IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
[ Upstream commit f4c32e87de7d66074d5612567c5eac7325024428 ]
The realtime bitmap and summary files are regular files that are hidden
away from the directory tree. Since they're regular files, inode
inactivation will try to purge what it thinks are speculative
preallocations beyond the incore size of the file. Unfortunately,
xfs_growfs_rt forgets to update the incore size when it resizes the
inodes, with the result that inactivating the rt inodes at unmount time
will cause their contents to be truncated.
Fix this by updating the incore size when we change the ondisk size as
part of updating the superblock. Note that we don't do this when we're
allocating blocks to the rt inodes because we actually want those blocks
to get purged if the growfs fails.
This fixes corruption complaints from the online rtsummary checker when
running xfs/233. Since that test requires rmap, one can also trigger
this by growing an rt volume, cycling the mount, and creating rt files.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8488cd96ff88966ccb076e4f3654f59d84ba686d upstream.
As part of an effort to clean up fscrypt-related error codes, make
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fail with EEXIST when the file already uses
a different encryption policy. This is more descriptive than EINVAL,
which was ambiguous with some of the other error cases.
I am not aware of any users who might be relying on the previous error
code of EINVAL, which was never documented anywhere.
This failure case will be exercised by an xfstest.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit db717d8e26c2d1b0dba3e08668a1e6a7f665adde upstream.
Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl.
To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy()
implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard
security and correctness precautions, rename them to
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(). Make the
latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5e55e777cc93eae1416f0fa4908e8846b6d7825 upstream.
Currently, trying to rename or link a regular file, directory, or
symlink into an encrypted directory fails with EPERM when the source
file is unencrypted or is encrypted with a different encryption policy,
and is on the same mountpoint. It is correct for the operation to fail,
but the choice of EPERM breaks tools like 'mv' that know to copy rather
than rename if they see EXDEV, but don't know what to do with EPERM.
Our original motivation for EPERM was to encourage users to securely
handle their data. Encrypting files by "moving" them into an encrypted
directory can be insecure because the unencrypted data may remain in
free space on disk, where it can later be recovered by an attacker.
It's much better to encrypt the data from the start, or at least try to
securely delete the source data e.g. using the 'shred' program.
However, the current behavior hasn't been effective at achieving its
goal because users tend to be confused, hack around it, and complain;
see e.g. https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/76. And in some cases
it's actually inconsistent or unnecessary. For example, 'mv'-ing files
between differently encrypted directories doesn't work even in cases
where it can be secure, such as when in userspace the same passphrase
protects both directories. Yet, you *can* already 'mv' unencrypted
files into an encrypted directory if the source files are on a different
mountpoint, even though doing so is often insecure.
There are probably better ways to teach users to securely handle their
files. For example, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool could provide a
command that migrates unencrypted files into an encrypted directory,
acting like 'shred' on the source files and providing appropriate
warnings depending on the type of the source filesystem and disk.
Receiving errors on unimportant files might also force some users to
disable encryption, thus making the behavior counterproductive. It's
desirable to make encryption as unobtrusive as possible.
Therefore, change the error code from EPERM to EXDEV so that tools
looking for EXDEV will fall back to a copy.
This, of course, doesn't prevent users from still doing the right things
to securely manage their files. Note that this also matches the
behavior when a file is renamed between two project quota hierarchies;
so there's precedent for using EXDEV for things other than mountpoints.
xfstests generic/398 will require an update with this change.
[Rewritten from an earlier patch series by Michael Halcrow.]
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d78092e4937de9ce55edcb4ee4c5e3c707be0190 upstream.
After unlock_request() pages from the ap->pages[] array may be put (e.g. by
aborting the connection) and the pages can be freed.
Prevent use after free by grabbing a reference to the page before calling
unlock_request().
The original patch was created by Pradeep P V K.
Reported-by: Pradeep P V K <ppvk@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 336af6a4686d885a067ecea8c3c3dd129ba4fc75 upstream.
