1813 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Juergen Gross
1424ab4bb3 x86/xen: Drop USERGS_SYSRET64 paravirt call
commit afd30525a659ac0ae0904f0cb4a2ca75522c3123 upstream.

USERGS_SYSRET64 is used to return from a syscall via SYSRET, but
a Xen PV guest will nevertheless use the IRET hypercall, as there
is no sysret PV hypercall defined.

So instead of testing all the prerequisites for doing a sysret and
then mangling the stack for Xen PV again for doing an iret just use
the iret exit from the beginning.

This can easily be done via an ALTERNATIVE like it is done for the
sysenter compat case already.

It should be noted that this drops the optimization in Xen for not
restoring a few registers when returning to user mode, but it seems
as if the saved instructions in the kernel more than compensate for
this drop (a kernel build in a Xen PV guest was slightly faster with
this patch applied).

While at it remove the stale sysret32 remnants.

  [ pawan: Brad Spengler and Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
	   reported a problem with the 5.10 backport commit edc702b4a820
	   ("x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition").

	   When CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL=y, CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is not executed in
	   syscall_return_via_sysret path as USERGS_SYSRET64 is runtime
	   patched to:

	.cpu_usergs_sysret64    = { 0x0f, 0x01, 0xf8,
				    0x48, 0x0f, 0x07 }, // swapgs; sysretq

	   which is missing CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS. It turns out dropping
	   USERGS_SYSRET64 simplifies the code, allowing CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
	   to be explicitly added to syscall_return_via_sysret path. Below
	   is with CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL=y and this patch applied:

	   syscall_return_via_sysret:
	   ...
	   <+342>:   swapgs
	   <+345>:   xchg   %ax,%ax
	   <+347>:   verw   -0x1a2(%rip)  <------
	   <+354>:   sysretq
  ]

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-6-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25 16:19:05 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski
f594871732 x86/stackprotector/32: Make the canary into a regular percpu variable
[ Upstream commit 3fb0fdb3bbe7aed495109b3296b06c2409734023 ]

On 32-bit kernels, the stackprotector canary is quite nasty -- it is
stored at %gs:(20), which is nasty because 32-bit kernels use %fs for
percpu storage.  It's even nastier because it means that whether %gs
contains userspace state or kernel state while running kernel code
depends on whether stackprotector is enabled (this is
CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS), and this setting radically changes the way
that segment selectors work.  Supporting both variants is a
maintenance and testing mess.

Merely rearranging so that percpu and the stack canary
share the same segment would be messy as the 32-bit percpu address
layout isn't currently compatible with putting a variable at a fixed
offset.

Fortunately, GCC 8.1 added options that allow the stack canary to be
accessed as %fs:__stack_chk_guard, effectively turning it into an ordinary
percpu variable.  This lets us get rid of all of the code to manage the
stack canary GDT descriptor and the CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS mess.

(That name is special.  We could use any symbol we want for the
 %fs-relative mode, but for CONFIG_SMP=n, gcc refuses to let us use any
 name other than __stack_chk_guard.)

Forcibly disable stackprotector on older compilers that don't support
the new options and turn the stack canary into a percpu variable. The
"lazy GS" approach is now used for all 32-bit configurations.

Also makes load_gs_index() work on 32-bit kernels. On 64-bit kernels,
it loads the GS selector and updates the user GSBASE accordingly. (This
is unchanged.) On 32-bit kernels, it loads the GS selector and updates
GSBASE, which is now always the user base. This means that the overall
effect is the same on 32-bit and 64-bit, which avoids some ifdeffery.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c0ff7dba14041c7e5d1cae5d4df052f03759bef3.1613243844.git.luto@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: e3f269ed0acc ("x86/pm: Work around false positive kmemleak report in msr_build_context()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-04-13 12:58:45 +02:00
Kunwu Chan
eb279074ba x86/xen: Add some null pointer checking to smp.c
[ Upstream commit 3693bb4465e6e32a204a5b86d3ec7e6b9f7e67c2 ]

kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.

Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202401161119.iof6BQsf-lkp@intel.com/
Suggested-by: Markus Elfring <Markus.Elfring@web.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119094948.275390-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-26 18:21:45 -04:00
Juergen Gross
583016037a x86/xen: Fix secondary processors' FPU initialization
commit fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e upstream.

Moving the call of fpu__init_cpu() from cpu_init() to start_secondary()
broke Xen PV guests, as those don't call start_secondary() for APs.

Call fpu__init_cpu() in Xen's cpu_bringup(), which is the Xen PV
replacement of start_secondary().

Fixes: b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703130032.22916-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-08 19:57:38 +02:00
Xiu Jianfeng
70e7f308d7 x86/xen: Fix memory leak in xen_init_lock_cpu()
[ Upstream commit ca84ce153d887b1dc8b118029976cc9faf2a9b40 ]

In xen_init_lock_cpu(), the @name has allocated new string by kasprintf(),
if bind_ipi_to_irqhandler() fails, it should be freed, otherwise may lead
to a memory leak issue, fix it.

Fixes: 2d9e1e2f58b5 ("xen: implement Xen-specific spinlocks")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123155858.11382-3-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14 10:15:21 +01:00
Xiu Jianfeng
fc134c355b x86/xen: Fix memory leak in xen_smp_intr_init{_pv}()
[ Upstream commit 69143f60868b3939ddc89289b29db593b647295e ]

These local variables @{resched|pmu|callfunc...}_name saves the new
string allocated by kasprintf(), and when bind_{v}ipi_to_irqhandler()
fails, it goes to the @fail tag, and calls xen_smp_intr_free{_pv}() to
free resource, however the new string is not saved, which cause a memory
leak issue. fix it.

