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[ Upstream commit 11215630aada28307ba555a43138db6ac54fa825 ]
A customer has reported a BUG_ON in ext4_clear_journal_err() hitting
during an LTP testing. Either this has been caused by a test setup
issue where the filesystem was being overwritten while LTP was mounting
it or the journal replay has overwritten the superblock with invalid
data. In either case it is preferable we don't take the machine down
with a BUG_ON. So handle the situation of unexpectedly missing
has_journal feature more gracefully. We issue warning and fail the mount
in the cases where the race window is narrow and the failed check is
most likely a programming error. In cases where fs corruption is more
likely, we do full ext4_error() handling before failing mount / remount.
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200710140759.18031-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 24dc9864914eb5813173cfa53313fcd02e4aea7d ]
Callers of __jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer() and
__jbd2_journal_refile_buffer() assume that the b_transaction is set. In
fact if it's not, we can end up with journal_head refcounting errors
leading to crash much later that might be very hard to track down. Add
asserts to make sure that is the case.
We also make sure that b_next_transaction is NULL in
__jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer() since the callers expect that as well and
we should not get into that stage in this state anyway, leading to
problems later on if we do.
Tested with fstests.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200617092549.6712-1-lczerner@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa9967734227b44acb1b6918033f9122dc7825b9 ]
Make sure the delayed work stopped before releasing the resources.
cancel_delayed_work_sync() will only guarantee that the work finishes
executing if the work is already in the ->worklist. That means after
the cancel_delayed_work_sync() returns, it will leave the work requeued
if it was rearmed at the end. That can lead to a use after free once the
work struct is freed.
Fix it by flushing the delayed work instead of trying to cancel it, and
ensure that the work doesn't rearm if the mdsc is stopping.
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46293
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a7f8b1c2ac21bf081b41264c9cfd6260dffa6246 ]
The incoming qgroup reserved space timing will move the data reservation
to ordered extent completely.
However in btrfs_punch_hole_lock_range() will call
btrfs_invalidate_page(), which will clear QGROUP_RESERVED bit for the
range.
In current stage it's OK, but if we're making ordered extents handle the
reserved space, then btrfs_punch_hole_lock_range() can clear the
QGROUP_RESERVED bit before we submit ordered extent, leading to qgroup
reserved space leakage.
So here change the timing to make reserve data space after
btrfs_punch_hole_lock_range().
The new timing is fine for either current code or the new code.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 99c787cfd2bd04926f1f553b30bd7dcea2caaba1 ]
During umount, f2fs_put_super() unregisters procfs entries after
f2fs_destroy_segment_manager(), it may cause use-after-free
issue when umount races with procfs accessing, fix it by relocating
f2fs_unregister_sysfs().
[Chao Yu: change commit title/message a bit]
Signed-off-by: Li Guifu <bluce.liguifu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 96355d5a1f0ee6dcc182c37db4894ec0c29f1692 ]
In tracking down a problem in this patchset, I discovered we are
reclaiming dirty stale inodes. This wasn't discovered until inodes
were always attached to the cluster buffer and then the rcu callback
that freed inodes was assert failing because the inode still had an
active pointer to the cluster buffer after it had been reclaimed.
Debugging the issue indicated that this was a pre-existing issue
resulting from the way the inodes are handled in xfs_inactive_ifree.
When we free a cluster buffer from xfs_ifree_cluster, all the inodes
in cache are marked XFS_ISTALE. Those that are clean have nothing
else done to them and so eventually get cleaned up by background
reclaim. i.e. it is assumed we'll never dirty/relog an inode marked
XFS_ISTALE.
On journal commit dirty stale inodes as are handled by both
buffer and inode log items to run though xfs_istale_done() and
removed from the AIL (buffer log item commit) or the log item will
simply unpin it because the buffer log item will clean it. What happens
to any specific inode is entirely dependent on which log item wins
the commit race, but the result is the same - stale inodes are
clean, not attached to the cluster buffer, and not in the AIL. Hence
inode reclaim can just free these inodes without further care.
