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[ Upstream commit 907ea529fc4c3296701d2bfc8b831dd2a8121a34 ]
If the in-core buddy bitmap gets corrupted (or out of sync with the
block bitmap), issue a WARN_ON and try to recover. In most cases this
involves skipping trying to allocate out of a particular block group.
We can end up declaring the file system corrupted, which is fair,
since the file system probably should be checked before we proceed any
further.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200414035649.293164-1-tytso@mit.edu
Google-Bug-Id: 34811296
Google-Bug-Id: 34639169
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a17a9d935dc4a50acefaf319d58030f1da7f115a ]
Current wait times have proven to be too short to protect against inode
reuses that lead to metadata inconsistencies.
Now that we will retry the inode allocation if we can't find any
recently deleted inodes, it's a lot safer to increase the recently
deleted time from 5 seconds to a minute.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200414023925.273867-1-tytso@mit.edu
Google-Bug-Id: 36602237
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c2a559bc0e7ed5a715ad6b947025b33cb7c05ea7 ]
Run generic/388 with journal data mode sometimes may trigger the warning
in ext4_invalidatepage. Actually, we should use the matching invalidatepage
in ext4_writepage.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200226041002.13914-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c142932c29e533ee892f87b44d8abc5719edceec ]
In the reflink extent remap function, it turns out that uirec (the block
mapping corresponding only to the part of the passed-in mapping that got
unmapped) was not fully initialized. Specifically, br_state was not
being copied from the passed-in struct to the uirec. This could lead to
unpredictable results such as the reflinked mapping being marked
unwritten in the destination file.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 10a98cb16d80be3595fdb165fad898bb28b8b6d2 upstream.
Leaving PF_MEMALLOC set when exiting a kthread causes it to remain set
during do_exit(). That can confuse things. In particular, if BSD
process accounting is enabled, then do_exit() writes data to an
accounting file. If that file has FS_SYNC_FL set, then this write
occurs synchronously and can misbehave if PF_MEMALLOC is set.
For example, if the accounting file is located on an XFS filesystem,
then a WARN_ON_ONCE() in iomap_do_writepage() is triggered and the data
doesn't get written when it should. Or if the accounting file is
located on an ext4 filesystem without a journal, then a WARN_ON_ONCE()
in ext4_write_inode() is triggered and the inode doesn't get written.
Fix this in xfsaild() by using the helper functions to save and restore
PF_MEMALLOC.
This can be reproduced as follows in the kvm-xfstests test appliance
modified to add the 'acct' Debian package, and with kvm-xfstests's
recommended kconfig modified to add CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y:
mkfs.xfs -f /dev/vdb
mount /vdb
touch /vdb/file
chattr +S /vdb/file
accton /vdb/file
mkfs.xfs -f /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
umount /vdc
It causes:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 336 at fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1534
CPU: 1 PID: 336 Comm: xfsaild/vdc Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:iomap_do_writepage+0x16b/0x1f0 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1534
[...]
Call Trace:
write_cache_pages+0x189/0x4d0 mm/page-writeback.c:2238
iomap_writepages+0x1c/0x33 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1642
xfs_vm_writepages+0x65/0x90 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c:578
do_writepages+0x41/0xe0 mm/page-writeback.c:2344
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xd2/0x120 mm/filemap.c:421
file_write_and_wait_range+0x71/0xc0 mm/filemap.c:760
xfs_file_fsync+0x7a/0x2b0 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c:114
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2867 [inline]
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x379/0x3b0 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c:691
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1901 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x130/0x1d0 fs/read_write.c:483
__kernel_write+0x54/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:515
do_acct_process+0x122/0x170 kernel/acct.c:522
slow_acct_process kernel/acct.c:581 [inline]
acct_process+0x1d4/0x27c kernel/acct.c:607
do_exit+0x83d/0xbc0 kernel/exit.c:791
kthread+0xf1/0x140 kernel/kthread.c:257
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
This bug was originally reported by syzbot at
https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000000e7156059f751d7b@google.com.
Reported-by: syzbot+1f9dc49e8de2582d90c2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4b674b9ac852937af1f8c62f730c325fb6eadcdb upstream.
The filesystem freeze sequence in XFS waits on any background
eofblocks or cowblocks scans to complete before the filesystem is
quiesced. At this point, the freezer has already stopped the
transaction subsystem, however, which means a truncate or cowblock
cancellation in progress is likely blocked in transaction
allocation. This results in a deadlock between freeze and the
associated scanner.
Fix this problem by holding superblock write protection across calls
into the block reapers. Since protection for background scans is
acquired from the workqueue task context, trylock to avoid a similar
deadlock between freeze and blocking on the write lock.
Fixes: d6b636ebb1c9f ("xfs: halt auto-reclamation activities while rebuilding rmap")
Reported-by: Paul Furtado <paulfurtado91@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Collins <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1e8399eee72e9d5246d4d1bcacd793debe34dd3 upstream.
New struct nfsd4_blocked_lock allocated in find_or_allocate_block()
does not initialized nbl_list and nbl_lru.
If conflock allocation fails rollback can call list_del_init()
access uninitialized fields and corrupt memory.
v2: just initialize nbl_list and nbl_lru right after nbl allocation.
Fixes: 76d348fadff5 ("nfsd: have nfsd4_lock use blocking locks for v4.1+ lock")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc56ad8c74b8588685c2875de0df8ab6974828ef upstream.