Fixes: 9702785a747a ("i386: move xen")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123155858.11382-2-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14 10:15:21 +01:00
Kees Cook
1f730d4ae6 x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug
[ Upstream commit 3e1730842f142add55dc658929221521a9ea62b6 ]

Clang produces a false positive when building with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
and CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y when operating on an array with a dynamic
offset. Work around this by using a direct assignment of an empty
instance. Avoids this warning:

../include/linux/fortify-string.h:309:4: warning: call to __write_overflow_field declared with 'warn
ing' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Wat
tribute-warning]
                        __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
                        ^

which was isolated to the memset() call in xen_load_idt().

Note that this looks very much like another bug that was worked around:
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1592

Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/41527d69-e8ab-3f86-ff37-6b298c01d5bc@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-26 13:25:45 +02:00
Ben Hutchings
668cb1ddf0 x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk
The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed
into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation).  Change the initial
instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit
5b2fc51576ef "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR".

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:52 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
0d1a8a16e6 objtool: Add entry UNRET validation
commit a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e upstream.

Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the
retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET
instruction.

Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts
as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or
those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0.

This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is
intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked
entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END.

If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be
reported.

There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances:

 - UNTRAIN_RET itself
 - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET
 - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S no pt_regs return at .Lerror_entry_done_lfence]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/builtin-check.c no link option validation]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/check.c opts.ibt is ibt]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h leave unret option as bool, no struct opts]
[cascardo: objtool is still called from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh]
[cascardo: no IBT support]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[bwh: Backported to 5.10:
 - In scripts/link-vmlinux.sh, use "test -n" instead of is_enabled
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:45 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
f728eff263 x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points
commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream.

Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called
entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are
named consistently.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:44 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
28aa3fa0b2 objtool: Update Retpoline validation
commit 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f upstream.

Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of
not having bare naked RET instructions.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict fixup at arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:44 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
3c91e22576 x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculation
commit f94909ceb1ed4bfdb2ada72f93236305e6d6951f upstream.

Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making
RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without
RET defined.

  find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file
  do
	sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file
  done

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
[bwh: Backported to 5.10: ran the above command]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:28 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf
5f93d900b9 x86/xen: Support objtool vmlinux.o validation in xen-head.S
commit f4b4bc10b0b85ec66f1a9bf5dddf475e6695b6d2 upstream.

The Xen hypercall page is filled with zeros, causing objtool to fall
through all the empty hypercall functions until it reaches a real
function, resulting in a stack state mismatch.

The build-time contents of the hypercall page don't matter because the
page gets rewritten by the hypervisor.  Make it more palatable to
objtool by making each hypervisor function a true empty function, with
nops and a return.

Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0883bde1d7a1fb3b6a4c952bc0200e873752f609.1611263462.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:08 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf
b626e17c11 x86/xen: Support objtool validation in xen-asm.S
commit cde07a4e4434ddfb9b1616ac971edf6d66329804 upstream.

The OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD annotation is used to tell objtool to
ignore a file.  File-level ignores won't work when validating vmlinux.o.

Tweak the ELF metadata and unwind hints to allow objtool to follow the
code.

Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8b042a09c69e8645f3b133ef6653ba28f896807d.1611263462.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-25 11:26:08 +02:00
Dongli Zhang
a2a0e04f64 xen: delay xen_hvm_init_time_ops() if kdump is boot on vcpu>=32
[ Upstream commit eed05744322da07dd7e419432dcedf3c2e017179 ]

The sched_clock() can be used very early since commit 857baa87b642
("sched/clock: Enable sched clock early"). In addition, with commit
38669ba205d1 ("x86/xen/time: Output xen sched_clock time from 0"), kdump
kernel in Xen HVM guest may panic at very early stage when accessing
&__this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu)->time as in below:

setup_arch()
 -> init_hypervisor_platform()
     -> x86_init.hyper.init_platform = xen_hvm_guest_init()
         -> xen_hvm_init_time_ops()
             -> xen_clocksource_read()
                 -> src = &__this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu)->time;

This is because Xen HVM supports at most MAX_VIRT_CPUS=32 'vcpu_info'
embedded inside 'shared_info' during early stage until xen_vcpu_setup() is
used to allocate/relocate 'vcpu_info' for boot cpu at arbitrary address.

However, when Xen HVM guest panic on vcpu >= 32, since
xen_vcpu_info_reset(0) would set per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) = NULL when
vcpu >= 32, xen_clocksource_read() on vcpu >= 32 would panic.

This patch calls xen_hvm_init_time_ops() again later in
xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() after the 'vcpu_info' for boot vcpu is
registered when the boot vcpu is >= 32.

This issue can be reproduced on purpose via below command at the guest
side when kdump/kexec is enabled:

"taskset -c 33 echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger"

The bugfix for PVM is not implemented due to the lack of testing
environment.