Without this patch efivarfs_alloc_dentry creates dentries with slashes in
their name if the respective EFI variable has slashes in its name. This in
turn causes EIO on getdents64, which prevents a complete directory listing
of /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
This patch replaces the invalid shlashes with exclamation marks like
kobject_set_name_vargs does for /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ to have consistently
named dentries under /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ and /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schaller <misch@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200925074502.150448-1-misch@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e9d4709fcc26353df12070566970f080e651f0c9 ]
When a usrjquota or grpjquota mount option is used multiple times, we
will leak memory allocated for the file name. Make sure the last setting
is used and all the previous ones are properly freed.
Reported-by: syzbot+c9e294bbe0333a6b7640@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2a6ca4baed620303d414934aa1b7b0a8e7bab05f ]
There's an overflow bug in the realtime allocator. If the rt volume is
large enough to handle a single allocation request that is larger than
the maximum bmap extent length and the rt bitmap ends exactly on a
bitmap block boundary, it's possible that the near allocator will try to
check the freeness of a range that extends past the end of the bitmap.
This fails with a corruption error and shuts down the fs.
Therefore, constrain maxlen so that the range scan cannot run off the
end of the rt bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8859bf2b1278d064a139e3031451524a49a56bd0 ]
unlock_new_inode() is only meant to be called after a new inode has
already been inserted into the hash table. But reiserfs_new_inode() can
call it even before it has inserted the inode, triggering the WARNING in
unlock_new_inode(). Fix this by only calling unlock_new_inode() if the
inode has the I_NEW flag set, indicating that it's in the table.
This addresses the syzbot report "WARNING in unlock_new_inode"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=187510916eb6a14598f7).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200628070057.820213-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+187510916eb6a14598f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 044e2e26f214e5ab26af85faffd8d1e4ec066931 ]
When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may
be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.
Reported-by: syzbot+91f02b28f9bb5f5f1341@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 44ac6b829c4e173fdf6df18e6dd86aecf9a3dc99 ]
Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger
than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to
access memory beyond end of buffer.
Reported-by: syzbot+9991561e714f597095da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d2825c8c6105b0f36f3ff72760799fa2e71420e ]
This patch fixes the following memory detected by kmemleak and umount
gfs2 filesystem which removed the last lockspace:
unreferenced object 0xffff9264f482f600 (size 192):
comm "dlm_controld", pid 325, jiffies 4294690276 (age 48.136s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6e 6f 64 65 73 00 00 00 ........nodes...
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000060481d7>] make_space+0x41/0x130
[<000000008d905d46>] configfs_mkdir+0x1a2/0x5f0
[<00000000729502cf>] vfs_mkdir+0x155/0x210
[<000000000369bcf1>] do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
[<00000000cc478a33>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[<00000000ce9ccf01>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The patch just remembers the "nodes" entry pointer in space as I think
it's created as subdirectory when parent "spaces" is created. In
function drop_space() we will lost the pointer reference to nds because
configfs_remove_default_groups(). However as this subdirectory is always
available when "spaces" exists it will just be freed when "spaces" will be
freed.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d367cb960ce88914898cbfa43645c2e43ede9465 upstream.
The "end" pointer is either NULL or it points to the next byte to parse.
If there isn't a next byte then dereferencing "end" is an off-by-one out
of bounds error. And, of course, if it's NULL that leads to an Oops.
Printing "*end" doesn't seem very useful so let's delete this code.
Also for the last debug statement, I noticed that it should be printing
"sequence_end" instead of "end" so fix that as well.
Reported-by: Dominik Maier <dmaier@sect.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.
With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will
crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up
in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:
xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395
reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677
reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209
get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141
check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline]
acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline]
generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353
do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline]
inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463
lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557
reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972
reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176
mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417
Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not
yet initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+9b33c9b118d77ff59b6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.
reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use
_make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are
properly initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+d94d02749498bb7bab4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3701cb59d892b88d569427586f01491552f377b1 upstream.
or get freed, for that matter, if it's a long (separately stored)
name.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe0a916c1eae8e17e86c3753d13919177d63ed7e upstream.
Checking for the lack of epitems refering to the epoll we want to insert into
is not enough; we might have an insertion of that epoll into another one that
has already collected the set of files to recheck for excessive reverse paths,
but hasn't gotten to creating/inserting the epitem for it.
