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commit 50e31ef486afe60f128d42fb9620e2a63172c15c upstream.
[BUG]
There are several bug reports about recent kernel unable to relocate
certain data block groups.
Sometimes the error just goes away, but there is one reporter who can
reproduce it reliably.
The dmesg would look like:
[438.260483] BTRFS info (device dm-10): balance: start -dvrange=34625344765952..34625344765953
[438.269018] BTRFS info (device dm-10): relocating block group 34625344765952 flags data|raid1
[450.439609] BTRFS info (device dm-10): found 167 extents, stage: move data extents
[463.501781] BTRFS info (device dm-10): balance: ended with status: -2
[CAUSE]
The ENOENT error is returned from the following call chain:
add_data_references()
|- delete_v1_space_cache();
|- if (!found)
return -ENOENT;
The variable @found is set to true if we find a data extent whose
disk bytenr matches parameter @data_bytes.
With extra debugging, the offending tree block looks like this:
leaf bytenr = 42676709441536, data_bytenr = 34626327621632
ctime 1567904822.739884119 (2019-09-08 03:07:02)
mtime 0.0 (1970-01-01 01:00:00)
otime 0.0 (1970-01-01 01:00:00)
item 27 key (51933 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 9854 itemsize 53
generation 1517381 type 2 (prealloc)
prealloc data disk byte 34626327621632 nr 262144 <<<
prealloc data offset 0 nr 262144
item 28 key (52262 ROOT_ITEM 0) itemoff 9415 itemsize 439
generation 2618893 root_dirid 256 bytenr 42677048360960 level 3 refs 1
lastsnap 2618893 byte_limit 0 bytes_used 5557338112 flags 0x0(none)
uuid d0d4361f-d231-6d40-8901-fe506e4b2b53
Although item 27 has disk bytenr 34626327621632, which matches the
data_bytenr, its type is prealloc, not reg.
This makes the existing code skip that item, and return ENOENT.
[FIX]
The code is modified in commit 19b546d7a1b2 ("btrfs: relocation: Use
btrfs_find_all_leafs to locate data extent parent tree leaves"), before
that commit, we use something like
"if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) continue;"
But in that offending commit, we use (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG),
ignoring BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC.
Fix it by also checking BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC.
Reported-by: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs2@lesimple.fr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/505cabfa88575ed6dbe7cb922d8914fb@lesimple.fr
Fixes: 19b546d7a1b2 ("btrfs: relocation: Use btrfs_find_all_leafs to locate data extent parent tree leaves")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+
Tested-By: Stéphane Lesimple <stephane_btrfs2@lesimple.fr>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f8b848788f77c7f5c3bd98febce66b7aa14785f upstream.
When CRC32 is disabled, zonefs cannot be linked:
ld: fs/zonefs/super.o: in function `zonefs_fill_super':
Add a Kconfig 'select' statement for it.
Fixes: 8dcc1a9d90c1 ("fs: New zonefs file system")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ca408d9c749c32288bc28725f9f12ba30299e8f upstream.
Commit
121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the
compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs.
sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat
handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that
takes the split args for native 32-bit.
[ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ]
Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e076ab2a2ca70a0270232067cd49f76cd92efe64 ]
Commit 38d715f494f2 ("btrfs: use btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in
shrink_delalloc") cleaned up how we do delalloc shrinking by utilizing
some infrastructure we have in place to flush inodes that we use for
device replace and snapshot. However this introduced a pretty serious
performance regression. To reproduce the user untarred the source
tarball of Firefox (360MiB xz compressed/1.5GiB uncompressed), and would
see it take anywhere from 5 to 20 times as long to untar in 5.10
compared to 5.9. This was observed on fast devices (SSD and better) and
not on HDD.
The root cause is because before we would generally use the normal
writeback path to reclaim delalloc space, and for this we would provide
it with the number of pages we wanted to flush. The referenced commit
changed this to flush that many inodes, which drastically increased the
amount of space we were flushing in certain cases, which severely
affected performance.
We cannot revert this patch unfortunately because of 3d45f221ce62
("btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extent and low on free
metadata space") which requires the ability to skip flushing inodes that
are being cloned in certain scenarios, which means we need to keep using
our flushing infrastructure or risk re-introducing the deadlock.
Instead to fix this problem we can go back to providing
btrfs_start_delalloc_roots with a number of pages to flush, and then set
up a writeback_control and utilize sync_inode() to handle the flushing
for us. This gives us the same behavior we had prior to the fix, while
still allowing us to avoid the deadlock that was fixed by Filipe. I
redid the users original test and got the following results on one of
our test machines (256GiB of ram, 56 cores, 2TiB Intel NVMe drive)
5.9 0m54.258s
5.10 1m26.212s
5.10+patch 0m38.800s
5.10+patch is significantly faster than plain 5.9 because of my patch
series "Change data reservations to use the ticketing infra" which
contained the patch that introduced the regression, but generally
improved the overall ENOSPC flushing mechanisms.