When performing rename operation with RENAME_WHITEOUT flag, we will
hold AGF lock to allocate or free extents in manipulating the dirents
firstly, and then doing the xfs_iunlink_remove() call last to hold
AGI lock to modify the tmpfile info, so we the lock order AGI->AGF.
The big problem here is that we have an ordering constraint on AGF
and AGI locking - inode allocation locks the AGI, then can allocate
a new extent for new inodes, locking the AGF after the AGI. Hence
the ordering that is imposed by other parts of the code is AGI before
AGF. So we get an ABBA deadlock between the AGI and AGF here.
Process A:
Call trace:
? __schedule+0x2bd/0x620
schedule+0x33/0x90
schedule_timeout+0x17d/0x290
__down_common+0xef/0x125
? xfs_buf_find+0x215/0x6c0 [xfs]
down+0x3b/0x50
xfs_buf_lock+0x34/0xf0 [xfs]
xfs_buf_find+0x215/0x6c0 [xfs]
xfs_buf_get_map+0x37/0x230 [xfs]
xfs_buf_read_map+0x29/0x190 [xfs]
xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x13d/0x520 [xfs]
xfs_read_agf+0xa6/0x180 [xfs]
? schedule_timeout+0x17d/0x290
xfs_alloc_read_agf+0x52/0x1f0 [xfs]
xfs_alloc_fix_freelist+0x432/0x590 [xfs]
? down+0x3b/0x50
? xfs_buf_lock+0x34/0xf0 [xfs]
? xfs_buf_find+0x215/0x6c0 [xfs]
xfs_alloc_vextent+0x301/0x6c0 [xfs]
xfs_ialloc_ag_alloc+0x182/0x700 [xfs]
? _xfs_trans_bjoin+0x72/0xf0 [xfs]
xfs_dialloc+0x116/0x290 [xfs]
xfs_ialloc+0x6d/0x5e0 [xfs]
? xfs_log_reserve+0x165/0x280 [xfs]
xfs_dir_ialloc+0x8c/0x240 [xfs]
xfs_create+0x35a/0x610 [xfs]
xfs_generic_create+0x1f1/0x2f0 [xfs]
...
Process B:
Call trace:
? __schedule+0x2bd/0x620
? xfs_bmapi_allocate+0x245/0x380 [xfs]
schedule+0x33/0x90
schedule_timeout+0x17d/0x290
? xfs_buf_find+0x1fd/0x6c0 [xfs]
__down_common+0xef/0x125
? xfs_buf_get_map+0x37/0x230 [xfs]
? xfs_buf_find+0x215/0x6c0 [xfs]
down+0x3b/0x50
xfs_buf_lock+0x34/0xf0 [xfs]
xfs_buf_find+0x215/0x6c0 [xfs]
xfs_buf_get_map+0x37/0x230 [xfs]
xfs_buf_read_map+0x29/0x190 [xfs]
xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x13d/0x520 [xfs]
xfs_read_agi+0xa8/0x160 [xfs]
xfs_iunlink_remove+0x6f/0x2a0 [xfs]
? current_time+0x46/0x80
? xfs_trans_ichgtime+0x39/0xb0 [xfs]
xfs_rename+0x57a/0xae0 [xfs]
xfs_vn_rename+0xe4/0x150 [xfs]
...
In this patch we move the xfs_iunlink_remove() call to
before acquiring the AGF lock to preserve correct AGI/AGF locking
order.
[Minor massage required due to upstream change making xfs_bumplink() a
void function where as in the 4.19.y tree the return value is checked,
even though it is always zero. Only change was to the last code block
removed by the patch. Functionally equivalent to upstream.]
Signed-off-by: kaixuxia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bdebd6a2831b6fab69eb85cee74a8ba77f1a1cc2 upstream.
remap_vmalloc_range() has had various issues with the bounds checks it
promises to perform ("This function checks that addr is a valid
vmalloc'ed area, and that it is big enough to cover the vma") over time,
e.g.:
- not detecting pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT overflow
- not detecting (pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT)+usize overflow
- not checking whether addr and addr+(pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT) are the same
vmalloc allocation
- comparing a potentially wildly out-of-bounds pointer with the end of
the vmalloc region
In particular, since commit fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap() support for
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY"), unprivileged users can cause kernel null pointer
dereferences by calling mmap() on a BPF map with a size that is bigger
than the distance from the start of the BPF map to the end of the
address space.
This could theoretically be used as a kernel ASLR bypass, by using
whether mmap() with a given offset oopses or returns an error code to
perform a binary search over the possible address range.
To allow remap_vmalloc_range_partial() to verify that addr and
addr+(pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT) are in the same vmalloc region, pass the offset
to remap_vmalloc_range_partial() instead of adding it to the pointer in
remap_vmalloc_range().
In remap_vmalloc_range_partial(), fix the check against
get_vm_area_size() by using size comparisons instead of pointer
comparisons, and add checks for pgoff.
Fixes: 833423143c3a ("[PATCH] mm: introduce remap_vmalloc_range()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200415222312.236431-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
A race condition between threads updating mountpoint reference counter
affects longterm releases 4.4.220, 4.9.220, 4.14.177 and 4.19.118.
The mountpoint reference counter corruption may occur when:
* one thread increments m_count member of struct mountpoint
[under namespace_sem, but not holding mount_lock]
pivot_root()
* another thread simultaneously decrements the same m_count
[under mount_lock, but not holding namespace_sem]
put_mountpoint()
unhash_mnt()
umount_mnt()
mntput_no_expire()
To fix this race condition, grab mount_lock before updating m_count in
pivot_root().