However, any such insertion in progress can be detected - it will update the
generation count in our epoll when it's done looking through it for files
to check. That gets done under ->mtx of our epoll and that allows us to
detect that safely.
We are *not* holding epmutex here, so the generation count is not stable.
However, since both the update of ep->gen by loop check and (later)
insertion into ->f_ep_link are done with ep->mtx held, we are fine -
the sequence is
grab epmutex
bump loop_check_gen
...
grab tep->mtx // 1
tep->gen = loop_check_gen
...
drop tep->mtx // 2
...
grab tep->mtx // 3
...
insert into ->f_ep_link
...
drop tep->mtx // 4
bump loop_check_gen
drop epmutex
and if the fastpath check in another thread happens for that
eventpoll, it can come
* before (1) - in that case fastpath is just fine
* after (4) - we'll see non-empty ->f_ep_link, slow path
taken
* between (2) and (3) - loop_check_gen is stable,
with ->mtx providing barriers and we end up taking slow path.
Note that ->f_ep_link emptiness check is slightly racy - we are protected
against insertions into that list, but removals can happen right under us.
Not a problem - in the worst case we'll end up taking a slow path for
no good reason.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 18306c404abe18a0972587a6266830583c60c928 upstream.
removes the need to clear it, along with the races.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d33030e2ee3508d65db5644551435310df86010e ]
nfs_readdir_page_filler() iterates over entries in a directory, reusing
the same security label buffer, but does not reset the buffer's length.
This causes decode_attr_security_label() to return -ERANGE if an entry's
security label is longer than the previous one's. This error, in
nfs4_decode_dirent(), only gets passed up as -EAGAIN, which causes another
failed attempt to copy into the buffer. The second error is ignored and
the remaining entries do not show up in ls, specifically the getdents64()
syscall.
Reproduce by creating multiple files in NFS and giving one of the later
files a longer security label. ls will not see that file nor any that are
added afterwards, though they will exist on the backend.
In nfs_readdir_page_filler(), reset security label buffer length before
every reuse
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
Fixes: b4487b935452 ("nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dc3da0461cc4b76f2d0c5b12247fcb3b520edbbf ]
Nothing ensures that session will still be valid by the time we
dereference the pointer. Take and put a reference.
In principle, we should always be able to get a reference here, but
throw a warning if that's ever not the case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7c09c03091ac562ddca2b393e5d65c1d37da79f1 ]
Deleting a subvolume on a full filesystem leads to ENOSPC followed by a
forced read-only. This is not a transaction abort and the filesystem is
otherwise ok, so the error should be just propagated to the callers.
This is caused by unnecessary call to btrfs_handle_fs_error for all
errors, except EAGAIN. This does not make sense as the standard
transaction abort mechanism is in btrfs_drop_snapshot so all relevant
failures are handled.
Originally in commit cb1b69f4508a ("Btrfs: forced readonly when
btrfs_drop_snapshot() fails") there was no return value at all, so the
btrfs_std_error made some sense but once the error handling and
propagation has been implemented we don't need it anymore.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 32f98877c57bee6bc27f443a96f49678a2cd6a50 ]
page_count() is unstable. Unless there has been an RCU grace period
between when the page was removed from the page cache and now, a
speculative reference may exist from the page cache.
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b849dd84b6ccfe32622988b79b7b073861fcf9f7 ]
While trying to "dd" to the block device for a USB stick, I
encountered a hung task warning (blocked for > 120 seconds). I
managed to come up with an easy way to reproduce this on my system
(where /dev/sdb is the block device for my USB stick) with:
while true; do dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=4M; done
With my reproduction here are the relevant bits from the hung task
detector:
INFO: task udevd:294 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
...
udevd D 0 294 1 0x00400008
Call trace:
...
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
__blkdev_get+0x7c/0x3d4
blkdev_get+0x118/0x138
blkdev_open+0x94/0xa8
do_dentry_open+0x268/0x3a0
vfs_open+0x34/0x40
path_openat+0x39c/0xdf4
do_filp_open+0x90/0x10c
do_sys_open+0x150/0x3c8
...