Additional testing on consumer-grade SSD (8GiB ram, 8 CPU) confirm
the results:
5.10.5 4m00s
5.10.5+patch 1m08s
5.11-rc2 5m14s
5.11-rc2+patch 1m30s
Reported-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de>
Fixes: 38d715f494f2 ("btrfs: use btrfs_start_delalloc_roots in shrink_delalloc")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Tested-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add my test results ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d45f221ce627d13e2e6ef3274f06750c84a6542 ]
When cloning an inline extent there are cases where we can not just copy
the inline extent from the source range to the target range (e.g. when the
target range starts at an offset greater than zero). In such cases we copy
the inline extent's data into a page of the destination inode and then
dirty that page. However, after that we will need to start a transaction
for each processed extent and, if we are ever low on available metadata
space, we may need to flush existing delalloc for all dirty inodes in an
attempt to release metadata space - if that happens we may deadlock:
* the async reclaim task queued a delalloc work to flush delalloc for
the destination inode of the clone operation;
* the task executing that delalloc work gets blocked waiting for the
range with the dirty page to be unlocked, which is currently locked
by the task doing the clone operation;
* the async reclaim task blocks waiting for the delalloc work to complete;
* the cloning task is waiting on the waitqueue of its reservation ticket
while holding the range with the dirty page locked in the inode's
io_tree;
* if metadata space is not released by some other task (like delalloc for
some other inode completing for example), the clone task waits forever
and as a consequence the delalloc work and async reclaim tasks will hang
forever as well. Releasing more space on the other hand may require
starting a transaction, which will hang as well when trying to reserve
metadata space, resulting in a deadlock between all these tasks.
When this happens, traces like the following show up in dmesg/syslog:
[87452.323003] INFO: task kworker/u16:11:1810830 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[87452.323644] Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
[87452.324248] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[87452.324852] task:kworker/u16:11 state:D stack: 0 pid:1810830 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[87452.325520] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
[87452.326136] Call Trace:
[87452.326737] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0
[87452.327390] schedule+0x45/0xe0
[87452.328174] lock_extent_bits+0x1e6/0x2d0 [btrfs]
[87452.328894] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90
[87452.329474] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x32c/0x390 [btrfs]
[87452.330133] ? __mod_memcg_state+0x8e/0x160
[87452.330738] __extent_writepage+0x2d4/0x400 [btrfs]
[87452.331405] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2b2/0x500 [btrfs]
[87452.332007] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0
[87452.332557] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1b/0xf0
[87452.333127] extent_writepages+0x43/0x90 [btrfs]
[87452.333653] ? lock_acquire+0x1a3/0x490
[87452.334177] do_writepages+0x43/0xe0
[87452.334699] ? __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa4/0x100
[87452.335720] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc5/0x100
[87452.336500] btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs]
[87452.337216] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs]
[87452.337838] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0
[87452.338437] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[87452.339137] ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[87452.339884] kthread+0x153/0x170
[87452.340507] ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0
[87452.341153] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[87452.341806] INFO: task kworker/u16:1:2426217 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[87452.342487] Tainted: G B W 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
[87452.343274] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[87452.344049] task:kworker/u16:1 state:D stack: 0 pid:2426217 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[87452.344974] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space [btrfs]
[87452.345655] Call Trace:
[87452.346305] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0
[87452.346947] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[87452.347676] ? wait_for_completion+0x81/0x110
[87452.348389] schedule+0x45/0xe0
[87452.349077] schedule_timeout+0x30c/0x580
[87452.349718] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60
[87452.350340] ? lock_acquire+0x1a3/0x490
[87452.351006] ? try_to_wake_up+0x7a/0xa20
[87452.351541] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0
[87452.352040] ? lock_acquired+0x199/0x490
[87452.352517] ? wait_for_completion+0x81/0x110
[87452.353000] wait_for_completion+0xab/0x110
[87452.353490] start_delalloc_inodes+0x2af/0x390 [btrfs]
[87452.353973] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x12d/0x250 [btrfs]
[87452.354455] flush_space+0x24f/0x660 [btrfs]
[87452.355063] btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x1bb/0x480 [btrfs]
[87452.355565] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0
[87452.356024] worker_thread+0x20f/0x3b0
[87452.356487] ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
[87452.356973] kthread+0x153/0x170
[87452.357434] ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0
[87452.357880] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
(...)
