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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dave Marchevsky
d2dcc67df9 bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail
Consider this code snippet:

  struct node {
    long key;
    bpf_list_node l;
    bpf_rb_node r;
    bpf_refcount ref;
  }

  int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx)
  {
    struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/*...*/), *m;

    bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->r, /* ... */);
    m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&other_tree, &m->r, /* ... */);

    bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);

    /* ... */
  }

After bpf_refcount_acquire, n and m point to the same underlying memory,
and that node's bpf_rb_node field is being used by the some_tree insert,
so overwriting it as a result of the second insert is an error. In order
to properly support refcounted nodes, the rbtree and list insert
functions must be allowed to fail. This patch adds such support.

The kfuncs bpf_rbtree_add, bpf_list_push_{front,back} are modified to
return an int indicating success/failure, with 0 -> success, nonzero ->
failure.

bpf_obj_drop on failure
=======================

Currently the only reason an insert can fail is the example above: the
bpf_{list,rb}_node is already in use. When such a failure occurs, the
insert kfuncs will bpf_obj_drop the input node. This allows the insert
operations to logically fail without changing their verifier owning ref
behavior, namely the unconditional release_reference of the input
owning ref.

With insert that always succeeds, ownership of the node is always passed
to the collection, since the node always ends up in the collection.

With a possibly-failed insert w/ bpf_obj_drop, ownership of the node
is always passed either to the collection (success), or to bpf_obj_drop
(failure). Regardless, it's correct to continue unconditionally
releasing the input owning ref, as something is always taking ownership
from the calling program on insert.

Keeping owning ref behavior unchanged results in a nice default UX for
insert functions that can fail. If the program's reaction to a failed
insert is "fine, just get rid of this owning ref for me and let me go
on with my business", then there's no reason to check for failure since
that's default behavior. e.g.:

  long important_failures = 0;

  int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx)
  {
    struct node *n, *m, *o; /* all bpf_obj_new'd */

    bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &m->node, /* ... */);
    if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &o->node, /* ... */)) {
      important_failures++;
    }
    bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
  }

If we instead chose to pass ownership back to the program on failed
insert - by returning NULL on success or an owning ref on failure -
programs would always have to do something with the returned ref on
failure. The most likely action is probably "I'll just get rid of this
owning ref and go about my business", which ideally would look like:

  if (n = bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */))
    bpf_obj_drop(n);

But bpf_obj_drop isn't allowed in a critical section and inserts must
occur within one, so in reality error handling would become a
hard-to-parse mess.

For refcounted nodes, we can replicate the "pass ownership back to
program on failure" logic with this patch's semantics, albeit in an ugly
way:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/* ... */), *m;

  bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

  m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
  if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */)) {
    /* Do something with m */
  }

  bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
  bpf_obj_drop(m);

bpf_refcount_acquire is used to simulate "return owning ref on failure".
This should be an uncommon occurrence, though.

Addition of two verifier-fixup'd args to collection inserts
===========================================================

The actual bpf_obj_drop kfunc is
bpf_obj_drop_impl(void *, struct btf_struct_meta *), with bpf_obj_drop
macro populating the second arg with 0 and the verifier later filling in
the arg during insn fixup.

Because bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} now might do
bpf_obj_drop, these kfuncs need a btf_struct_meta parameter that can be
passed to bpf_obj_drop_impl.

Similarly, because the 'node' param to those insert functions is the
bpf_{list,rb}_node within the node type, and bpf_obj_drop expects a
pointer to the beginning of the node, the insert functions need to be
able to find the beginning of the node struct. A second
verifier-populated param is necessary: the offset of {list,rb}_node within the
node type.

These two new params allow the insert kfuncs to correctly call
__bpf_obj_drop_impl:

  beginning_of_node = bpf_rb_node_ptr - offset
  if (already_inserted)
    __bpf_obj_drop_impl(beginning_of_node, btf_struct_meta->record);

Similarly to other kfuncs with "hidden" verifier-populated params, the
insert functions are renamed with _impl prefix and a macro is provided
for common usage. For example, bpf_rbtree_add kfunc is now
bpf_rbtree_add_impl and bpf_rbtree_add is now a macro which sets
"hidden" args to 0.

Due to the two new args BPF progs will need to be recompiled to work
with the new _impl kfuncs.

This patch also rewrites the "hidden argument" explanation to more
directly say why the BPF program writer doesn't need to populate the
arguments with anything meaningful.