...
Showing all locks held in the system:
...
1 lock held by dd/2798:
#0: ffffff814ac1a3b8 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_put+0x50/0x204
...
dd D 0 2798 2764 0x00400208
Call trace:
...
schedule+0x8c/0xbc
io_schedule+0x1c/0x40
wait_on_page_bit_common+0x238/0x338
__lock_page+0x5c/0x68
write_cache_pages+0x194/0x500
generic_writepages+0x64/0xa4
blkdev_writepages+0x24/0x30
do_writepages+0x48/0xa8
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xac/0xd8
filemap_write_and_wait+0x30/0x84
__blkdev_put+0x88/0x204
blkdev_put+0xc4/0xe4
blkdev_close+0x28/0x38
__fput+0xe0/0x238
____fput+0x1c/0x28
task_work_run+0xb0/0xe4
do_notify_resume+0xfc0/0x14bc
work_pending+0x8/0x14
The problem appears related to the fact that my USB disk is terribly
slow and that I have a lot of RAM in my system to cache things.
Specifically my writes seem to be happening at ~15 MB/s and I've got
~4 GB of RAM in my system that can be used for buffering. To write 4
GB of buffer to disk thus takes ~4000 MB / ~15 MB/s = ~267 seconds.
The 267 second number is a problem because in __blkdev_put() we call
sync_blockdev() while holding the bd_mutex. Any other callers who
want the bd_mutex will be blocked for the whole time.
The problem is made worse because I believe blkdev_put() specifically
tells other tasks (namely udev) to go try to access the device at right
around the same time we're going to hold the mutex for a long time.
Putting some traces around this (after disabling the hung task detector),
I could confirm:
dd: 437.608600: __blkdev_put() right before sync_blockdev() for sdb
udevd: 437.623901: blkdev_open() right before blkdev_get() for sdb
dd: 661.468451: __blkdev_put() right after sync_blockdev() for sdb
udevd: 663.820426: blkdev_open() right after blkdev_get() for sdb
A simple fix for this is to realize that sync_blockdev() works fine if
you're not holding the mutex. Also, it's not the end of the world if
you sync a little early (though it can have performance impacts).
Thus we can make a guess that we're going to need to do the sync and
then do it without holding the mutex. We still do one last sync with
the mutex but it should be much, much faster.
With this, my hung task warnings for my test case are gone.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit acc5af3efa303d5f36cc8c0f61716161f6ca1384 ]
In “ubifs_check_node”, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal,
the code will goto label of "out_len" for execution. Then, in the
following "ubifs_dump_node", if inode type is "UBIFS_DATA_NODE",
in "print_hex_dump", an out-of-bounds access may occur due to the
wrong "ch->len".
Therefore, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal, data length
should to be adjusted to a reasonable safe range. At this time,
structured data is not credible, so dump the corrupted data directly
for analysis.
Signed-off-by: Liu Song <liu.song11@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1cb5deb5bc095c070c09a4540c45f9c9ba24be43 ]
If we decide that a directory free block is corrupt, we must take care
not to leak a buffer pointer to the caller. After xfs_trans_brelse
returns, the buffer can be freed or reused, which means that we have to
set *bpp back to NULL.
Callers are supposed to notice the nonzero return value and not use the
buffer pointer, but we should code more defensively, even if all current
callers handle this situation correctly.
Fixes: de14c5f541e7 ("xfs: verify free block header fields")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9bd4540836684013aaad6070a65d6fcdd9006625 ]
Currenly we doesn't assume that a server may break a lease
from RWH to RW which causes us setting a wrong lease state
on a file and thus mistakenly flushing data and byte-range
locks and purging cached data on the client. This leads to
performance degradation because subsequent IOs go directly
to the server.