< stack traces of several tasks waiting for the locks of the inodes of the
clone operation >
(...)
[92867.444138] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3371bbe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000052
[92867.444624] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3371bea0 RCX: 00007f61efe73f97
[92867.445116] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000560fbd5d7a40 RDI: 0000560fbd5d8960
[92867.445595] RBP: 00007ffc3371beb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[92867.446070] R10: 00007ffc3371b996 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[92867.446820] R13: 000000000000001f R14: 00007ffc3371bea0 R15: 00007ffc3371beb0
[92867.447361] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:2508238 ppid:2508153 flags:0x00004000
[92867.447920] Call Trace:
[92867.448435] __schedule+0x5d1/0xcf0
[92867.448934] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60
[92867.449423] schedule+0x45/0xe0
[92867.449916] __reserve_bytes+0x4a4/0xb10 [btrfs]
[92867.450576] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90
[92867.451202] btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes+0x29/0x190 [btrfs]
[92867.451815] btrfs_block_rsv_add+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs]
[92867.452412] start_transaction+0x2d1/0x760 [btrfs]
[92867.453216] clone_copy_inline_extent+0x333/0x490 [btrfs]
[92867.453848] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0
[92867.454539] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x9a7/0xc30 [btrfs]
[92867.455218] btrfs_clone+0x569/0x7e0 [btrfs]
[92867.455952] btrfs_clone_files+0xf6/0x150 [btrfs]
[92867.456588] btrfs_remap_file_range+0x324/0x3d0 [btrfs]
[92867.457213] do_clone_file_range+0xd4/0x1f0
[92867.457828] vfs_clone_file_range+0x4d/0x230
[92867.458355] ? lock_release+0x20e/0x4c0
[92867.458890] ioctl_file_clone+0x8f/0xc0
[92867.459377] do_vfs_ioctl+0x342/0x750
[92867.459913] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x62/0xb0
[92867.460377] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[92867.460842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
(...)
< stack traces of more tasks blocked on metadata reservation like the clone
task above, because the async reclaim task has deadlocked >
(...)
Another thing to notice is that the worker task that is deadlocked when
trying to flush the destination inode of the clone operation is at
btrfs_invalidatepage(). This is simply because the clone operation has a
destination offset greater than the i_size and we only update the i_size
of the destination file after cloning an extent (just like we do in the
buffered write path).
Since the async reclaim path uses btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() to trigger
the flushing of delalloc for all inodes that have delalloc, add a runtime
flag to an inode to signal it should not be flushed, and for inodes with
that flag set, start_delalloc_inodes() will simply skip them. When the
cloning code needs to dirty a page to copy an inline extent, set that flag
on the inode and then clear it when the clone operation finishes.
This could be sporadically triggered with test case generic/269 from
fstests, which exercises many fsstress processes running in parallel with
several dd processes filling up the entire filesystem.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Fixes: 05a5a7621ce6 ("Btrfs: implement full reflink support for inline extents")
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f2f121ab500d0457cc9c6f54269d21ffdf5bd304 ]
Every time we log an inode we lookup in the fs/subvol tree for xattrs and
if we have any, log them into the log tree. However it is very common to
have inodes without any xattrs, so doing the search wastes times, but more
importantly it adds contention on the fs/subvol tree locks, either making
the logging code block and wait for tree locks or making the logging code
making other concurrent operations block and wait.
The most typical use cases where xattrs are used are when capabilities or
ACLs are defined for an inode, or when SELinux is enabled.
This change makes the logging code detect when an inode does not have
xattrs and skip the xattrs search the next time the inode is logged,
unless the inode is evicted and loaded again or a xattr is added to the
inode. Therefore skipping the search for xattrs on inodes that don't ever
have xattrs and are fsynced with some frequency.