[boris: xen_hvm_init_time_ops() returns on errors instead of jumping to end]

Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302164032.14569-3-dongli.zhang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-13 21:01:01 +02:00
Juergen Gross
e9445a7a59 xen: fix is_xen_pmu()
[ Upstream commit de2ae403b4c0e79a3410e63bc448542fbb9f9bfc ]

is_xen_pmu() is taking the cpu number as parameter, but it is not using
it. Instead it just tests whether the Xen PMU initialization on the
current cpu did succeed. As this test is done by checking a percpu
pointer, preemption needs to be disabled in order to avoid switching
the cpu while doing the test. While resuming from suspend() this seems
not to be the case:

[   88.082751] ACPI: PM: Low-level resume complete
[   88.087933] ACPI: EC: EC started
[   88.091464] ACPI: PM: Restoring platform NVS memory
[   88.097166] xen_acpi_processor: Uploading Xen processor PM info
[   88.103850] Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
[   88.108128] installing Xen timer for CPU 1
[   88.112763] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: systemd-sleep/7138
[   88.122256] caller is is_xen_pmu+0x12/0x30
[   88.126937] CPU: 0 PID: 7138 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G        W         5.16.13-2.fc32.qubes.x86_64 #1
[   88.137939] Hardware name: Star Labs StarBook/StarBook, BIOS 7.97 03/21/2022
[   88.145930] Call Trace:
[   88.148757]  <TASK>
[   88.151193]  dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
[   88.155381]  check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
[   88.160641]  is_xen_pmu+0x12/0x30
[   88.164441]  xen_smp_intr_init_pv+0x75/0x100

Fix that by replacing is_xen_pmu() by a simple boolean variable which
reflects the Xen PMU initialization state on cpu 0.

Modify xen_pmu_init() to return early in case it is being called for a
cpu other than cpu 0 and the boolean variable not being set.

Fixes: bf6dfb154d93 ("xen/PMU: PMU emulation code")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220325142002.31789-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-08 14:40:29 +02:00
Jan Beulich
3c958dbcba x86/Xen: streamline (and fix) PV CPU enumeration
[ Upstream commit e25a8d959992f61b64a58fc62fb7951dc6f31d1f ]

This started out with me noticing that "dom0_max_vcpus=<N>" with <N>
larger than the number of physical CPUs reported through ACPI tables
would not bring up the "excess" vCPU-s. Addressing this is the primary
purpose of the change; CPU maps handling is being tidied only as far as
is necessary for the change here (with the effect of also avoiding the
setting up of too much per-CPU infrastructure, i.e. for CPUs which can
never come online).

Noticing that xen_fill_possible_map() is called way too early, whereas
xen_filter_cpu_maps() is called too late (after per-CPU areas were
already set up), and further observing that each of the functions serves
only one of Dom0 or DomU, it looked like it was better to simplify this.
Use the .get_smp_config hook instead, uniformly for Dom0 and DomU.
xen_fill_possible_map() can be dropped altogether, while
xen_filter_cpu_maps() is re-purposed but not otherwise changed.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2dbd5f0a-9859-ca2d-085e-a02f7166c610@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-02-23 12:01:00 +01:00
Juergen Gross
4bbbc9c4f3 x86/pv: Switch SWAPGS to ALTERNATIVE
[ Upstream commit 53c9d9240944088274aadbbbafc6138ca462db4f ]

SWAPGS is used only for interrupts coming from user mode or for
returning to user mode. So there is no reason to use the PARAVIRT
framework, as it can easily be replaced by an ALTERNATIVE depending
on X86_FEATURE_XENPV.

There are several instances using the PV-aware SWAPGS macro in paths
which are never executed in a Xen PV guest. Replace those with the
plain swapgs instruction. For SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK the same applies.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120135555.32594-5-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-12-08 09:03:27 +01:00
Lai Jiangshan
2015ffa3a4 x86/xen: Add xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
[ Upstream commit 5c8f6a2e316efebb3ba93d8c1af258155dcf5632 ]

In the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the
trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so
PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack.

In that case, source and destination stacks are identical, which means
that reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv
would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the
IRET frame below %rsp.

This is dangerous as it can be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of
these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber
data on the (original) stack.

And, with  XEN pv, swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing
the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone
when there is any future attempt to modify the code.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-12-08 09:03:27 +01:00
Jan Beulich
101e1bcb11 xen/x86: prevent PVH type from getting clobbered
[ Upstream commit 9172b5c4a778da1f855b2e3780b1afabb3cfd523 ]

Like xen_start_flags, xen_domain_type gets set before .bss gets cleared.
Hence this variable also needs to be prevented from getting put in .bss,
which is possible because XEN_NATIVE is an enumerator evaluating to
zero. Any use prior to init_hvm_pv_info() setting the variable again
would lead to wrong decisions; one such case is xenboot_console_setup()
when called as a result of "earlyprintk=xen".

Use __ro_after_init as more applicable than either __section(".data") or
__read_mostly.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d301677b-6f22-5ae6-bd36-458e1f323d0b@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-27 09:56:46 +02:00
Jan Beulich
f792828491 xen/x86: fix PV trap handling on secondary processors
commit 0594c58161b6e0f3da8efa9c6e3d4ba52b652717 upstream.

The initial observation was that in PV mode under Xen 32-bit user space
didn't work anymore. Attempts of system calls ended in #GP(0x402). All
of the sudden the vector 0x80 handler was not in place anymore. As it
turns out up to 5.13 redundant initialization did occur: Once from
cpu_initialize_context() (through its VCPUOP_initialise hypercall) and a
2nd time while each CPU was brought fully up. This 2nd initialization is
now gone, uncovering that the 1st one was flawed: Unlike for the
set_trap_table hypercall, a full virtual IDT needs to be specified here;
the "vector" fields of the individual entries are of no interest. With
many (kernel) IDT entries still(?) (i.e. at that point at least) empty,
the syscall vector 0x80 ended up in slot 0x20 of the virtual IDT, thus
becoming the domain's handler for vector 0x20.