Reference: CVE-2020-12114
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 688078e7f36c293dae25b338ddc9e0a2790f6e06 upstream.
In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before
memcpy e_name to buffer.
If the e_name_len is corrupted,
unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.19: Use f2fs_msg() instead of f2fs_err()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0aa971b6fd3f92afef6afe24ef78d9bb14471519 ]
1. try_get_cap_refs() fails to get caps and finds that mds_wanted
does not include what it wants. It returns -ESTALE.
2. ceph_get_caps() calls ceph_renew_caps(). ceph_renew_caps() finds
that inode has cap, so it calls ceph_check_caps().
3. ceph_check_caps() finds that issued caps (without checking if it's
stale) already includes caps wanted by open file, so it skips
updating wanted caps.
Above events can cause an infinite loop inside ceph_get_caps().
Signed-off-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c6d50296032f0b97473eb2e274dc7cc5d0173847 ]
Return the error returned by ceph_mdsc_do_request(). Otherwise,
r_target_inode ends up being NULL this ends up returning ENOENT
regardless of the error.
Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4068664e3cd2312610ceac05b74c4cf1853b8325 ]
Extents are cached in read_extent_tree_block(); as a result, extents
are not cached for inodes with depth == 0 when we try to find the
extent using ext4_find_extent(). The result of the lookup is cached
in ext4_map_blocks() but is only a subset of the extent on disk. As a
result, the contents of extents status cache can get very badly
fragmented for certain workloads, such as a random 4k read workload.
File size of /mnt/test is 33554432 (8192 blocks of 4096 bytes)
ext: logical_offset: physical_offset: length: expected: flags:
0: 0.. 8191: 40960.. 49151: 8192: last,eof
$ perf record -e 'ext4:ext4_es_*' /root/bin/fio --name=t --direct=0 --rw=randread --bs=4k --filesize=32M --size=32M --filename=/mnt/test
$ perf script | grep ext4_es_insert_extent | head -n 10
fio 131 [000] 13.975421: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [494/1) mapped 41454 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.975939: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [6064/1) mapped 47024 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.976467: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [6907/1) mapped 47867 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.976937: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [3850/1) mapped 44810 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.977440: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [3292/1) mapped 44252 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.977931: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [6882/1) mapped 47842 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.978376: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [3117/1) mapped 44077 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.978957: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [2896/1) mapped 43856 status W
fio 131 [000] 13.979474: ext4:ext4_es_insert_extent: dev 253,0 ino 12 es [7479/1) mapped 48439 status W
Fix this by caching the extents for inodes with depth == 0 in
ext4_find_extent().
[ Renamed ext4_es_cache_extents() to ext4_cache_extents() since this
newly added function is not in extents_cache.c, and to avoid
potential visual confusion with ext4_es_cache_extent(). -TYT ]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191106122502.19986-1-dmonakhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dc5a941223edd803f476a153abd950cc3a83c3e1 ]
There is a race condition that we may miss to wait for all node pages
writeback, fix it.
- fsync() - shrink
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- __write_node_page
- set_page_writeback(page#0)
: remove DIRTY/TOWRITE flag
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages
: won't find page #0 as TOWRITE flag was removeD
- f2fs_wait_on_node_pages_writeback
: wont' wait page #0 writeback as it was not in fsync_node_list list.
- f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry
Fixes: 50fa53eccf9f ("f2fs: fix to avoid broken of dnode block list")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 32302085a8d90859c40cf1a5e8313f575d06ec75 ]
Fix a debug-only build error in ext2/xattr.c:
When building without extra debugging, (and with another patch that uses
no_printk() instead of <empty> for the ext2-xattr debug-print macros,
this build error happens:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c: In function ‘ext2_xattr_cache_insert’:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:869:18: error: ‘ext2_xattr_cache’ undeclared (first use in
this function); did you mean ‘ext2_xattr_list’?
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
Fix the problem by removing cached entry count from the debug message
since otherwise we'd have to export the mbcache structure just for that.
Fixes: be0726d33cb8 ("ext2: convert to mbcache2")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 44a52022e7f15cbaab957df1c14f7a4f527ef7cf ]
When EXT2_ATTR_DEBUG is not defined, modify the 2 debug macros
to use the no_printk() macro instead of <nothing>.
This fixes gcc warnings when -Wextra is used:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:252:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body]
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:258:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body]
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:330:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body]
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:872:45: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘else’ statement [-Wempty-body]
I have verified that the only object code change (with gcc 7.5.0) is
the reversal of some instructions from 'cmp a,b' to 'cmp b,a'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e18a7395-61fb-2093-18e8-ed4f8cf56248@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 862f35c94730c9270833f3ad05bd758a29f204ed ]
If we just set the mirror count to 1 without first clearing out
the mirrors, we can leak queued up requests.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3946d0d04bb360acca72db5efe9ae8440012d9dc ]
When encryption is used, smb2_transform_hdr is defined on the stack and is
passed to the transport. This doesn't work with RDMA as the buffer needs to
be DMA'ed.