The following script that calls dbench was used to measure the impact of
this change on a VM with 8 CPUs, 16Gb of ram, using a raw NVMe device
directly (no intermediary filesystem on the host) and using a non-debug
kernel (default configuration on Debian distributions):
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdk
MNT=/mnt/sdk
MOUNT_OPTIONS="-o ssd"
mkfs.btrfs -f -m single -d single $DEV
mount $MOUNT_OPTIONS $DEV $MNT
dbench -D $MNT -t 200 40
umount $MNT
The results before this change:
Operation Count AvgLat MaxLat
----------------------------------------
NTCreateX 5761605 0.172 312.057
Close 4232452 0.002 10.927
Rename 243937 1.406 277.344
Unlink 1163456 0.631 298.402
Deltree 160 11.581 221.107
Mkdir 80 0.003 0.005
Qpathinfo 5221410 0.065 122.309
Qfileinfo 915432 0.001 3.333
Qfsinfo 957555 0.003 3.992
Sfileinfo 469244 0.023 20.494
Find 2018865 0.448 123.659
WriteX 2874851 0.049 118.529
ReadX 9030579 0.004 21.654
LockX 18754 0.003 4.423
UnlockX 18754 0.002 0.331
Flush 403792 10.944 359.494
Throughput 908.444 MB/sec 40 clients 40 procs max_latency=359.500 ms
The results after this change:
Operation Count AvgLat MaxLat
----------------------------------------
NTCreateX 6442521 0.159 230.693
Close 4732357 0.002 10.972
Rename 272809 1.293 227.398
Unlink 1301059 0.563 218.500
Deltree 160 7.796 54.887
Mkdir 80 0.008 0.478
Qpathinfo 5839452 0.047 124.330
Qfileinfo 1023199 0.001 4.996
Qfsinfo 1070760 0.003 5.709
Sfileinfo 524790 0.033 21.765
Find 2257658 0.314 125.611
WriteX 3211520 0.040 232.135
ReadX 10098969 0.004 25.340
LockX 20974 0.003 1.569
UnlockX 20974 0.002 3.475
Flush 451553 10.287 331.037
Throughput 1011.77 MB/sec 40 clients 40 procs max_latency=331.045 ms
+10.8% throughput, -8.2% max latency
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e2224c5867fead6c0b94b84727cc676ac6353a3 ]
alloc_fixed_file_ref_node() currently returns an ERR_PTR on failure.
io_sqe_files_unregister() expects it to return NULL and since it can only
return -ENOMEM, it makes more sense to change alloc_fixed_file_ref_node()
to behave that way.
Fixes: 1ffc54220c44 ("io_uring: fix io_sqe_files_unregister() hangs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6c503150ae33ee19036255cfda0998463613352c upstream
IOPOLL skips completion locking but keeps it under uring_lock, thus
io_cqring_overflow_flush() and so io_cqring_events() need additional
locking with uring_lock in some cases for IOPOLL.
Remove __io_cqring_overflow_flush() from io_cqring_events(), introduce a
wrapper around flush doing needed synchronisation and call it by hand.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 89448c47b8452b67c146dc6cad6f737e004c5caf upstream
We don't need to take uring_lock for SQPOLL|IOPOLL to do
io_cqring_overflow_flush() when cq_overflow_list is empty, remove it
from the hot path.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 81b6d05ccad4f3d8a9dfb091fb46ad6978ee40e4 upstream
io_req_task_submit() might be called for IOPOLL, do the fail path under
uring_lock to comply with IOPOLL synchronisation based solely on it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0b3f407e6728d990ae1630a02c7b952c21c288d3 upstream.
When doing an incremental send, if we have a new inode that happens to
have the same number that an old directory inode had in the base snapshot
and that old directory has a pending rmdir operation, we end up computing
a wrong path for the new inode, causing the receiver to fail.
Example reproducer:
$ cat test-send-rmdir.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
mkdir $MNT/dir
touch $MNT/dir/file1
touch $MNT/dir/file2
touch $MNT/dir/file3
# Filesystem looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- dir/ (ino 257)
# |----- file1 (ino 258)
# |----- file2 (ino 259)
# |----- file3 (ino 260)
#
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap1
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT/snap1
# Now remove our directory and all its files.
rm -fr $MNT/dir
# Unmount the filesystem and mount it again. This is to ensure that
# the next inode that is created ends up with the same inode number
# that our directory "dir" had, 257, which is the first free "objectid"
# available after mounting again the filesystem.
umount $MNT
mount $DEV $MNT
# Now create a new file (it could be a directory as well).
touch $MNT/newfile
# Filesystem now looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- newfile (ino 257)
#
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap2
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap2.send -p $MNT/snap1 $MNT/snap2
# Now unmount the filesystem, create a new one, mount it and try to apply
# both send streams to recreate both snapshots.
umount $DEV
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap2.send $MNT
umount $MNT
When running the test, the receive operation for the incremental stream
fails:
$ ./test-send-rmdir.sh
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap1'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap1
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap2'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap2
At subvol snap1
At snapshot snap2
ERROR: chown o257-9-0 failed: No such file or directory
So fix this by tracking directories that have a pending rmdir by inode
number and generation number, instead of only inode number.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Reported-by: Massimo B. <massimo.b@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Massimo B. <massimo.b@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6ae34776e85912960a253a8327068a892998e685.camel@gmx.net/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ae5e070eaca9dbebde3459dd8f4c2756f8c097d0 upstream.