However, if the stale inode is relogged, it gets dirtied again and
relogged into the CIL. Most of the time this isn't an issue, because
relogging simply changes the inode's location in the current
checkpoint. Problems arise, however, when the CIL checkpoints
between two transactions in the xfs_inactive_ifree() deferops
processing. This results in the XFS_ISTALE inode being redirtied
and inserted into the CIL without any of the other stale cluster
buffer infrastructure being in place.
Hence on journal commit, it simply gets unpinned, so it remains
dirty in memory. Everything in inode writeback avoids XFS_ISTALE
inodes so it can't be written back, and it is not tracked in the AIL
so there's not even a trigger to attempt to clean the inode. Hence
the inode just sits dirty in memory until inode reclaim comes along,
sees that it is XFS_ISTALE, and goes to reclaim it. This reclaiming
of a dirty inode caused use after free, list corruptions and other
nasty issues later in this patchset.
Hence this patch addresses a violation of the "never log XFS_ISTALE
inodes" caused by the deferops processing rolling a transaction
and relogging a stale inode in xfs_inactive_free. It also adds a
bunch of asserts to catch this problem in debug kernels so that
we don't reintroduce this problem in future.
Reproducer for this issue was generic/558 on a v4 filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a9ed4a6560b8562b7e2e2bed9527e88001f7b682 upstream.
When adding a new fd to an epoll, and that this new fd is an
epoll fd itself, we recursively scan the fds attached to it
to detect cycles, and add non-epool files to a "check list"
that gets subsequently parsed.
However, this check list isn't completely safe when deletions
can happen concurrently. To sidestep the issue, make sure that
a struct file placed on the check list sees its f_count increased,
ensuring that a concurrent deletion won't result in the file
disapearing from under our feet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5e0b17b026eb7c6de9baa9b0d45a51b05f05abe1 ]
If an error occurs during the construction of an afs superblock, it's
possible that an error occurs after a superblock is created, but before
we've created the root dentry. If the superblock has a dynamic root
(ie. what's normally mounted on /afs), the afs_kill_super() will call
afs_dynroot_depopulate() to unpin any created dentries - but this will
oops if the root hasn't been created yet.
Fix this by skipping that bit of code if there is no root dentry.
This leads to an oops looking like:
general protection fault, ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
...
RIP: 0010:afs_dynroot_depopulate+0x25f/0x529 fs/afs/dynroot.c:385
...
Call Trace:
afs_kill_super+0x13b/0x180 fs/afs/super.c:535
deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335
afs_get_tree+0x1124/0x1460 fs/afs/super.c:598
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x1387/0x2070 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
which is oopsing on this line:
inode_lock(root->d_inode);
presumably because sb->s_root was NULL.
Fixes: 0da0b7fd73e4 ("afs: Display manually added cells in dynamic root mount")
Reported-by: syzbot+c1eff8205244ae7e11a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf9a379d0980e7413d94cb18dac73db2bfc5f470 ]
Currently, add_system_zone() just silently merges two added system zones
that overlap. However the overlap should not happen and it generally
suggests that some unrelated metadata overlap which indicates the fs is
corrupted. We should have caught such problems earlier (e.g. in
ext4_check_descriptors()) but add this check as another line of defense.
In later patch we also use this for stricter checking of journal inode
extent tree.
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728130437.7804-3-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5872331b3d91820e14716632ebb56b1399b34fe1 ]
If for any reason a directory passed to do_split() does not have enough
active entries to exceed half the size of the block, we can end up
iterating over all "count" entries without finding a split point.
In this case, count == move, and split will be zero, and we will
attempt a negative index into map[].
Guard against this by detecting this case, and falling back to
split-to-half-of-count instead; in this case we will still have
plenty of space (> half blocksize) in each split block.
Fixes: ef2b02d3e617 ("ext34: ensure do_split leaves enough free space in both blocks")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f53e246b-647c-64bb-16ec-135383c70ad7@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a089e3fd5a82aea20f3d9ec4caa5f4c65cc2cfcc ]
The kernel signalfd4() syscall returns different error codes when called
either in compat or native mode. This behaviour makes correct emulation
in qemu and testing programs like LTP more complicated.
