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The configurations are passed in from the user when the user domain is
allocated. This helper interprets these configurations according to the
data structure defined in uapi/linux/iommufd.h. The EINVAL error will be
returned if any of configurations are not compatible with the hardware
capabilities. The caller can retry with another compatible user domain.
The encoding of fields of each pasid entry is defined in section 9.6 of
the VT-d spec.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026044216.64964-5-yi.l.liu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
IOMMU advertises Access/Dirty bits for second-stage page table if the
extended capability DMAR register reports it (ECAP, mnemonic ECAP.SSADS).
The first stage table is compatible with CPU page table thus A/D bits are
implicitly supported. Relevant Intel IOMMU SDM ref for first stage table
"3.6.2 Accessed, Extended Accessed, and Dirty Flags" and second stage table
"3.7.2 Accessed and Dirty Flags".
First stage page table is enabled by default so it's allowed to set dirty
tracking and no control bits needed, it just returns 0. To use SSADS, set
bit 9 (SSADE) in the scalable-mode PASID table entry and flush the IOTLB
via pasid_flush_caches() following the manual. Relevant SDM refs:
"3.7.2 Accessed and Dirty Flags"
"6.5.3.3 Guidance to Software for Invalidations,
Table 23. Guidance to Software for Invalidations"
PTE dirty bit is located in bit 9 and it's cached in the IOTLB so flush
IOTLB to make sure IOMMU attempts to set the dirty bit again. Note that
iommu_dirty_bitmap_record() will add the IOVA to iotlb_gather and thus the
caller of the iommu op will flush the IOTLB. Relevant manuals over the
hardware translation is chapter 6 with some special mention to:
"6.2.3.1 Scalable-Mode PASID-Table Entry Programming Considerations"
"6.2.4 IOTLB"
Select IOMMUFD_DRIVER only if IOMMUFD is enabled, given that IOMMU dirty
tracking requires IOMMUFD.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024135109.73787-13-joao.m.martins@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Even the PCI devices don't support pasid capability, PASID table is
mandatory for a PCI device in scalable mode. However flushing cache
of pasid directory table for these devices are not taken after pasid
table is allocated as the "size" of table is zero. Fix it by
calculating the size by page order.
Found this when reading the code, no real problem encountered for now.
Fixes: 194b3348bd ("iommu/vt-d: Fix PASID directory pointer coherency")
Suggested-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yanfei Xu <yanfei.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616081045.721873-1-yanfei.xu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
PCIe Process address space ID (PASID) is used to tag DMA traffic, it
provides finer grained isolation than requester ID (RID).
For each device/RID, 0 is a special PASID for the normal DMA (no
PASID). This is universal across all architectures that supports PASID,
therefore warranted to be reserved globally and declared in the common
header. Consequently, we can avoid the conflict between different PASID
use cases in the generic code. e.g. SVA and DMA API with PASIDs.
This paved away for device drivers to choose global PASID policy while
continue doing normal DMA.
Noting that VT-d could support none-zero RID/NO_PASID, but currently not
used.
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802212427.1497170-2-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
On platforms that do not support IOMMU Extended capability bit 0
Page-walk Coherency, CPU caches are not snooped when IOMMU is accessing
any translation structures. IOMMU access goes only directly to
memory. Intel IOMMU code was missing a flush for the PASID table
directory that resulted in the unrecoverable fault as shown below.
This patch adds clflush calls whenever allocating and updating
a PASID table directory to ensure cache coherency.
On the reverse direction, there's no need to clflush the PASID directory
pointer when we deactivate a context entry in that IOMMU hardware will
not see the old PASID directory pointer after we clear the context entry.
PASID directory entries are also never freed once allocated.