There is a chance of racing for qgroup flushing which may lead to
deadlock:
Thread A | Thread B
(not holding trans handle) | (holding a trans handle)
--------------------------------+--------------------------------
__btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta() | __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta()
|- try_flush_qgroup() | |- try_flush_qgroup()
|- QGROUP_FLUSHING bit set | |
| | |- test_and_set_bit()
| | |- wait_event()
|- btrfs_join_transaction() |
|- btrfs_commit_transaction()|
!!! DEAD LOCK !!!
Since thread A wants to commit transaction, but thread B is holding a
transaction handle, blocking the commit.
At the same time, thread B is waiting for thread A to finish its commit.
This is just a hot fix, and would lead to more EDQUOT when we're near
the qgroup limit.
The proper fix would be to make all metadata/data reservations happen
without holding a transaction handle.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]
Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:
perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes)
sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock)
by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex)
While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is
exec.
There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5d069dbe8aaf2a197142558b6fb2978189ba3454 ]
Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):
The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
dnotify mark to the open directory. After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;
This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
properly and eventually crashes.
Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode. Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.
This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...
Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 82ef1370b0c1757ab4ce29f34c52b4e93839b0aa ]
Commit cfd732377221 ("ext4: add prefetching for block allocation
bitmaps") introduced block bitmap prefetch, and expects to read block
bitmaps of flex_bg through an IO. However, it seems to ignore the
value range of s_log_groups_per_flex. In the scenario where the value
of s_log_groups_per_flex is greater than 27, s_mb_prefetch or
s_mb_prefetch_limit will overflow, cause a divide zero exception.
In addition, the logic of calculating nr is also flawed, because the
size of flexbg is fixed during a single mount, but s_mb_prefetch can
be modified, which causes nr to fail to meet the value condition of
[1, flexbg_size].
To solve this problem, we need to set the upper limit of
s_mb_prefetch. Since we expect to load block bitmaps of a flex_bg
through an IO, we can consider determining a reasonable upper limit
among the IO limit parameters. After consideration, we chose
BLK_MAX_SEGMENT_SIZE. This is a good choice to solve divide zero
problem and avoiding performance degradation.
[ Some minor code simplifications to make the changes easy to follow -- TYT ]
Reported-by: Tosk Robot <tencent_os_robot@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Liao <samuelliao@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1607051143-24508-1-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9cd2be519d05ee78876d55e8e902b7125f78b74f ]
list_empty_careful() is not racy only if some conditions are met, i.e.
no re-adds after del_init. io_cqring_overflow_flush() does list_move(),
so it's actually racy.
Remove those checks, we have ->cq_check_overflow for the fast path.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 503b934a752f7e789a5f33217520e0a79f3096ac ]
Expanding the READ_PLUS extents can cause the read buffer to overflow.
If it does, then don't error, but just exit early.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit edf7ddbf1c5eb98b720b063b73e20e8a4a1ce673 ]
Missing calls to mntget() (or equivalently, too many calls to mntput())
are hard to detect because mntput() delays freeing mounts using
task_work_add(), then again using call_rcu(). As a result, mnt_count
can often be decremented to -1 without getting a KASAN use-after-free
report. Such cases are still bugs though, and they point to real
use-after-frees being possible.
For an example of this, see the bug fixed by commit 1b0b9cc8d379
("vfs: fsmount: add missing mntget()"), discussed at
https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190605135401.GB30925@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#u.
This bug *should* have been trivial to find. But actually, it wasn't
found until syzkaller happened to use fchdir() to manipulate the
reference count just right for the bug to be noticeable.
Address this by making mntput_no_expire() issue a WARN if mnt_count has
become negative.
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b6d49ecd1081740b6e632366428b960461f8158b ]
When returning the layout in nfs4_evict_inode(), we need to ensure that
the layout is actually done being freed before we can proceed to free the
inode itself.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 10f04d40a9fa29785206c619f80d8beedb778837 ]
The on-disk quota format supports quota files with upto 2^32 blocks. Be
careful when computing quota file offsets in the quota files from block
numbers as they can overflow 32-bit types. Since quota files larger than
4GB would require ~26 millions of quota users, this is mostly a
theoretical concern now but better be careful, fuzzers would find the
problem sooner or later anyway...
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 65b2b213484acd89a3c20dbb524e52a2f3793b78 upstream.
syzbot reports following issue:
INFO: task syz-executor.2:12399 can't die for more than 143 seconds.
task:syz-executor.2 state:D stack:28744 pid:12399 ppid: 8504 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:3773 [inline]
__schedule+0x893/0x2170 kernel/sched/core.c:4522
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:4600
schedule_timeout+0x1d8/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1847
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x163/0x260 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
kthread_stop+0x17a/0x720 kernel/kthread.c:596
io_put_sq_data fs/io_uring.c:7193 [inline]
io_sq_thread_stop+0x452/0x570 fs/io_uring.c:7290
io_finish_async fs/io_uring.c:7297 [inline]
io_sq_offload_create fs/io_uring.c:8015 [inline]
io_uring_create fs/io_uring.c:9433 [inline]
io_uring_setup+0x19b7/0x3730 fs/io_uring.c:9507
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45deb9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x45de8f.