How does this new logic affect non-owning references?
=====================================================

Currently, non-owning refs are valid until the end of the critical
section in which they're created. We can make this guarantee because, if
a non-owning ref exists, the referent was added to some collection. The
collection will drop() its nodes when it goes away, but it can't go away
while our program is accessing it, so that's not a problem. If the
referent is removed from the collection in the same CS that it was added
in, it can't be bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end. Those are the only
two ways to free the referent's memory and neither can happen until
after the non-owning ref's lifetime ends.

On first glance, having these collection insert functions potentially
bpf_obj_drop their input seems like it breaks the "can't be
bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end" line of reasoning. But we care about
the memory not being _freed_ until end of CS end, and a previous patch
in the series modified bpf_obj_drop such that it doesn't free refcounted
nodes until refcount == 0. So the statement can be more accurately
rewritten as "can't be free'd until after CS end".

We can prove that this rewritten statement holds for any non-owning
reference produced by collection insert functions:

* If the input to the insert function is _not_ refcounted
  * We have an owning reference to the input, and can conclude it isn't
    in any collection
    * Inserting a node in a collection turns owning refs into
      non-owning, and since our input type isn't refcounted, there's no
      way to obtain additional owning refs to the same underlying
      memory
  * Because our node isn't in any collection, the insert operation
    cannot fail, so bpf_obj_drop will not execute
  * If bpf_obj_drop is guaranteed not to execute, there's no risk of
    memory being free'd

* Otherwise, the input to the insert function is refcounted
  * If the insert operation fails due to the node's list_head or rb_root
    already being in some collection, there was some previous successful
    insert which passed refcount to the collection
  * We have an owning reference to the input, it must have been
    acquired via bpf_refcount_acquire, which bumped the refcount
  * refcount must be >= 2 since there's a valid owning reference and the
    node is already in a collection
  * Insert triggering bpf_obj_drop will decr refcount to >= 1, never
    resulting in a free

So although we may do bpf_obj_drop during the critical section, this
will never result in memory being free'd, and no changes to non-owning
ref logic are needed in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-6-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
7c50b1cb76 bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc
Currently, BPF programs can interact with the lifetime of refcounted
local kptrs in the following ways:

  bpf_obj_new  - Initialize refcount to 1 as part of new object creation
  bpf_obj_drop - Decrement refcount and free object if it's 0
  collection add - Pass ownership to the collection. No change to
                   refcount but collection is responsible for
		   bpf_obj_dropping it

In order to be able to add a refcounted local kptr to multiple
collections we need to be able to increment the refcount and acquire a
new owning reference. This patch adds a kfunc, bpf_refcount_acquire,
implementing such an operation.

bpf_refcount_acquire takes a refcounted local kptr and returns a new
owning reference to the same underlying memory as the input. The input
can be either owning or non-owning. To reinforce why this is safe,
consider the following code snippets:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); // A
  struct node *m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n); // B

In the above snippet, n will be alive with refcount=1 after (A), and
since nothing changes that state before (B), it's obviously safe. If
n is instead added to some rbtree, we can still safely refcount_acquire
it:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));
  struct node *m;

  bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
  bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);   // A
  m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);              // B
  bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);

In the above snippet, after (A) n is a non-owning reference, and after
(B) m is an owning reference pointing to the same memory as n. Although
n has no ownership of that memory's lifetime, it's guaranteed to be
alive until the end of the critical section, and n would be clobbered if
we were past the end of the critical section, so it's safe to bump
refcount.

Implementation details:

* From verifier's perspective, bpf_refcount_acquire handling is similar
  to bpf_obj_new and bpf_obj_drop. Like the former, it returns a new
  owning reference matching input type, although like the latter, type
  can be inferred from concrete kptr input. Verifier changes in
  {check,fixup}_kfunc_call and check_kfunc_args are largely copied from
  aforementioned functions' verifier changes.

* An exception to the above is the new KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR
  arg, indicated by new "__refcounted_kptr" kfunc arg suffix. This is
  necessary in order to handle both owning and non-owning input without
  adding special-casing to "__alloc" arg handling. Also a convenient
  place to confirm that input type has bpf_refcount field.

* The implemented kfunc is actually bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, with
  'hidden' second arg that the verifier sets to the type's struct_meta
  in fixup_kfunc_call.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
c834df847e bpf: Add bpf_rbtree_{add,remove,first} decls to bpf_experimental.h
These kfuncs will be used by selftests in following patches

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-7-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-02-13 19:40:53 -08:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
64069c72b4 selftests/bpf: Add __contains macro to bpf_experimental.h
Add user facing __contains macro which provides a convenient wrapper
over the verbose kernel specific BTF declaration tag required to
annotate BPF list head structs in user types.

Acked-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-20-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 19:22:14 -08:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
8cab76ec63 bpf: Introduce single ownership BPF linked list API
Add a linked list API for use in BPF programs, where it expects
protection from the bpf_spin_lock in the same allocation as the
bpf_list_head. For now, only one bpf_spin_lock can be present hence that
is assumed to be the one protecting the bpf_list_head.