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [00:0d.2] fault addr 0x1026a4000
[fault reason 0x51] SM: Present bit in Directory Entry is clear
DMAR: Dump dmar1 table entries for IOVA 0x1026a4000
DMAR: scalable mode root entry: hi 0x0000000102448001, low 0x0000000101b3e001
DMAR: context entry: hi 0x0000000000000000, low 0x0000000101b4d401
DMAR: pasid dir entry: 0x0000000101b4e001
DMAR: pasid table entry[0]: 0x0000000000000109
DMAR: pasid table entry[1]: 0x0000000000000001
DMAR: pasid table entry[2]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: pasid table entry[3]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: pasid table entry[4]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: pasid table entry[5]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: pasid table entry[6]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: pasid table entry[7]: 0x0000000000000000
DMAR: PTE not present at level 4
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 0bbeb01a4f ("iommu/vt-d: Manage scalalble mode PASID tables")
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reported-by: Sukumar Ghorai <sukumar.ghorai@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209212843.1788125-1-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Resolve conflicts in drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c by using the iommfd version.
The rc fix was done a different way when iommufd patches reworked this
code.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
SRS cap is the hardware cap telling if the hardware IOMMU can support
requests seeking supervisor privilege or not. SRE bit in scalable-mode
PASID table entry is treated as Reserved(0) for implementation not
supporting SRS cap.
Checking SRS cap before setting SRE bit can avoid the non-recoverable
fault of "Non-zero reserved field set in PASID Table Entry" caused by
setting SRE bit while there is no SRS cap support. The fault messages
look like below:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 2
DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [00:0d.0] fault addr 0x1154e1000
[fault reason 0x5a]
SM: Non-zero reserved field set in PASID Table Entry
Fixes: 6f7db75e1c ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115070346.1112273-1-tina.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221116051544.26540-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Following the new rules in include/linux/iommu.h kdocs, EINVAL now can be
used to indicate that domain and device are incompatible by a caller that
treats it as a soft failure and tries attaching to another domain.
On the other hand, there are ->attach_dev callback functions returning it
for obvious device-specific errors. They will result in some inefficiency
in the caller handling routine.
Update these places to corresponding errnos following the new rules.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5924c03bea637f05feb2a20d624bae086b555ec5.1666042872.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
When a DMA domain is attached to a device, it needs to allocate a domain
ID from its IOMMU. Currently, the domain ID information is stored in two
static arrays embedded in the domain structure. This can lead to memory
waste when the driver is running on a small platform.
This optimizes these static arrays by replacing them with an xarray and
consuming memory on demand.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702015610.2849494-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The IOMMU driver shares the pasid table for PCI alias devices. When the
RID2PASID entry of the shared pasid table has been filled by the first
device, the subsequent device will encounter the "DMAR: Setup RID2PASID
failed" failure as the pasid entry has already been marked as present.
As the result, the IOMMU probing process will be aborted.
On the contrary, when any alias device is hot-removed from the system,
for example, by writing to /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../remove, the shared
RID2PASID will be cleared without any notifications to other devices.
As the result, any DMAs from those rest devices are blocked.
Sharing pasid table among PCI alias devices could save two memory pages
for devices underneath the PCIe-to-PCI bridges. Anyway, considering that
those devices are rare on modern platforms that support VT-d in scalable
mode and the saved memory is negligible, it's reasonable to remove this
part of immature code to make the driver feasible and stable.
Fixes: ef848b7e5a ("iommu/vt-d: Setup pasid entry for RID2PASID support")
Reported-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623065720.727849-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220625133430.2200315-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
This fixes improper iotlb invalidation in intel_pasid_tear_down_entry().
When a PASID was used as nested mode, released and reused, the following
error message will appear:
[ 180.187556] Unexpected page request in Privilege Mode
[ 180.187565] Unexpected page request in Privilege Mode
[ 180.279933] Unexpected page request in Privilege Mode
[ 180.279937] Unexpected page request in Privilege Mode
Per chapter 6.5.3.3 of VT-d spec 3.3, when tear down a pasid entry, the
software should use Domain selective IOTLB flush if the PGTT of the pasid
entry is SL only or Nested, while for the pasid entries whose PGTT is FL
only or PT using PASID-based IOTLB flush is enough.
Fixes: 2cd1311a26 ("iommu/vt-d: Add set domain DOMAIN_ATTR_NESTING attr")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Sanjay K <sanjay.k.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817042425.1784279-1-yi.l.liu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817124321.1517985-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The opening comment mark '/**' is used for highlighting the beginning of
kernel-doc comments.
The header for drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c follows this syntax, but
the content inside does not comply with kernel-doc.