Fix the code to always return -in both modes- EFAULT for unaccessible user
memory, and EINVAL when called with an invalid signal mask.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200530100707.GA10159@ls3530.fritz.box
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 96cf2a2c75567ff56195fe3126d497a2e7e4379f ]
If xfs_sysfs_init is called with parent_kobj == NULL, UBSAN
shows the following warning:
UBSAN: null-ptr-deref in ./fs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.h:37:23
member access within null pointer of type 'struct xfs_kobj'
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x10e/0x195
ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0x241/0x280
__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x32/0x40
init_xfs_fs+0x12b/0x28f
do_one_initcall+0xdd/0x1d0
do_initcall_level+0x151/0x1b6
do_initcalls+0x50/0x8f
do_basic_setup+0x29/0x2b
kernel_init_freeable+0x19f/0x20b
kernel_init+0x11/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fix it by checking parent_kobj before the code accesses its member.
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: minor whitespace edits]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a7caa88f8b72c136f9a401f498471b8a8e35370d ]
If the ceph_mdsc_init() fails, it will free the mdsc already.
Reported-by: syzbot+b57f46d8d6ea51960b8c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 798b7347e4f29553db4b996393caf12f5b233daf ]
The log of UAF problem is listed below.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in jffs2_rmdir+0xa4/0x1cc [jffs2] at addr c1f165fc
Read of size 4 by task rm/8283
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Tainted: P B O ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in 0xbbbbbbbb age=3054364 cpu=0 pid=0
0xb0bba6ef
jffs2_write_dirent+0x11c/0x9c8 [jffs2]
__slab_alloc.isra.21.constprop.25+0x2c/0x44
__kmalloc+0x1dc/0x370
jffs2_write_dirent+0x11c/0x9c8 [jffs2]
jffs2_do_unlink+0x328/0x5fc [jffs2]
jffs2_rmdir+0x110/0x1cc [jffs2]
vfs_rmdir+0x180/0x268
do_rmdir+0x2cc/0x300
ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x3c
INFO: Freed in 0x205b age=3054364 cpu=0 pid=0
0x2e9173
jffs2_add_fd_to_list+0x138/0x1dc [jffs2]
jffs2_add_fd_to_list+0x138/0x1dc [jffs2]
jffs2_garbage_collect_dirent.isra.3+0x21c/0x288 [jffs2]
jffs2_garbage_collect_live+0x16bc/0x1800 [jffs2]
jffs2_garbage_collect_pass+0x678/0x11d4 [jffs2]
jffs2_garbage_collect_thread+0x1e8/0x3b0 [jffs2]
kthread+0x1a8/0x1b0
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Call Trace:
[c17ddd20] [c02452d4] kasan_report.part.0+0x298/0x72c (unreliable)
[c17ddda0] [d2509680] jffs2_rmdir+0xa4/0x1cc [jffs2]
[c17dddd0] [c026da04] vfs_rmdir+0x180/0x268
[c17dde00] [c026f4e4] do_rmdir+0x2cc/0x300
[c17ddf40] [c001a658] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x3c
The root cause is that we don't get "jffs2_inode_info.sem" before
we scan list "jffs2_inode_info.dents" in function jffs2_rmdir.
This patch add codes to get "jffs2_inode_info.sem" before we scan
"jffs2_inode_info.dents" to slove the UAF problem.
Signed-off-by: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f959b5d037e71a4d69b5bf71faffa065d9269b4a ]
xfs_trans_dqresv is the function that we use to make reservations
against resource quotas. Each resource contains two counters: the
q_core counter, which tracks resources allocated on disk; and the dquot
reservation counter, which tracks how much of that resource has either
been allocated or reserved by threads that are working on metadata
updates.
For disk blocks, we compare the proposed reservation counter against the
hard and soft limits to decide if we're going to fail the operation.
However, for inodes we inexplicably compare against the q_core counter,
not the incore reservation count.
Since the q_core counter is always lower than the reservation count and
we unlock the dquot between reservation and transaction commit, this
means that multiple threads can reserve the last inode count before we
hit the hard limit, and when they commit, we'll be well over the hard
limit.
Fix this by checking against the incore inode reservation counter, since
we would appear to maintain that correctly (and that's what we report in
GETQUOTA).
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Collins <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ef3f5830b859604eda8723c26d90ab23edc027a4 upstream.
jbd2_write_superblock() is under the buffer lock of journal superblock
before ending that superblock write, so add a missing unlock_buffer() in
in the error path before submitting buffer.