Make xen_convert_trap_info() fit for either purpose, leveraging the fact
that on the xen_copy_trap_info() path the table starts out zero-filled.
This includes moving out the writing of the sentinel, which would also
have lead to a buffer overrun in the xen_copy_trap_info() case if all
(kernel) IDT entries were populated. Convert the writing of the sentinel
to clearing of the entire table entry rather than just the address
field.

(I didn't bother trying to identify the commit which uncovered the issue
in 5.14; the commit named below is the one which actually introduced the
bad code.)

Fixes: f87e4cac4f4e ("xen: SMP guest support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7a266932-092e-b68f-f2bb-1473b61adc6e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-30 10:10:59 +02:00
Juergen Gross
1a5a3ba21a xen: reset legacy rtc flag for PV domU
commit f68aa100d815b5b4467fd1c3abbe3b99d65fd028 upstream.

A Xen PV guest doesn't have a legacy RTC device, so reset the legacy
RTC flag. Otherwise the following WARN splat will occur at boot:

[    1.333404] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c:25 mc146818_get_time+0x1be/0x210
[    1.333404] Modules linked in:
[    1.333404] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-rc7-default+ #282
[    1.333404] RIP: e030:mc146818_get_time+0x1be/0x210
[    1.333404] Code: c0 64 01 c5 83 fd 45 89 6b 14 7f 06 83 c5 64 89 6b 14 41 83 ec 01 b8 02 00 00 00 44 89 63 10 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 30 0e ef 82 4c 89 e6 e8 71 2a 24 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff
[    1.333404] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040093df8 EFLAGS: 00010002
[    1.333404] RAX: 00000000000000ff RBX: ffffc90040093e34 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    1.333404] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000d
[    1.333404] RBP: ffffffff82ef0e30 R08: ffff888005013e60 R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.333404] R10: ffffffff82373e9b R11: 0000000000033080 R12: 0000000000000200
[    1.333404] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffffffff82cdc6d4
[    1.333404] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807d440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.333404] CS:  10000e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.333404] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000260a000 CR4: 0000000000050660
[    1.333404] Call Trace:
[    1.333404]  ? wakeup_sources_sysfs_init+0x30/0x30
[    1.333404]  ? rdinit_setup+0x2b/0x2b
[    1.333404]  early_resume_init+0x23/0xa4
[    1.333404]  ? cn_proc_init+0x36/0x36
[    1.333404]  do_one_initcall+0x3e/0x200
[    1.333404]  kernel_init_freeable+0x232/0x28e
[    1.333404]  ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
[    1.333404]  kernel_init+0x16/0x120
[    1.333404]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 8d152e7a5c7537 ("x86/rtc: Replace paravirt rtc check with platform legacy quirk")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210903084937.19392-3-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 12:27:54 +02:00
Juergen Gross
907944851a xen: fix setting of max_pfn in shared_info
commit 4b511d5bfa74b1926daefd1694205c7f1bcf677f upstream.

Xen PV guests are specifying the highest used PFN via the max_pfn
field in shared_info. This value is used by the Xen tools when saving
or migrating the guest.

Unfortunately this field is misnamed, as in reality it is specifying
the number of pages (including any memory holes) of the guest, so it
is the highest used PFN + 1. Renaming isn't possible, as this is a
public Xen hypervisor interface which needs to be kept stable.

The kernel will set the value correctly initially at boot time, but
when adding more pages (e.g. due to memory hotplug or ballooning) a
real PFN number is stored in max_pfn. This is done when expanding the
p2m array, and the PFN stored there is even possibly wrong, as it
should be the last possible PFN of the just added P2M frame, and not
one which led to the P2M expansion.

Fix that by setting shared_info->max_pfn to the last possible PFN + 1.

Fixes: 98dd166ea3a3c3 ("x86/xen/p2m: hint at the last populated P2M entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210730092622.9973-2-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-18 13:40:06 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
59aa5c91f8 x86/xen: Fix noinstr fail in exc_xen_unknown_trap()
[ Upstream commit 4c9c26f1e67648f41f28f8c997c5c9467a3dbbe4 ]

Fix:

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_xen_unknown_trap()+0x7: call to printk() leaves .noinstr.text section

Fixes: 2e92493637a0 ("x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210621120120.606560778@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-30 08:47:18 -04:00
Jan Beulich
e2c26ddd4e x86/Xen: swap NX determination and GDT setup on BSP
commit ae897fda4f507e4b239f0bdfd578b3688ca96fb4 upstream.

xen_setup_gdt(), via xen_load_gdt_boot(), wants to adjust page tables.
For this to work when NX is not available, x86_configure_nx() needs to
be called first.

[jgross] Note that this is a revert of 36104cb9012a82e73 ("x86/xen:
Delay get_cpu_cap until stack canary is established"), which is possible
now that we no longer support running as PV guest in 32-bit mode.

Cc: <stable.vger.kernel.org> # 5.9
Fixes: 36104cb9012a82e73 ("x86/xen: Delay get_cpu_cap until stack canary is established")
Reported-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/12a866b0-9e89-59f7-ebeb-a2a6cec0987a@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2021-05-26 12:06:57 +02:00
Roger Pau Monne
451ba16cc5 Revert "xen: fix p2m size in dom0 for disabled memory hotplug case"
commit af44a387e743ab7aa39d3fb5e29c0a973cf91bdc upstream.