The following functions are added to kick things off:

// Add node to beginning of list
void bpf_list_push_front(struct bpf_list_head *head, struct bpf_list_node *node);

// Add node to end of list
void bpf_list_push_back(struct bpf_list_head *head, struct bpf_list_node *node);

// Remove node at beginning of list and return it
struct bpf_list_node *bpf_list_pop_front(struct bpf_list_head *head);

// Remove node at end of list and return it
struct bpf_list_node *bpf_list_pop_back(struct bpf_list_head *head);

The lock protecting the bpf_list_head needs to be taken for all
operations. The verifier ensures that the lock that needs to be taken is
always held, and only the correct lock is taken for these operations.
These checks are made statically by relying on the reg->id preserved for
registers pointing into regions having both bpf_spin_lock and the
objects protected by it. The comment over check_reg_allocation_locked in
this change describes the logic in detail.

Note that bpf_list_push_front and bpf_list_push_back are meant to
consume the object containing the node in the 1st argument, however that
specific mechanism is intended to not release the ref_obj_id directly
until the bpf_spin_unlock is called. In this commit, nothing is done,
but the next commit will be introducing logic to handle this case, so it
has been left as is for now.

bpf_list_pop_front and bpf_list_pop_back delete the first or last item
of the list respectively, and return pointer to the element at the
list_node offset. The user can then use container_of style macro to get
the actual entry type. The verifier however statically knows the actual
type, so the safety properties are still preserved.

With these additions, programs can now manage their own linked lists and
store their objects in them.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-17-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 19:22:14 -08:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
ac9f06050a bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_drop
Introduce bpf_obj_drop, which is the kfunc used to free allocated
objects (allocated using bpf_obj_new). Pairing with bpf_obj_new, it
implicitly destructs the fields part of object automatically without
user intervention.

Just like the previous patch, btf_struct_meta that is needed to free up
the special fields is passed as a hidden argument to the kfunc.

For the user, a convenience macro hides over the kernel side kfunc which
is named bpf_obj_drop_impl.

Continuing the previous example:

void prog(void) {
	struct foo *f;

	f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f));
	if (!f)
		return;
	bpf_obj_drop(f);
}

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-15-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 19:22:14 -08:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
958cf2e273 bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new
Introduce type safe memory allocator bpf_obj_new for BPF programs. The
kernel side kfunc is named bpf_obj_new_impl, as passing hidden arguments
to kfuncs still requires having them in prototype, unlike BPF helpers
which always take 5 arguments and have them checked using bpf_func_proto
in verifier, ignoring unset argument types.

Introduce __ign suffix to ignore a specific kfunc argument during type
checks, then use this to introduce support for passing type metadata to
the bpf_obj_new_impl kfunc.

The user passes BTF ID of the type it wants to allocates in program BTF,
the verifier then rewrites the first argument as the size of this type,
after performing some sanity checks (to ensure it exists and it is a
struct type).

The second argument is also fixed up and passed by the verifier. This is
the btf_struct_meta for the type being allocated. It would be needed
mostly for the offset array which is required for zero initializing
special fields while leaving the rest of storage in unitialized state.

It would also be needed in the next patch to perform proper destruction
of the object's special fields.

Under the hood, bpf_obj_new will call bpf_mem_alloc and bpf_mem_free,
using the any context BPF memory allocator introduced recently. To this
end, a global instance of the BPF memory allocator is initialized on
boot to be used for this purpose. This 'bpf_global_ma' serves all
allocations for bpf_obj_new. In the future, bpf_obj_new variants will
allow specifying a custom allocator.

Note that now that bpf_obj_new can be used to allocate objects that can
be linked to BPF linked list (when future linked list helpers are
available), we need to also free the elements using bpf_mem_free.
However, since the draining of elements is done outside the
bpf_spin_lock, we need to do migrate_disable around the call since
bpf_list_head_free can be called from map free path where migration is
enabled. Otherwise, when called from BPF programs migration is already
disabled.

A convenience macro is included in the bpf_experimental.h header to hide
over the ugly details of the implementation, leading to user code
looking similar to a language level extension which allocates and
constructs fields of a user type.

struct bar {
	struct bpf_list_node node;
};

struct foo {
	struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
	struct bpf_list_head head __contains(bar, node);
};

void prog(void) {
	struct foo *f;

	f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f));
	if (!f)
		return;
	...
}

A key piece of this story is still missing, i.e. the free function,
which will come in the next patch.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-14-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2022-11-17 19:22:14 -08:00