Fixes: 742b06b5628f ("jbd2: check superblock mapped prior to committing")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200620061948.2049579-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7303cb5bfe845f7d43cd9b2dbd37dbb266efda9b upstream.
ext4_search_dir() and ext4_generic_delete_entry() can be called both for
standard director blocks and for inline directories stored inside inode
or inline xattr space. For the second case we didn't call
ext4_check_dir_entry() with proper constraints that could result in
accepting corrupted directory entry as well as false positive filesystem
errors like:
EXT4-fs error (device dm-0): ext4_search_dir:1395: inode #28320400:
block 113246792: comm dockerd: bad entry in directory: directory entry too
close to block end - offset=0, inode=28320403, rec_len=32, name_len=8,
size=4096
Fix the arguments passed to ext4_check_dir_entry().
Fixes: 109ba779d6cc ("ext4: check for directory entries too close to block end")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200731162135.8080-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bcf85fcedfdd17911982a3e3564fcfec7b01eebd upstream.
romfs has a superblock field that limits the size of the filesystem; data
beyond that limit is never accessed.
romfs_dev_read() fetches a caller-supplied number of bytes from the
backing device. It returns 0 on success or an error code on failure;
therefore, its API can't represent short reads, it's all-or-nothing.
However, when romfs_dev_read() detects that the requested operation would
cross the filesystem size limit, it currently silently truncates the
requested number of bytes. This e.g. means that when the content of a
file with size 0x1000 starts one byte before the filesystem size limit,
->readpage() will only fill a single byte of the supplied page while
leaving the rest uninitialized, leaking that uninitialized memory to
userspace.
Fix it by returning an error code instead of truncating the read when the
requested read operation would go beyond the end of the filesystem.
Fixes: da4458bda237 ("NOMMU: Make it possible for RomFS to use MTD devices directly")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818013202.2246365-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e6e238c3002ea3611465ce5f32777ddd6a40126 ]
[BUG]
There is a bug report of NULL pointer dereference caused in
compress_file_extent():
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_delalloc_helper [btrfs]
NIP [c008000006dd4d34] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x75c/0x8a0 [btrfs]
LR [c008000006dd4d1c] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x744/0x8a0 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
[c000000c69093b00] [c008000006dd4d1c] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x744/0x8a0 [btrfs] (unreliable)
[c000000c69093bd0] [c008000006dd4ebc] async_cow_start+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]
[c000000c69093c10] [c008000006e14824] normal_work_helper+0xdc/0x598 [btrfs]
[c000000c69093c80] [c0000000001608c0] process_one_work+0x2c0/0x5b0
[c000000c69093d10] [c000000000160c38] worker_thread+0x88/0x660
[c000000c69093db0] [c00000000016b55c] kthread+0x1ac/0x1c0
[c000000c69093e20] [c00000000000b660] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x7c
---[ end trace f16954aa20d822f6 ]---
[CAUSE]
For the following execution route of compress_file_range(), it's
possible to hit NULL pointer dereference:
compress_file_extent()
|- pages = NULL;
|- start = async_chunk->start = 0;
|- end = async_chunk = 4095;
|- nr_pages = 1;
|- inode_need_compress() == false; <<< Possible, see later explanation
| Now, we have nr_pages = 1, pages = NULL
|- cont:
|- ret = cow_file_range_inline();
|- if (ret <= 0) {
|- for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
|- WARN_ON(pages[i]->mapping); <<< Crash
To enter above call execution branch, we need the following race:
Thread 1 (chattr) | Thread 2 (writeback)
--------------------------+------------------------------
| btrfs_run_delalloc_range
| |- inode_need_compress = true
| |- cow_file_range_async()
btrfs_ioctl_set_flag() |
|- binode_flags |= |
BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS |
| compress_file_range()
| |- inode_need_compress = false
| |- nr_page = 1 while pages = NULL
| | Then hit the crash
[FIX]
This patch will fix it by checking @pages before doing accessing it.
This patch is only designed as a hot fix and easy to backport.
More elegant fix may make btrfs only check inode_need_compress() once to
avoid such race, but that would be another story.