This partially reverts commit 882213990d32 ("xen: fix p2m size in dom0
for disabled memory hotplug case")

There's no need to special case XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC anymore in order
to correctly size the p2m. The generic memory hotplug option has
already been tied together with the Xen hotplug limit, so enabling
memory hotplug should already trigger a properly sized p2m on Xen PV.

Note that XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC depends on ZONE_DEVICE which pulls in
MEMORY_HOTPLUG.

Leave the check added to __set_phys_to_machine and the adjusted
comment about EXTRA_MEM_RATIO.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210324122424.58685-3-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[boris: fixed formatting issues]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2021-03-30 14:32:08 +02:00
Roger Pau Monne
b740e58324 xen/x86: make XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_LIMIT depend on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
[ Upstream commit 2b514ec72706a31bea0c3b97e622b81535b5323a ]

The Xen memory hotplug limit should depend on the memory hotplug
generic option, rather than the Xen balloon configuration. It's
possible to have a kernel with generic memory hotplug enabled, but
without Xen balloon enabled, at which point memory hotplug won't work
correctly due to the size limitation of the p2m.

Rename the option to XEN_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_LIMIT since it's no longer
tied to ballooning.

Fixes: 9e2369c06c8a18 ("xen: add helpers to allocate unpopulated memory")
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210324122424.58685-2-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-30 14:32:04 +02:00
Juergen Gross
9c62adb6e2 xen: fix p2m size in dom0 for disabled memory hotplug case
commit 882213990d32fd224340a4533f6318dd152be4b2 upstream.

Since commit 9e2369c06c8a18 ("xen: add helpers to allocate unpopulated
memory") foreign mappings are using guest physical addresses allocated
via ZONE_DEVICE functionality.

This will result in problems for the case of no balloon memory hotplug
being configured, as the p2m list will only cover the initial memory
size of the domain. Any ZONE_DEVICE allocated address will be outside
the p2m range and thus a mapping can't be established with that memory
address.

Fix that by extending the p2m size for that case. At the same time add
a check for a to be created mapping to be within the p2m limits in
order to detect errors early.

While changing a comment, remove some 32-bit leftovers.

This is XSA-369.

Fixes: 9e2369c06c8a18 ("xen: add helpers to allocate unpopulated memory")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-07 12:34:15 +01:00
Jan Beulich
545c837d67 Xen/gnttab: handle p2m update errors on a per-slot basis
commit 8310b77b48c5558c140e7a57a702e7819e62f04e upstream.

Bailing immediately from set_foreign_p2m_mapping() upon a p2m updating
error leaves the full batch in an ambiguous state as far as the caller
is concerned. Instead flags respective slots as bad, unmapping what
was mapped there right away.

HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op()'s return value and the individual unmap
slots' status fields get used only for a one-time - there's not much we
can do in case of a failure.

Note that there's no GNTST_enomem or alike, so GNTST_general_error gets
used.

The map ops' handle fields get overwritten just to be on the safe side.

This is part of XSA-367.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96cccf5d-e756-5f53-b91a-ea269bfb9be0@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-07 12:34:15 +01:00
Jan Beulich
0c08037b56 Xen/x86: also check kernel mapping in set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
commit b512e1b077e5ccdbd6e225b15d934ab12453b70a upstream.

We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying
attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough.

Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-23 15:53:24 +01:00
Jan Beulich
740f4d9d0c Xen/x86: don't bail early from clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()
commit a35f2ef3b7376bfd0a57f7844bd7454389aae1fc upstream.

Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its
only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case
of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order
for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation
should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It
is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it
would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings
succeeded.

Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state
related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-23 15:53:24 +01:00
Juergen Gross
b444b86e37 x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
commit 2e92493637a09547734f92c62a2471f6f0cb9a2c upstream.

When booting a kernel which has been built with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
enabled as a Xen pv guest a warning is issued for each processor:

[    5.964347] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    5.968314] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:660 get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90
[    5.972321] Modules linked in:
[    5.976313] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W         5.11.0-rc5-default #75
[    5.980313] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9020/0PC5F7, BIOS A05 12/05/2013
[    5.984313] RIP: e030:get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90
[    5.988313] Code: 42 10 83 f0 01 85 f6 74 04 84 c0 75 1d b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 3d 00 80 83 82 72 08 48 3d 20 81 83 82 72 0c b8 01 00 00 00 eb db <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 2d 00 80 83 82 48 ba 72 1c c7 71 1c c7 71 1c 48
[    5.992313] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040033d38 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    5.996313] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff82a141d0 RCX: ffffffff8222ec38
[    6.000312] RDX: ffffffff8222ec38 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffc90040033d40
[    6.004313] RBP: ffff8881003984a0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: ffff888100398000
[    6.008312] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffc90040246000 R12: ffff8884082182a8
[    6.012313] R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000001d R15: ffff8881003982d0
[    6.016316] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888408200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    6.020313] CS:  e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    6.024313] CR2: ffffc900020ef000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 0000000000050660
[    6.028314] Call Trace:
[    6.032313]  cvt_gate_to_trap.part.7+0x3f/0x90
[    6.036313]  ? asm_exc_double_fault+0x30/0x30
[    6.040313]  xen_convert_trap_info+0x87/0xd0
[    6.044313]  xen_pv_cpu_up+0x17a/0x450
[    6.048313]  bringup_cpu+0x2b/0xc0
[    6.052313]  ? cpus_read_trylock+0x50/0x50
[    6.056313]  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x80/0x4c0
[    6.060313]  _cpu_up+0xa7/0x140
[    6.064313]  cpu_up+0x98/0xd0
[    6.068313]  bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60
[    6.072313]  smp_init+0x26/0x79
[    6.076313]  kernel_init_freeable+0x103/0x258
[    6.080313]  ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
[    6.084313]  kernel_init+0xa/0x110
[    6.088313]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[    6.092313] ---[ end trace be9ecf17dceeb4f3 ]---

Reason is that there is no Xen pv trap entry for X86_TRAP_VC.