Fix this by propagating new lease state and epoch values
to the oplock break handler through cifsFileInfo structure
and removing the use of cifsInodeInfo flags for that. It
allows to avoid some races of several lease/oplock breaks
using those flags in parallel.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2a2b5932db67586bacc560cc065d62faece5b996 ]
The leaf format xattr addition helper xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work()
adjusts the block freemap in a couple places. The first update drops
the size of the freemap that the caller had already selected to
place the xattr name/value data. Before the function returns, it
also checks whether the entries array has encroached on a freemap
range by virtue of the new entry addition. This is necessary because
the entries array grows from the start of the block (but end of the
block header) towards the end of the block while the name/value data
grows from the end of the block in the opposite direction. If the
associated freemap is already empty, however, size is zero and the
subtraction underflows the field and causes corruption.
This is reproduced rarely by generic/070. The observed behavior is
that a smaller sized freemap is aligned to the end of the entries
list, several subsequent xattr additions land in larger freemaps and
the entries list expands into the smaller freemap until it is fully
consumed and then underflows. Note that it is not otherwise a
corruption for the entries array to consume an empty freemap because
the nameval list (i.e. the firstused pointer in the xattr header)
starts beyond the end of the corrupted freemap.
Update the freemap size modification to account for the fact that
the freemap entry can be empty and thus stale.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d7a9520f0c3e6a68b6de8c5812fc8b6d7a52626 ]
A client should be able to handle getting an ERR_DELAY error
while doing a LOCK call to reclaim state due to delegation being
recalled. This is a transient error that can happen due to server
moving its volumes and invalidating its file location cache and
upon reference to it during the LOCK call needing to do an
expensive lookup (leading to an ERR_DELAY error on a PUTFH).
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1c78544eaa4660096aeb6a57ec82b42cdb3bfe5a upstream.
When faulting in the pages for the user supplied buffer for the search
ioctl, we are passing only the base address of the buffer to the function
fault_in_pages_writeable(). This means that after the first iteration of
the while loop that searches for leaves, when we have a non-zero offset,
stored in 'sk_offset', we try to fault in a wrong page range.
So fix this by adding the offset in 'sk_offset' to the base address of the
user supplied buffer when calling fault_in_pages_writeable().
Several users have reported that the applications compsize and bees have
started to operate incorrectly since commit a48b73eca4ceb9 ("btrfs: fix
potential deadlock in the search ioctl") was added to stable trees, and
these applications make heavy use of the search ioctls. This fixes their
issues.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/632b888d-a3c3-b085-cdf5-f9bb61017d92@lechevalier.se/
Link: https://github.com/kilobyte/compsize/issues/34
Fixes: a48b73eca4ceb9 ("btrfs: fix potential deadlock in the search ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Tested-by: A L <mail@lechevalier.se>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d3a84a8d0dde4e26bc084b36ffcbdc5932ac85e2 ]
The basic permission bits (protection bits in AmigaOS) have been broken
in Linux' AFFS - it would only set bits, but never delete them.
Also, contrary to the documentation, the Archived bit was not handled.
Let's fix this for good, and set the bits such that Linux and classic
AmigaOS can coexist in the most peaceful manner.
Also, update the documentation to represent the current state of things.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a48b73eca4ceb9b8a4b97f290a065335dbcd8a04 ]
With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following
lockdep splat:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
compsize/11122 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff889fabca8768 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}:
down_write_nested+0x3b/0x70
__btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x120
btrfs_search_slot+0x756/0x990
btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xb4
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x270
btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x168/0x230
btrfs_work_helper+0xd4/0x570
process_one_work+0x2ad/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x3a/0x3d0
kthread+0x133/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
-> #1 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0x50/0x440
btrfs_update_inode+0x8a/0xf0
btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5b/0xd0
touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0
btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60
mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640
do_mmap+0x376/0x580
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
__might_fault+0x68/0x90
_copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300
search_ioctl+0x106/0x200
btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0
btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0
ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&mm->mmap_lock#2 --> &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-fs-00
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(btrfs-fs-00);
lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
lock(btrfs-fs-00);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by compsize/11122:
#0: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
stack backtrace:
CPU: 17 PID: 11122 Comm: compsize Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922
Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x165/0x180
__lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
? find_held_lock+0x72/0x90
__might_fault+0x68/0x90
? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
_copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300
? btrfs_search_forward+0x2a6/0x360
search_ioctl+0x106/0x200
btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0
btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0
? __do_sys_newfstat+0x5a/0x70
? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The problem is we're doing a copy_to_user() while holding tree locks,
which can deadlock if we have to do a page fault for the copy_to_user().