Reported-by: Luciano Chavez <chavez@us.ibm.com>
Fixes: 4d3a800ebb12 ("btrfs: merge nr_pages input and output parameter in compress_pages")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14.x: cecc8d9038d16: btrfs: Move free_pages_out label in inline extent handling branch in compress_file_range
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cecc8d9038d164eda61fbcd72520975a554ea63e ]
This label is only executed if compress_file_range fails to create an
inline extent. So move its code in the semantically related inline
extent handling branch. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3ef3959b29c4a5bd65526ab310a1a18ae533172a ]
Chris Murphy reported a problem where rpm ostree will bind mount a bunch
of things for whatever voodoo it's doing. But when it does this
/proc/mounts shows something like
/dev/sda /mnt/test btrfs rw,relatime,subvolid=256,subvol=/foo 0 0
/dev/sda /mnt/test/baz btrfs rw,relatime,subvolid=256,subvol=/foo/bar 0 0
Despite subvolid=256 being subvol=/foo. This is because we're just
spitting out the dentry of the mount point, which in the case of bind
mounts is the source path for the mountpoint. Instead we should spit
out the path to the actual subvol. Fix this by looking up the name for
the subvolid we have mounted. With this fix the same test looks like
this
/dev/sda /mnt/test btrfs rw,relatime,subvolid=256,subvol=/foo 0 0
/dev/sda /mnt/test/baz btrfs rw,relatime,subvolid=256,subvol=/foo 0 0
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <chris@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c0c907a47dccf2cf26251a8fb4a8e7a3bf79ce84 ]
The functions will be used outside of export.c and super.c to allow
resolving subvolume name from a given id, eg. for subvolume deletion by
id ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ split from the next patch ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 88b2e9b06381551b707d980627ad0591191f7a2d ]
The 64 bit ino is being compared to the product of two u32 values,
however, the multiplication is being performed using a 32 bit multiply so
there is a potential of an overflow. To be fully safe, cast uspi->s_ncg
to a u64 to ensure a 64 bit multiplication occurs to avoid any chance of
overflow.
Fixes: f3e2a520f5fb ("ufs: NFS support")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200715170355.1081713-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintentional integer overflow")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f666f9fb9a36f1c833b9d18923572f0e4d304754 ]
When truncating a file to a size within the last allowed logical block,
block_to_path() is called with the *next* block. This exceeds the limit,
causing the "block %ld too big" error message to be printed.
This case isn't actually an error; there are just no more blocks past that
point. So, remove this error message.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a12c4a8069607247cb8edc3b035a664e636fd9a ]
The minix filesystem reads its maximum file size from its on-disk
superblock. This value isn't necessarily a multiple of the block size.
When it's not, the V1 block mapping code doesn't allow mapping the last
possible block. Commit 6ed6a722f9ab ("minixfs: fix block limit check")
fixed this in the V2 mapping code. Fix it in the V1 mapping code too.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 32ac86efff91a3e4ef8c3d1cadd4559e23c8e73a ]
The minix filesystem leaves super_block::s_maxbytes at MAX_NON_LFS rather
than setting it to the actual filesystem-specific limit. This is broken
because it means userspace doesn't see the standard behavior like getting
EFBIG and SIGXFSZ when exceeding the maximum file size.
Fix this by setting s_maxbytes correctly.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 ]
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
[Trond: clean up duplicate test of label->len != 0]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 38d51b2dd171ad973afc1f5faab825ed05a2d5e9 upstream.
Dan Carpenter reported the following static checker warning.
fs/ocfs2/super.c:1269 ocfs2_parse_options() warn: '(-1)' 65535 can't fit into 32767 'mopt->slot'
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:859 ocfs2_init_inode_steal_slot() warn: '(-1)' 65535 can't fit into 32767 'osb->s_inode_steal_slot'
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:867 ocfs2_init_meta_steal_slot() warn: '(-1)' 65535 can't fit into 32767 'osb->s_meta_steal_slot'
That's because OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT is (u16)-1. Slot number in ocfs2 can be
never negative, so change s16 to u16.