RSP: 002b:00007f174e51ac78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001a9
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008640 RCX: 000000000045deb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 00000000000050e5
RBP: 000000000118bf58 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118bf2c
R13: 00007ffed9ca723f R14: 00007f174e51b9c0 R15: 000000000118bf2c
INFO: task syz-executor.2:12399 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3-next-20201110-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
Currently we don't have a reproducer yet, but seems that there is a
race in current codes:
=> io_put_sq_data
ctx_list is empty now. |
==> kthread_park(sqd->thread); |
| T1: sq thread is parked now.
==> kthread_stop(sqd->thread); |
KTHREAD_SHOULD_STOP is set now.|
===> kthread_unpark(k); |
| T2: sq thread is now unparkd, run again.
|
| T3: sq thread is now preempted out.
|
===> wake_up_process(k); |
|
| T4: Since sqd ctx_list is empty, needs_sched will be true,
| then sq thread sets task state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE,
| and schedule, now sq thread will never be waken up.
===> wait_for_completion |
I have artificially used mdelay() to simulate above race, will get same
stack like this syzbot report, but to be honest, I'm not sure this code
race triggers syzbot report.
To fix this possible code race, when sq thread is unparked, need to check
whether sq thread has been stopped.
Reported-by: syzbot+03beeb595f074db9cfd1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8d1ddb5e79374fb277985a6b3faa2ed8631c5b4c upstream.
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive
read deadlock detection in lockdep:
[...] ========================================================
[...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
[...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
[...] --------------------------------------------------------
[...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock:
[...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200
[...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past:
[...] (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2}
[...]
[...]
[...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
[...]
[...]
[...] other info that might help us debug this:
[...] Chain exists of:
[...] &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
[...]
[...] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[...]
[...] CPU0 CPU1
[...] ---- ----
[...] lock(&f->f_owner.lock);
[...] local_irq_disable();
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...] lock(&new->fa_lock);
[...] <Interrupt>
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...]
[...] *** DEADLOCK ***
The corresponding deadlock case is as followed:
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2
read_lock(&fown->lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...)
write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock
read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release
// due to the fairness
<interrupted>
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock
The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
handler->event(): // evdev_event()
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock(&fown->lock);
To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use
read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore().
Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9200760da8a728eb9767ca41a956764b28c1310 upstream.
Check for valid block size directly by validating s_log_block_size; we
were doing this in two places. First, by calculating blocksize via
BLOCK_SIZE << s_log_block_size, and then checking that the blocksize
was valid. And then secondly, by checking s_log_block_size directly.
The first check is not reliable, and can trigger an UBSAN warning if
s_log_block_size on a maliciously corrupted superblock is greater than
22. This is harmless, since the second test will correctly reject the
maliciously fuzzed file system, but to make syzbot shut up, and
because the two checks are duplicative in any case, delete the
blocksize check, and move the s_log_block_size earlier in
ext4_fill_super().
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: syzbot+345b75652b1d24227443@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc889b8d4a8122549feabe99eead04e6b23b6513 upstream.
Make the printk() [bfs "printf" macro] seem less severe by changing
"WARNING:" to "NOTE:".
<asm-generic/bug.h> warns us about using WARNING or BUG in a format string
other than in WARN() or BUG() family macros. bfs/inode.c is doing just
that in a normal printk() call, so change the "WARNING" string to be
"NOTE".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203212634.17278-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Reported-by: syzbot+3fd34060f26e766536ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Tigran A. Aivazian" <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1ffc54220c444774b7f09e6d2121e732f8e19b94 upstream.
io_sqe_files_unregister() uninterruptibly waits for enqueued ref nodes,
however requests keeping them may never complete, e.g. because of some
userspace dependency. Make sure it's interruptible otherwise it would
hang forever.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1642b4450d20e31439c80c28256c8eee08684698 upstream.
Setting a new reference node to a file data is not trivial, don't repeat
it, add and use a helper.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac0648a56c1ff66c1cbf735075ad33a26cbc50de upstream.
io_file_data_ref_zero() can be invoked from soft-irq from the RCU core,
hence we need to ensure that the file_data lock is bottom half safe. Use
the _bh() variants when grabbing this lock.
Reported-by: syzbot+1f4ba1e5520762c523c6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77788775c7132a8d93c6930ab1bd84fc743c7cb7 upstream.