Fix it by using kmalloc.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c96e2b8564adfb8ac14469ebc51ddc1bfecb3ae2 ]
Under some circumstances we may encounter a filesystem error on a
read-only block device, and if we try to save the error info to the
superblock and commit it, we'll wind up with a noisy error and
backtrace, i.e.:
[ 3337.146838] EXT4-fs error (device pmem1p2): ext4_get_journal_inode:4634: comm mount: inode #0: comm mount: iget: illegal inode #
------------[ cut here ]------------
generic_make_request: Trying to write to read-only block-device pmem1p2 (partno 2)
WARNING: CPU: 107 PID: 115347 at block/blk-core.c:788 generic_make_request_checks+0x6b4/0x7d0
...
To avoid this, commit the error info in the superblock only if the
block device is writable.
Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4b6e774d-cc00-3469-7abb-108eb151071a@sandeen.net
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8605cf0e852af3b2c771c18417499dc4ceed03d5 ]
When dreq is allocated by nfs_direct_req_alloc(), dreq->kref is
initialized to 2. Therefore we need to call nfs_direct_req_release()
twice to release the allocated dreq. Usually it is called in
nfs_file_direct_{read, write}() and nfs_direct_complete().
However, current code only calls nfs_direct_req_relese() once if
nfs_get_lock_context() fails in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}().
So, that case would result in memory leak.
Fix this by adding the missing call.
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d911c57a19551c6bef116a3b55c6b089901aacb0 ]
Make sure to test the stateid for validity so that we catch instances
where the server may have been reusing stateids in
nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid().
Fixes: 7b410d9ce460 ("pNFS: Delay getting the layout header in CB_LAYOUTRECALL handlers")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d87f639258a6a5980183f11876c884931ad93da2 upstream.
Since commit a8ac900b8163 ("ext4: use non-movable memory for the
superblock") buffers for ext4 superblock were allocated using
the sb_bread_unmovable() helper which allocated buffer heads
out of non-movable memory blocks. It was necessarily to not block
page migrations and do not cause cma allocation failures.
However commit 85c8f176a611 ("ext4: preload block group descriptors")
broke this by introducing pre-reading of the ext4 superblock.
The problem is that __breadahead() is using __getblk() underneath,
which allocates buffer heads out of movable memory.
It resulted in page migration failures I've seen on a machine
with an ext4 partition and a preallocated cma area.
Fix this by introducing sb_breadahead_unmovable() and
__breadahead_gfp() helpers which use non-movable memory for buffer
head allocations and use them for the ext4 superblock readahead.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Fixes: 85c8f176a611 ("ext4: preload block group descriptors")
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200229001411.128010-1-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 801674f34ecfed033b062a0f217506b93c8d5e8a upstream.
We do not want to create initialized extents beyond end of file because
for e2fsck it is impossible to distinguish them from a case of corrupted
file size / extent tree and so it complains like:
Inode 12, i_size is 147456, should be 163840. Fix? no
Code in ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_convert_extents() try to make sure it does not create
initialized extents beyond inode size however they check against
inode->i_size which is wrong. They should instead check against
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize which is the current inode size on disk.
That's what e2fsck is going to see in case of crash before all dirty
data is written. This bug manifests as generic/456 test failure (with
recent enough fstests where fsx got fixed to properly pass
FALLOC_KEEP_SIZE_FL flags to the kernel) when run with dioread_lock
mount option.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 21ca087a3891 ("ext4: Do not zero out uninitialized extents beyond i_size")
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200331105016.8674-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4d4225fc228e46948486d8b8207955f0c031b92e upstream.
Previously we would set the reloc root's last snapshot to transid - 1.
However there was a problem with doing this, and we changed it to
setting the last snapshot to the generation of the commit node of the fs
root.
This however broke should_ignore_root(). The assumption is that if we
are in a generation newer than when the reloc root was created, then we
would find the reloc root through normal backref lookups, and thus can
ignore any fs roots we find with an old enough reloc root.
Now that the last snapshot could be considerably further in the past
than before, we'd end up incorrectly ignoring an fs root. Thus we'd
find no nodes for the bytenr we were searching for, and we'd fail to
relocate anything. We'd loop through the relocate code again and see
that there were still used space in that block group, attempt to
relocate those bytenr's again, fail in the same way, and just loop like
this forever. This is tricky in that we have to not modify the fs root
at all during this time, so we need to have a block group that has data
in this fs root that is not shared by any other root, which is why this
has been difficult to reproduce.
Fixes: 054570a1dc94 ("Btrfs: fix relocation incorrectly dropping data references")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b9c538da4e52a7b79dfcf4cfa487c46125066dfb upstream.
If ext4_fill_super detects an invalid number of inodes per group, the
resulting error message printed the number of blocks per group, rather
than the number of inodes per group. Fix it to print the correct value.
Fixes: cd6bb35bf7f6d ("ext4: use more strict checks for inodes_per_block on mount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8be03355983a08e5d4eed480944613454d7e2550.1585434649.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit df41460a21b06a76437af040d90ccee03888e8e5 upstream.
ext4_fill_super doublechecks the number of groups before mounting; if
that check fails, the resulting error message prints the group count
from the ext4_sb_info sbi, which hasn't been set yet. Print the freshly
computed group count instead (which at that point has just been computed
in "blocks_count").
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Fixes: 4ec1102813798 ("ext4: Add sanity checks for the superblock before mounting the filesystem")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8b957cd1513fcc4550fe675c10bcce2175c33a49.1585431964.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 780f66e59231fcf882f36c63f287252ee47cc75a upstream.
Improve comments in jbd2_journal_commit_transaction() to describe why
we don't need to clear the buffer_mapped bit for freeing file mapping
buffers whose page mapping is NULL.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200217112706.20085-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Fixes: c96dceeabf76 ("jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer")
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 300b124fcf6ad2cd99a7b721e0f096785e0a3134 upstream.