Fixes: 9277f8334ffc ("ocfs2: fix value of OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627001259.19757-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc2fbaa4d3808aef82dd1064a8e61c16549fe956 upstream.
sbi->s_freeinodes_counter is only decreased by the ext2 code, it is never
increased. This patch fixes it.
Note that sbi->s_freeinodes_counter is only used in the algorithm that
tries to find the group for new allocations, so this bug is not easily
visible (the only visibility is that the group finding algorithm selects
inoptinal result).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2004201538300.19436@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f26433e9b3eb7a55ed70d8f882ae9cd48ba448b upstream.
While logging an inode, at copy_items(), if we fail to lookup the checksums
for an extent we release the destination path, free the ins_data array and
then return immediately. However a previous iteration of the for loop may
have added checksums to the ordered_sums list, in which case we leak the
memory used by them.
So fix this by making sure we iterate the ordered_sums list and free all
its checksums before returning.
Fixes: 3650860b90cc2a ("Btrfs: remove almost all of the BUG()'s from tree-log.c")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf53d4687b8f3f6b752f091eb85f62369a515dfd upstream.
In try_to_merge_free_space we attempt to find entries to the left and
right of the entry we are adding to see if they can be merged. We
search for an entry past our current info (saved into right_info), and
then if right_info exists and it has a rb_prev() we save the rb_prev()
into left_info.
However there's a slight problem in the case that we have a right_info,
but no entry previous to that entry. At that point we will search for
an entry just before the info we're attempting to insert. This will
simply find right_info again, and assign it to left_info, making them
both the same pointer.
Now if right_info _can_ be merged with the range we're inserting, we'll
add it to the info and free right_info. However further down we'll
access left_info, which was right_info, and thus get a use-after-free.
Fix this by only searching for the left entry if we don't find a right
entry at all.
The CVE referenced had a specially crafted file system that could
trigger this use-after-free. However with the tree checker improvements
we no longer trigger the conditions for the UAF. But the original
conditions still apply, hence this fix.
Reference: CVE-2019-19448
Fixes: 963030817060 ("Btrfs: use hybrid extents+bitmap rb tree for free space")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 27942c9971cc405c60432eca9395e514a2ae9f5e upstream.
Reported by Forza on IRC that remounting with compression options does
not reflect the change in level, or at least it does not appear to do so
according to the messages:
mount -o compress=zstd:1 /dev/sda /mnt
mount -o remount,compress=zstd:15 /mnt
does not print the change to the level to syslog:
[ 41.366060] BTRFS info (device vda): use zstd compression, level 1
[ 41.368254] BTRFS info (device vda): disk space caching is enabled
[ 41.390429] BTRFS info (device vda): disk space caching is enabled
What really happens is that the message is lost but the level is actualy
changed.
There's another weird output, if compression is reset to 'no':
[ 45.413776] BTRFS info (device vda): use no compression, level 4
To fix that, save the previous compression level and print the message
in that case too and use separate message for 'no' compression.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 18c850fdc5a801bad4977b0f1723761d42267e45 upstream.
There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under
the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex.
Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all
suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies,
which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
but task is already holding lock:
ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}:
__sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220
btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs]
do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130
do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0
handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850
do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0
exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
-> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
__might_fault+0x60/0x80
_copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0
get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0
scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0
cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4
sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0
block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180
__blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550
blkdev_get+0x38/0x150
do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0
path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00
do_filp_open+0x75/0x100
do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140
__x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
__blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550
blkdev_get+0x85/0x150
blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70
btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs]
open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs]
btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs]
btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs]
legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs]
legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0
__x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs]
commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0
lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs]
btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs]
file_update_time+0xc6/0x120
btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs]
do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130
do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0
handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850
do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0
exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sb_pagefaults);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
lock(sb_pagefaults);
lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by systemd-journal/509:
#0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0
#1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs]
#2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x92/0xc8
check_noncircular+0x134/0x150
__lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0
lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400
? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400
? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
__mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820
? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30
? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs]
btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs]
file_update_time+0xc6/0x120
btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs]
? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130
do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0
handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850
do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0
exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe
Code: Bad RIP value.
Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The
device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list
while the file system is running.