If we COW the identity, we assume that ->mm never changes. But this
isn't true of multiple processes end up sharing the ring. Hence treat
id->mm like like any other process compontent when it comes to the
identity mapping. This is pretty trivial, just moving the existing grab
into io_grab_identity(), and including a check for the match.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10
Fixes: 1e6fa5216a0e ("io_uring: COW io_identity on mismatch")
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
Tested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit cd3ed3c73ac671ff6b0230ccb72b8300292d3643 ]
Set rp_size to zero will be ignore during remounting.
The method to identify whether we input a remounting option of
rp_size is to check if the rp_size input is zero. It can not work
well if we pass "rp_size=0".
This patch add a bool variable "set_rp_size" to fix this problem.
Reported-by: Jubin Zhong <zhongjubin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit dfea9fce29fda6f2f91161677e0e0d9b671bc099 upstream.
The purpose of io_uring_cancel_files() is to wait for all requests
matching ->files to go/be cancelled. We should first drop files of a
request in io_req_drop_files() and only then make it undiscoverable for
io_uring_cancel_files.
First drop, then delete from list. It's ok to leave req->id->files
dangling, because it's not dereferenced by cancellation code, only
compared against. It would potentially go to sleep and be awaken by
following in io_req_drop_files() wake_up().
Fixes: 0f2122045b946 ("io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 398840f8bb935d33c64df4ec4fed77a7d24c267d upstream.
This was an oversight in the original implementation, as it makes no
sense to specify both scoping flags to the same openat2(2) invocation
(before this patch, the result of such an invocation was equivalent to
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT being ignored).
This is a userspace-visible ABI change, but the only user of openat2(2)
at the moment is LXC which doesn't specify both flags and so no
userspace programs will break as a result.
Fixes: fddb5d430ad9 ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027235044.5240-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c61b3e4839007668360ed8b87d7da96d2e59fc6c upstream.
Bounds checking tools can flag a bug in dbAdjTree() for an array index
out of bounds in dmt_stree. Since dmt_stree can refer to the stree in
both structures dmaptree and dmapctl, use the larger array to eliminate
the false positive.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fecc4559780d52d174ea05e3bf543669165389c3 upstream.
fsnotify_parent() used to send two separate events to backends when a
parent inode is watching children and the child inode is also watching.
In an attempt to avoid duplicate events in fanotify, we unified the two
backend callbacks to a single callback and handled the reporting of the
two separate events for the relevant backends (inotify and dnotify).
However the handling is buggy and can result in inotify and dnotify
listeners receiving events of the type they never asked for or spurious
events.
The problem is the unified event callback with two inode marks (parent and
child) is called when any of the parent and child inodes are watched and
interested in the event, but the parent inode's mark that is interested
in the event on the child is not necessarily the one we are currently
reporting to (it could belong to a different group).
So before reporting the parent or child event flavor to backend we need
to check that the mark is really interested in that event flavor.
The semantics of INODE and CHILD marks were hard to follow and made the
logic more complicated than it should have been. Replace it with INODE
and PARENT marks semantics to hopefully make the logic more clear.
Thanks to Hugh Dickins for spotting a bug in the earlier version of this
patch.
Fixes: 497b0c5a7c06 ("fsnotify: send event to parent and child with single callback")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202120713.702387-4-amir73il@gmail.com
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1a2620a99803ad660edc5d22fd9c66cce91ceb1c upstream.
Convert inotify to use the simple handle_inode_event() interface to
get rid of the code duplication between the generic helper
fsnotify_handle_event() and the inotify_handle_event() callback, which
also happen to be buggy code.
The bug will be fixed in the generic helper.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202120713.702387-3-amir73il@gmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9a1b9772509 ("fsnotify: create method handle_inode_event() in fsnotify_operations")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 950cc0d2bef078e1f6459900ca4d4b2a2e0e3c37 upstream.
The handle_inode_event() interface was added as (quoting comment):
"a simple variant of handle_event() for groups that only have inode
marks and don't have ignore mask".
In other words, all backends except fanotify. The inotify backend
also falls under this category, but because it required extra arguments
it was left out of the initial pass of backends conversion to the
simple interface.
This results in code duplication between the generic helper
fsnotify_handle_event() and the inotify_handle_event() callback
which also happen to be buggy code.
Generalize the handle_inode_event() arguments and add the check for
FS_EXCL_UNLINK flag to the generic helper, so inotify backend could
be converted to use the simple interface.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202120713.702387-2-amir73il@gmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9a1b9772509 ("fsnotify: create method handle_inode_event() in fsnotify_operations")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08cd274f9b8283a1da93e2ccab216a336da83525 upstream.
