and the loop continues with (p += len) being wrapped.
Change the type of "len" to signed int to fix the error handling.
size_t len;
...
for (...) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(...);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This allows audit to specify rules in which we compare two fields of a
process. Such as is the running process uid != to the running process
euid?
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This completes the matrix of interfield comparisons between uid/gid
information for the current task and the uid/gid information for inodes.
aka I can audit based on differences between the euid of the process and
the uid of fs objects.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than code the same loop over and over implement a helper function which
uses some pointer magic to make it generic enough to be used numerous places
as we implement more audit interfield comparisons
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We wish to be able to audit when a uid=500 task accesses a file which is
uid=0. Or vice versa. This patch introduces a new audit filter type
AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE which takes as an 'enum' which indicates which fields
should be compared. At this point we only define the task->uid vs
inode->uid, but other comparisons can be added.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Just a code cleanup really. We don't need to make a function call just for
it to return on error. This also makes the VFS function even easier to follow
and removes a conditional on a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something. You can't.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Much like the ability to filter audit on the uid of an inode collected, we
should be able to filter on the gid of the inode.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Allow syscall exit filter matching based on the uid of the owner of an
inode used in a syscall. aka:
auditctl -a always,exit -S open -F obj_uid=0 -F perm=wa
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Audit entry,always rules are not allowed and are automatically changed in
exit,always rules in userspace. The kernel refuses to load such rules.
Thus a task in the middle of a syscall (and thus in audit_finish_fork())
can only be in one of two states: AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT or AUDIT_DISABLED.
Since the current task cannot be in AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT we aren't every
going to actually use the code in audit_finish_fork() since it will
return without doing anything. Thus drop the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
A number of audit hooks make function calls before they determine that
auxilary records do not need to be collected. Do those checks as static
inlines since the most common case is going to be that records are not
needed and we can skip the function call overhead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