Commit 6dde1e42f497 ("ovl: make i_ino consistent with st_ino in more
cases"), relaxed the condition nfs_export=on in order to set the value of
i_ino to xino map of real ino.
Specifically, it also relaxed the pre-condition that index=on for
consistent i_ino. This opened the corner case of lower hardlink in
ovl_get_inode(), which calls ovl_fill_inode() with ino=0 and then
ovl_init_inode() is called to set i_ino to lower real ino without the xino
mapping.
Pass the correct values of ino;fsid in this case to ovl_fill_inode(), so it
can initialize i_ino correctly.
Fixes: 6dde1e42f497 ("ovl: make i_ino consistent with st_ino in more ...")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 25efb2ffdf991177e740b2f63e92b4ec7d310a92 upstream.
When removing files containing extended attributes, the hfsplus driver may
remove the wrong entries from the attributes b-tree, causing major
filesystem damage and in some cases even kernel crashes.
To remove a file, all its extended attributes have to be removed as well.
The driver does this by looking up all keys in the attributes b-tree with
the cnid of the file. Each of these entries then gets deleted using the
key used for searching, which doesn't contain the attribute's name when it
should. Since the key doesn't contain the name, the deletion routine will
not find the correct entry and instead remove the one in front of it. If
parent nodes have to be modified, these become corrupt as well. This
causes invalid links and unsorted entries that not even macOS's fsck_hfs
is able to fix.
To fix this, modify the search key before an entry is deleted from the
attributes b-tree by copying the found entry's key into the search key,
therefore ensuring that the correct entry gets removed from the tree.
Signed-off-by: Simon Gander <simon@tuxera.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327155541.1521-1-simon@tuxera.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 783fda856e1034dee90a873f7654c418212d12d7 upstream.
Linux fallocate(2) with FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE mode set, its offset can
exceed the inode size. Ocfs2 now doesn't allow that offset beyond inode
size. This restriction is not necessary and violates fallocate(2)
semantics.
If fallocate(2) offset is beyond inode size, just return success and do
nothing further.
Otherwise, ocfs2 will crash the kernel.
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2//alloc.c:7264!
ocfs2_truncate_inline+0x20f/0x360 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_remove_inode_range+0x23c/0xcb0 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_change_file_space+0x4a5/0x650 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_fallocate+0x83/0xa0 [ocfs2]
vfs_fallocate+0x148/0x230
SyS_fallocate+0x48/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x79/0x170
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge <chge@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407082754.17565-1-chge@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26c5d78c976ca298e59a56f6101a97b618ba3539 upstream.
After request_module(), nothing is stopping the module from being
unloaded until someone takes a reference to it via try_get_module().
The WARN_ONCE() in get_fs_type() is thus user-reachable, via userspace
running 'rmmod' concurrently.
Since WARN_ONCE() is for kernel bugs only, not for user-reachable
situations, downgrade this warning to pr_warn_once().
Keep it printed once only, since the intent of this warning is to detect
a bug in modprobe at boot time. Printing the warning more than once
wouldn't really provide any useful extra information.
Fixes: 41124db869b7 ("fs: warn in case userspace lied about modprobe return")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.13+]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200312202552.241885-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit add42de31721fa29ed77a7ce388674d69f9d31a4 upstream.
When we detach a subrequest from the list, we must also release the
reference it holds to the parent.
Fixes: 5b2b5187fa85 ("NFS: Fix nfs_page_group_destroy() and nfs_lock_and_join_requests() race cases")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ff06729c22ec0b7498d900d79cc88cfb8aceaeb upstream.
Ordered ops are started twice in sync file, once outside of inode mutex
and once inside, taking the dio semaphore. There was one error path
missing the semaphore unlock.
Fixes: aab15e8ec2576 ("Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 95418ed1d10774cd9a49af6f39e216c1256f1eeb upstream.
When doing a fast fsync for a range that starts at an offset greater than
zero, we can end up with a log that when replayed causes the respective
inode miss a file extent item representing a hole if we are not using the
NO_HOLES feature. This is because for fast fsyncs we don't log any extents
that cover a range different from the one requested in the fsync.
Example scenario to trigger it:
$ mkfs.btrfs -O ^no-holes -f /dev/sdd
$ mount /dev/sdd /mnt
# Create a file with a single 256K and fsync it to clear to full sync
# bit in the inode - we want the msync below to trigger a fast fsync.
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 256K" -c "fsync" /mnt/foo
# Force a transaction commit and wipe out the log tree.
$ sync
# Dirty 768K of data, increasing the file size to 1Mb, and flush only
# the range from 256K to 512K without updating the log tree
# (sync_file_range() does not trigger fsync, it only starts writeback
# and waits for it to finish).
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 256K 768K" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -c "sync_range -abw 256K 256K" /mnt/foo
# Now dirty the range from 768K to 1M again and sync that range.
$ xfs_io -c "mmap -w 768K 256K" \
-c "mwrite -S 0xef 768K 256K" \
-c "msync -s 768K 256K" \
-c "munmap" \
/mnt/foo
<power fail>
# Mount to replay the log.
$ mount /dev/sdd /mnt
$ umount /mnt
$ btrfs check /dev/sdd
Opening filesystem to check...