The jffs2 mount options will be ignored when remounting jffs2.
It can be easily reproduced with the steps listed below.
1. mount -t jffs2 -o compr=none /dev/mtdblockx /mnt
2. mount -o remount compr=zlib /mnt
Since ec10a24f10c8, the option parsing happens before fill_super and
then pass fc, which contains the options parsing results, to function
jffs2_reconfigure during remounting. But function jffs2_reconfigure do
not update c->mount_opts.
This patch add a function jffs2_update_mount_opts to fix this problem.
By the way, I notice that tmpfs use the same way to update remounting
options. If it is necessary to unify them?
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: ec10a24f10c8 ("vfs: Convert jffs2 to use the new mount API")
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9afc9a8a4909fece0e911e72b1060614ba2f7969 upstream.
The log of this problem is:
jffs2: Error garbage collecting node at 0x***!
jffs2: No space for garbage collection. Aborting GC thread
This is because GC believe that it do nothing, so it abort.
After going over the image of jffs2, I find a scene that
can trigger this problem stably.
The scene is: there is a normal dirent node at summary-area,
but abnormal at corresponding not-summary-area with error
name_crc.
The reason that GC exit abnormally is because it find that
abnormal dirent node to GC, but when it goes to function
jffs2_add_fd_to_list, it cannot meet the condition listed
below:
if ((*prev)->nhash == new->nhash && !strcmp((*prev)->name, new->name))
So no node is marked obsolete, statistical information of
erase_block do not change, which cause GC exit abnormally.
The root cause of this problem is: we do not check the
name_crc of the abnormal dirent node with summary is enabled.
Noticed that in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we use
function jffs2_scan_dirty_space to deal with the dirent
node with error name_crc. So this patch add a checking
code in function read_direntry to ensure the correctness
of dirent node. If checked failed, the dirent node will
be marked obsolete so GC will pass this node and this
problem will be fixed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 20f1431160c6b590cdc269a846fc5a448abf5b98 upstream.
Write buffers use a kmalloc()'ed buffer, they can leak
up to seven bytes of kernel memory to flash if writes are not
aligned.
So use ubifs_pad() to fill these gaps with padding bytes.
This was never a problem while scanning because the scanner logic
manually aligns node lengths and skips over these gaps.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac05a2 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7955f105afb6034af344038d663bc98809483cdd upstream.
In the negotiate protocol preauth context, the server is not required
to populate the salt (although it is done by most servers) so do
not warn on mount.
We retain the checks (warn) that the preauth context is the minimum
size and that the salt does not exceed DataLength of the SMB response.
Although we use the defaults in the case that the preauth context
response is invalid, these checks may be useful in the future
as servers add support for additional mechanisms.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc7c4129d4cdc56d1b5477c1714246f27df914dd upstream.
Azure does not send an SPNEGO blob in the negotiate protocol response,
so we shouldn't assume that it is there when validating the location
of the first negotiate context. This avoids the potential confusing
mount warning:
CIFS: Invalid negotiate context offset
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ebcd6de98754d9b6a5f89d7835864b1c365d432f upstream.
Mounts to Azure cause an unneeded warning message in dmesg
"CIFS: VFS: parse_server_interfaces: incomplete interface info"
Azure rounds up the size (by 8 additional bytes, to a
16 byte boundary) of the structure returned on the query
of the server interfaces at mount time. This is permissible
even though different than other servers so do not log a warning
if query network interfaces response is only rounded up by 8
bytes or fewer.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5cafce3ad0f8652d6849314d951459c2bff7233 upstream.
A NULL pointer dereference may occur in __ceph_remove_cap with some of the
callbacks used in ceph_iterate_session_caps, namely trim_caps_cb and
remove_session_caps_cb. Those callers hold the session->s_mutex, so they
are prevented from concurrent execution, but ceph_evict_inode does not.
Since the callers of this function hold the i_ceph_lock, the fix is simply
a matter of returning immediately if caps->ci is NULL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/43272
Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 89bdfaf93d9157499c3a0d61f489df66f2dead7f upstream.
ovl_ioctl_set_flags() does a capability check using flags, but then the
real ioctl double-fetches flags and uses potentially different value.
The "Check the capability before cred override" comment misleading: user
can skip this check by presenting benign flags first and then overwriting
them to non-benign flags.
Just remove the cred override for now, hoping this doesn't cause a
regression.
The proper solution is to create a new setxflags i_op (patches are in the
works).
Xfstests don't show a regression.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: dab5ca8fd9dd ("ovl: add lsattr/chattr support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b08070eca9e247f60ab39d79b2c25d274750441f upstream.
ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally
remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.
Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