Fix that by adding a generic trap handler for unknown traps and wire all
unknown bare metal handlers to this generic handler, which will just
crash the system in case such a trap will ever happen.

Fixes: 0786138c78e793 ("x86/sev-es: Add a Runtime #VC Exception Handler")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-03 23:28:38 +01:00
Randy Dunlap
8478091a1b x86/xen: fix 'nopvspin' build error
[ Upstream commit bd9dcef67ffcae2de49e319fba349df76472fd10 ]

Fix build error in x86/xen/ when PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS is not enabled.

Fixes this build error:

../arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c: In function ‘xen_hvm_smp_init’:
../arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c:77:3: error: ‘nopvspin’ undeclared (first use in this function)
   nopvspin = true;

Fixes: 3d7746bea925 ("x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210115191123.27572-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-01-27 11:55:04 +01:00
David Woodhouse
99e301aca6 x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available
[ Upstream commit 3d7746bea92530e8695258a3cf3ddec7a135edd6 ]

Only the IPI-related functions in the smp_ops should be conditional
on the vector callback being available. The rest should still happen:

 • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu()

   This function does two things, both of which should still happen if
   there is no vector callback support.

   The call to xen_vcpu_setup() for vCPU0 should still happen as it just
   sets up the vcpu_info for CPU0. That does happen for the secondary
   vCPUs too, from xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm().

   The second thing it does is call xen_init_spinlocks(), which perhaps
   counter-intuitively should *also* still be happening in the case
   without vector callbacks, so that it can clear its local xen_pvspin
   flag and disable the virt_spin_lock_key accordingly.

   Checking xen_have_vector_callback in xen_init_spinlocks() itself
   would affect PV guests, so set the global nopvspin flag in
   xen_hvm_smp_init() instead, when vector callbacks aren't available.

 • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus()

   This does some IPI-related setup by calling xen_smp_intr_init() and
   xen_init_lock_cpu(), which can be made conditional. And it sets the
   xen_vcpu_id to XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID for all possible CPUS, which does
   need to happen.

 • xen_smp_cpus_done()

   This offlines any vCPUs which doesn't fit in the global shared_info
   page, if separate vcpu_info placement isn't available. That part also
   needs to happen regardless of vector callback support.

 • xen_hvm_cpu_die()

   This doesn't actually do anything other than commin_cpu_die() right
   right now in the !vector_callback case; all three teardown functions
   it calls should be no-ops. But to guard against future regressions
   it's useful to call it anyway, and for it to explicitly check for
   xen_have_vector_callback before calling those additional functions.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-6-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-01-27 11:55:01 +01:00
David Woodhouse
a8fddd4192 x86/xen: Add xen_no_vector_callback option to test PCI INTX delivery
[ Upstream commit b36b0fe96af13460278bf9b173beced1bd15f85d ]

It's useful to be able to test non-vector event channel delivery, to make
sure Linux will work properly on older Xen which doesn't have it.

It's also useful for those working on Xen and Xen-compatible hypervisors,
because there are guest kernels still in active use which use PCI INTX
even when vector delivery is available.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-4-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-01-27 11:55:01 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
4ccf7a01e8 xen: branch for v5.10-rc5
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Merge tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

Pull xen fix from Juergen Gross:
 "A single fix for avoiding WARN splats when booting a Xen guest with
  nosmt"

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  x86/xen: don't unbind uninitialized lock_kicker_irq
2020-11-20 10:30:48 -08:00
Brian Masney
65cae18882 x86/xen: don't unbind uninitialized lock_kicker_irq
When booting a hyperthreaded system with the kernel parameter
'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the following warning occurs:

    WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:1112 unbind_from_irqhandler+0x4e/0x60
    ...
    Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 08/24/2006
    ...
    Call Trace:
     xen_uninit_lock_cpu+0x28/0x62
     xen_hvm_cpu_die+0x21/0x30
     takedown_cpu+0x9c/0xe0
     ? trace_suspend_resume+0x60/0x60
     cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9a/0x530
     _cpu_up+0x11a/0x130
     cpu_up+0x7e/0xc0
     bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x48/0x50
     smp_init+0x26/0x79
     kernel_init_freeable+0xea/0x229
     ? rest_init+0xaa/0xaa
     kernel_init+0xa/0x106
     ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The secondary CPUs are not activated with the nosmt mitigations and only
the primary thread on each CPU core is used. In this situation,
xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus(), and more importantly xen_init_lock_cpu(), is
not called, so the lock_kicker_irq is not initialized for the secondary
CPUs. Let's fix this by exiting early in xen_uninit_lock_cpu() if the
irq is not set to avoid the warning from above for each secondary CPU.

Signed-off-by: Brian Masney <bmasney@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201107011119.631442-1-bmasney@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2020-11-09 07:43:45 -06:00
Joe Perches
33def8498f treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")
Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.

Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.

Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.