Checking filesystem on /dev/sdd
UUID: 482fb574-b288-478e-a190-a9c44a78fca6
[1/7] checking root items
[2/7] checking extents
[3/7] checking free space cache
[4/7] checking fs roots
root 5 inode 257 errors 100, file extent discount
Found file extent holes:
start: 262144, len: 524288
ERROR: errors found in fs roots
found 720896 bytes used, error(s) found
total csum bytes: 512
total tree bytes: 131072
total fs tree bytes: 32768
total extent tree bytes: 16384
btree space waste bytes: 123514
file data blocks allocated: 589824
referenced 589824
Fix this issue by setting the range to full (0 to LLONG_MAX) when the
NO_HOLES feature is not enabled. This results in extra work being done
but it gives the guarantee we don't end up with missing holes after
replaying the log.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8e19c9732ad1d127b5575a10f4fbcacf740500ff upstream.
If we have an error while building the backref tree in relocation we'll
process all the pending edges and then free the node. However if we
integrated some edges into the cache we'll lose our link to those edges
by simply freeing this node, which means we'll leak memory and
references to any roots that we've found.
Instead we need to use remove_backref_node(), which walks through all of
the edges that are still linked to this node and free's them up and
drops any root references we may be holding.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75ec1db8717a8f0a9d9c8d033e542fdaa7b73898 upstream.
In my EIO stress testing I noticed I was getting forced to rescan the
uuid tree pretty often, which was weird. This is because my error
injection stuff would sometimes inject an error after log replay but
before we loaded the UUID tree. If log replay committed the transaction
it wouldn't have updated the uuid tree generation, but the tree was
valid and didn't change, so there's no reason to not update the
generation here.
Fix this by setting the BTRFS_FS_UPDATE_UUID_TREE_GEN bit immediately
after reading all the fs roots if the uuid tree generation matches the
fs generation. Then any transaction commits that happen during mount
won't screw up our uuid tree state, forcing us to do needless uuid
rescans.
Fixes: 70f801754728 ("Btrfs: check UUID tree during mount if required")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f0cc2cd70164efe8f75c5d99560f0f69969c72e4 upstream.
During unmount we can have a job from the delayed inode items work queue
still running, that can lead to at least two bad things:
1) A crash, because the worker can try to create a transaction just
after the fs roots were freed;
2) A transaction leak, because the worker can create a transaction
before the fs roots are freed and just after we committed the last
transaction and after we stopped the transaction kthread.
A stack trace example of the crash:
[79011.691214] kernel BUG at lib/radix-tree.c:982!
[79011.692056] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[79011.693180] CPU: 3 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-54 #2
(...)
[79011.696789] Workqueue: btrfs-delayed-meta btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
[79011.697904] RIP: 0010:radix_tree_tag_set+0xe7/0x170
(...)
[79011.702014] RSP: 0018:ffffb3c84a317ca0 EFLAGS: 00010293
[79011.702949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[79011.704202] RDX: ffffb3c84a317cb0 RSI: ffffb3c84a317ca8 RDI: ffff8db3931340a0
[79011.705463] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: ffffffff974629d0
[79011.706756] R10: ffffb3c84a317bc0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8db393134000
[79011.708010] R13: ffff8db3931340a0 R14: ffff8db393134068 R15: 0000000000000001
[79011.709270] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8db3b6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[79011.710699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[79011.711710] CR2: 00007f22c2a0a000 CR3: 0000000232ad4005 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[79011.712958] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[79011.714205] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[79011.715448] Call Trace:
[79011.715925] record_root_in_trans+0x72/0xf0 [btrfs]
[79011.716819] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4b/0x70 [btrfs]
[79011.717925] start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[79011.718829] btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x17e/0x2b0 [btrfs]
[79011.719915] btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs]
[79011.720773] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0
[79011.721497] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0
[79011.722153] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
[79011.722901] kthread+0x103/0x140
[79011.723481] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[79011.724379] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
(...)
The following diagram shows a sequence of steps that lead to the crash
during ummount of the filesystem:
CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3
btrfs_punch_hole()
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty()
btrfs_balance_delayed_items()
--> sees
fs_info->delayed_root->items
with value 200, which is greater
than
BTRFS_DELAYED_BACKGROUND (128)
and smaller than
BTRFS_DELAYED_WRITEBACK (512)
btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node()
--> queues a job for
fs_info->delayed_workers to run
btrfs_async_run_delayed_root()
btrfs_async_run_delayed_root()
--> job queued by CPU 1
--> starts picking and running
delayed nodes from the
prepare_list list
close_ctree()
btrfs_delete_unused_bgs()
btrfs_commit_super()
btrfs_join_transaction()
--> gets transaction N
btrfs_commit_transaction(N)
--> set transaction state
to TRANTS_STATE_COMMIT_START
btrfs_first_prepared_delayed_node()
--> picks delayed node X through
the prepared_list list
btrfs_run_delayed_items()
btrfs_first_delayed_node()
--> also picks delayed node X
but through the node_list
list
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items()
--> runs all delayed items from
this node and drops the
node's item count to 0
through call to
btrfs_release_delayed_inode()
--> finishes running any remaining
delayed nodes
--> finishes transaction commit
--> stops cleaner and transaction threads
btrfs_free_fs_roots()
--> frees all roots and removes them
from the radix tree
fs_info->fs_roots_radix
btrfs_join_transaction()
start_transaction()
btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
record_root_in_trans()
radix_tree_tag_set()
--> crashes because
the root is not in
the radix tree
anymore
If the worker is able to call btrfs_join_transaction() before the unmount
task frees the fs roots, we end up leaking a transaction and all its
resources, since after the call to btrfs_commit_super() and stopping the
transaction kthread, we don't expect to have any transaction open anymore.