However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this
action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding
here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the
->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the
->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change
the devices at this point.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add some comments ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4faf55b03823e96c44dc4e364520000ed3b12fdb upstream.
->show_devname currently shows the lowest devid in the list. As the seed
devices have the lowest devid in the sprouted filesystem, the userland
tool such as findmnt end up seeing seed device instead of the device from
the read-writable sprouted filesystem. As shown below.
mount /dev/sda /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: WARNING: device write-protected, mounted read-only.
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sda /btrfs 899f7027-3e46-4626-93e7-7d4c9ad19111
btrfs dev add -f /dev/sdb /btrfs
umount /btrfs
mount /dev/sdb /btrfs
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sda /btrfs 899f7027-3e46-4626-93e7-7d4c9ad19111
All sprouts from a single seed will show the same seed device and the
same fsid. That's confusing.
This is causing problems in our prototype as there isn't any reference
to the sprout file-system(s) which is being used for actual read and
write.
This was added in the patch which implemented the show_devname in btrfs
commit 9c5085c14798 ("Btrfs: implement ->show_devname").
I tried to look for any particular reason that we need to show the seed
device, there isn't any.
So instead, do not traverse through the seed devices, just show the
lowest devid in the sprouted fsid.
After the patch:
mount /dev/sda /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: WARNING: device write-protected, mounted read-only.
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sda /btrfs 899f7027-3e46-4626-93e7-7d4c9ad19111
btrfs dev add -f /dev/sdb /btrfs
mount -o rw,remount /dev/sdb /btrfs
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sdb /btrfs 595ca0e6-b82e-46b5-b9e2-c72a6928be48
mount /dev/sda /btrfs1
mount: /btrfs1: WARNING: device write-protected, mounted read-only.
btrfs dev add -f /dev/sdc /btrfs1
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs1
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sdc /btrfs1 ca1dbb7a-8446-4f95-853c-a20f3f82bdbb
cat /proc/self/mounts | grep btrfs
/dev/sdb /btrfs btrfs rw,relatime,noacl,space_cache,subvolid=5,subvol=/ 0 0
/dev/sdc /btrfs1 btrfs ro,relatime,noacl,space_cache,subvolid=5,subvol=/ 0 0
Reported-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Tested-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d60ba8de1164e1b42e296ff270c622a070ef8fe7 upstream.
clang static analysis flags this error
fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:290:3: warning: Potential leak of memory pointed to by 're' [unix.Malloc]
kfree(be);
^~~~~
The problem is in this block of code:
if (root_objectid) {
struct root_entry *exist_re;
exist_re = insert_root_entry(&exist->roots, re);
if (exist_re)
kfree(re);
}
There is no 'else' block freeing when root_objectid is 0. Add the
missing kfree to the else branch.
Fixes: fd708b81d972 ("Btrfs: add a extent ref verify tool")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 851fd730a743e072badaf67caf39883e32439431 upstream.
[BUG]
When a lot of subvolumes are created, there is a user report about
transaction aborted:
BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -24)
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 17041 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1576 create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs]
RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
create_pending_snapshots+0x82/0xa0 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x275/0x8c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x4b9/0x500 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x11a4/0x2da0 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x640
ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---[ end trace 33f2f83f3d5250e9 ]---
BTRFS: error (device sda1) in create_pending_snapshot:1576: errno=-24 unknown
BTRFS info (device sda1): forced readonly
BTRFS warning (device sda1): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS: error (device sda1) in cleanup_transaction:1831: errno=-24 unknown
[CAUSE]
The error is EMFILE (Too many files open) and comes from the anonymous
block device allocation. The ids are in a shared pool of size 1<<20.
The ids are assigned to live subvolumes, ie. the root structure exists
in memory (eg. after creation or after the root appears in some path).
The pool could be exhausted if the numbers are not reclaimed fast
enough, after subvolume deletion or if other system component uses the
anon block devices.
[WORKAROUND]
Since it's not possible to completely solve the problem, we can only
minimize the time the id is allocated to a subvolume root.
Firstly, we can reduce the use of anon_dev by trees that are not
subvolume roots, like data reloc tree.
This patch will do extra check on root objectid, to skip roots that
don't need anon_dev. Currently it's only data reloc tree and orphan
roots.