Conversion done using the script at:

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@gooogle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-25 14:51:49 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
bd6aabc7ca xen: branch for v5.10-rc1c
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Merge tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1c-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

Pull more xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - a series for the Xen pv block drivers adding module parameters for
   better control of resource usge

 - a cleanup series for the Xen event driver

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1c-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  Documentation: add xen.fifo_events kernel parameter description
  xen/events: unmask a fifo event channel only if it was masked
  xen/events: only register debug interrupt for 2-level events
  xen/events: make struct irq_info private to events_base.c
  xen: remove no longer used functions
  xen-blkfront: Apply changed parameter name to the document
  xen-blkfront: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants
  xen-blkback: add a parameter for disabling of persistent grants
2020-10-25 10:55:35 -07:00
Juergen Gross
d04b1ae5a9 xen/events: only register debug interrupt for 2-level events
xen_debug_interrupt() is specific to 2-level event handling. So don't
register it with fifo event handling being active.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022094907.28560-4-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2020-10-23 05:41:25 -05:00
Christoph Hellwig
5dd63bf1d0 x86/xen: open code alloc_vm_area in arch_gnttab_valloc
Replace the last call to alloc_vm_area with an open coded version using an
iterator in struct gnttab_vm_area instead of the triple indirection magic
in alloc_vm_area.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002122204.1534411-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-18 09:27:10 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
5a32c3413d dma-mapping updates for 5.10
- rework the non-coherent DMA allocator
  - move private definitions out of <linux/dma-mapping.h>
  - lower CMA_ALIGNMENT (Paul Cercueil)
  - remove the omap1 dma address translation in favor of the common
    code
  - make dma-direct aware of multiple dma offset ranges (Jim Quinlan)
  - support per-node DMA CMA areas (Barry Song)
  - increase the default seg boundary limit (Nicolin Chen)
  - misc fixes (Robin Murphy, Thomas Tai, Xu Wang)
  - various cleanups
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Merge tag 'dma-mapping-5.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping

Pull dma-mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:

 - rework the non-coherent DMA allocator

 - move private definitions out of <linux/dma-mapping.h>

 - lower CMA_ALIGNMENT (Paul Cercueil)

 - remove the omap1 dma address translation in favor of the common code

 - make dma-direct aware of multiple dma offset ranges (Jim Quinlan)

 - support per-node DMA CMA areas (Barry Song)

 - increase the default seg boundary limit (Nicolin Chen)

 - misc fixes (Robin Murphy, Thomas Tai, Xu Wang)

 - various cleanups

* tag 'dma-mapping-5.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: (63 commits)
  ARM/ixp4xx: add a missing include of dma-map-ops.h
  dma-direct: simplify the DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING handling
  dma-direct: factor out a dma_direct_alloc_from_pool helper
  dma-direct check for highmem pages in dma_direct_alloc_pages
  dma-mapping: merge <linux/dma-noncoherent.h> into <linux/dma-map-ops.h>
  dma-mapping: move large parts of <linux/dma-direct.h> to kernel/dma
  dma-mapping: move dma-debug.h to kernel/dma/
  dma-mapping: remove <asm/dma-contiguous.h>
  dma-mapping: merge <linux/dma-contiguous.h> into <linux/dma-map-ops.h>
  dma-contiguous: remove dma_contiguous_set_default
  dma-contiguous: remove dev_set_cma_area
  dma-contiguous: remove dma_declare_contiguous
  dma-mapping: split <linux/dma-mapping.h>
  cma: decrease CMA_ALIGNMENT lower limit to 2
  firewire-ohci: use dma_alloc_pages
  dma-iommu: implement ->alloc_noncoherent
  dma-mapping: add new {alloc,free}_noncoherent dma_map_ops methods
  dma-mapping: add a new dma_alloc_pages API
  dma-mapping: remove dma_cache_sync
  53c700: convert to dma_alloc_noncoherent
  ...
2020-10-15 14:43:29 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a09b1d7850 xen: branch for v5.10-rc1
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Merge tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - two small cleanup patches

 - avoid error messages when initializing MCA banks in a Xen dom0

 - a small series for converting the Xen gntdev driver to use
   pin_user_pages*() instead of get_user_pages*()

 - intermediate fix for running as a Xen guest on Arm with KPTI enabled
   (the final solution will need new Xen functionality)

* tag 'for-linus-5.10b-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  x86/xen: Fix typo in xen_pagetable_p2m_free()
  x86/xen: disable Firmware First mode for correctable memory errors
  xen/arm: do not setup the runstate info page if kpti is enabled
  xen: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
  xen/gntdev.c: Convert get_user_pages*() to pin_user_pages*()
  xen/gntdev.c: Mark pages as dirty
2020-10-14 10:34:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6873139ed0 objtool changes for v5.10:
- Most of the changes are cleanups and reorganization to make the objtool code
    more arch-agnostic. This is in preparation for non-x86 support.
 
 Fixes:
 
  - KASAN fixes.
  - Handle unreachable trap after call to noreturn functions better.
  - Ignore unreachable fake jumps.
  - Misc smaller fixes & cleanups.
 
 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'objtool-core-2020-10-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull objtool updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Most of the changes are cleanups and reorganization to make the
  objtool code more arch-agnostic. This is in preparation for non-x86
  support.