This line was probably not meant for kernel-doc parsing, but is parsed
due to the presence of kernel-doc like comment syntax(i.e, '/**'), which
causes unexpected warnings from kernel-doc:
warning: Function parameter or member 'fmt' not described in 'pr_fmt'
Provide a simple fix by replacing this occurrence with general comment
format, i.e. '/*', to prevent kernel-doc from parsing it.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Srivastava <yashsri421@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210523143245.19040-1-yashsri421@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210610020115.1637656-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Commit f68c7f539b ("iommu/vt-d: Enable write protect for supervisor
SVM") added pasid_enable_wpe() which hit below compile error with !X86.
../drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c: In function 'pasid_enable_wpe':
../drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c:554:22: error: implicit declaration of function 'read_cr0' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
554 | unsigned long cr0 = read_cr0();
| ^~~~~~~~
In file included from ../include/linux/build_bug.h:5,
from ../include/linux/bits.h:22,
from ../include/linux/bitops.h:6,
from ../drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c:12:
../drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c:557:23: error: 'X86_CR0_WP' undeclared (first use in this function)
557 | if (unlikely(!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP))) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/compiler.h:78:42: note: in definition of macro 'unlikely'
78 | # define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0)
| ^
../drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c:557:23: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
557 | if (unlikely(!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP))) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/compiler.h:78:42: note: in definition of macro 'unlikely'
78 | # define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0)
|
Add the missing dependency.
Cc: Sanjay Kumar <sanjay.k.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Fixes: f68c7f539b ("iommu/vt-d: Enable write protect for supervisor SVM")
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210411062312.3057579-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When a present pasid entry is disassembled, all kinds of pasid related
caches need to be flushed. But when a pasid entry is not being used
(PRESENT bit not set), we don't need to do this. Check the PRESENT bit
in intel_pasid_tear_down_entry() and avoid flushing caches if it's not
set.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210320025415.641201-6-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The Intel VT-d driver checks wrong register to report snoop capablility
when using first level page table for GPA to HPA translation. This might
lead the IOMMU driver to say that it supports snooping control, but in
reality, it does not. Fix this by always setting PASID-table-entry.PGSNP
whenever a pasid entry is setting up for GPA to HPA translation so that
the IOMMU driver could report snoop capability as long as it runs in the
scalable mode.
Fixes: b802d070a5 ("iommu/vt-d: Use iova over first level")
Suggested-by: Rajesh Sankaran <rajesh.sankaran@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210330021145.13824-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The pasid_lock is used to synchronize different threads from modifying a
same pasid directory entry at the same time. It causes below lockdep splat.
[ 83.296538] ========================================================
[ 83.296538] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
[ 83.296539] 5.12.0-rc3+ #25 Tainted: G W
[ 83.296539] --------------------------------------------------------
[ 83.296540] bash/780 just changed the state of lock:
[ 83.296540] ffffffff82b29c98 (device_domain_lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at:
iommu_flush_dev_iotlb.part.0+0x32/0x110
[ 83.296547] but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
[ 83.296547] (pasid_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}
[ 83.296548]
and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
[ 83.296549] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 83.296549] Chain exists of:
device_domain_lock --> &iommu->lock --> pasid_lock
[ 83.296551] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 83.296551] CPU0 CPU1
[ 83.296552] ---- ----
[ 83.296552] lock(pasid_lock);
[ 83.296553] local_irq_disable();
[ 83.296553] lock(device_domain_lock);
[ 83.296554] lock(&iommu->lock);
[ 83.296554] <Interrupt>
[ 83.296554] lock(device_domain_lock);
[ 83.296555]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Fix it by replacing the pasid_lock with an atomic exchange operation.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210320020916.640115-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
DevTLB flush can be used for both DMA request with and without PASIDs.
The former uses PASID#0 (RID2PASID), latter uses non-zero PASID for SVA
usage.
This patch adds a check for PASID value such that devTLB flush with
PASID is used for SVA case. This is more efficient in that multiple
PASIDs can be used by a single device, when tearing down a PASID entry
we shall flush only the devTLB specific to a PASID.
Fixes: 6f7db75e1c ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724014925.15523-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