When this situation happens the worker has a delayed node that has no
more items to run, since the task calling btrfs_run_delayed_items(),
which is doing a transaction commit, picks the same node and runs all
its items first.
We can not wait for the worker to complete when running delayed items
through btrfs_run_delayed_items(), because we call that function in
several phases of a transaction commit, and that could cause a deadlock
because the worker calls btrfs_join_transaction() and the task doing the
transaction commit may have already set the transaction state to
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING.
Also it's not possible to get into a situation where only some of the
items of a delayed node are added to the fs/subvolume tree in the current
transaction and the remaining ones in the next transaction, because when
running the items of a delayed inode we lock its mutex, effectively
waiting for the worker if the worker is running the items of the delayed
node already.
Since this can only cause issues when unmounting a filesystem, fix it in
a simple way by waiting for any jobs on the delayed workers queue before
calling btrfs_commit_supper() at close_ctree(). This works because at this
point no one can call btrfs_btree_balance_dirty() or
btrfs_balance_delayed_items(), and if we end up waiting for any worker to
complete, btrfs_commit_super() will commit the transaction created by the
worker.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 97adda8b3ab703de8e4c8d27646ddd54fe22879c upstream.
This patch is used to fix the bug in collect_uncached_read_data()
that rc is automatically converted from a signed number to an
unsigned number when the CIFS asynchronous read fails.
It will cause ctx->rc is error.
Example:
Share a directory and create a file on the Windows OS.
Mount the directory to the Linux OS using CIFS.
On the CIFS client of the Linux OS, invoke the pread interface to
deliver the read request.
The size of the read length plus offset of the read request is greater
than the maximum file size.
In this case, the CIFS server on the Windows OS returns a failure
message (for example, the return value of
smb2.nt_status is STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER).
After receiving the response message, the CIFS client parses
smb2.nt_status to STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
and converts it to the Linux error code (rdata->result=-22).
Then the CIFS client invokes the collect_uncached_read_data function to
assign the value of rdata->result to rc, that is, rc=rdata->result=-22.
The type of the ctx->total_len variable is unsigned integer,
the type of the rc variable is integer, and the type of
the ctx->rc variable is ssize_t.
Therefore, during the ternary operation, the value of rc is
automatically converted to an unsigned number. The final result is
ctx->rc=4294967274. However, the expected result is ctx->rc=-22.
Signed-off-by: Yilu Lin <linyilu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.
Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id
wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This
bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
credentials during exec.
The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.
Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit
a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still
remains expoiltable.
I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
locations.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c871b7314dde9ab64f20de8f5aa3d01be4518e8 upstream.
In Aug 2018 NeilBrown noticed
commit 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and interface")
"Some ->next functions do not increment *pos when they return NULL...
Note that such ->next functions are buggy and should be fixed.
A simple demonstration is
dd if=/proc/swaps bs=1000 skip=1
Choose any block size larger than the size of /proc/swaps. This will
always show the whole last line of /proc/swaps"
/proc/swaps output was fixed recently, however there are lot of other
affected files, and one of them is related to pstore subsystem.
If .next function does not change position index, following .show function
will repeat output related to current position index.
There are at least 2 related problems:
- read after lseek beyond end of file, described above by NeilBrown
"dd if=<AFFECTED_FILE> bs=1000 skip=1" will generate whole last list
- read after lseek on in middle of last line will output expected rest of
last line but then repeat whole last line once again.
If .show() function generates multy-line output (like
pstore_ftrace_seq_show() does ?) following bash script cycles endlessly
$ q=;while read -r r;do echo "$((++q)) $r";done < AFFECTED_FILE
Unfortunately I'm not familiar enough to pstore subsystem and was unable
to find affected pstore-related file on my test node.
If .next function does not change position index, following .show function
will repeat output related to current position index.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code ...")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4e49830d-4c88-0171-ee24-1ee540028dad@virtuozzo.com
[kees: with robustness tweak from Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ea287ab157c2816bf12aad4cece41372f9d146b4 ]
We always search the commit root of the extent tree for looking up back
references, however we track the reloc roots based on their current
bytenr.
This is wrong, if we commit the transaction between relocating tree
blocks we could end up in this code in build_backref_tree
if (key.objectid == key.offset) {
/*
* Only root blocks of reloc trees use backref
* pointing to itself.
*/
root = find_reloc_root(rc, cur->bytenr);
ASSERT(root);
cur->root = root;
break;
}
find_reloc_root() is looking based on the bytenr we had in the commit
root, but if we've COWed this reloc root we will not find that bytenr,
and we will trip over the ASSERT(root).
Fix this by using the commit_root->start bytenr for indexing the commit
root. Then we change the __update_reloc_root() caller to be used when
we switch the commit root for the reloc root during commit.
This fixes the panic I was seeing when we started throttling relocation
for delayed refs.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7b7b74315b24dc064bc1c683659061c3d48f8668 ]
This was pretty subtle, we default to reloc roots having 0 root refs, so
if we crash in the middle of the relocation they can just be deleted.
If we successfully complete the relocation operations we'll set our root
refs to 1 in prepare_to_merge() and then go on to merge_reloc_roots().
At prepare_to_merge() time if any of the reloc roots have a 0 reference
still, we will remove that reloc root from our reloc root rb tree, and
then clean it up later.