This exists even without my locking changes, so it needs to be fixed.
Rework the search ioctl to do the pre-fault and then
copy_to_user_nofault for the copying.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d3beaa253fd6fa40b8b18a216398e6e5376a9d21 ]
These are special extent buffers that get rewound in order to lookup
the state of the tree at a specific point in time. As such they do not
go through the normal initialization paths that set their lockdep class,
so handle them appropriately when they are created and before they are
locked.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 24cee18a1c1d7c731ea5987e0c99daea22ae7f4a ]
When a rewound buffer is created it already has a ref count of 1 and the
dummy flag set. Then another ref is taken bumping the count to 2.
Finally when this buffer is released from btrfs_release_path the extra
reference is decremented by the special handling code in
free_extent_buffer.
However, this special code is in fact redundant sinca ref count of 1 is
still correct since the buffer is only accessed via btrfs_path struct.
This paves the way forward of removing the special handling in
free_extent_buffer.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6c122e2a0c515cfb3f3a9cefb5dad4cb62109c78 ]
get_old_root used used only by btrfs_search_old_slot to initialise the
path structure. The old root is always a cloned buffer (either via alloc
dummy or via btrfs_clone_extent_buffer) and its reference count is 2: 1
from allocation, 1 from extent_buffer_get call in get_old_root.
This latter explicit ref count acquire operation is in fact unnecessary
since the semantic is such that the newly allocated buffer is handed
over to the btrfs_path for lifetime management. Considering this just
remove the extra extent_buffer_get in get_old_root.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 9771a5cf937129307d9f58922d60484d58ababe7 upstream.
With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following
lockdep splat:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.8.0-rc7-00167-g0d7ba0c5b375-dirty #925 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
btrfs-uuid/7955 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88bfbafec0f8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88bfbafef2a8 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}:
down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
__btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50
btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990
btrfs_uuid_tree_add+0x89/0x2d0
btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x330/0x390
kthread+0x133/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
-> #0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
__btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50
btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990
btrfs_find_root+0x45/0x1b0
btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x100
btrfs_get_root_ref.part.50+0x143/0x630
btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate+0x207/0x314
btrfs_uuid_rescan_kthread+0x12/0x50
kthread+0x133/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(btrfs-uuid-00);
lock(btrfs-root-00);
lock(btrfs-uuid-00);
lock(btrfs-root-00);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by btrfs-uuid/7955:
#0: ffff88bfbafef2a8 (btrfs-uuid-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
stack backtrace:
CPU: 73 PID: 7955 Comm: btrfs-uuid Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00167-g0d7ba0c5b375-dirty #925
Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x165/0x180
__lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
? btrfs_root_node+0x1c/0x1d0
down_read_nested+0x3e/0x140
? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180
__btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50
btrfs_search_slot+0x4bd/0x990
btrfs_find_root+0x45/0x1b0
btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x100
btrfs_get_root_ref.part.50+0x143/0x630
btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate+0x207/0x314
? btree_readpage+0x20/0x20
btrfs_uuid_rescan_kthread+0x12/0x50
kthread+0x133/0x150
? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This problem exists because we have two different rescan threads,
btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread which creates the uuid tree, and
btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate that goes through and updates or deletes any out
of date roots. The problem is they both do things in different order.
btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread() reads the tree_root, and then inserts entries
into the uuid_root. btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate() scans the uuid_root, but
then does a btrfs_get_fs_root() which can read from the tree_root.
It's actually easy enough to not be holding the path in
btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread() when we add a uuid entry, as we already drop
it further down and re-start the search when we loop. So simply move
the path release before we add our entry to the uuid tree.
This also fixes a problem where we're holding a path open after we do
btrfs_end_transaction(), which has it's own problems.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 77f4689de17c0887775bb77896f4cc11a39bf848 ]
epoll_loop_check_proc() can run into a file already committed to destruction;
we can't grab a reference on those and don't need to add them to the set for
reverse path check anyway.