Reported-by: Greed Rong <greedrong@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CA+UqX+NTrZ6boGnWHhSeZmEY5J76CTqmYjO2S+=tHJX7nb9DPw@mail.gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 082b6c970f02fefd278c7833880cda29691a5f34 upstream.
[BUG]
When a lot of subvolumes are created, there is a user report about
transaction aborted caused by slow anonymous block device reclaim:
BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -24)
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 17041 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1576 create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs]
RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
create_pending_snapshots+0x82/0xa0 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x275/0x8c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x4b9/0x500 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x11a4/0x2da0 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x640
ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---[ end trace 33f2f83f3d5250e9 ]---
BTRFS: error (device sda1) in create_pending_snapshot:1576: errno=-24 unknown
BTRFS info (device sda1): forced readonly
BTRFS warning (device sda1): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS: error (device sda1) in cleanup_transaction:1831: errno=-24 unknown
[CAUSE]
The anonymous device pool is shared and its size is 1M. It's possible to
hit that limit if the subvolume deletion is not fast enough and the
subvolumes to be cleaned keep the ids allocated.
[WORKAROUND]
We can't avoid the anon device pool exhaustion but we can shorten the
time the id is attached to the subvolume root once the subvolume becomes
invisible to the user.
Reported-by: Greed Rong <greedrong@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CA+UqX+NTrZ6boGnWHhSeZmEY5J76CTqmYjO2S+=tHJX7nb9DPw@mail.gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0a018944eee913962bce8ffebbb121960d5125d9 upstream.
When mounting with Kerberos, users have been confused about the
default error returned in scenarios in which either keyutils is
not installed or the user did not properly acquire a krb5 ticket.
Log a warning message in the case that "ENOKEY" is returned
from the get_spnego_key upcall so that users can better understand
why mount failed in those two cases.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d474f96104bd4377573526ebae2ee212205a6839 upstream.
If the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN_REQUESTED flag is set, we want to return the
layout as soon as possible, meaning that the affected layout segments
should be marked as invalid, and should no longer be in use for I/O.
Fixes: f0b429819b5f ("pNFS: Ignore non-recalled layouts in pnfs_layout_need_return()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff041727e9e029845857cac41aae118ead5e261b upstream.
If the layout segment is still in use for a read or a write, we should
not move it to the layout plh_return_segs list. If we do, we can end
up returning the layout while I/O is still in progress.
Fixes: e0b7d420f72a ("pNFS: Don't discard layout segments that are marked for return")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 270ef41094e9fa95273f288d7d785313ceab2ff3 upstream.
If the minix filesystem tries to map a very large logical block number to
its on-disk location, block_to_path() can return offsets that are too
large, causing out-of-bounds memory accesses when accessing indirect index
blocks. This should be prevented by the check against the maximum file
size, but this doesn't work because the maximum file size is read directly
from the on-disk superblock and isn't validated itself.
Fix this by validating the maximum file size at mount time.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+c7d9ec7a1a7272dd71b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+3b7b03a0c28948054fb5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6e056ee473568865f3e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit facb03dddec04e4aac1bb2139accdceb04deb1f3 upstream.
If an inode has no links, we need to mark it bad rather than allowing it
to be accessed. This avoids WARNINGs in inc_nlink() and drop_nlink() when
doing directory operations on a fuzzed filesystem.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac3de1b5de5fb10efc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+df958cf5688a96ad3287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit da27e0a0e5f655f0d58d4e153c3182bb2b290f64 upstream.
Patch series "fs/minix: fix syzbot bugs and set s_maxbytes".
This series fixes all syzbot bugs in the minix filesystem:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref Write in get_block
KASAN: use-after-free Write in get_block
KASAN: use-after-free Read in get_block
WARNING in inc_nlink
KMSAN: uninit-value in get_block
WARNING in drop_nlink
It also fixes the minix filesystem to set s_maxbytes correctly, so that
userspace sees the correct behavior when exceeding the max file size.
This patch (of 6):
sb_getblk() can fail, so check its return value.
This fixes a NULL pointer dereference.
Originally from Qiujun Huang.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4a88b2b9dc280f47baf4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Qiujun Huang <anenbupt@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200628060846.682158-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