However this only happens if we successfully start a transaction. If
we've aborted previously we will skip this step completely, and only
have reloc roots with a reference count of 0, but were never properly
removed from the reloc control's rb tree.
This isn't a problem per-se, our references are held by the list the
reloc roots are on, and by the original root the reloc root belongs to.
If we end up in this situation all the reloc roots will be added to the
dirty_reloc_list, and then properly dropped at that point. The reloc
control will be free'd and the rb tree is no longer used.
There were two options when fixing this, one was to remove the BUG_ON(),
the other was to make prepare_to_merge() handle the case where we
couldn't start a trans handle.
IMO this is the cleaner solution. I started with handling the error in
prepare_to_merge(), but it turned out super ugly. And in the end this
BUG_ON() simply doesn't matter, the cleanup was happening properly, we
were just panicing because this BUG_ON() only matters in the success
case. So I've opted to just remove it and add a comment where it was.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d61acbbf54c612ea9bf67eed609494cda0857b3a ]
[BUG]
There are some reports about btrfs wait forever to unmount itself, with
the following call trace:
INFO: task umount:4631 blocked for more than 491 seconds.
Tainted: G X 5.3.8-2-default #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
umount D 0 4631 3337 0x00000000
Call Trace:
([<00000000174adf7a>] __schedule+0x342/0x748)
[<00000000174ae3ca>] schedule+0x4a/0xd8
[<00000000174b1f08>] schedule_timeout+0x218/0x420
[<00000000174af10c>] wait_for_common+0x104/0x1d8
[<000003ff804d6994>] btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion+0x84/0xb0 [btrfs]
[<000003ff8044a616>] close_ctree+0x4e/0x380 [btrfs]
[<0000000016fa3136>] generic_shutdown_super+0x8e/0x158
[<0000000016fa34d6>] kill_anon_super+0x26/0x40
[<000003ff8041ba88>] btrfs_kill_super+0x28/0xc8 [btrfs]
[<0000000016fa39f8>] deactivate_locked_super+0x68/0x98
[<0000000016fcb198>] cleanup_mnt+0xc0/0x140
[<0000000016d6a846>] task_work_run+0xc6/0x110
[<0000000016d04f76>] do_notify_resume+0xae/0xb8
[<00000000174b30ae>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8
[CAUSE]
The problem happens when we have called qgroup_rescan_init(), but
not queued the worker. It can be caused mostly by error handling.
Qgroup ioctl thread | Unmount thread
----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------
|
btrfs_qgroup_rescan() |
|- qgroup_rescan_init() |
| |- qgroup_rescan_running = true; |
| |
|- trans = btrfs_join_transaction() |
| Some error happened |
| |
|- btrfs_qgroup_rescan() returns error |
But qgroup_rescan_running == true; |
| close_ctree()
| |- btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion()
| |- running == true;
| |- wait_for_completion();
btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker is never queued, thus no one is going to wake
up close_ctree() and we get a deadlock.
All involved qgroup_rescan_init() callers are:
- btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
The example above. It's possible to trigger the deadlock when error
happened.
- btrfs_quota_enable()
Not possible. Just after qgroup_rescan_init() we queue the work.
- btrfs_read_qgroup_config()
It's possible to trigger the deadlock. It only init the work, the
work queueing happens in btrfs_qgroup_rescan_resume().
Thus if error happened in between, deadlock is possible.
We shouldn't set fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running just in
qgroup_rescan_init(), as at that stage we haven't yet queued qgroup
rescan worker to run.
[FIX]
Set qgroup_rescan_running before queueing the work, so that we ensure
the rescan work is queued when we wait for it.
Fixes: 8d9eddad1946 ("Btrfs: fix qgroup rescan worker initialization")
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
[ Change subject and cause analyse, use a smaller fix ]
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit df5db5f9ee112e76b5202fbc331f990a0fc316d6 ]
Before this patch, run_queue would demote glocks based on whether
there are any more holders. But if the glock has pending revokes that
haven't been written to the media, giving up the glock might end in
file system corruption if the revokes never get written due to
io errors, node crashes and fences, etc. In that case, another node
will replay the metadata blocks associated with the glock, but
because the revoke was never written, it could replay that block
even though the glock had since been granted to another node who
might have made changes.
This patch changes the logic in run_queue so that it never demotes
a glock until its count of pending revokes reaches zero.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8a57d6d4ddfa41c49014e20493152c41a38fcbf8 ]
There is a potential mem leak when pstore_init_fs failed,
since the pstore compression maybe unlikey to initialized
successfully. We must clean up the allocation once this
unlikey issue happens.
Signed-off-by: chenqiwu <chenqiwu@xiaomi.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581068800-13817-1-git-send-email-qiwuchen55@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b27a939e8376a3f1ed09b9c33ef44d20f18ec3d0 upstream.
syzbot reported that 4fbc0c711b24 ("ceph: remove the extra slashes in
the server path") had caused a regression where an allocation could be
done under a spinlock -- compare_mount_options() is called by sget_fc()
with sb_lock held.
We don't really need the supplied server path, so canonicalize it
in place and compare it directly. To make this work, the leading
slash is kept around and the logic in ceph_real_mount() to skip it
is restored. CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SESSION now reports the same (i.e.
canonicalized) path, with the leading slash of course.
Fixes: 4fbc0c711b24 ("ceph: remove the extra slashes in the server path")
Reported-by: syzbot+98704a51af8e3d9425a9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