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Fixes: a9ed4a6560b8 ("epoll: Keep a reference on files added to the check list")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 496ceaf12432b3d136dcdec48424312e71359ea7 ]
Leases don't currently work correctly on kcephfs, as they are not broken
when caps are revoked. They could eventually be implemented similarly to
how we did them in libcephfs, but for now don't allow them.
[ idryomov: no need for simple_nosetlease() in ceph_dir_fops and
ceph_snapdir_fops ]
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fb2fecbad50964b9f27a3b182e74e437b40753ef ]
With my new locking code dbench is so much faster that I tripped over a
transaction abort from ENOSPC. This turned out to be because
btrfs_del_dir_entries_in_log was checking for ret == -ENOSPC, but this
function sets err on error, and returns err. So instead of properly
marking the inode as needing a full commit, we were returning -ENOSPC
and aborting in __btrfs_unlink_inode. Fix this by checking the proper
variable so that we return the correct thing in the case of ENOSPC.
The ENOENT needs to be checked, because btrfs_lookup_dir_item_index()
can return -ENOENT if the dir item isn't in the tree log (which would
happen if we hadn't fsync'ed this guy). We actually handle that case in
__btrfs_unlink_inode, so it's an expected error to get back.
Fixes: 4a500fd178c8 ("Btrfs: Metadata ENOSPC handling for tree log")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add note and comment about ENOENT ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f9cae926f35e8230330f28c7b743ad088611a8de upstream.
When we are processing writeback for sync(2), move_expired_inodes()
didn't set any inode expiry value (older_than_this). This can result in
writeback never completing if there's steady stream of inodes added to
b_dirty_time list as writeback rechecks dirty lists after each writeback
round whether there's more work to be done. Fix the problem by using
sync(2) start time is inode expiry value when processing b_dirty_time
list similarly as for ordinarily dirtied inodes. This requires some
refactoring of older_than_this handling which simplifies the code
noticeably as a bonus.
Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5afced3bf28100d81fb2fe7e98918632a08feaf5 upstream.
Inode's i_io_list list head is used to attach inode to several different
lists - wb->{b_dirty, b_dirty_time, b_io, b_more_io}. When flush worker
prepares a list of inodes to writeback e.g. for sync(2), it moves inodes
to b_io list. Thus it is critical for sync(2) data integrity guarantees
that inode is not requeued to any other writeback list when inode is
queued for processing by flush worker. That's the reason why
writeback_single_inode() does not touch i_io_list (unless the inode is
completely clean) and why __mark_inode_dirty() does not touch i_io_list
if I_SYNC flag is set.
However there are two flaws in the current logic:
1) When inode has only I_DIRTY_TIME set but it is already queued in b_io
list due to sync(2), concurrent __mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_SYNC)
can still move inode back to b_dirty list resulting in skipping
writeback of inode time stamps during sync(2).
2) When inode is on b_dirty_time list and writeback_single_inode() races
with __mark_inode_dirty() like:
writeback_single_inode() __mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_PAGES)
inode->i_state |= I_SYNC
__writeback_single_inode()
inode->i_state |= I_DIRTY_PAGES;
if (inode->i_state & I_SYNC)
bail
if (!(inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_ALL))
- not true so nothing done
We end up with I_DIRTY_PAGES inode on b_dirty_time list and thus
standard background writeback will not writeback this inode leading to
possible dirty throttling stalls etc. (thanks to Martijn Coenen for this
analysis).
Fix these problems by tracking whether inode is queued in b_io or
b_more_io lists in a new I_SYNC_QUEUED flag. When this flag is set, we
know flush worker has queued inode and we should not touch i_io_list.
On the other hand we also know that once flush worker is done with the
inode it will requeue the inode to appropriate dirty list. When
I_SYNC_QUEUED is not set, __mark_inode_dirty() can (and must) move inode
to appropriate dirty list.
Reported-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Tested-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b35250c0816c7cf7d0a8de92f5fafb6a7508a708 upstream.