  Other changes:

   - KASAN fixes

   - Handle unreachable trap after call to noreturn functions better

   - Ignore unreachable fake jumps

   - Misc smaller fixes & cleanups"

* tag 'objtool-core-2020-10-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
  perf build: Allow nested externs to enable BUILD_BUG() usage
  objtool: Allow nested externs to enable BUILD_BUG()
  objtool: Permit __kasan_check_{read,write} under UACCESS
  objtool: Ignore unreachable trap after call to noreturn functions
  objtool: Handle calling non-function symbols in other sections
  objtool: Ignore unreachable fake jumps
  objtool: Remove useless tests before save_reg()
  objtool: Decode unwind hint register depending on architecture
  objtool: Make unwind hint definitions available to other architectures
  objtool: Only include valid definitions depending on source file type
  objtool: Rename frame.h -> objtool.h
  objtool: Refactor jump table code to support other architectures
  objtool: Make relocation in alternative handling arch dependent
  objtool: Abstract alternative special case handling
  objtool: Move macros describing structures to arch-dependent code
  objtool: Make sync-check consider the target architecture
  objtool: Group headers to check in a single list
  objtool: Define 'struct orc_entry' only when needed
  objtool: Skip ORC entry creation for non-text sections
  objtool: Move ORC logic out of check()
  ...
2020-10-14 10:13:37 -07:00
Dan Williams
2dd57d3415 x86/numa: cleanup configuration dependent command-line options
Patch series "device-dax: Support sub-dividing soft-reserved ranges", v5.

The device-dax facility allows an address range to be directly mapped
through a chardev, or optionally hotplugged to the core kernel page
allocator as System-RAM.  It is the mechanism for converting persistent
memory (pmem) to be used as another volatile memory pool i.e.  the current
Memory Tiering hot topic on linux-mm.

In the case of pmem the nvdimm-namespace-label mechanism can sub-divide
it, but that labeling mechanism is not available / applicable to
soft-reserved ("EFI specific purpose") memory [3].  This series provides a
sysfs-mechanism for the daxctl utility to enable provisioning of
volatile-soft-reserved memory ranges.

The motivations for this facility are:

1/ Allow performance differentiated memory ranges to be split between
   kernel-managed and directly-accessed use cases.

2/ Allow physical memory to be provisioned along performance relevant
   address boundaries. For example, divide a memory-side cache [4] along
   cache-color boundaries.

3/ Parcel out soft-reserved memory to VMs using device-dax as a security
   / permissions boundary [5]. Specifically I have seen people (ab)using
   memmap=nn!ss (mark System-RAM as Persistent Memory) just to get the
   device-dax interface on custom address ranges. A follow-on for the VM
   use case is to teach device-dax to dynamically allocate 'struct page' at
   runtime to reduce the duplication of 'struct page' space in both the
   guest and the host kernel for the same physical pages.

[2]: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200713160837.13774-11-joao.m.martins@oracle.com
[3]: http://lore.kernel.org/r/157309097008.1579826.12818463304589384434.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[4]: http://lore.kernel.org/r/154899811738.3165233.12325692939590944259.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[5]: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110190313.17144-1-joao.m.martins@oracle.com

This patch (of 23):

In preparation for adding a new numa= option clean up the existing ones to
avoid ifdefs in numa_setup(), and provide feedback when the option is
numa=fake= option is invalid due to kernel config.  The same does not need
to be done for numa=noacpi, since the capability is already hard disabled
at compile-time.

Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brice Goglin <Brice.Goglin@inria.fr>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Cc: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160106109960.30709.7379926726669669398.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159643094279.4062302.17779410714418721328.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159643094925.4062302.14979872973043772305.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-13 18:38:27 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig
0a0f0d8be7 dma-mapping: split <linux/dma-mapping.h>
Split out all the bits that are purely for dma_map_ops implementations
and related code into a new <linux/dma-map-ops.h> header so that they
don't get pulled into all the drivers.  That also means the architecture
specific <asm/dma-mapping.h> is not pulled in by <linux/dma-mapping.h>
any more, which leads to a missing includes that were pulled in by the
x86 or arm versions in a few not overly portable drivers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-10-06 07:07:03 +02:00
Hui Su
32118f97f4 x86/xen: Fix typo in xen_pagetable_p2m_free()
Fix typo in xen_pagetable_p2m_free(): s/Fortunatly/Fortunately

Signed-off-by: Hui Su <sh_def@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200927172836.GA7423@rlk

[boris: reword commit message slightly]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2020-10-04 18:41:34 -05:00
Juergen Gross
d759af3857 x86/xen: disable Firmware First mode for correctable memory errors
When running as Xen dom0 the kernel isn't responsible for selecting the
error handling mode, this should be handled by the hypervisor.

So disable setting FF mode when running as Xen pv guest. Not doing so
might result in boot splats like:

[    7.509696] HEST: Enabling Firmware First mode for corrected errors.
[    7.510382] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 2.
[    7.510383] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 3.
[    7.510384] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 4.
[    7.510384] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 5.
[    7.510385] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 6.
[    7.510386] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 7.
[    7.510386] mce: [Firmware Bug]: Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank 8.

Reason is that the HEST ACPI table contains the real number of MCA
banks, while the hypervisor is emulating only 2 banks for guests.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200925140751.31381-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2020-10-04 18:41:34 -05:00
Julien Thierry
00089c048e objtool: Rename frame.h -> objtool.h
Header frame.h is getting more code annotations to help objtool analyze
object files.

Rename the file to objtool.h.

[ jpoimboe: add objtool.h to MAINTAINERS ]

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <jthierry@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2020-09-10 10:43:13 -05:00
Juergen Gross
e1ac3e66d3 x86/paravirt: Remove set_pte_at() pv-op
On x86 set_pte_at() is now always falling back to set_pte(). So instead
of having this fallback after the paravirt maze just drop the
set_pte_at paravirt operation and let set_pte_at() use the set_pte()
function directly.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200815100641.26362-6-jgross@suse.com
2020-08-15 13:52:12 +02:00