Currently, operations on inode->i_io_list are protected by
wb->list_lock. In the following patches we'll need to maintain
consistency between inode->i_state and inode->i_io_list so change the
code so that inode->i_lock protects also all inode's i_io_list handling.
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # Prerequisite for "writeback: Avoid skipping inode writeback"
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bbc37d6e475eee8ffa2156ec813efc6bbb43c06d upstream.
If a transaction aborts it can cause a memory leak of the pages array of
a block group's io_ctl structure. The following steps explain how that can
happen:
1) Transaction N is committing, currently in state TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED
and it's about to start writing out dirty extent buffers;
2) Transaction N + 1 already started and another task, task A, just called
btrfs_commit_transaction() on it;
3) Block group B was dirtied (extents allocated from it) by transaction
N + 1, so when task A calls btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(), at the
very beginning of the transaction commit, it starts writeback for the
block group's space cache by calling btrfs_write_out_cache(), which
allocates the pages array for the block group's io_ctl with a call to
io_ctl_init(). Block group A is added to the io_list of transaction
N + 1 by btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups();
4) While transaction N's commit is writing out the extent buffers, it gets
an IO error and aborts transaction N, also setting the file system to
RO mode;
5) Task A has already returned from btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(), is at
btrfs_commit_transaction() and has set transaction N + 1 state to
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START. Immediately after that it checks that the
filesystem was turned to RO mode, due to transaction N's abort, and
jumps to the "cleanup_transaction" label. After that we end up at
btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction() which calls btrfs_cleanup_dirty_bgs().
That helper finds block group B in the transaction's io_list but it
never releases the pages array of the block group's io_ctl, resulting in
a memory leak.
In fact at the point when we are at btrfs_cleanup_dirty_bgs(), the pages
array points to pages that were already released by us at
__btrfs_write_out_cache() through the call to io_ctl_drop_pages(). We end
up freeing the pages array only after waiting for the ordered extent to
complete through btrfs_wait_cache_io(), which calls io_ctl_free() to do
that. But in the transaction abort case we don't wait for the space cache's
ordered extent to complete through a call to btrfs_wait_cache_io(), so
that's why we end up with a memory leak - we wait for the ordered extent
to complete indirectly by shutting down the work queues and waiting for
any jobs in them to complete before returning from close_ctree().
We can solve the leak simply by freeing the pages array right after
releasing the pages (with the call to io_ctl_drop_pages()) at
__btrfs_write_out_cache(), since we will never use it anymore after that
and the pages array points to already released pages at that point, which
is currently not a problem since no one will use it after that, but not a
good practice anyway since it can easily lead to use-after-free issues.
So fix this by freeing the pages array right after releasing the pages at
__btrfs_write_out_cache().
This issue can often be reproduced with test case generic/475 from fstests
and kmemleak can detect it and reports it with the following trace:
unreferenced object 0xffff9bbf009fa600 (size 512):
comm "fsstress", pid 38807, jiffies 4298504428 (age 22.028s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 a0 7c 4d 3d ed ff ff 40 a0 7c 4d 3d ed ff ff ..|M=...@.|M=...
80 a0 7c 4d 3d ed ff ff c0 a0 7c 4d 3d ed ff ff ..|M=.....|M=...
backtrace:
[<00000000f4b5cfe2>] __kmalloc+0x1a8/0x3e0
[<0000000028665e7f>] io_ctl_init+0xa7/0x120 [btrfs]
[<00000000a1f95b2d>] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x86/0x4a0 [btrfs]
[<00000000207ea1b0>] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7f/0xf0 [btrfs]
[<00000000af21f534>] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x27b/0x580 [btrfs]
[<00000000c3c23d44>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xa6f/0xe70 [btrfs]
[<000000009588930c>] create_subvol+0x581/0x9a0 [btrfs]
[<000000009ef2fd7f>] btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
[<00000000474e5187>] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[<00000000708ee349>] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xb0/0xf0 [btrfs]
[<00000000ea60106f>] btrfs_ioctl+0x12c/0x3130 [btrfs]
[<000000005c923d6d>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[<0000000043ace2c9>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[<00000000904efbce>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
